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ABSTRACT
This dissertation surveys sociological approaches to morality. First, I distinguish the 
‘strong programs’ of Marx and Durkheim, which subordinate morality’s form and content 
to social scientific conceptual analysis, from Max Weber’s ‘weak program,’ which 
attempts to preserve the independence of moral action from domination by expert social 
science. Siding with—while critiquing—Weber’s weak program, I turn to three more 
recent academic disputes, each of which proposes a concept as a potential candidate for 
resolving the ongoing dilemma of sociology’s relationship to morality. These concepts 
are character, anxiety, and practice. I discuss each of them in the contexts of particular 
academic disputes: 1) the situation vs. character dispute in moral philosophy and social 
psychology; 2) the status anxiety vs. moral concern dispute carried on between studies in 
moral regulation and communitarianism in the 1980s and 90s; 3) the contrasting views of 
practice developed by Pierre Bourdieu and Alasdair MacIntyre. Each concept is 
subjected, in these disputes, to a kind of crucible, and each, in some way, fails the test. In 
each failure I suggest a remainder, a kind of ‘residual category’—in Parsons’ sense but 
without his scientistic judgement. With a nod to Bakhtin, but without binding myself to 
‘dialogics,’ I have called that remainder ‘answerability,’ and give a variety of definitions 
that differ/defer from any operationalized concept. Taking my basic theme from Adorno’s 
critique of identity thinking, I argue that answerability constitutes a minimal criterion that 
can performatively structure a ‘weak’ program in the sociology of morality, applying 
symmetrically to the sociological vocation and the question of morality. Definitional 
deferrals indicate, in addition to the influence of Adorno—but also Derrida, and Butler’s 
notion of the subject’s failed but necessary accounting for oneself—that the sociology of 
morality exceeds the Habermasian model of ongoing conversation. Answerability refers 
to more than criticizable validity claims. It points to avenues of experience, expression, 
and reflexivity that may not find their way into ‘rational discourse.’ It points, with Gillian 
Rose, to political action in the gap between law and morality, is and ought.
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INTRODUCTION: RETURN OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALITY
The centrality of morality to the sociological agenda is not debatable and remains 
remarkably strong. (Lamont 2010:vi)
A. THE RETURN OF THE MORAL?
How central is morality to sociology? Contrary to the claim made by Harvard cultural 
sociologist Michèle Lamont, in her brief introduction to the Handbook of the Sociology 
of Morality (Hitlin and Vaisey 2010), the question is eminently debatable. One need look 
no further than the collection of articles that she introduces to find evidence of morality’s 
uneven and rather perplexing relationship with sociology. As Steven Lukes puts it in his 
contribution to the Handbook, “What is clear is that what ‘morality’ denotes is subject to 
endless contestation” (2010:550; see also Lukes 2008). Indeed, the centrality of morality 
to the sociological agenda has often been debated and its meaning and salience have been 
persistent, but also persistently ambiguous. To begin with, are we talking about the word 
(morality), or about some sort of stable (or unstable) referent behind the word? Should 
we favour ‘ethics’ over ‘morality’ (and individual autonomy over conformity to group 
norms)? Shall we equate morality with the ‘normative,’ or with ‘cultural values,’ or 
something else? Are sociologists interested (or disinterested) in the term ‘morality,’ or the 
‘thing in itself?’ And in that case, is morality a kind of Durkheimian ‘thing’ (i.e., a ‘social 
fact’), a social product whose substantiality is unproblematic but difficult to represent, 
and that we may approach in a variety of ways—a variety celebrated in a conventional 
manner by Lamont—or does the “broad umbrella” (Lamont 2010:vii) provided by the 
editors shelter deeper underlying divisions in what we understand by ‘morality?’
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It gets worse, for we must also ask whether morality—as form? As substance? As 
relation?—needs to be applied to or embodied by sociology itself (e.g., as ‘ethical’ 
research methods) (cf. Bourdieu 1990a:177). Can we prevent this from becoming a ‘bad 
infinity’ (cf. Rose 2009:227). Can we separate ‘descriptive’ from ‘normative’ sociologies 
of morality? With respect to morality are sociologists poised to offer expert scientific 
analysis? Or should we concern ourselves with the motes in our own eyes, the amoral or 
immoral quality of our own practices, or perhaps our un/justifiable ‘moralistic’ 
contributions to ‘governmentality’ (Dean 1999) or to ‘regulating the poor’ (Piven and 
Cloward 1971)? What is more, in Judith Shklar’s terms (1984), does this mean ‘putting 
cruelty first?’ Or should we be, along with Nietzsche, ‘putting hypocrisy first?’ Which, if 
either, constitutes a more important “epistemic value” (Putnam 2002:31) for sociologists, 
whether ‘liberal,’ like Shklar, or ‘radical,’ like Nietzsche?
The subtitle of Lamont’s introduction, “The Return of the Moral,” belies her own 
suggestion that sociological attention to morality has “remained” strong, suggesting, 
instead, that it has had, perhaps, a tidal quality, ebbing and flowing with the decades. 
According to an alternate metaphor, the sociology of morality may have gone on an ill-
advised journey, returning now like a prodigal.1 If I have resisted Lamont’s remark about 
debatability, I have no impulse to quibble with the notion of a return. Sociologists do 
seem to be returning to something they call morality. In fact, Hitlin and Vaisey’s 
1  The ‘Prodigal Son’ parable (Luke 15:11–32) provides a paradigmatic narration of the distinction between 
conventional (legalistic) morality (the elder brother’s) and the ‘true’ morality (as metanoia, 
conversion/return) of the humble prodigal. Is the sociological return of morality also its metanoia? Turning 
and returning remain relevant throughout the dissertation, which deals with a number of ‘turns’ (e.g., 
linguistic; practice; affective). See also, on turning, Sara Ahmed’s essay ‘Feminist Killjoys’ (2010:50–87).
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collection, which contains 30 chapters by 43 different authors, appears to constitute a 
kind of morality renaissance all by itself. This dissertation, which concerns itself with 
sociological attempts to understand morality, is doubtless part of the same social current, 
or has imbibed from the same punchbowl of collective consciousness. It was conceived 
and composed independently of the Hitlin and Vaisey collection even though it intersects 
with some of the work that appears there. A few descriptive remarks are in order, since 
the Handbook provides some sense of the conscience collective, which includes both 
sociology (e.g., Bargheer 2011; Black 2011; Hodgkiss 2013; Morgan 2013; Tavory 2011) 
and anthropology (e.g., Howell 1997; Robbins 2004; Rydstrøm 2003; Zigon 2009), from 
which the dissertation arose.
What does this renascent sociology of morality look like? The Hitlin and Vaisey 
collection includes articles by aging scholars (e.g., Raymond Boudon, Steven Lukes, 
Edward Tiryakian), authors in mid-career, recent recipients of the PhD, and some 
students still in graduate school. They look to be mostly men and mostly Americans.
The Handbook’s thirty chapters fall under four headings: 1) What is morality? 2) 
Where does it come from? 3) How does it work? and 4) Future directions. This language 
helps to present the sociology of morality as a straightforward empirical project, but these 
headings succeed only marginally in sorting the collection. In some ways the reader 
encounters a motley assembly, representing a variety of sociological traditions and 
approaches. In other ways, it is a remarkably homogeneous American soup, equal parts 
small ‘p’ pragmatism, functionalist Durkheimianism, and rational choice theory.
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Durkheim is the most-referred-to author (his name appears 120 times), with 
Weber coming a somewhat distant second (76 references in the 610 page volume). Marx, 
Simmel, and Parsons receive relatively equal coverage (33, 32 and 35 respectively), but 
most of the Parsons and Simmel references appear in Donald Levine’s chapter, while 9 
separate chapters refer to Marx, but none take his work as the guiding perspective or the 
central focus. Raymond Boudon and Andrew Sayer give significant attention to Adam 
Smith and The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Boudon linking him to Weber and Sayer 
connecting him to Pierre Bourdieu. The collection contains only three (passing) 
references to Freud and just six to Nietzsche. American pragmatists Cooley, Dewey, and 
Mead receive relatively little mention (4, 7, and 12 references, respectively). Amongst 
more recent sociologists, Alexander, Boltanski, Bourdieu, Garfinkel, Giddens, Goffman, 
Habermas, Lamont, Christian Smith, Swidler, and Wuthnow all receive some attention.
Leaving aside the word ‘morality,’ references to ‘emotion’ led all other indexed 
topics, followed—in roughly this order—by values, work, culture (or cultural), tradition, 
right, actors, status, community, commitment, meaning, and status. References to 
community occur about three times more than references to capitalism (Andrew Sayer’s 
extended discussion of Bourdieu creates a closer ratio between ‘community’ and 
‘capital’). ‘Culture,’ however, more than doubles ‘community’ in popularity (168 
appearances as compared to 77).2 Given the ‘warm’ connotations of ‘community’ and 
‘culture,’ and the ‘cold’ connotations of ‘capitalism,’ and the ‘economy,’ morality 
2  All of these numbers have been derived, in the main, by perusing the index and counting (with the aid of 
the index finger). There may be some minor errors, but my basic counting skills are quite good.
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appears, then, to be implicitly associated with warmth—whether as in ‘warm and fuzzy’ 
or as in ‘that makes my blood boil.’ This also tacitly links morality to emotion, which is 
similarly caught up in a set of heat connotations, as Hochschild makes clear in her rather 
Goldilocks usage of warm/cool metaphors in her article “The Culture of Politics: 
Traditional, Postmodern, Cold-modern, and Warm-modern Ideals of Care” (1995). What 
kind of assumptions have already been made when we treat morality as a ‘warm’ object? 
To what extent does this limit analysis to a game of hot and cold that culminates, as much 
contemporary moral philosophy does, in an appeal to moral intuitions?
The chapters tend to be Durkheim-inflected (whether or not they advocate ‘value 
freedom’). They tend to emphasize the importance of emotions, especially the 
intertwining of emotions with rationality. Suffering and pain, however, receive little 
attention, remaining in the background even in Tiryakian’s chapter “The (Im)morality of 
War” (2010:73–93), which focuses on interaction processes related to overcoming 
prohibitions of killing, often involving narratives of sacrifice and the sacred. Morality is 
linked more closely to culture (whatever that is) than to economy (whatever that is). Its 
relationship with evolution is not emphasized—only Jonathan Turner’s chapter 
(2010:125–145) tackles evolution directly—although emotion could easily serve as a link 
between them. That it does not suggests that ‘emotion’ might actually be serving as an 
inoculation against the ‘reductionism’ of evolutionary perspectives.
Radical political critique (another evasive species) makes few appearances, if any, 
and the same goes for the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ whether of Freudian, Nietzschean, 
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or Marxian varieties. There are few hints that morality might be an ideological 
obfuscation of more powerful underlying motives, whether social or asocial, economic or 
instinctual, though many chapters emphasize the importance of emotions to morality. 
There is also a dearth of critical reflection on the motives of the authors themselves.
B. REVIVING THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORALITY
Handbook editors Hitlin and Vaisey argue that sociologists have neglected morality for 
decades (2010:3). While fields such as psychology, neuroscience, law, and philosophy, 
have been busy studying morality, sociology has been slower to reengage with this 
fundamental topic and risks missing its moment. Hitlin and Vaisey blame disciplinary 
fragmentation, long-term disagreements about how to define morality, and the backlash 
against the Parsonsian ‘values and norms’ approach to culture (cf. Levine 2010:57). 
Interdisciplinary engagement has been hampered, in turn, by suspicions about the 
reductionism of biological, psychological, and philosophical approaches that define or 
experimentally construct social situations so narrowly that they lack “ecological validity” 
(Hitlin and Vaisey 2010:10; Lamont 2010:v; Firat and McPherson 2010:362). Hitlin and 
Vaisey enjoin sociologists to work past these obstacles and vigorously engage with other 
approaches or forfeit the chance to contribute to increasingly public debates about the 
nature and direction of morality. In their words, “More than anything, we simply need to 
roll up our sleeves and engage with our colleagues from other fields, challenging, 
confirming, and complementing their models as warranted by research not yet 
conducted” (2010:11–12; see also Hitlin and Vaisey 2013).
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The closing chapter of the Handbook, “What’s New and What’s Old about the 
New Sociology of Morality?” (Abend 2010:561–584), provides a focused discussion of 
the contemporary scene. Like Hitlin and Vaisey, Gabriel Abend emphasizes aggressive 
interdisciplinary engagement in order to ensure further progress in developing and 
institutionalizing a reinvigorated sociology of morality. Abend, one of the vanguard in the 
current generation of US-based sociologists of morality, argues that, more than a century 
after the initial surge in scholarly interest, sociology of morality is finally coming into its 
own. Abend’s opening summary includes the standard references:
There were many earlier calls for a sociology of morality. For example, in 
1970 Maria Ossowska made a “plea for a sociology of morality” 
(1970:27–29). In 1973 Steven Lukes lamented that “the sociology of 
morality is the great void in contemporary social science” (1973:432). In 
1991 Craig Calhoun lamented that “[f]or the most part, sociologists have 
not carried forward Durkheim’s task of creating a sociology of morality” 
(1991:232). But we had to wait until the beginning of the twenty-first 
century for a self-aware intellectual social movement to emerge (see 
Frickel and Gross 2005). Today no eyebrows are raised when “sociology 
of morality” is used as an attributive noun—e.g., someone may teach a 
sociology-of-morality class or write a sociology-of-morality paper. 
Naturally, institutionalization lags a bit behind, but some small steps have 
already been taken. (562)
With this quasi-biblical frame in place, according to which an exilic period characterized 
by yearning and lamentation finally gives way to a period of progress on a journey, a 
narrative that appears to endorse this institutionalizing development, Abend turns to 
“three old issues” for the sociology of morality:
(a) whether morality can and should be scientifically investigated and how 
this scientific investigation might differ from academic moral philosophy, 
popular moralizing, and normative arguments in general; (b) whether and 
how morals vary across time and place; and (c) whether and how social 
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factors can causally explain these variations. (563) 
Classical sociologists thought that they should investigate morality and that this research 
would lead to practical recommendations, but the “current orthodoxy”—and here Abend 
includes “most of the contributors to this Handbook”—confines sociology to description 
and explanation, ruling out value judgments and recommendations (566). Abend argues 
that this position is dated and oversimplified. Sociologists need to reengage with moral 
philosophy, which is now “much more sophisticated” (572) and suggests that there is no 
simple alternative of opting in or out of value-neutrality. For example, Hilary Putnam’s 
critique of the fact/value dichotomy suggests that we cannot make airtight distinctions 
between objective facts and subjective value statements. Facts and values are intertwined, 
and science presupposes “epistemic values” (Putnam 2002:4) such as coherence and 
simplicity. We have grown less certain about our capacity for “pure” objectivity and less 
certain that values lack truth content just because they are grounded in subjective 
judgements or preferences (cf. Davydova and Sharrock 2003).
On the question of cultural and societal diversity in morals, Abend reiterates the 
importance of developments in moral philosophy. He suggests that sociologies of 
morality, old and new, usually begin by acknowledging moral variation and then attempt 
to describe and explain this variation. This involves addressing the attendant question of 
‘metaethical skepticism’: Does moral variation entail moral relativism? Abend describes 
classical sociological approaches (e.g., Harriet Martineau; Lucien Lévy-Bruhl) to moral 
variation as “multifaceted and thus difficult to pigeonhole” (2010:568). Much 
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contemporary sociology of morality, by contrast, too easily posits metaethical skepticism 
(i.e., moral variation disproves a universal moral sense or set of principles).3 Abend’s own 
position on moral truth is pragmatically agnostic (Abend 2008): sociologists should 
exclude claims about moral truth rather than assume a skeptical position (2010:574).
Whether we take a skeptical or an agnostic position, if the fact of moral variation 
bars traditional claims concerning the innateness or universality of morality, the problem 
of explanation or causation remains. Classical 19th century sociology of morality 
(exemplified by Martineau and Lévy-Bruhl, again) made mechanistic or deterministic 
claims about the relationship between environmental factors (as independent variables), 
and morality (as a dependent variable). For Martineau, morals develop out of 
‘circumstances’ and ‘influences,’ including class, gender, occupation, population density, 
and so forth (Abend 2010:571). According to Abend, 21st century sociologists of morality 
also tend, like their classical counterparts, to treat morality as a dependent variable and to 
hunt for the underlying causes of particular moral phenomena, but they “tend to make 
probabilistic rather than deterministic causal arguments” (571).
Interestingly, Abend says nothing about treating morality as an independent 
variable, as Jeffrey Alexander and the ‘strong program’ (Alexander and Smith 2003) do 
with respect to culture. His general historical picture depicts a move away from 
normative ethics and towards value-neutrality, away from moral absolutism and towards 
metaethical skepticism, and finally, while still treating morality as a dependent variable, 
3  Chernilo’s recent book (2013), by contrast, traces the persistence of universalistic ‘natural law’ theory in 
modern social thought.
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explanations have moved away from determinism and towards probabilism.
According to Abend, metaethical developments such as Putnam’s discussion of 
the fact/value distinction have consequences for how one does the sociology of morality. 
If it turns out that ‘moral truths’ cannot be ruled unscientific on the basis of being 
‘subjective,’ it may also turn out, as Putnam argues, that beyond Weber’s 
acknowledgement that research begins with an evaluative claim (i.e., that the research is 
worth doing, or ‘value relevant’), it is also impossible to develop truly value-neutral 
descriptions, whether of morality or of something else (Putnam 2002:63). As already 
mentioned, Abend draws the agnostic conclusion that the sociology of morality should 
not use ‘moral truths’ in its explanations because we cannot be sure that they exist. 
However, it is not so easy to bracket moral or evaluative convictions, even in our 
‘scientific’ descriptions. Could we have a completely impartial and non-judgmental 
sociological discussion of the Holocaust? Would it be an empirically adequate 
sociological analysis? Abend chooses not to take a side, because his point in referring to 
fact/value debates in moral philosophy is not to endorse normative sociology (that would 
assume certain ‘moral truths’ to be self-evident and obligatory for sociology) but to argue 
that the problems posed there should not be avoided:
...the problems of moral truth...can’t be quickly dismissed with a wave of 
the hand. While ultimately philosophical, they may have important 
sociological implications. Perhaps the sociologist who wishes to attain a 
complete explanation and full understanding of moral views, practices, 
and institutions can’t reasonably bracket and ignore their content and/or 
their worth. (Abend 2010:575)
This “Perhaps” reasserts Abend’s agnostic position on moral truth, while also asserting 
10
his commitment to the epistemic values of “complete explanation” and “full 
understanding” by suggesting that sociologists ought to keep up with developments in 
moral philosophy. For Abend, agnosticism drives research, rather than limiting it. 
Sociology is not philosophy, and the question of moral truth is “ultimately philosophical.” 
The relative autonomy of their discipline allows sociologists to ignore developments in 
moral philosophy, but this contradicts their disciplinary commitments. The sociologist is 
one who “wishes to attain a complete explanation and full understanding” (575). As 
Weber put it with regard to both ethical or scientific commitment, “it is not a cab, which 
one can have stopped at one’s pleasure; it is all or nothing...if trivialities are not to result” 
(1958a:119).
Abend then turns to a second new challenge, the one posed by current 
developments in moral neuroscience. These threaten, Abend suggests, “to make the 
sociology of morality irrelevant” (2010:576). If contemporary moral philosophy 
challenges the sociology of morality by complicating issues of impartiality and 
objectivity (but perhaps without directly threatening institutional resources or public 
prestige) the rapid development of moral neuroscience looks to be marginalizing 
sociology from the opposite direction, that of ‘hard’ empirical science, and with evident 
significance for the power and influence of sociological pronouncements on morality:
...if the journals Science and Nature are a reliable indicator of what we 
think of as our best, most important, state-of-the-art scientific knowledge, 
then the current experts on morality are neuroscientists, psychologists, 
biologists, and primatologists. Surely not the sociologists of morality. 
(576)
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It is an odd statement. A general survey of the usual articles published in Science or 
Nature delivers a picture in which sociologists do not function as experts on much of 
anything, so it is not clear how these journals could be used as bellwethers on this 
particular issue. What Science and Nature tell us is something about where sociology in 
general fits in prestige and influence in relation to other ‘scientific’ disciplines. Be that as 
it may, a serious question ‘going forward’ may be who commands more public prestige 
and institutional resources in the form of research grants, university chairs, media 
attention, and policy influence. Here Abend correctly, I think, points to moral 
neuroscience as a significant competitor for public resources, attention, and respect. He 
engages in question-begging, however, with respect to the notion that sociologists of 
morality should aspire to the role of social expertise, his supposed agnosticism––which 
would play a different role in sociology, presumably, than the cautions suggested by 
Bernard Williams with regard to moral philosophy (1985)—notwithstanding.
Assuming that we want to struggle for scientific status and public respect, Abend 
offers several responses: 1) We may suggest that sociological fluency in social variables 
like education, religion, and socioeconomic status, provides an advantage over moral 
neuroscientists in predicting moral judgments and behaviour; 2) Sociologists may argue 
that some moral phenomena are group-level emergent phenomena (e.g., societal levels of 
blood and organ donation) that cannot be explained at the individual level; 3) As already 
mentioned, we may argue, along the lines of Hilary Putnam, that the study of morality 
cannot involve a hard and fast dichotomy between description and evaluation of morality 
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“because the description has the evaluation built into it” (Abend 2010:579). Here we can 
use contemporary moral philosophy to criticize contemporary moral neuroscience. Since 
moral neuroscience tends to deal with abstract, rigidly categorical, or ‘thin’ moral 
concepts, it provides only a partial picture of morality, leaving out many ‘thick’ moral 
concepts (such as cruelty). This gets at what Hitlin and Vaisey called ‘ecological validity.’
Abend is not trying to refute moral neuroscience or contemporary moral 
philosophy, but sociologists of morality need to take these fields into account, whether 
this accounting results in integration or in contestation. Like Hitlin and Vaisey, Abend 
recommends a pragmatic approach. Sociologists of morality need to be energetic, strong, 
and assertive. They need to recognize and to understand their competitors in other 
academic disciplines while forging ahead with aggressive research programs and projects 
of institutionalization. At the same time, they need to recognize the newly emerging 
complexities attending moral discourses and scientific practices.
Whether in spite of or because of his agnosticism, Abend sees contemporary 
American sociology of morality as confronting a variety of tasks. Caught between 
philosophy and neuroscience, which bring sociology into question from opposite angles, 
work is the salve for epistemic uncertainty. Abend offers the same advice as Hitlin and 
Vaisey: let us roll up our sleeves and set to work. Is it surprising that Max Weber offered 
the same advice in his ‘Science as a Vocation’ lecture? Is it surprising that work is offered 
as the way out of an aporia? Should we suspect that this is still the ‘Spirit of Capitalism’ 
operating, with its compulsive attempt to substitute ‘productivity’ (apparently carried out 
13
under conditions of peaceful competition) and value for moral reflection and action? 
These productivist solutions beg the question, as the conceptual ‘work’ of Frankfurt 
School critical theory has tried to explore (cf. Adorno 2001:137; Benjamin 1968:258–
259), with concepts like ‘repressive desublimation’ (Marcuse 1964). For a more recent 
critique of productivism, see Kathi Weeks’ The Problem of Work (2011).4
Abend’s pragmatically agnostic program in the sociology of morality fits with the 
generally moderate ambit of the Handbook, which tends to (liberally) endorse moral 
‘diversity’ while acknowledging moral diversity’s attendant ambiguities and offering 
qualified assertions about universal (cross-cultural) moral fundamentals (e.g., Rawls 
2010:95–121). The collection thrusts the reader toward further work in the sociology of 
morality while disregarding the possibility that sociology itself (as an historically and 
socially institutionalized set of practices; as part of a ‘discursive formation,’ in Foucault’s 
sense) may be fundamentally brought into question by morality. What kind of work are 
we talking about? What relations of production underly this work? What forms of 
governance (of self and others)? What processes of commodification or 
instrumentalization? What (perhaps ‘forced’) division of labour? These are questions, as 
we will see, that were addressed by classical sociologists. Why not here?
Abend addresses metaethical skepticism (skepticism about universal moral 
truths), but his recommendation of pragmatic agnosticism skirts the question of 
skepticism about the vocation of sociology. His conclusion tacitly echoes the position
—“We shall set to work and meet the ‘demands of the day’”—articulated almost a 
4  In Against Love Laura Kipnis pungently registers her position: “Fuck work” (2003:109).
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century ago in Max Weber’s ‘Science as a Vocation’ lecture (1958a:156), but Abend 
leaves out Weber’s most troubling insight: agnosticism about moral truth entails 
agnosticism about the moral value of doing sociology. Abend and other contributors to 
the Handbook do not address this problem, which calls for deeper reflexivity (or perhaps 
resistance to reflexivity), as metaethics (or metacritique). Instead, Abend attempts to limit 
the problem by maintaining a distinction between philosophical and sociological 
questions5 and between disciplinary recommendations and personal vocational questions. 
This results in an overall vulnerability to the accusation of petitio principii with respect to 
the basic relationship between morality and sociology. His most recent work continues in 
this direction, rightly criticizing the imperialism of evolutionary psychology, but 
remaining rather too sanguine in endorsing a happy family of ‘multi-methods’ (Abend 
2013), as if being a busy jack-of-all-sociological-trades solves the vocational dilemma.
Suppressing the dialectic between the sociological vocation and the sociology of 
morality entails suppressing basic puzzles of subjectivity, puzzles whose lineage we 
typically trace to Augustine’s confession: “I had become to myself a vast problem” 
(1998:IV.9). This puzzle of subjectivity with respect to understanding sociology of 
morality as a vocation is more than a question of quietistic navel-gazing. It is a concrete 
problem of making sense of and acting from within one’s situation in the social world, 
with its attendant peculiarities, tensions, challenges, and contradictions (cf. Smith 1987).
Maintaining a distinction between the spheres of sociology and philosophy can 
5  Adorno suggests, from the other direction, that sociology infiltrates philosophy: “You may observe in 
this context that the usual distinction between social science and pure philosophy cannot be sustained 
because social categories enter into the very fibre of those of moral philosophy” (Adorno 2001:138).
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amount to an implicit endorsement of the socially prevailing division of labour, a division 
of labour which can be questioned, even if it cannot be easily escaped (Adorno 
1991:198). The fact that the Hitlin and Vaisey collection appears in Springer’s quickly 
expanding Handbook series provides the most obvious and ironic signal, here (and 
potentially self-consciously so, except that the question is never raised). The ‘handbook’ 
framework recruits associations to straightforward instruction-manuals, tempting a 
(perhaps Heideggerian) discussion of the morality of the (in/visible) hand (cf. Levinas 
1989) and a querying of the craft ethos implicitly claimed for the book and its authors (cf. 
Sennett 2008), which, as I shall argue in the chapter on practice, evades broader critical 
reflection (cf. Bourdieu 1988; 2008a) on the social division and reproduction of academic 
labour. There were at least 15 other ‘Handbooks’ available in the series at the time this 
one was published, and Springer Science+Business Media is the second largest academic 
publisher in the world, after Elsevier. In short, these Handbooks are caught up in a 
massive system of knowledge commodification.
Abend, like the Handbook as a whole, shirks the ambiguities associated with 
current neo-liberalizing and corporatizing processes within the university and, 
consequently, any problems associated with embracing aggressive lines of sociological 
research aimed at garnering a larger share of an increasingly commodified and 
industrialized knowledge economy (cf. Newson 2012; Thornton 2012). This reinforces 
the impression that we are dealing with a basically uncritical text that demands an 
unquestioned faith in the value of (commodified) intellectual production as an end in 
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itself. Ultimately, this kind of academic productivism begs the vocational question, and 
Abend’s lack of critical reflexivity on this question belies his deferral to the 
‘sophistication’ of contemporary moral philosophy. As a counterweight to this placidity 
about sociology’s right (Recht) to study morality, we turn now to Zygmunt Bauman’s 
strident critical review of standard sociological approaches to morality.
C. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN’S AMBIVALENT PRE-SOCIETAL MORALITY
It is not an accident that Zygmunt Bauman’s withering critique of ‘orthodox sociology of 
morality’ (2000a [1989]), appears only fleetingly in the Handbook. Gabriel Ignatow 
dismisses Bauman in a few pages (2010:415–417). Bauman then appears briefly in 
Abend’s chapter (2010:567, 574) in references linked to Abend’s earlier programmatic 
piece, “Two Main Problems in the Sociology of Morality.” There Abend oddly 
assimilates Bauman to a ‘Durkheimian’ approach to morality (2008:89) while annexing 
Bauman’s ‘orthodox sociology of morality’ phrase and applying it to ‘value-free’ 
sociology of morality (which Abend dubs the ‘Weberian Paradigm’). Thus, Abend doubly 
misleads, for Bauman’s ‘orthodox sociology of morality’ (Bauman 2000a) refers 
(somewhat unfairly) to ‘Durksonian’ (Bauman 1976) approaches that assimilate morality 
to socially prevailing legal norms (Bauman 1990a:12). Instead of recognizing that 
Bauman discards Durkheimian (and Parsonsian) sociology of morality in favour of a 
Levinasian ethical a priori, Abend equates Durkheim’s relativist notion of moral validity 
with Bauman’s universalist claims about ethical subjectivity (Bauman 1990a:34).
Abend’s attempt to bracket the severity of the problems of agnosticism for the 
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sociology of morality can be linked to his misrepresentation and/or misunderstanding of 
Zygmunt Bauman’s attempt at a wholesale critique of the ‘orthodox sociology of 
morality.’ While Abend characterizes the orthodox position as advocating the neutral 
objectivity of a ‘value-free’ approach, Bauman sees the elements of sociological 
orthodoxy rather differently. According to Bauman, the standard sociological view 
assumes that individuals require society as a moralizing force because of their innate 
moral depravity. In addition, the standard view places scientists in a legislative/expert 
role (i.e., society needs us because individuals lack capacities of moral self-regulation). 
According to Bauman, morality is innate, society should be seen as primarily 
constraining or manipulating (rather than enabling) our innate moral impulses, and social 
scientists should be interpreters, not experts or legislators (Bauman 1987; 1990a).
Abend’s and Bauman’s very different interpretive approaches to the Holocaust 
illustrate the gap between them. Abend uses the Holocaust to test the possibility of 
scientific value-neutrality, and concludes that if we wish for a complete explanation, 
perhaps we will not be able to treat the Holocaust in a value-neutral fashion (i.e., since 
‘thick descriptions’ of moral or immoral qualities will tend towards an indictment of Nazi 
society). Bauman, by contrast, wants to question the notion of relative moral-validity 
(i.e., Durkheim’s thesis that each society has a morality that is appropriate to it). For 
Bauman the question is not that of ‘thick’ or ‘thin’ moral concepts or even of ‘ecological 
validity.’ Neither is it a question of an alternative between value-free and normative 
sociology. The issue, for Bauman, is whether it is immorality rather than morality that is a 
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measurable social substance (i.e., a ‘social fact’ in Durkheim’s sense).6 According to 
Bauman, while immorality has peculiar societal forms, morality has universal pre-societal 
sources in basic human sociality, which constitute a priori conditions of possibility for 
society: the sociology of immorality help explain how, in Nazi Germany, human morality 
was constrained and neutralized by emergent and then institutionalized social practices.
Bauman goes much further than Abend’s suggestion that sociologists should pay 
attention to contemporary moral philosophy. He follows Emmanuel Levinas in arguing 
that morality should be treated as ‘first philosophy’ (Levinas 1979:43), as prior to 
socialization, as necessarily distinguished from institutionalized social forms, and as 
riven with equivocation and ambivalence (Bauman 1990b; Junge 2008). This is not the 
same as approaching morality agnostically (and thus that sociological analysis of Nazism 
and the Holocaust should not presuppose that moral truths may be found there). Levinas 
begins Totality and Infinity by claiming that “Everyone will readily agree that it is of the 
highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality” (1979:21). We cannot 
proceed agnostically. We begin by getting our metaethics in order. Morality should be 
approached with Kierkegaardian fear and trembling, for morality does have a truth: 
absolute responsibility in the face of the ethical demand of the Other (cf. Løgstrup 1997).
Abend is more sanguine. On his reading, sociology does not need to base itself on 
moral philosophical premises. We should consult moral philosophy, but if it does not 
supply us with a consensus on morality, that is okay. He suggests, on the one hand, that 
“most...empirical research on morality is based on hopelessly bankrupt 
6  Chapter 2 argues that this is one way of reading Marx’s position on morality.
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epistemological/methodological foundations” (2008:88) and that sociologists should 
better acquaint themselves with recent “advances” in moral philosophy, but then suggests 
that “given the fundamental disagreements that persist in the philosophical literature, any 
authoritative verdict about their worth would be questionable” (90). The tension, here, 
bordering on contradiction, is surely a common experience for those who engage in 
interdisciplinary exploration. The difficulty of adjudicating between competing 
authorities in a field in which one has not received a primary formation can weaken the 
conviction that interdisciplinary conversation can be effective. If no authoritative verdict 
is available, can Abend be sure that moral philosophy has advanced or that sociologists 
should consult it?7 What is more, this claim of progress constitutes his own authoritative 
verdict. But was that really the Owl of Minerva that you saw flying at dusk, or just bats?
Bauman, in contrast to Abend, aligns himself with a particular moral philosophy, 
and assumes the validity of the claims it makes about moral truth. In a move with more in 
common with Weber than with Durkheim, however, Bauman sees this moral truth as 
lacking in legislative force. That is, Levinasian moral philosophy asserts the existence of 
a primordial moral sociality in the form of a categorical imperative, a formal duty whose 
content must be supplied by each individual. Concrete ethical decisions cannot have their 
legitimacy supplied by expert or collective authority. Bauman does not present morality 
as a contest between fundamentally opposed values, as Weber does—as the ‘ethic of 
absolute ends’ vs. the ‘ethic of responsibility’ (1958a)—but his characterization of 
7  These were the stakes of the debate between Luhmann and Habermas about the autonomy (what systems 
theory refers to as autopoiesis) of different fields of discourse. Neither Abend’s article nor any of the other 
articles in the Handbook deal in any detail with this balkanization problem.
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morality as fundamentally ambivalent has affinities with Weber’s emphasis on decision.
Abend’s pragmatic agnosticism allows one to continue with disciplinary activity 
while lacking certainty about the (true) worth of one’s work. But this is a real aporia. 
Why should we begin working on such a shaky foundation? It requires great faith in the 
broader meaningfulness of pragmatic work procedures. While Abend correctly points out 
the importance of engaging with philosophical and moral neuroscientific approaches to 
morality, he underplays the extent to which this derives from the permeability, underlying 
instability, and perpetual questionability of disciplinary practices as such (cf. Halberstam 
2011). Similarly, while he provides an engaging review of some questions typically 
addressed by sociologists of morality, this pragmatic ‘style’ appears unserious insofar as 
it treats moral questions as reducible to the question of objective moral knowledge, not 
also as questions constitutive of (sociological) subjectivities.8
Levinas, by contrast, (and following him, Bauman) demotes the epistemological 
question, posed in the Cartesian and Kantian tradition (i.e., of beginning with 
skepticism), by making the ethical question into the fundamental transcendental 
condition, and subordinating the true (both epistemology and ontology) to the good: “Not 
‘Why being rather than nothing?’, but how being justifies itself” (Levinas 1989:86). 
However, while the aporetical notion of ethics as absolute responsibility for the other 
may sideline the epistemological problem of moral knowledge or the ontological question 
of being, it may actually block the sociology of morality, or reduce it to disciplinary self-
8  A question for all forms of pragmatism (as types of functionalism), whether Abend’s or other recent 
formulations (e.g., Morgan 2013): pragmatic for whom? If the answer is ‘everyone,’ we are necessarily 
pushed back into foundational questions (e.g., like universal categorical imperatives).
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critique, or to a sociology of immorality, as in Bauman’s reading (2000a [1989]; 1993; 
1994; 1995). On this view, which takes the moral impulse to be 
a challenge that precedes all socially created and socially run ontological 
settings...society is primarily a contraption for reducing the essentially 
unconditional and unlimited responsibility-for-the-Other, or the infinity of 
the ‘ethical demand,’ to a set of prescriptions and proscriptions more on a 
par with human abilities to cope and to manage. (Bauman 2008:48)
On this view, then, Nazism and the Holocaust do not indicate the failure of the social to 
restrain our innate moral depravity, the ‘return of the repressed,’ but rather the success of 
modern socially constructed forms of adiaphorization, which effect the neutralization of 
the moral impulse. Sociology can only diagnose the social conditions that limit and 
constrain morality and thereby enable specific forms of immoral action.
Terry Eagleton has suggested, however, that Bauman and Levinas’s revision of 
Kantian duty-focused morality—which revises away from Kant’s deduction of the 
categorical imperative from the transcendental conditions of practical reason and towards 
the face-to-face encounter with the other, rendering the moral and the ethical something 
“to be approached through sensibility rather than through cognition” (Eagleton 2009:224)
—demands too much. On Eagleton’s reading, Levinas exaggerates the priority and the 
absolute alterity of the Other, and as a result Levinasian “Absolute responsibility...is 
really a case of Hegel’s ‘bad infinity’” (237). Eagleton suggests that when we read 
morality transcendentally/phenomenologically as constituted by the pre-societal ‘party of 
two,’ the confrontation with the face of the absolutely other, we cut ourselves off from the 
possibility of concrete moral (and political) action: “Levinas seems not to recognise that 
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to strip the subject of its social context is to render it more abstract rather than more 
immediate, and thus more akin to the bloodless Enlightenment subject he detests” (227).
Gillian Rose develops a reading that is broadly consonant with Eagleton’s, 
suggesting that the Levinasian position installs “repetitive dualisms of power and 
otherness” (1996:10), rendering activity (including sociological activity) permanently 
melancholic rather than engaged in genuine (ethical/political) acts of mourning (11) or 
social transformation. This melancholia is mobilized by a ressentiment that loses itself in 
declarations of absolute guilt or absolute victimhood (e.g., the sacrificial sublimity of the 
Holocaust, from which Bauman tries to derive too much meaning by reading it as a 
thoroughgoing indictment of Enlightenment reason). The Bauman-Levinas position, in 
other words, has affinities both with what Hegel called ‘unhappy consciousness’ (in the 
transition from self-consciousness to Reason) and with what he called the ‘beautiful soul’ 
(in the transition from Spirit to Religion), and seems to conclude with a mere declaration 
of guilt in the face of the other. The problem, here, lies not with the declaration of guilt, 
but with the failed attempt to invert Kant’s first two critiques and to make (and this is 
Ignatow’s point in labelling Bauman an ‘inverted Kantian’) ‘practical reason’ the 
transcendental basis for ‘pure reason.’ On this question I follow Rose and J.M. Bernstein, 
who argue that Kant represents, above all, the philosophical (if not the material) origin of 
the tragic modern diremption or ‘trisection of reason’ (Bernstein 1997), in which truth, 
goodness, and beauty are incapable of being unified under an act of comprehensive 
reason. This diremption cannot be repaired by making ethics into first philosophy (i.e., by 
23
subordinating truth to goodness).
Bauman’s transcendental ethical position appears at times to reject all forms of 
sociology that would conceive of morality as a human construct, a concrete form of 
ongoing human activity, what American sociologist Alan Wolfe calls “the precious gift 
society is” (1989:23). For Bauman, morality remains ambivalent, but human values are 
timeless. As a result, in a certain sense morality has no history. Only the social 
institutions that constrain and limit our moral impulse in various ways have a history. 
Only immorality has a history. Though the two universal human moral values of freedom 
and security (Bauman 2008:13) are persistent, history shows us that, “instead of 
following a path of linear progress toward more freedom and more security, we can 
observe a pendulumlike movement: first overwhelmingly and staunchly toward one of 
the two values, and then a swing away from it and toward the other” (13–14). At the 
moment, we live, on the one hand, in the era of the consumer; social forces of globalizing 
capitalism and individualizing consumption of commodities have enabled us to break 
away in new ways from our primordial ‘ethical demand’ as they ‘adiaphorize’ new 
spheres of activity, neutralizing and rendering our moral impulse irrelevant. On the other 
hand, the value of security is reduced to an American empire-sponsored ‘war on terror’ 
that takes advantage of that adiaphorization in order to enable the ‘smooth functioning’ of 
military policies that (perpetually) attempt to ‘cleanse’ and ‘purify’ the world of ‘terror.’
Against this view of immorality as having a social history, while morality is 
ahistorical and focused entirely on ‘the face of the other’ (i.e., ‘the moral party of two’) as 
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absolute but abstract otherness, Gillian Rose proposes a neo-Hegelian reading of social 
change and of the (moral/izing) encounter of self and other as a “dialectic of 
misrecognition” (1996:74). (Historical) mediation is an essential element of morality, and 
not just its reduction or its socially constrained expression. The mediating element, here, 
what Rose calls ‘the broken middle,’ deserves to be distinguished both from Axel 
Hönneth’s ‘struggle for recognition’—because that assumes a too-idealistic (and one-
dimensional) view of the trajectory of human nature (cf. the critiques of Hönneth by 
Butler 2008; Geuss 2008; Lear 2008) or rests on an incomplete analysis of power 
relations (cf. McNay 2008)—and from Habermas’s ‘criticizable validity claim’—because 
this assumes a too-rationalistic view of particularity, and too narrow a view of how 
motivation and expression are linked together or reducible to a content to be directly 
communicated and debated. As Bernstein (2001) argues, Habermas endorses ‘double 
men,’ with passions and sensuous experiences, on the one hand, and discursive reasons 
on the other, too formally endorsing the law as the embodiment of a process of 
democratic will-formation. His notion of communicative reason is too incommunicable.
Though she does not accept his rejection of style, nevertheless, like Habermas and 
unlike Bauman, Rose gives central standing to the mediating role of law. While the 
Bauman-Levinas view of morality suggests that we are “inborn moral beings” (Bauman 
2008:54–55), Rose argues that it is through a risky sublimation/endorsement of the law, 
through immanent critique, through an act aimed at the good of all, that we discover, 
experience, and establish usufruct on new moral territory and manage to deconstruct the 
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exclusionary logic of social solidarity achieved through scapegoating (1996:35–36). 
Through acts of this sort (e.g., Antigone illegally mourning her slain brother) ‘mourning 
becomes the law,’ not law as a system of prohibitions and punishments, except insofar as 
it is also the law of risky obligation for which we must discover new modes of 
fulfilment.9 This may be on the basis of an ‘inborn’ morality, but the law in this sense is 
not the silencing or the minimizing of morality, as in Bauman, but one of the conditions 
of its excitation, although not exactly in the sense conceived by Habermas. For Rose, as 
for Habermas, law is the middle. It is, however, a ‘broken middle,’ for Rose, precisely 
because law and morality are more fundamentally and traumatically split than Habermas 
has argued. Nevertheless, we cannot preserve our morality by turning away from the law, 
but only by enacting the law in the face of its actually existing forms, perhaps by 
breaking it. In the notion of mourning becoming the law rather than remaining the 
melancholy illegality of much criminalized behaviour, Rose points to the phenomenon 
Hannah Arendt (1998) called natality.
Against the sanguinity of pragmatic agnosticism, Rose’s model entails faith (in 
the law) and risk in the face of avoidable danger. And perhaps this formulation best 
renders visible the criteria for a weak program in the sociology of morality. In any case, 
whether I have been fair to Abend or to Bauman, this dissertation properly begins here, 
9  See, on this point, the contrasting readings of shame’s role in identity and social relation-formation 
developed by sociologist of emotion, Jonathan H. Turner (2011) and affect theorist Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
(2003). Sedgwick’s discussion of shame’s role in shaping identity and relation in a way that precedes 
prohibition and repression (based upon Basch 1976) supports Rose’s notion of a political dialectic of 
misrecognition, and appears to offer a subtler resource in thinking about morality’s relation to the law than 
Turner’s structural and quantitative approach to ‘the problem of emotions.’
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with the sense that uncertainty (and ambivalence) provoke an accountability that is 
neither an a priori absolute nor, on the other hand, reducible to expressions of 
agnosticism, and that answerability for scholarly practice forms a key element of the 
sociology of morality.
Still, what passes for answerability may be no more than a moral narcissism 
linked to an inflated (or absolute) sense of responsibility (cf. Cremin 2012), what Butler 
refers to as “the reduction of ethical philosophy to the inward mutilations of conscience” 
(2005:135). To counter this possibility, we need to combine Butler’s claim that there is a 
permanent gap between truth and the subject—a gap which means that I can never fully 
account for myself, but that “my own foreignness to myself is, paradoxically, the source 
of my ethical connection with others” (84)—with Foucault’s distinction (1997:223–252) 
between self-knowledge and ‘care of the self.’
This approach may allow us to avoid the ‘bad infinity’ that dogs the Baumanian-
Levinasian position—which always needs to bracket (phenomenologically) the effects of 
socialization—without reverting to Abend’s pragmatic agnosticism—which needs to 
bracket (analytically) the existence of moral truths in order to act (sociologically). 
Bauman is unable to consistently maintain the Levinasian distinction between primordial 
sociality and societal moral forms. His discussions of morality depend on a social stock 
of exemplary moral accomplishments—such as resistance to Nazism—and moral heroes 
that have been supplied through particular and institutionalized forms of memorialization, 
cultural narration, education. He claims (2000a; cf. Arendt 1998) that sociology cannot 
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explain the moral heroes that he celebrates, but surely the virtues he assigns these heroes, 
like Lech Walesa’s hope, courage, and stubbornness (Bauman 2008:30), can be traced, 
without being explained away, to antecedent (but not a priori) social experiences which 
may serve as social determinations, although certainly not mechanistic causes, of action 
(cf. Morgan 2013). On the other hand, Abend is unable, as he has himself begun to admit, 
to ‘scientifically’ bracket non-agnostic assertions about moral truth.
This dissertation diverges from Hitlin and Vaisey’s collection of Durkheim-heavy 
approaches because it emphasizes the paradoxical or aporetical relationship between 
sociology and morality. The sociology of morality has constantly fallen into 
contradictions. These contradictions have been rooted in the paradox that, instead of 
simply ‘explaining’ moral phenomena, sociological concepts of morality tend to displace 
and replace everyday morality with expert concepts. How can we approach sociological 
conceptualizations of morality without merely displacing the social objects, practices, and 
realities to which they respond? It is, in an important sense, a question of symmetry. To 
change metaphors abruptly, the loose thread that stitches the chapters that follow, whether 
tying or simply entangling them, is the concept of answerability. This is the thread with 
which I hope to suture some paradoxes seemingly inherent to sociology of morality.
D. ON THE MEANING OF A WEAK PROGRAM: ANSWERABILITY
How can a social science hope to succeed if it deliberately neglects a fundamental 
property of its object and ignores the fact that persons face an obligation to answer for 
their behavior, evidence in hand, to other persons with whom they interact? (Boltanski 
and Thévenot 2006:37)
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...any system of thought that takes up the question of the institution of the social is 
simultaneously confronted with the question of its own institution. It cannot restrict itself 
to comparing structures and systems once it realizes that the elaboration of coexistence 
creates meaning, produces markers for distinguishing between true and false, just and 
unjust, imaginary and real; and that it establishes the horizons of human beings’ relations 
with one another and with the world. It attempts to explain itself and, at the same time, to 
explain its object. (Lefort 2006:155)
‘...I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I 
am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to 
see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.’ (Foucault 
1972:17)
This dissertation sets out an approach to the sociology of morality that I have been 
calling, a ‘weak program’ (cf. Alexander and Smith 2003; Bloor 1976; Vattimo 2007; 
Vattimo and Zabala 2011; Hönneth 2009:43–53). A key aspect of this weak program is 
the reflexive project of developing scholarly practices that advance thought without 
advancing social and political domination and that advance personal autonomy without 
generating arbitrary and one-sided forms of personal authority. It takes cues from 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s claim that, as Simon Jarvis summarizes it, “all rationality to 
date has been entangled in some way with social domination and the domination of 
nature, while...none the less, reason does not have to be like this” (Jarvis 1998:24).
This is a theoretical project, and its contours are intended to emerge within the 
broad outlines of ‘critical theory,’ taken here to include both the Frankfurt School, the 
work of Foucault and Bourdieu, and a range of research concerned with the relationship 
between science and democracy (e.g., Harding 1993, 2008; Latour 2004, 2010; Brown 
2009). It is also beholden in various ways to the critical neo-Hegelian thought of J.M. 
Bernstein, Judith Butler, Gillian Rose, and Slavoj Žižek.
With respect to morality—whatever that might turn out to be—a weak ‘science of 
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morality’ is equally a weak ‘morality of science.’ This symmetry indicates that the weak 
approach does not advocate the arrogation of social, moral, and political authority by the 
university,10 even if it still risks, as Gillian Rose suggests in The Broken Middle, “...the 
ever-incipient fatality of arrogating the authority of beginning” (1992:308). Sociologists 
need the audacity to be the authors of sociological acts. But if the social sciences really 
do in some way aim at a transformation of social practices such that legitimacy 
conditions authority’s appearance rather than being the rationalizing veneer that one 
provides for already existing relations of domination, the substitution of arguments to 
authority—what Habermas formulates as ‘criticizable validity claims’—for arguments 
from authority, authority itself needing to be constituted in a transformed manner (in 
Rose’s phrase, ‘mourning becomes the law’) that dismantles what Althusser thought of as 
the permanence of ideology, then the goal is not philosopher kings, or August Comte’s 
infamous sociological priesthood, or technocratic rule by experts, or even domination of 
the academic field in the Bourdieusian sense.11 Rather, in a weak program—
acknowledging that the sociality of morality entails critical reflection on (moral) 
authority—scholars of morality would work, paradoxically, to undermine their own 
authority (a seeming mixture of Weber’s charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational 
forms), in part so as not to reproduce or to extend existing ‘relations of ruling’ (cf. Smith 
1990; also Bauman 1987; Williams 1985), recognizing that the current institutionalization 
of the social sciences exhibits, as Habermas puts it, “The lack of symmetry between 
10  The role of experts is itself limited by the proliferation of even more experts (Giddens 1991:179).
11  On domination of the ‘field,’ compare Wacquant’s (2013) eulogy of Bourdieu’s ‘take-over’ of French 
sociology with Turner’s (2012) curmudgeonly critique of the ‘de-intellectualization’ of American sociology.
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capacities for self-reflection and for self-organization that we have ascribed to modern 
societies as a whole” (Habermas 1990a:364–365; cf. Wallerstein 1996). At the same time, 
recognizing that this asymmetry exists in the university, sometimes as a kind of neo-
Scholastic, petty bourgeois dream of becoming aristocracy, does not entail endorsing the 
neo-conservative position (e.g., Horowitz 1997) that today’s university intellectuals 
constitute a subversive and conspiratorial power, “...seducers in the garb of enlighteners
—who share in the priestly domination by the New Class” (Habermas 1990a:74). 
Furthermore, persistent priestly/patriarchal aspects of the university differ from emerging 
‘knowledge economies’ that refashion students as consumers (Newson 2012; Thornton 
2012; Luxton and Mossman, eds. 2012).
Still, this is not to say that a weak program recommends auto-deconstruction as a 
form of purity or other-worldliness, an impermeable barrier between science and the 
political, or an obsessive ‘morality of method.’ By no means! On this point, at least, I 
identify with Rosenstock-Huessy’s confession, “I am an impure thinker” (2001:2; cf. 
Bourdieu 2000:3; Adorno, in Jarvis 1998:159), while also following Foucault in being 
suspicious of the Rousseauian confessional, which luxuriates in voluptuous and self-
subjugating autobiography. To be sure, there is no easy way around the power/knowledge 
nexus of subjectivity that characterizes post-Christian modernity and for which 
Rousseau’s Confessions (2000) remains prototypical. Nevertheless, I can examine my 
conditions of im/possibility without explicitly writing autobiography (cf. Campbell 
2010). Rather, the proposed weak program attempts to extend and to explore the 
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Enlightenment critique of authority as well as the ambiguities attendant upon the special 
dispensation claimed for scholarly thought, most famously in Kant’s distinction between 
the public and the private use of reason. It does this via a general notion of answerability 
(Bakhtin 1990; Nielsen 2002; White and Peters 2011), of call and response, which does 
not culminate with the tendencies of some forms of reflexive sociology—including 
Bourdieu’s, which ostensibly focuses on raising awareness of social suffering (e.g., 
Bourdieu, et al. 1999), but still tends towards paternalism (cf. Rancière 2012)—nor with 
the neo-Kantian abstraction from experience entailed by Habermasian discourse ethics.
The concept of answerability will need to be defined in a way that preserves 
enough latitude to be useful in each of the conversations developed in the chapters of this 
dissertation. It will take up, then, a negative space. It is, indeed, an intentionally residual 
category, inhabiting space left over by other, failing, concepts. This dissertation focuses, 
in particular, on notions of collective representation, charisma, interpellation, character, 
affect, and practice, but we may also include communicative action (Habermas), rational 
choice, community values, virtue ethics, and so on. The main purpose of the concept of 
answerability, as a permanently residual category, is symmetry between sociologist and 
everyday citizen. When it comes to morality, is there another option? The ‘weak 
program’ in the sociology of morality asserts, then, that the sociology of morality 
involves, minimally, answerability in the sociologist and in the ‘object.’ A passage from 
Judith Butler’s Giving an Account of Oneself articulates this premise nicely: “...when the 
‘I’ seeks to give an account of itself, an account that must include the conditions of its 
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own emergence, it must, as a matter of necessity, become a social theorist” (Butler 
2005:8). The converse, of course, at least historically speaking, has not been true. When 
social theorists have attempted to account for themselves, accounts that include the 
conditions of their own emergence, they have not always had to account for their ‘I’ (cf. 
Rancière 2011a:40). Nevertheless, answerability appears to constitute the basic but 
ambiguous moral structure of contemporary vocational life, including the lives of social 
theorists (cf. Tilly 2006; 2008). It resembles, in some ways, the concept of ‘testing’ 
developed by Boltanski and Thevénot (2006). As Boltanski and Chiapello put it:
in order to avoid an idealistic construction that is overly reliant on verbal 
argumentation, Boltanski and Thevénot considered that people’s claims 
had to be confronted with the real world, hence pass a series of more or 
less standardised procedures they called tests (épreuve in French). In the 
end, it is the outcome of these tests that lends substance to the judgements 
people make. (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005:167)
Answerability is vocational, but in what sense, and by whom are we called? We are now 
faced with a variety of puzzles of ‘interpellation,’ puzzles given a classical conceptual 
frame and also a personal and perhaps tragic form by Louis Althusser (1971:170–183; 
1993). In what sense are sociologists ‘called?’ Who calls and who answers? In what sense 
is this vocation a ‘self-calling?’ In what sense might the scientific vocation be resistance 
to “the re-formation of a vocation in a society in which reflection dominates” in favour of 
“revolutionary practice” (Rose 2009:235)?
If we cannot accept Althusser’s distinction between the ‘technical’ and the ‘social’ 
division of labour (Althusser 2011), what can justify the role of the intellectual in 
capitalist society? What, after the student movements of the 1960s and the events of May 
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1968, can we say about ‘science as a vocation?’ If we accept Rancière’s polemic against 
paternalistic academic Marxism (and against Althusser, one of his own paternal figures), 
in which he claims that “workers, don’t need our science, but our revolt” (Rancière 
2011a:12), does that mean we can follow in his footsteps in forming our own academic 
vocation (Brown 2011)? That is, should we try to fashion our own trajectory on the model 
of breaking away from paternal interpellation and conversion (metanoia) or ‘turning’ to 
‘the people,’ with Maoist faith in the intelligence of the masses, dedicating ourselves to 
an attempt to “echo the expressions through which the struggles and questions of our 
present seek to give voice to a new freedom” (Rancière 2011a:124)?
To begin with, the ‘call’ to which a weak program responds is irreducible either to 
communication (Habermas’s ideal speech situation) or to discourse. As Foucault 
famously insisted, “discourse is not life, its time is not your time” (1972:211). Sociology 
of morality as answerability cannot be reduced to the communicative transcendentals that 
Habermas attempts to defend with the developmental theory of human nature derived 
from his reading of Mead and Piaget (and extended and adapted by Axel Hönneth). 
Habermas’s approach to child psychology underestimates the importance of archaic and 
traumatic experiences in the pre-history of infancy (cf. Laplanche 1976) even as his 
deferral to Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘me’ theory of the (negative) freedom inherent to (voluntarily) 
constrained action (Mead 1967) deserves serious consideration alongside Althusser’s 
(1971) Lacanian influenced ideological determinism. However, answerability—as against 
the archaeology of Foucault’s middle period, with its focus on the ‘rules’ of discursive 
34
practice (cf. Foucault 2002:52)—refers at least to a sociological spectator embedded in 
observed (and perhaps non-discursive) practices, embedded in a manner that renders 
observing and interpreting activities immanent to the practices that are interpreted or 
observed.12 Answerability entails symmetrical involvement of subjectivity and 
objectivity, sociality and morality, the social relational obligation to ‘give an account of 
oneself’ and the obligation incurred by thinking to acknowledge the ‘priority of the 
object’ (over the concepts with which we render our accounts) (Adorno 1973).
At the same time, this answerability differs from accountability in the neo-liberal 
sense that one should be obliged to provide ‘the taxpayer,’ for instance, with a prompt 
justification of the ‘practical’ worth of one’s research. The move being made, here, is 
metacritical, in Adornian terms (Jarvis 1998:155) rather than practical. Answerability 
would entail, among other things, the answerability of the social sciences not to 
taxpayers, but to the critical thought, whatever its origin, recognizing social scientists as 
accomplices to the processes of history and modernity, processes that go on “piling 
wreckage upon wreckage” (Benjamin 1968:257).13
The metacritical question concerns, on the one hand, how we can combine 
sustained thinking about sociality and morality with the critique of authority in light of 
the ambiguous social position occupied by social scientists and other intellectuals (i.e., 
those Bourdieu calls a ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class’). On the other hand, 
rather than being a simple sociology of knowledge, issues regarding the nature of reason, 
12  As against the archaeological Foucault, the late Foucault drops the notion of scientific detachment, as 
both Butler (2005) and Rabinow and Dreyfus (1983:100) have pointed out.
13  More prosaically, community-based participatory research constitutes a type of answerability.
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of thinking as such, are at stake. The weak program suggests that we simultaneously 
develop and weaken the force of sociology. We might call this, drawing both 
pretentiously and by compulsion (or perhaps seduction) upon theological poetics, the 
incarnation and kenosis (cf. Philippians 2:7) of sociology.14 This means recognizing that 
the secularizing impulse of the social sciences, in carrying out the left Hegelian critique 
(cf. Hönneth 2009:52) of religion as the translation/sublation into human terms of acts 
and attributes historically considered divine, may also be read as a desublimation or 
repetition of God-becoming-human or humans-becoming-gods (e.g., the concept of the 
social construction of reality contains an implicit element of ‘deification’ of human 
capacities for ‘world-creation’) (cf. Bewes 2002:5). The rigour and vigour of academic 
practice ought simultaneously to render me vulnerable and capable, human and divine, 
and to orient me towards my dwelling-in-the-world and my capacity for bearing the 
‘guilt’ of human action. A mere wish? Or the diremption of thought trying to think itself?
Second, this means recognizing, along with Marx, the ongoing bourgeois 
revolution; all that is solid melts, and not just the remnants of feudalism, but bourgeois 
14  The ‘public sociology’ debate initiated during Michael Burawoy’s 2004 ASA Presidency (cf. Burawoy 
2005; Clawson, et al. 2007; Hanemaayer and Schneider 2014; Nyden, Hossfeld, and Nyden 2012), while 
important, tends not to really address the permanent ambiguity of the quasi-aristocratic social position of a 
state-funded intelligentsia with academic freedom (which sometimes attempts to defend itself against a 
corporate-funded intelligentsia oriented to the market), and may be underwritten by a “functionalist 
fallacy” (Selg 2013:15). See also what Merton called “The misplaced masochism of the social scientist” 
(1968:49). Chapter seven discusses Bourdieu’s sometime ‘martyr complex.’
The weak program keeps an eye on aspects of ‘slave morality’ in the sociological tradition, not to 
replace this with a sociological ‘master morality,’ but to explore Bernstein’s analysis, according to which 
even ‘public sociology,’ as a form of “communicative action, in the weak sense, has been constituted by 
power relations that render invisible the operation of the causality of fate; and thereby defuse the claims of 
reciprocity that its avenging power is said to reveal” (1997:262). Public, pragmatic, communicative 
sociology, none of these can magically reduce the “affective deficit left by the systematic rationalization of 
the lifeworld” (262) nor alter underlying asymmetries between sociologists and ‘their’ publics.
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institutions like the modern university, too. The kenosis of sociology, then, as a (perhaps 
ironic) form of De Imitatione Christi (cf. Vattimo 2007:36), would indicate the ‘self-
emptying’ of an already incarnated (i.e., ‘public’) sociology, an alternate path to that 
suggested by Bourdieu’s aggressive neo-Marxian field theory or the luxuriousness of 
Oxbridge nostalgics, both of which fall prey to meritocratic ideology. With the concept of 
answerability I am stuck in a difficult spot (or non-spot) (cf. van Riessen 2007), trying to 
stake out something between Levinasian ‘reception to the other’ and Habermasian 
‘intersubjectivity.’ I look for support from notions of political and aesthetic action 
developed by Bernstein and Rose in their critical readings of Adorno. In Adorno’s terms, 
“our aim is total self-relinquishment” (1973:13; cf. Moltmann 1974). Taken together, 
incarnation and kenosis constitute a negation of the negation. However, the weak 
program reads this as a negative dialectic in Adorno’s sense: “The name of dialectics says 
no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a 
remainder” (1973:5). This indicates, on the one hand, that ‘incarnation’ and ‘kenosis’ are 
not proper names for what a weak program accomplishes with regard to the sociology of 
morals. Something in sociology, in the social and the moral, eludes these names. On the 
other hand, the ‘sociologizing’ of (metaphysical) theology also leaves (or retains/sublates) 
a remainder. The transformation or secularization (the subject of much recent analysis 
and debate) of theological language leaves something behind (Baum 1975; Carroll 2007; 
Eagleton 2009b; 2010; Flanagan 1996; Lefort 2006; Milbank 2006; Tester 2010; de Vries 
2008; Žižek and Gunjevic 2012). When we attempt to articulate and/or enact legitimate 
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sociological authority, authorship, or vocation, we find ourselves entangled in god 
language, especially when we try to leave it behind, whether through public ‘incarnation,’ 
which brings sociology ‘down to earth’ (Henslin 2007), or through ‘kenosis,’ which 
exacts self-relinquishment as the task of science/thought.
Self-relinquishment was also embedded (and dis-embodied) in the dualistic 
Cartesian formula cogito ergo sum, which skeptically bracketed the body, and which 
forms the basis of so much of the effort spent attempting to produce a scientific ‘view 
from nowhere (Nagel 1986). In the language of the virtues, we would simply call it 
humility (never forgetting humility’s link to humiliation). We see it in the famous seventh 
and final proposition of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, “What we cannot speak about we must 
pass over in silence” (2001:89), which provided 20th century analytic philosophy with the 
formula of its ironically unsuccessful attempt to humbly bracket metaphysics and to de-
transcendentalize thought. According to Sloterdijk (2009:5), this proposition was carried 
to completion, in sociology, by Niklas Luhmann. For Nietzsche, of course, scientific 
humility reads as an attempt to generate a priestly ‘spiritual’ power and privilege.15 
Answerability, however, would be less an ascetic search for purity than the pursuit of 
what Rosenstock-Huessy formulated in rewriting the Cartesian formula to read 
respondeo etsi mutabor (‘I respond although I will be changed’) (2001:2).
Theological remainders belie Habermas’s claim that “the normative content of 
modernity is stored in rationalized lifeworlds” (1990a:366), merely waiting to be 
15  See, for example, David Noble’s book A World Without Women: The Christian Clerical Culture of 
Western Science (1992). For an approach closer to the tenor of this dissertation, see Walter Benjamin’s 
“Capitalism as Religion” (1996; also Hamacher 2002; Löwy 2006).
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‘translated’ in order to give strength to ‘autonomous public spheres.’ They exceed the 
‘discursive redemption of the sacred,’ in which the sociologist or moral philosopher 
sublates religion or theology (or art) “by taking up the position of interpreter on behalf of 
the lifeworld” (Bernstein 1997:259). According to Bauman, communicative reason 
cannot discharge the fundamentally ambivalent situation of the ‘moral party of two,’ 
since “Discursive redemption destroys the very moral reality it purports to redeem” 
(Bauman 1993:184). Even if Bauman goes too far, it is no accident that Habermas’s 
concept of ‘discursive redemption’ appears not to have finished paying its theological 
debts, as commentators (Miller 2011:ix) and his more recent publications now admit 
(e.g., Habermas 2002; 2008; Habermas and Ratzinger 2006; Habermas et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, the appearance of theological language in the weak program signals 
neither the submission of sociology to theology’s authority nor the translation of 
sociology into theology. It signals, rather, our ongoing conceptual incapacity to cash out 
(i.e., redeem) our ‘sensuous particularity’ in terms of criticizable validity claims, and the 
need for a further secularization or profanation (Agamben 2007) of sociality and of 
sociology if we are to respond to Adorno’s claim that “The matters of true philosophical 
interest at this point in history...are nonconceptuality, individuality, and particularity” 
(Adorno 1973:8).16 This claim demands to be taken beyond the anthropocentric 
humanism reached in Durkheim’s ‘cult of the individual’ via his distinction between the 
sacred and the profane, which Durkheim purported to be the scientific ‘redemption’ of the 
16  Consider, for instance, the ambiguities of the seemingly simple issue of the relationship between the 
university and the spaces (or neighbourhoods) where it is located (cf. James 2012:30).
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elementary forms of religious life, and of human social life as such, a view that Bataille 
and the Collège de Sociologie attempted to carry forward in their attempt to develop a 
‘sacred sociology’ (Richman 2002).
I use theological language, here, to focus the project on what Adorno referred to 
as “metaphysical need” (1973:399), a notion with roots in Walter Benjamin’s definition 
of philosophy as “the representation of truth and not as a guide to the acquisition of 
knowledge” (Benjamin 2003:28). Sociology cannot satisfy metaphysical need, but it may 
be able to cultivate it. Adorno indicates the intertwining of theology, philosophy, and 
social theory in his well-known programmatic statement in Minima Moralia:
The only philosophy which can be responsibly practised in face of despair 
is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves 
from the standpoint of redemption. Knowledge has no light but that shed 
on the world by redemption: all else is reconstruction, mere technique. 
Perspectives must be fashioned that displace and estrange the world, 
reveal it to be, with its rifts and crevices, as indigent and distorted as it 
will appear one day in the messianic light. To gain such perspectives 
without velleity or violence, entirely from the felt contact with its objects
—this alone is the task of thought. (2005:§153, 247)17
J.M. Bernstein, a secularist (cf. 1992:9), renders this verdict: “The dilemma is profound: 
if the Weberian diagnosis as interpreted by Adorno is correct, then as yet we have nothing 
approaching a normative account explaining how a wholly secular form of life can be 
rationally compelling and intrinsically motivating” (2001:18; cf. Zuidervaart 2007:12).
E. NO RIGHT LIFE IN THE WRONG ONE
Under the influence of Adorno and the critical tradition that has followed him, then, the 
17  It is true that my use of theological language does not follow Adorno’s, who would perhaps interpret a 
phrase like ‘the kenosis of sociology’ as ‘wishful thinking’ rather than as responding to ‘the need in 
thinking’ (Adorno 1973:407–408).
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weak program reads the history of the modern social sciences, and the sociology of 
morality more specifically, as an outworking of long-standing contradictions with 
peculiar forms in modern capitalism, tensions between theory and practice, autonomy and 
heteronomy, mental and physical labour, individual freedoms and collective goods, expert 
knowledge and personal experience, rational systems and instinctual life. It is also a 
tragic history of political and conceptual failures, and perhaps of radical evil. The objects 
of modernity do not go into the concepts of modernity without a remainder. The 
remainder indicates that there is no ‘final solution,’ and that, grievously, the way has been 
repeatedly tried (cf. Agamben 1999). Read in this way, the history of the social sciences 
continues to be a history of failures, and not just in the institutional sense of failing to 
become a true science (Turner and Turner 1990), but in the broader sense of failing to 
become the dreamed of panacea capable of socially mending all that has been socially 
broken. To join in, as an author, is to attempt to contribute one’s own failure, looking, 
through this process, “to know, to misknow, and yet to grow” (Rose 1992:310). This 
means assenting not just to an ironically pragmatic conception of thought as a process of, 
as Beckett put it, “Try again. Fail again. Fail better” (1989:101) but also to Rose’s claim 
that we live, in modernity, with “the diremption of law and ethics” (Rose 1992:xiv). In 
Adorno’s famous phrase, “wrong life cannot be lived rightly” (Adorno 2005:39).
Among other problems, although we are able to recognize a variety of possible 
ways to live (i.e., ‘forms of life’), we are not able to take the measure, in terms of 
knowledge or, more importantly, in terms of experience, of the life we are living (cf. 
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Bernstein 1992:8). Instead, to quote Adorno once again, here with a grimly ironic image 
probably inspired by his exile in Hollywood, “Men are reduced to walk-on parts in a 
monster documentary film which has no spectators, since the least of them has his bit to 
do on the screen” (55). Judith Butler delivered a lecture on this statement on the occasion 
of receiving the Adorno Prize. In her lecture title she renders Adorno’s German phrase, 
‘Es gibt kein richtiges Leben im falschen’ in the form of a question: ‘Can one lead a good 
life in a bad life?’ (2012). The occasion itself modelled the dilemma, the ‘diremption of 
law and ethics,’ as the event was protested by people unhappy with Butler’s critique of 
Zionism, labelling it anti-Semitism. The published version of the essay illustrates this 
dilemma with several photos of these protests.
To speak directly to the academic context, we live and make shift in the midst of a 
mutating and circulating surplus labour supply, in which individual success for one 
means failure for others, although we do not know which others, how many others, what 
will happen next, or what meaning to attach to these successes and failures. Weber was 
already acutely aware of this problem when he tackled the problem of conceiving of 
‘Science as a Vocation’ in a truly secular and immanent manner. Despite his personal 
proclivity for martial virtues, he did not propose ‘honour’ as a means of synthesizing the 
radical pluralism of modern value orientations. Just so, we cannot simply adopt the value 
system of the ‘professional group,’ and endorse the honours and rewards offered on the 
basis of the sensus communis. This communitarian option is simply not available to us at 
the level of experience (Bernstein 1992:8), even if it may happen to ‘work’ on an 
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individual basis as a source of ‘motivation.’ In this world the fragile but still existent 
relative autonomy of the university from the dictates of both political and economic 
‘steering mechanisms’ has the at least ironic and perhaps perverse effect that aggressive 
(even ‘radical’) criticism of the political, economic, and even the academic system may 
be precisely the means by which one is provided with a relatively stable and privileged 
position within that system (cf. Rancière 2011a) and thereby ‘incorporated’ into the 
‘warmth’ of the scholarly community, sheltered from various ‘cold monsters,’ whether the 
state (Nietzsche 1954:I.9, 160) or the economy.18
Where life exceeds our capacity to experience it—a phenomenon classically 
articulated for modernity by Simmel (1950)—the possibility of an incarnational and 
kenotic sociology slips away, just as the possibility of divine incarnation moves, as Lefort 
suggests (2006:187), from the realm of the symbolic to the realm of the imaginary. As the 
saved view the drowned (Levi 1989), and as the ‘Angel of History’ (Benjamin 1968:257–
258) sees the victims of human history piling up, we see the possibility of a symbolically 
structured and guaranteed good life and good death vanish. We are left with only an 
imaginary vocation to the imitation of Christ, or to a Socratic death, to an altruistic 
sacrifice, or to a sociology capable of dropping out of the ‘dialectic of enlightenment’ 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1988) so as to avoid another round of (anti-)social engineering 
by means of atom bombs or wars on drugs or on terror. The idea of being a good 
18  The musicians on the Titanic, who reputedly played til the end, during the sinking, are remembered as 
heroes, but is it entirely perverse to link their actions to the famous (apocryphal) claim that Nero ‘fiddled 
while Rome burned?’ In the face of a dysfunctional division of labour—many passengers on the Titanic 
died needlessly—were they engaged in a work of mourning or over-identifying with their role in an act of 
bad faith? In any case, the dualism involved in any claim to a ‘life of the mind’ needs to be registered.
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sociologist of the good is a tempting fantasy, perhaps irresistible. Again in Adorno’s stark 
and what we wish were hyperbolic phraseology, we are faced with the paradox of 
The guilt of a life which purely as a fact will strangle other life, according 
to statistics that eke out an overwhelming number of killed with a minimal 
number of rescued, as if this were provided in the theory of probabilities—
this guilt is irreconcilable with living. And the guilt does not cease to 
reproduce itself, because not for an instant can it be made fully, presently 
conscious.
This, nothing else, is what compels us to philosophize. (1973:364)
Bernstein takes up this Adornian compulsion, suggesting that ethics is best understood as 
a work of mourning and an attempt to recognize and to develop expressions of guilt:
At best, our ethics can be just a kind of non-complicity with official 
culture, while at the same time being an aporetical realisation of there 
being no possibility (and no real legitimacy) for any serious 
noncomplicity. Perhaps, then, it can be an ethics which acknowledges the 
harm it has done to the nonidentical and an expression of guilt for having 
done so. (Bernstein 2001:20–21)
The ‘ethical demand,’ however, requires more than an expression of guilt. Faced with the 
diremption of law and ethics, between facts and values, the weak program follows Rose’s 
claim that we retain synthesis as a goal. Even though each attempted synthesis fails, these 
failures, insofar as they acknowledge the oppositions and attempt to engage in the 
“process and pain” of taking the “risk of coming to know” (Rose 1992:xiii), need not end 
in despair (or masochistic declarations of guilt). Nor do they need to end by ‘failing 
towards functionalism,’ a failure Rose attributes to both Giddens and Habermas. These 
humourless sociologies ‘in the severe style’ (Rose 1992:245) become positivist and 
functionalist by replacing the diremption of law and ethics, the ‘guilt in thinking,’ with 
analysis “grounded on posited ‘dualities’...[and]...The result is an intellectual culture in 
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which anxiety of beginning is displaced by voluminous sociology; equivocation is 
replaced by ‘integration’; the broken middle translated into ‘steering media’” (246).
Taking a (hopefully) cautious stand against discourse ethics, Habermas’s 
procedural ‘weak’ program, my conception of a weak program in the sociology of 
morality does not confine itself to clarifying the ‘ideal speech situation,’ in which 
experiences embedded in the lifeworld find discursive redemption when formulated as 
criticizable validity claims. On this point I follow Bernstein’s critical remark:
By suppressing...the pull of the world in our reasoning...Habermas drives 
out of consideration the deepest reasons we have...The search for 
impartiality in communicative reason forces us to take a stand outside the 
circle of reasons and experience that typically underwrites our allegiance 
to moral norms. (1995:221)
Although I am somewhat skeptical of the Rousseau at the base of Bernstein’s argument, I 
follow his claim that “the separation of the moral [as public and social] from the ethical 
[as personal conviction] cannot be sustained” (113), since the expression of subjective 
experience is an essential element of ethical life which cannot be bracketed off from a 
moral sphere characterized by discursive translation and focused solely on action 
coordination via “consensus about the rightness of binding norms” (113). Just so, neither 
moral theory nor the sociology of morality can be sustainably separated from the morality 
of sociology (or of moral theory). Indeed one could formulate it as a speculative 
proposition along the same line as Hegel’s ‘the real is the rational,’ which Rose 
paraphrases as ‘reality is ethical’ (cf. Rose 2009:235) and which may perhaps be 
rephrased once again as ‘the social is moral.’ As a speculative proposition, however, this 
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phrase refuses the identity thinking which would suggest that the social is identical with 
the moral, or that the moral is identical with the sum of successfully formulated 
‘criticizable validity claims,’ a process that critics argue is just the consistent and stable 
means by which the actors that monopolize dominant modes of ‘sophisticated’ moral 
discourse have their viewpoints symbolically legitimated (e.g., as law).
The weak program in some ways resembles, then, but remains non-identical with 
the Habermasian ‘tension’ theory, which sees law as mediating Between Facts and Norms 
(Habermas 1998). Habermas attempts to turn the Adornian problem into the very 
condition of “communicative” society, a state of permanent “tension between facticity 
and validity” (1998). As long as the intermediary between fact and norm is 
communication, the goals are public discourse, criticizable validity, enlarged social 
access to the public sphere, and so on. This procedural solution does not succeed in 
dissolving the dictum (i.e., ‘no right life in the wrong one’), however. In part this is 
because discursive action is an insufficient source of social motivation. Habermas 
endorses a procedure in which actors abstract and extract an argument from personal 
experiences and motives in order to qualify as participants in the public sphere.19
Habermas’s concept of the public sphere as a realm of discursive and criticizable 
validity claims in which law is the mediator between facts and norms, systematically 
evades the tragic quality of the “trisection of reason,” taking the demand that 
communicative reason be impartial as “a legitimate disarticulation” of reason (Bernstein 
19  An examination of the final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, which held 
hearings in which residential school survivors were given a forum to talk about their experiences, could 
provide a relevant case study in the Canadian context.
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1997:257) rather than a diremption or deformation.20 This displaces Habermas’s earlier 
(1991 [1962]) conception of the public sphere and, what is more, “colludes with the very 
diremption of reason it now seeks to undo by taking up the position of interpreter on 
behalf of the lifeworld” (Bernstein 1997:259). The later Habermas, indeed, has moved to 
law as the mode through which “morality can spread to all spheres of action, including 
those systemically independent spheres of media-steered interactions that unburden 
actors of all moral expectations other than that of a general obedience to law” (Habermas 
1998:118). Habermas divides problems up by assuming that only “anonymous networks” 
(1998:117) can provide avenues for the universalization of “postconventional morality.” 
The Adornian problem is presented clearly:
...the unmistakable duty to preserve even anonymous neighbors from 
starvation conspicuously contrasts with the fact that millions of inhabitants 
of the First World allow hundreds of thousands in poverty-stricken areas 
of the Third World to perish. Even charitable aid can be transmitted only 
along organized paths...a structural improvement would require no less 
than a new economic world order. Similar problems that can only be 
managed by institutions arise in one’s own region, and even in one’s very 
neighborhood. The more that moral consciousness attunes itself to 
universalistic value orientations, the greater are the discrepancies between 
uncontested moral demands, on the one hand, and organizational 
constraints and resistances to change, on the other. (116)
For Habermas, ‘positive law’ has to fill in the gaps left by ‘weakness of the will’ (117). 
Habermas, like Durkheim, suggests that nihilism is a symptom of a lack of organization 
and regulation, not the source of the problem (118). Motivation is supplied by 1) 
socialization and 2) individual conscience, but this needs supplementation by 
20  On this point Gabriel Abend, with his relatively easy conscience about separating philosophical from 
sociological questions, would surely agree with Habermas, and would perhaps take this entire discussion of 
‘diremption’ for maudlin hysterics.
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organization and regulation. For Durkheim, professional groups provide this, on the one 
hand, in the form of protection and relief from the over-regulating tendencies of the state 
and, on the other hand, through unique forms of moral regulation that are appropriate to 
and more directly fashioned by the members. For Habermas, this comes in the form of 
“systemically independent spheres of media-steered interactions” (118) bound together 
by a system of laws/rights that balance “private and public autonomy of the citizen” 
(118). He suggests, optimistically, that “Under conditions of high complexity, moral 
contents can spread throughout a society along the channels of legal regulation” (118). At 
the same time, however, as Bernstein points out, Habermas concedes that “rationalized 
moral theory decontextualizes and demotivates” (Bernstein 2001:81; Rousseau 1974:41), 
for “The search for impartiality in communicative reason forces us to take a stand outside 
the circle of reasons and experiences that typically underwrites our allegiance to moral 
norms” (Bernstein 1995:221).
In the weak program, instead of looking to law as an institution with one foot in 
the lifeworld and one in the world of autopoietic systems, capable of mediating ‘between 
facts and norms’ as an element of communicative action aimed at reaching understanding 
or co-ordinating action, we give special weight to non-impartial acts expressive of 
subjective experience and arising from answerability. Furthermore, as Bernstein argues, 
“it is false to claim, as Habermas routinely does, that our choice is between acting 
communicatively...and acting strategically” (1995:186). Answerability is reducible 
neither to communication, nor to argumentation, nor to instrumental action. In addition, 
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as a key element of a weak program in the sociology of morality, answerability suggests 
that the sociological vocation has a more deeply ambiguous relation to law than 
Habermas wants to suggest. If one sense of weakness suggests that weak sociology lacks 
legislative powers, in what sense, on the other hand, are sociologists still ‘before the 
Law,’ in Kafka’s sense? Gillian Rose argues, against Habermas, that rather than law 
mediating between facts and norms, political action forms the broken middle for law and 
ethics (Rose 1992, 1995, 1996). Insofar as the ‘weak’ program remains capable of 
political action, it may be that this involves attempts to express hitherto invisible forms of  
experience, to ‘fail better,’ and to mourn better (perhaps by defying, and thereby 
potentially transforming the law).
Why engage with these tensions at all? Why develop a ‘program’ in the sociology 
of morality? Why not locate sociology within Habermas’s realm of “private autonomy 
that can also be described as liberation from the obligations of what I call 
‘communicative freedom’” (Habermas 1998:119)? Why should sociologists be 
dialectically answerable with respect to morality? J.M. Bernstein wants to place his trust 
in aesthetic modernism: “If the non-discursive, because non-demonstrable, judgement of 
the body inflicted with pain provides motivation for resisting domination, this can be no 
idle point with Habermas, since a perpetual difficulty for his theory has been the absence 
of a motivational base for taking up the claims of communicative reason” (1997:252).
This brings us back to the question of sociology as a calling, or vocation (cf. 
Newson and Polster, eds. 2010). What does it mean, in contemporary life, to have a 
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calling? What does it mean in the context of neo-liberal economics, which has been 
widely criticized for its negative impact on the university (Washburn 2005; Etkowitz, 
Webster and Healey 1998; Inglis 2014; Randle 2002)? What does it mean, in the 
Canadian context (cf. Curtis and Weir 2002; Crocker 2003; O’Malley and Hunt 2003; 
Weir and Curtis 2003)? In late modernity, as Anthony Giddens points out, “in many areas 
of social life—including the domain of the self—there are no determinant authorities” 
(1991:194). As a result, the reasons, motives, or justifications that are offered for what 
one does, although they may be drawn from more places than ever before, encounter a 
social world that may or may not be interested, that may or may not be convinced, that 
may or may not provide formal institutional, bureaucratic, or spiritual approval or 
disapproval, or effective formation and remonstration. Giddens reiterates what Weber 
already recognized: modern society throws us back upon our own resources. In the era of 
Durkheim’s ‘cult of the individual,’ our callings must, in the end, be auto-interpellations. 
Still, although within liberal democratic society there can be no unified social 
authority that designates one’s social position, the question of sociology as a vocation 
draws together the reason for doing and the thing done within what we are calling 
answerability—rather than ‘responsibilization’ (Roth 2010). The doing of sociology 
entails bringing oneself into question as a sociologist. Analyzing morality sociologically 
entails analyzing sociology morally. And so on. In each chapter of the dissertation, I 
argue that attempts to ‘solve’ the problem of founding a sociology of morality fail 
towards answerability.
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Once again, what keeps answerability from being a form of Habermasian 
‘communicative reason,’ is that answerability refers, here, not so much to the pragmatics 
of communicating and agreeing, or “reaching understanding” (Habermas 1998:14), as to 
the ‘guilt’ or ‘need’ in thinking, the recognition of misrecognition, the communication of 
miscommunication. These constitute, in significant ways, works of mourning. The 
Habermasian model of establishing solidarity through action-coordinating efforts aimed 
at communicating a particular discursive meaning content misses the possibility that 
social bonds, and ethical relations in particular, may appear precisely where ‘speech acts’ 
fail rather than where they seem to succeed, where, as Butler puts it, the ‘I’ fails to narrate 
itself to the other: “Then the ‘I’ is no longer imparting a narrative...the ‘I’ is staging a 
scene, recruiting the other into the scene of its own opacity to itself. The ‘I’ is breaking 
down in certain very specific ways in front of the other...” (2005:69; cf. Halberstam 
2011). Rather than the Kantian notion that society would fall apart if we could not trust 
each other to tell the truth, which Habermas attempts to recruit as a constitutive and a 
priori condition of possibility of communication and social order, the weak program 
assumes that our social conditions of possibility entail constitutive misrecognition and 
ongoing incapacity for truth-telling, according to which the moral of the story is 
recognized in its narrative gaps.
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F. BETRAYAL OF TRADITION, TRADITION OF BETRAYAL: GUILT & 
HISTORY
...in the etiological structure of time and history that Benjamin has in mind, here, every 
state of the world is guilty to the extent that it releases another deficient state of the world 
and bears the guilt for it. Every state of the world is therefore an incomplete one, a 
morally or legally lacking condition. Guilt is “the highest category” of history, because it 
is the category of the causation of deficiencies. Thus it must follow that history is guilt, 
and that it is guilty: it is history only to the extent that it is guilt history, a history out of 
guilt and a history of guilt. Guilt can only exist where there is history, and every history is 
a phenomenon of deficiency. And, conversely, there can only be history if a condition or 
an occurrence severs itself from another one without, however, completely losing all 
relation to it. Guilt is thus a deficitary relation, a relation to that which is lacking or 
missing. All history is therefore the history of guilt in the sense that the form—and only 
therefore also the content—of history is determined by guilt. There is no history that is 
not about guilt... (Hamacher 2002:83–84)
Immediately following the selected text quoted above, Werner Hamacher points out that 
Walter Benjamin’s other characterization of the time of history (other than ‘guilt history’) 
is the time of fate (Schicksal). Whether as guilt or as fate, ‘our time’ involves a grappling 
with the past, what Nietzsche viewed as fundamentally entangled with revenge, and 
called “the will’s antipathy towards time and time’s ‘it was’” (2006:276). As Bakhtin 
points out, “answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame” (1990:1), and the weak 
program follows Bernstein following Adorno in endorsing the notion that 
“acknowledgement of complicity and guilt is the ethical gesture that makes critique 
possible” (Bernstein 1992:11). In Negative Dialectics, Adorno declares that, after the 
Holocaust, the new categorical imperative has become ‘never again.’ This categorical 
imperative cannot be merely ‘discursively’ redeemed. Still, there is something ambiguous 
about this partnership between answerability and guilt. Adorno settles some of this 
ambiguity for us, also expressing the only real contestant against Nietzsche’s position:
...is guilt itself perhaps merely a complex, and bearing the burden of the 
52
past pathological, whereas the healthy and realistic person is fully 
absorbed in the present and its practical goals? Such a view would draw 
the moral from the saying: ‘And it’s as good as if it never happened,’ 
which comes from Goethe but, at a crucial passage in Faust, is uttered by 
the devil in order to reveal his innermost principle, the destruction of 
memory. The murdered are to be cheated out of the single remaining thing 
that our powerlessness can offer them: remembrance. (1998:91).
This statement entails the claim, in addition, that despite whatever ‘sociological validity’ 
may adhere to Giddens’ claim, against Freud, that “The characteristic movement of 
modernity, on the level of individual experience, is away from guilt” (1991:155), this is 
insufficient at the level of the ‘need in thinking.’ According to Giddens, modern 
civilization is characterized by a shift away from guilt and towards shame, since, 
increasingly, “The individual no longer lives primarily by extrinsic moral precepts but by 
means of the reflexive organisation of the self” (153). Instead of anxiety about failures to 
obey moral imperatives, the modern individual tends to feel insecurity in the face of 
complex and evolving social systems. Nevertheless, in the effort, as Arendt put it, “to 
think what we are doing” (1998:5), we are called to respond to this guilt, this debt of 
thought. In attempting to think sociologically about morality, or about the good life, we 
necessarily orient to the guilt-determined forms of our history, to our indebtedness to the 
conditions of our own possibility. This Adornian ‘need in thinking’ may be understood as 
a very specific alteration and ‘reorientation’ of Kant’s discussion of the ‘needs of reason’ 
in his essay “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” (1998). Kant suggests that 
we need to postulate a highest being in order to engage in (theoretical and practical) 
reason. For Adorno, by contrast, the need comes from the opposite direction: no concept 
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can be adequate to experience. The need in thinking is a form of guilt, and not just the 
postulate of a healthy mind. ‘Never again’ is not a categorical imperative derived by 
universalizing a maxim, then, but a ‘minim,’ as the title Minima Moralia indicates, that 
smells the blood, as Nietzsche suggested, behind the ‘maximization’ of a maxim. The 
transitional form of this reorientation may be found in Kierkegaard’s formula, in the first 
‘upbuilding discourse’ at the end of Either/Or part two, “The Upbuilding that lies in the 
thought that in relation to God we are always in the wrong” (1987:339–354).
At the same time, the ‘need’ in thinking requires that we struggle to distinguish, 
following Nietzsche’s genealogical exposition of the complications of motive, between 
ideological interpellation, narcissistic self-preoccupation—like Lebedev in Dosteovsky’s 
The Idiot (2002)—and legitimate demands of thought. Although the quote from Lotze 
inserted at the beginning of the second of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History” may be questioned for its suggestion that the present cannot envy the future, 
Benjamin’s claim that happiness is hermeneutical still serves as a fitting reference point:
Reflection shows us that our image of happiness is thoroughly colored by 
the time to which the course of our own existence has assigned us...In 
other words, our image of happiness is indissolubly bound up with the 
image of redemption. The same applies to our view of the past, which is 
the concern of history. The past carries with it a temporal index by which 
it is referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement between past 
generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like 
every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak 
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot 
be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that. (1968:253–
254)
Although I have been critical of Bauman’s project for its tendency to treat morality too 
54
much as a transcendental a priori, which constrains his ability to recognize sociologically 
conditioned but also socially transformative moral and political action, his adherence to 
the Adornian dictum, ‘never again,’ particularly through the project of developing and 
lending sociological concepts to efforts at ‘remembrance of the slain,’ harmonizes with 
the weak program. The weak program diverges from the transcendental project of 
Bauman and Levinas by deferring to political action from below and in its consideration 
of morality in negative dialectical terms. On my view, following Gillian Rose, the moral 
emerges via politically enacted immanent critiques of law (whether this means natural 
law, positive law, or laws of the social), political acts that subject law to answerability. If 
law, and the god that underwrites it (whether the Christian one, or the god of Capitalism), 
activate and generate guilt, political acts of answerability bear the weight of guilt, while 
contributing to the “self annihilation of the guilt-system” (Hamacher 2002:101), the 
deactivation of the logic of guilt by forgiveness. This dissertation focuses primarily on 
ways that sociologically formulated ‘laws’ may be subjected to answerability, and so in 
the chapters that follow, I attempt to follow this ‘in theory.’ This means, primarily, 
tracking a sort of negative dialectic of selected sociological concepts of morality, 
observing our ‘images of redemption’ as they fail, in a way that demonstrates the 
persistence of answerability and social science failing towards what Latour (2010:35) 
dubs ‘symmetrical anthropology,’ without losing the capacity to recognize and potentially 
to participate in political action and to initiate works of mourning. Thus the ‘weak 
program,’ which is certainly not Nietzsche’s ‘gay science,’ tries not to be Adorno’s 
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‘melancholy science’ (Rose 1978) either.
G. CHAPTERS 1 & 2: FROM MARX TO NIETZSCHE
The first two chapters of the dissertation deal with Marx’s ‘strong’ program in the 
sociology of morality. In chapter one, I argue that the ‘strength’ of Marx’s approach 
resides, to begin with, in his refusal to treat morality as an autonomous subject matter. 
Instead, Marx treats morality as something that follows from political economy, from 
relations of production and from social class divisions. Class societies generate morality 
as class morality. This class morality is abstract and one-sided, lacking content, while 
simultaneously rendering formal and class-based judgements (positive judgements about 
one’s own class and negative moral judgements about the antagonistic class). The ‘goods’ 
valued by particular classes, then, are partial and contradictory. Science overcomes this 
partiality, subordinating the good to the true.
In this vein, this chapter traces Marx’s assessment of bourgeois morality as 
hypocrisy, and discusses his appreciative but critical rejection of previous social and 
political philosophies of morality, those of Aristotle, Adam Smith, and Hegel, in 
particular. With respect to Aristotle, I argue that Marx rejected phronesis in favour of 
revolutionizing practice. With respect to Hegel and Adam Smith, Marx advocated 
attention to the social history of creative production over the abstract dialectics of 
recognition or the bourgeois moral imagination of the ‘impartial spectator.’ In part, this 
redirection away from the bourgeois imagination is based, I argue, in Marx’s acceptance 
of a Rousseauian notion of pity, based not in the imagination, but in a direct and 
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instinctive negative response to visible suffering. On Marx’s reading of social history, the 
rise of bourgeois morality, which is such a breakthrough in Smith’s terms of detached and 
impartial spectators, involves the suppression of (or alienation from) natural morality (as 
pity).21 If Smith saw morality as fundamentally a work of the imagination, Marx thought 
true morality must be unified with truth, and could only follow from scientific revelation, 
unveiling bourgeois hypocrisy while making way for political organization.
As Marx’s approach emphasizes history and social production over abstract    
imagination, he prizes intellectual virtues over moral ones. He views truth, and the public 
statement of the truth, to be simultaneously a political act and an organizational call for 
revolution in the relations of production. Intellectual virtue, which entails non-
participation, crucially, in projects that lack it (cf. ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’), 
becomes his de facto vocation in the absence of an explicit self-justifying discourse.
Chapter Two continues with questions of scientific vocation, discussing the 
ambiguity of Marx’s position, an ambiguity not necessarily solved by implicitly linking 
intellectual virtues to revolutionizing practice and to the production of knowledge. This 
ambiguity persists in the projects attempted, throughout the 20 th century, by Marxists, 
who have continued to struggle with the notion of academic vocation, positioned, as it is, 
21  Here I take a position opposed to Louis Althusser’s still influential one, which distinguishes an early 
humanist Marx (presumably the Marx influenced by Rousseau), from a later scientific Marx, whose 
critique of Smith’s notion of the moral imagination is not based upon Rousseau, but upon the ‘change of 
terrain’  or the
metamorphosis in the gaze...only produced in very specific, complex and often dramatic 
conditions...[the] real transformation of the means of production of knowledge...in which 
the ‘subject’ plays, not the part it believes it is playing, but the part which is assigned to it 
by the mechanism of the process. (Althusser and Balibar 1979:27)
On my reading, Althusser’s argument is interesting word-play, theorizing through shifting metaphors from 
visual to spatial (and structural). It does not, in the end, convince on the young Marx/mature Marx front.
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within what Bourdieu calls a ‘dominated fraction of the dominant class.’ In the midst of 
founding sociology as a professional and professionalizing practice, Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim faced this ambiguity more directly, and drew different conclusions, not 
able to claim that their academic practice could be assimilated to or harmonized with 
politically revolutionizing practice, and compelled to give more explicit justifications for 
their occupation and its value to actually existing society.
The second chapter explores the ambiguity of academia’s complicity with the 
processes of modernity through a discussion of the tensions between Marx and Nietzsche, 
especially Nietzsche’s different reading of human nature and his notion of the ‘will to 
truth.’ Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth as a form of ‘slave morality’ driven by 
ressentiment and by the distinction between good and evil, suggests that Marx’s 
scientistic approach conceals a deformation of will to power. Marx circles around the 
ambiguity of his own position through his analysis of class positions, which depends, for 
coherence, on isolating the root of social evils within a particular ‘class.’ ‘Speaking truth 
to power,’ a prophetic vocation proudly claimed by certain contemporary journalists, 
academics, and ‘public intellectuals,’ sometimes turns out to be a good way of 
contributing to the commodification of the ‘truth’ and to the bourgeois revolution rather 
than the proletarian one, in spite of Marx’s attempt to distinguish use value from 
exchange value and in spite of the utopian goal invoked in The Communist Manifesto that 
the present come to dominate the past. The chapter concludes with the suggestion that 
another version of slave morality, one not fully articulated in Nietzsche, is that which 
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refuses answerability (in favour, perhaps, of authenticity), thus repressing guilt into the 
unconscious and preparing the way for a future return of the repressed.
H. CHAPTERS 3 & 4: DURKHEIM & WEBER
Chapter three turns to Durkheim, the classical sociologist most often connected with the 
sociology of morality. The chapter begins with a conventional presentation of Durkheim’s 
approach to morality, an approach that includes an explicit defence of sociology as a 
profession and a positioning of sociology as authoritatively interpreting but not 
generating moral energies. In this regard, Durkheim gave a threefold interpretation of 
modern morality as consisting of 1) the cult of the individual mediated through forms of 
nationalism; 2) a growing obligation to charity; and 3) a self increasingly divided against 
itself with regard to social and biological demands (with regard to suffering, Durkheim 
argues that society has no justification if it does not provide us with a little bit of peace in 
our hearts and with each other. This reveals the still Hobbesian basis of his analysis).
The chapter continues by arguing for the inadequacy of Durkheim’s notion of 
collective representation as societal self-representation. Durkheim’s neo-Kantian 
approach viewed collective representations as attempts to express group feelings of unity 
in order to turn them into ‘experiences’ (meeting Kant’s requirement for turning sensuous 
material into experience, that it be subsumed under a concept). I argue for the need to 
think about social ‘learning’ and collective representations, especially the exploration of 
indigenous notions and collective representations that push sociality beyond the bounds 
of human relations to include ‘all our relations.’
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There is a lack of ‘answerability’ in Durkheim. Although he suggests that there is 
an underlying truth to collective representations, he reserves the right to offer the 
authoritative interpretation of the meaning of those representations. On this, he is 
followed by Habermas, who, under the guise of offering a constraint on what discourse 
ethics can offer, actually oversteps his interpretive authority (as Bernstein and Rose point 
out). Furthermore, self and other are not adequately dealt with in Durkheim’s theory of 
representation (inadequate politically, religiously, etc.). Durkheim’s version of dualism 
conceives of answerability in terms of the tension between individual physical impulses 
and societal demands. Conscience, which may indeed cause us to resist social pressures 
or norms, is still just that set of societal demands that we have internalized, perhaps 
elaborating it more consistently than presently existing practice, or attempting to apply a 
professional ethic more broadly than hitherto, but still tied to the notion that, though 
societies evolve and morality changes, there is at any given moment a collectivity that is 
identical with itself in substance (membership) and meaning, and this substance and 
meaning may be scientifically specified. On this point, however, Durkheim’s sociology of 
morality is only as good as his understanding of the relationship between the social and 
the political, an understanding that may be criticized from a number of angles (e.g., that 
developed by Jacques Rancière).
While Durkheim oversteps his interpretive authority as a sociologist, Weber goes 
too far in trying to constrain scientific boundaries. In chapter four I discuss Weber’s 
attempt to elaborate a value-free but value-relevant methodology and then turn to a 
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discussion of his concept of charisma to make the case for the aporetical nature of his 
attempt to make a value-free evaluation of a religious concept. While I would defend a 
version of the fact/value (or ‘value-neutral’/‘value-relevant’ distinction), I critique 
Weber’s attempt to deal with charisma as a non-moral concept. His approach to charisma 
as a form of authority, as a kind of individual domination over a group, functions as a 
residual category—although not in the terms specified by Stephen Turner (1993; 2003)—
for which Weber gives no real sociological explanation. Weber implicitly posits that the 
only escape from (modern) suffering is through mastery (Nietzschean heroism), which is 
also to say a non-rational form of obedience to a mysterious force (i.e., to one’s daimon). 
Suffering becomes meaningful through an act of will, and science becomes a vocation 
through an existential decision (‘to see how much I can take’). Against this version of 
(non-moral) authority and vocation as individual will, I propose that we think of charisma 
as an ambiguous, but socially-conditioned form of answerability.
I. CHAPTERS 5 & 6: SITUATION, CHARACTER, & THE AFFECTIVE TURN
The next chapter turns from these two founding figures of professional sociology to a 
contemporary debate about the concepts of character and situation, a debate carried out 
primarily in philosophy and social psychology. With respect to social suffering, can 
character save us? I argue, first, that character and situation can be seen as 
complementary rather than competing sociological frames. Secondly, I argue that the 
term character should be thought of within the full variety of its everyday uses rather than 
reduced to a narrowly technical application. Finally, I argue that in certain contexts we 
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should give a positive moral evaluation to ‘weak’ character, understood in the context of 
acts and practices that constitute emancipatory reversals. Once again, the chapter closes 
with references to answerability as constituting a non-synthetic link in a negative 
dialectic, this time between situation and character.
Earlier in this introduction I made passing reference to the prevalence of studies 
that link morality to emotions. In Chapter Six I discuss the ‘affective turn’ and affect as a 
methodological consideration. How do you get ‘in the mood’ to do sociology? It does this 
through a discussion of three separate strands of social science research 1) American 
communitarianism; 2) studies in Moral Regulation; and 3) the Feminist ‘ethic of care’ 
approach. Each of these strands of research make some fundamental assumptions about 
‘mood.’ Communitarians, I argue, try to adopt a (paternalistic) attitude of ‘concern.’ 
Moral Regulation studies, by contrast, locate ‘anxiety,’ and even ‘moral panic’ in the 
bourgeois subjects that they study, while implicitly constructing their own maturity and 
existential authenticity and steadfastness. Their implicit methodological recommendation 
for social scientists is ‘do not panic.’ It is especially important not to project one’s 
anxieties about social changes that may affect one’s social positions (and privileges) onto 
socially marginalized groups and individuals. Finally, the ‘ethic of care’ approach 
criticizes abstract and detached moral evaluation, and puts forward an ethic based on 
(women’s) experiences of connection, relation, and care. The ‘ethic of care’ is presented 
as both empirical finding and methodological ideal for feminist social science practice.
Each of these approaches recommends, on my reading, an ‘affective’ solution to 
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the problem of constituting a sociology of morality. We just need to be in the right mood. 
I conclude by arguing that, while none of these approaches on its own can constitute an 
adequate resolution of the problem of founding a sociology of morality, they provide a 
kind of constellation that may help to make visible the aporetic quality of the sociology 
of morality. Once again, I argue that answerability constitutes a minimal criterion that can 
performatively structure a ‘weak’ program in the sociology of morality. 
J. CHAPTER 7: RIVAL VERSIONS OF PRACTICE
Chapter seven turns from the ‘affective turn’ to the ‘practice turn.’ Practice, like affect, 
has been viewed as a potential means of bridging the is/ought divide and solving 
problems related to the sociology of morality and to sociology as a vocation. From the 
various extant forms of practice theory I take two particularly influential ones in order to 
try out the tensions in the notion of practice. Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of practice uses the 
concept of practice as a tool in the hermeneutics of suspicion, unveiling subtle forms of 
self-interested action that serve to reproduce (unjustified or ‘unmerited’) social 
inequality, privilege, and marginalization. On the other hand, Alasdair MacIntyre uses the 
concept of practice in an attempt to critique instrumental action and to develop a notion 
of human flourishing that may provide the inhabitants of modernity with a way out of the 
‘iron cage’ of instrumental reason (other than what MacIntyre calls ‘emotivism’). Both 
approaches present us with notions of practice that advance significant promises 
regarding its role as a basic building-block of morality. Their respective approaches also 
offer an opportunity to revisit questions concerning sociology as a vocation. Rather than 
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decide between the two approaches, I conclude that the concept of practice does not settle 
issues of vocation or morality. Once again, I argue that we should view practice theory as 
providing a constellation and a vision of answerability that opens up avenues of 
experience, expression, and reflexivity without supplying definitive interpretations of 
social life. The dissertation concludes with a brief restatement and summary.
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CHAPTER 1: REVOLUTIONIZING PRACTICE, IMAGINATION, & 
INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE: MARX’S STRONG PROGRAM
It should have been stated what is meant by an “effective” liability law.
Be it noted, incidentally, that in speaking of the normal working day the part of factory 
legislation that deals with health regulations and safety measures, etc., has been 
overlooked. The liability law only comes into operation when these regulations are 
infringed.
In short, this appendix also is distinguished by slovenly editing.
Dixi et salvavi animam meam.
(Marx [1875 ‘Critique of the Gotha Program’] 1972:398)
A. INTERPRETING MARX’S ANTI-MORALISM
What Marx writes about morality usually seems calculated to reveal its illusoriness. So 
why suggest that he has a ‘strong program’ in the sociology of morality? In Marx’s 
writings, when morality comes up, it is attached to the realm of politics and abstract right. 
In ‘On the Jewish Question,’ Marx equates the moral person with the formal citizen: 
“Political emancipation is a reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of civil 
society, an independent and egoistic individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, to a 
moral person” (1972:44). Moral personhood, this building block of bourgeois morality, 
reduces the human to the level of the abstract rights of liberty and equality and hides the 
realities of exploitation and inequality. To take this abstract moral discourse as more than 
the ideology of ‘the advantage of the stronger,’ as Plato has Thrasymachus define justice 
in the Republic (1997:I.338c, 983), and which Marx echoes in the Grundrisse, is to be 
taken in. Marx calls it a kind of forgetting (1973:85, 88). Abstract moral discourse forgets 
the material basis of society in concrete forces and relations of production and forgets 
that the ‘advantage of the stronger’ needs to be recognized as an historically constituted 
social power of creation that reflects current class relations rather than being an external, 
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eternal, unchangeable nature. Nevertheless, in this chapter as well as the next, I will argue 
that Marx can be described as having a ‘strong program’ in the sociology of morality. It is 
a ‘strong program’ because 1) the point is not merely to interpret the world, but to change 
it, and 2) in Marx’s work, moral virtues are subordinated to intellectual virtues. The good 
must also be true, and “slovenly editing” (Marx 1972:398) can be neither.
In the first volume of Capital, Marx writes that since bourgeois morality is illusory, 
the realities of capitalism must be dealt with, as capitalists themselves claim (when it 
suits them), without any appeal to sentiment or to the heart, without any illusion that 
‘equal rights’ is a moral claim with real substance. The reality of capitalist social relations 
is conflict between classes, and “Between equal rights force decides” (1978:225). In the 
case of the working-day “...the determination of what is a working-day presents itself as 
the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital...and collective labour” 
(225). Bourgeois morality is imaginary, made up of fantasies and fetishes. And bourgeois 
morality forgets. In the Manifesto Marx and Engels attempt to replace bourgeois morality 
with historical understanding, a kind of remembering that allows the transformation of 
the present by undoing the domination of the past (1972:347). The moralizing myths of 
bourgeois society must be replaced with scientific history.
By conflating morality with ‘bourgeois’ morality and attaching it to processes of 
‘merely political’ emancipation, Marx implies that morality, like religion, does not (or 
would not) have a place of its own (a sphere of ‘relative autonomy’) in a society that has 
achieved real social (and not merely political) emancipation. If morality, treated as an 
66
independent sphere, merely forms an ideological discourse that justifies injustice by 
means of abstract principles or mythical superstition, there is no need to formulate any 
specifically moral discourses for the communist society because there would be no need 
for ideological and abstract circumlocution (cf. Engels 1972:667–668). In any case, one 
could not do it in advance of such a society’s advent. Indeed, this is generally how Marx 
has been interpreted. And so, for a long time, “Critical social scientists, influenced by 
Marxism, regarded theorizing values and ethics as purist ideology” (Weir 2008:369; cf. 
Miller 1984; Tucker 1961; Wood 1980). Valid theory must be unified with practice. 
Moral philosophy must be subsumed by praxis in order to end its one-sidedness.
A ‘strong program’ seeks to accomplish precisely this unification. This comes first, 
however, in the form of a critique of all hitherto existing moralities. It would be a mistake 
to take Marx’s rhetorical posture toward bourgeois morality for a rejection of morality as 
such. This misses the fact that, rather than a ‘neutral’ scientific discourse, Marx produces 
equal amounts of satire and diatribe; and, like other radical forms of social critique that 
contrast ‘the present age’ with an age ‘to come’ (by means of a messianic or quasi-
messianic structure), he indicts the immorality of current law/morality (i.e., the ‘white-
washed sepulchre’) by contrast with a law-transcending spirit or grace that will transform 
the present system (cf. Tucker 1961). On this score, liberation theology (cf. Moltmann 
1974; West 1991) provides the more apposite––if also, and ironically, more ideologically 
‘impure’––interpretation of Marx. To read Marx’s economism, even that of Capital, as 
‘reductionistic’ or ‘utilitarian’ (e.g., Hönneth 2003:127) is to perform a reductionistic and 
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utilitarian reading of Marx. Anyone accusing Marx of economism needs to critically 
address the gap Marx posits between production and commodification.
B. THE WORKING-DAY & THE SABBATARIANS: MARX ON SENTIMENT & 
HYPOCRISY
One of Marx’s most sustained polemics against the concrete practices of capitalism 
appears in the first volume of Capital, in the section entitled ‘The Working-Day.’ Based 
largely on the reports of 19th century British factory inspectors, in the sixty odd pages of 
‘The Working-Day,’ Marx meticulously documents the hypocrisy of bourgeois morality 
(e.g., Marx 1978:232n.1; 252n.1). The tone is consistently sarcastic, with direct 
moralizing generally confined to the many long quotations from the inspectors’ reports. 
This indirect technique of moralizing through sarcasm and irony generates an account of 
the struggle for the length of the working-day stretched between objectivity and 
involvement; throughout Capital Marx generates a form of discourse that navigates in an 
original way, and without foundering, around and through scientism, sentimental 
sermonizing, and Swiftian satire.
‘The Working-Day’ presupposes that the attempt to divide moral and economic 
discourse into separate spheres is fundamentally self-contradictory or hypocritical and 
Marx exposes this division as a form of willfully sloppy thinking. He then pursues this 
division of spheres, exploiting the contradiction between neutral and evaluative modes. 
The struggle for the working-day, Marx writes, in an ironic paraphrase of business 
language, is not a matter of morality, “for in money matters sentiment is out of place” 
(1978:225). On the previous page, however, one has encountered this famous image: 
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“Capital is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives 
the more, the more labour it sucks” (224). Marx mobilizes the reader’s disgust by means 
of a grotesque image and then forces the reader to choke on this disgust by immediately 
suggesting that the economy is no place for sentiment. Throughout the section, Marx 
sustains this contradiction between the suffering of the industrial working-class and the 
neutrality of ‘business speak,’22 nudging the reader towards high dudgeon at the 
hypocrisy of bourgeois morality.
Marx’s style fits well amongst 19th century moralizing, which could draw from a 
rich spectrum of literary genres and evoke a set of newly articulated emotions, especially 
new forms of expression for sympathy, disgust, isolation and outrage.23 ‘The Working-
Day,’ and Capital in general—as distinct from his political pamphlets, which are more 
directly moralistic and focused on fomenting revolution. ‘The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte’ [1852] and ‘Reflections on the Civil War in France’ [1871] thematize 
the guilt, cowardice and hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie and the innocence, courage, and 
integrity of the proletariat—develop a unique mode of moral discourse that denies the 
validity of investigating morality as an independent formal sphere while simultaneously 
attempting to further a morally-transformative social revolution. Capital may be 
distinguished from the genre of satire only by the sincerity of its scientism. Jeffrey 
22  “Capital only speaks of the system in its ‘normal’ form” (1978:248).
23  Marx’s relationship to Rousseau—the inventor of the modern form of intimate confession and reflective 
self-consultation (Arendt 1998:38–41)—is an important one. Marx explicitly rejects both nostalgia for the 
‘state of nature,’ and optimism about the liberal citizen, but remains heavily influenced by Rousseau’s ideal 
of transparency, what Arendt refers to as “a close relationship between the social and the intimate” 
(1998:40) (cf. Starobinski 1988).
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Alexander claims that Marx “cloaked his moral concern in immanent economic laws” 
(2006:18), but this only gets at a single element of Marx’s discourse, and misses the 
tension that Marx generates between different affective modes.
Marx’s style was an innovation in a century of discursive innovation and scientific 
specialization (and anxiety over specialization), and the innovations were not merely 
stylistic. With regard to morality, it was the century of working out the consequences of 
‘Enlightenment’ thinking. One of the questions was this one: Is Enlightenment corrosive 
to morality, or does it enable its reconstruction on rational principles? To resolve this 
question one must first work out whether theory and practice are to be distinguished and, 
if so, which one has priority. Here Marx accepts Hegel’s critique of Kant’s abstract and 
therefore empty concept of Moralität and refuses, along with Hegel, Kant’s division 
between theoretical and practical philosophy. We need “integral people” (Marx, quoted in 
Althusser 1971:30) that unify theory and practice. Marx’s strong program attempts to 
illustrate the current and concrete reality of social contradictions, while working toward 
the negation of the division between theory and practice, form and content, is and ought.
Marx’s synthetic approach in some ways returns to classical conceptions of 
morality, but it comes with conceptual innovations in addition to the stylistic-affective 
innovations already mentioned. We now address Marx’s relationships to Aristotle, Hegel 
and Adam Smith, concluding with reflections on the unique qualities and limitations of 
Marx’s strong program.
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C. ARISTOTLE & MARX: FROM PHRONESIS TO PRAXIS
As the condensation of Marx’s strong program into aphoristic form, the eleventh and last 
of the ‘Theses on Feuerbach’—“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point, however, is to change it” (Marx 1972:109)—recapitulates, with 
radical additions, Aristotle’s claim, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that “we are not 
conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, else 
there would be no advantage in studying it” (1962:II.2, 1103b26–28). As recapitulation, 
praxis, or ‘revolutionizing practice,’ referred to in the ‘Theses on Feuerbach,’ like 
Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom—defined as “...a true and reasoned 
state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man” (VI.4 
1140b5–6)—is necessarily analytical and practical. Both Marx and Aristotle deny the 
desirability and even the coherence of a non-participatory analytical frame. 
Epistemologically speaking, thesis eleven implies that adequate knowledge of truth 
comes only through active, transformative engagement in social and political life: “Man 
must prove the truth...in practice” (Marx 1972:108). If phronesis is the key to Aristotle’s 
moral philosophy, praxis forms the heart of Marx’s strong program in moral sociology.24
However, although both Aristotle and Marx described their respective 
predecessors as ‘idealists’ in need of critical empirical correctives, Aristotle’s empirical 
critique appears to lack an historical-r/evolutionary element. As a result, Aristotle 
wonders how individuals can ‘become good’ rather than how the world itself can be 
24  Aristotle also has a concept of praxis, but phronesis is generally considered to be the relevant 
comparative term (Lobkowicz 1967).
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transformed in order to meet human needs (and even to generate and to fulfill new ones). 
In his Politics, Aristotle criticizes Plato for outlining ideals that are appealing in their 
perfection (Aristotle 1941: II.6 1265a10–15) but unrealistic, whereas “We should 
consider, not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is 
easily attainable” (IV.1 1288b35). For Marx, this is an empiricism of adjustment, not 
revolution. He aimed at eliminating social evils, not at perfecting individual virtues.
Aristotle ties phronesis to an understanding of individual character formation as 
an accumulation process activated by natural aptitude, habituation, education, and 
experience. Through right action, teaching, and repeated exercise of practical judgement, 
inborn abilities develop into practical wisdom in human affairs. The principle that 
phronesis is best exercised in situations of leadership has the important consequence that 
it tends to depend upon, reproduce, and to justify hierarchical and tutelary relations.
Aristotle’s theory of individual character is linear, but his theory of socio-political 
change is cyclical, based upon a formal typology of governments (i.e., 
Monarchy/Tyranny; Aristocracy/Oligarchy; Polity/Democracy), that periodically give 
way to each other in a kind of circuit. According to Marx, Aristotle could not conceive of 
revolutionary change or of history in the modern sense because he assumed human 
relations of domination and subordination to be permanent and natural, especially those 
between 1) free male citizens and women, slaves, and children (i.e., the political realm vs. 
the household); 2) rich and poor; and 3) teacher and student. One finds little sensitivity in 
Aristotle for the subtle ways in which experiences of hierarchy and inequality might 
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deform the practical reason of both dominated and dominant groups. His biological 
metaphysics restricted his concept of phronesis, rendering revolution circular and 
repetitious, not linear and potentially novel. Chapter seven will address the work of 
Alasdair MacIntyre, whose critical and Marxian re-reading of Aristotle attempts to ditch 
Aristotle’s insistence on ‘natural slaves’ and to synthesize Aristotle’s focus on individual 
virtues with Marx’s insistence on revolutionary transformation in a renovated concept of 
‘practice.’ Some followers of Alasdair MacIntyre now trumpet a program of Marx-
inflected “Revolutionary Aristotelianism” (Blackledge and Knight, eds. 2011).
We conventionally distinguish Marx’s notion of praxis from phronesis in several 
important ways. First, praxis implies reality’s historical and dialectical ‘fluidity,’ and its 
potential for radical and novel change. One of the keys to this fluidity lies in the nature of 
praxis itself as an emergent form of activity that develops from a particular position 
within a social order, transforming that order. Thus bourgeois society emerged within 
feudal society as the revolutionizing practice of an emergent and competitive business 
class. Second, praxis develops through class formation rather than through individual 
development. In the case of proletarian praxis, it will do so in a manner that ultimately 
subverts hierarchical relations (and class) rather than stabilizing them. Above all, 
proletarian praxis, as a form of work, produces; rather than merely responding to the 
decision-demanding dilemmas of the human condition, as in Aristotle, it actively and 
directly creates that human condition itself. Revolutionary proletarian praxis, as opposed 
to practical wisdom, or phronesis, will emerge from a society organized around inequality 
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and exploitation, but it will burst these relations of domination and subordination. This 
implies some freedom with respect to character as something permanently stamped-on 
from the outside, as unfreedom. Alienated labourers are transformed and transform 
themselves into the gravediggers of capitalist society. They complete the process of 
organization begun by the capitalist mode of production. Revolutionizing praxis reclaims 
the sociality of character, embedding it in a dynamic dialectical process.
While Aristotle develops an individual, linear, and cumulative conception of 
character formation, Marx theorizes character formation—implicitly rather than explicitly
—historically and in terms of classes rather than individuals. What accumulates are not 
so much virtues as class characteristics (e.g., the bourgeoisie as vampiric) that emerge 
dialectically from forms and degrees of socially produced inequality and exploitation. 
Through periods of accumulation classes develop distinct characteristics based upon the 
division of labour and their material life conditions, but since their relationships with 
each other are conflictual rather than mutual, these periods systematically deform 
sociality, intensify contradictions between classes, and ultimately culminate in 
revolutionary moments of crisis that generate new social systems and social classes. 
These revolutions are not mere repetitions of the past. They are transformations that 
produce novel social forms and new social characters. The bourgeoisie differ greatly. as a 
ruling class, from the landed aristocracy that they displaced.
On this view, history, while driven by class conflict, appears as a revolutionarily 
punctuated unrolling. In a way, Marx sublates the Aristotelian notion of human 
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flourishing, which Aristotle had confined to individual history, or at least to civilizational 
cycles. In Marx, human flourishing is both humanly created and determined 
(denaturalized), and historically emergent. His theory of revolution emphasizes the 
productive and novel possibilities of socio-political crises. As a form of praxis develops 
it may break the bonds of the past, revolutionizing the forces and relations of production, 
and transvaluing previously dominant morality. In the proletarian revolution, rather than 
being bound to their class character as to an investment—as the bourgeoisie are bound to 
their bank accounts and to the logic of capital—the proletariat will produce a character 
reversal that releases humanity from the bonds of hitherto existing forms of character, 
character as a measure of personal qualities that is confined to systems of unequal social 
relations. Within class society, the dominant class accumulates the bulk of socially 
recognized and rewarded virtues and a near monopoly on (virtuous) character,25 just as 
they accumulate the bulk of the material wealth by controlling the means of production. 
Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach makes the point:
The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and 
upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other 
circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change 
circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself.  
Hence, this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, 
one of which is superior to society (in Robert Owen, for example).
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human 
activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as 
revolutionising practice. (Marx 1972:108)
The ‘doctrine’ Marx refers to here is not Aristotle’s (cf. Carrier 2006), and Owen’s 
25  One’s reputation becomes a characteristically bourgeois obsession, as Weber noted well in his 
discussion (1958b) of Benjamin Franklin. Bourdieu’s influential work Distinction (1984) elaborates this 
logic in instructive ways, as will be discussed in chapter seven.
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criteria for dividing society into two parts were not Aristotle’s, but Aristotle and Owen 
both accepted a division between active and passive classes and a relationship of 
necessary tutelage between them. Owen, the wealthy 19th century English industrialist, 
fancied himself capable of transforming social relations into cooperative ones by means 
of paternalistic social engineering. For both Aristotle and Owen, good governance comes 
from above. They also shared a view of human character conceived as the gradual 
development of virtues (cf. Owen 1966:23–24). Since Marx has such a different notion of 
character, and little to say, directly, about the virtues other than to puncture bourgeois 
claims to them, it is only by means of an hermeneutic reconstruction that a Marxian 
conception of the virtues could be elaborated. Like Owen and Aristotle, Marx believed 
that only some people were in a position to develop particular abilities. However, in 
Marx’s view, the crucial individuals with regard to the changing of social circumstances 
were embedded in social circumstances rather than from a class somehow ‘superior to 
society.’ With regard to the proletarian revolution, the key actors were embedded in 
working-class struggle, in the direct enactment and production of revolutionizing praxis, 
through which society undergoes tutelage by the working-class itself.26
26  It is well-known that in the Manifesto Marx and Engels give a privileged position to two groups: 1) the 
“small section of the ruling class [that] cuts itself adrift and joins the revolutionary class...a portion of the 
bourgeois ideologists who have raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical 
movement as a whole” (1972:343); and 2) “The Communists...the most advanced and resolute section of 
the working-class parties of every country...they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of 
clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian 
movement” (346). These two concessions, the first of which makes room for Marx and Engels themselves, 
and the second of which makes room for the Party, those dedicated entirely to labour organizing, do not, 
technically, describe groups that are ‘superior to society,’ but they were used as the ideological justification 
for the hierarchical Soviet party system. Marxist and Marx-inspired theories of education have been 
struggling with this dilemma for over a century (cf., Gramsci, Freire, and Rancière). Althusser’s solution, 
the overcoming of ‘class instinct’ by adopting a proletarian ‘class position,’ (1971:12–13) does not satisfy, 
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According to Marx, Aristotle took social divisions as natural and permanent 
divisions because of his social context. Marx called Aristotle, “the greatest thinker of 
antiquity” (Marx 1978:384), but saw him as incapable of comprehending the political-
economic basis of his own society. Aristotle condemned market exchange (chrematistics), 
and Marx quoted him approvingly (1978:150–151n.2), but he did not understand its 
inseparability from oikonomia (household economics). Aristotle could not link his 
critique of exchange value to his appreciation of use value because he lived in a society 
based upon slave labour, which he accepted as natural:
The secret of the expression of value, namely, that all kinds of labour are 
equal and equivalent, because, and so far as they are human labour in 
general, cannot be deciphered, until the notion of human equality has 
already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice. This, however, is 
possible only in a society in which the great mass of the produce of labour 
takes the form of commodities, in which, consequently, the dominant 
relation between man and man, is that of owners of commodities. (Marx 
1978:65–66)
Marx attributes Aristotle’s inability to understand the truth of social relationships—both 
the centrality of labour and the character of historical change—to his social context rather 
than to his lack of intelligence or virtue. The material basis of Athenian society was 
fundamentally obscure. In spite of the Greek philosophers’ tendency to use metaphors of 
light and sight to represent knowledge, Greek society lacked the transparency that would 
enable real insight into its social conditions. Thus, while Plato’s parable of the cave 
depicts the members of society as enslaved, emancipation takes place entirely in the 
mind, leaving real material slavery uncriticized, useful only as a metaphor, and the 
and I express as much in scattered comments throughout the dissertation.
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obscurity of the fundamental social relationships of Greek society undermines Aristotle’s 
attempted critique of abstract idealism. Marx argues that Hegel’s philosophy fails for the 
same kinds of reasons.
D. MARX & HEGEL: REVOLUTIONARY SITTLICHKEIT?
Both Marx and Hegel follow Aristotle’s critique of Plato in setting themselves up against 
their predecessor’s abstract idealism. Hegel returned to Aristotle in criticizing Kant’s 
notion of Moralität by means of the notion of concrete ethical life (Sittlichkeit). 
According to Hegel, the synthesis of morality as the subjective will and ethical life as a 
society’s concrete practices and realities, could not be achieved in the abstract form of a 
universal lawfulness, like the ‘categorical imperative’ (1991:162, 186). The problem lies 
less in the categorical imperative itself than in misunderstanding its basis for validity, the 
practical basis for its actual content. On Hegel’s reading, the failure of the French 
Revolution followed as a consequence of the abstractness of its principles, the product of 
a misguided attempt to force content into an hypothetical form (on this point Hegel is 
sometimes compared with the English conservative Edmund Burke). Kant’s distinction 
between duty and inclination, which divides the moral imperative from one’s material 
disposition, is a false dichotomy. Hegel reframes the opposition as that between 
individual will (‘subjective’ ethical life) and the social system of rational institutions 
(‘objective’ ethical life) (Wood 1991:xii). When these two contradict, as in the classical 
Greek context depicted in Sophocles’ Antigone, the system of ethical life becomes tragic.
Marx contended, however, that Hegel’s concept of concrete ‘ethical life’ did not 
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protect him from also being one-sided and abstract. How does Marx make this claim? 
Once again, we shall turn to the concept of praxis, this time contrasting it with Hegel’s 
notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). While Hegel’s concept is historicist and dialectical, 
Sittlichkeit, like Aristotle’s phronesis, lacks, in Marx’s view, the possibility of successful 
revolutionary activity. This becomes more apparent in Hegel’s later writings, which use 
the concept, according to Marx, in circular fashion “to transfigure and to glorify the 
existing state of things” (Marx 1978:29; cf. Engels 1941:13). Hegel’s moral theory lacks 
concrete links to productive labour, and becomes an abstract category in a moral theory 
attached to contemporary bourgeois moral conventions but detached from contemporary 
material relations of production (precisely because of the alienation inherent in these 
relations of production). By the time of the Philosophy of Right, labour has become 
sidelined within the “system of needs” (Habermas 1973:162), a concept derived from 
Hegel’s appropriation of the Scottish Enlightenment’s concept of civil society.
Aristotle criticized Plato for being unrealistic. Hegel made the same criticism of 
Kant. Marx criticizes Hegel’s dialectical idealism not for being unrealistic, but for being 
upside-down: “With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again” 
(Marx 1978:29). Idealistic philosophy mystifies the true relationship between ideas and 
material reality, making it impossible to recognize either the really existing social 
relations of exploitation or the actual ‘fluid movement’ of these social relations. In the 
dialectical idealism of Hegel’s ‘reason in history,’ it all seems to take place in the life of 
the mind, rather than in material reality. As Marx puts it, “In Hegel, therefore, the 
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negation of the negation is not the confirmation of the true essence, effected precisely 
through negation of the pseudo-essence. With him the negation of the negation is the 
confirmation of the pseudo-essence, or of the self-estranged essence in its denial” 
(1972:96). The ‘mobile nature’ of social life is revealed in thought, but simultaneously 
confined to thought; true existence seems to take place in philosophy (97).27 Hegel is the 
first to formulate a dialectical account of history, but he becomes as accommodationist as 
Aristotle, and Marx lumps Hegel and Aristotle with Plato, arguing that the real problem 
of abstract thought is not too much optimism about the way things could be (lack of 
realism), but too much acceptance of the way things are (lack of criticism).
Marx locates Hegel’s missteps in the Philosophy of Right’s depiction of the 
relationship between State and civil society. Adopting the Scottish concept of civil 
society, Hegel incorporated and integrated egoistic activity into a social whole, thus 
making a significant move beyond Aristotle’s model (Hönneth 1995:13). According to 
Hegel, civil society is the realm of individual pursuit of self-interest (Hegel 1991:190). 
For Hegel this sphere constitutes an objective ‘system of needs’ (225). Following Adam 
Smith, following Mandeville (following Machiavelli), Hegel sees this egoistic sphere as 
producing public goods from private vices, that is to say, universals out of particulars. 
But he does not want to call them vices; neither does he want to use an atomistic model 
of the social (220). Hegel’s model assumes a primordial sociality while walking the line 
between Rousseau and Hobbes. He argues that the relation between State and civil 
society, when mediated by guild-like corporations (Stand) dialectically enables the 
27  Most famously: “What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (Hegel 1991:20).
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further development of Spirit, for
...[Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing 
this limitation and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and 
the continuum [Zusammenhang] of this external necessity, and in the very 
process of adapting itself to these limitations, by overcoming them and 
gaining its objective existence [Dasein] within them] Spirit is real only 
when by its own motion it divides itself, gives itself limit and finitude in 
the natural needs and the region of external necessity, and then, by 
moulding and shaping itself in them, overcomes them, and secures for 
itself an objective embodiment. (224)
By means of this dialectical process, the concretion of Spirit occurs in the citizens of the 
state, and “[their individuality [Einzelheit] and naturalness are raised...and subjectivity is 
educated in its particularity] the individual’s character is enlarged” (224).
Although Hegel wants to follow a dialectical movement, he retains a relatively 
cumulative notion of character development, one based, like Aristotle’s system, on 
virtues. The relationship between State and civil society, then, is one in which the self-
interested sphere of civil society is sublated, emerging as the ethical realm of a State that 
takes care of the education (Bildung) of its citizens. This is not the revolutionary model of 
character that we find in Marx. Most importantly, for Marx, Hegel fails to address the 
general effects on class character. In conceiving of the dialectical reversal or cancellation 
of self-interest into ethical life at the level of the individual citizen, who is transformed 
from a self-interested actor into a conscientious civil servant (cf. MacGregor 1984), 
Hegel neglects the relations of production and the real material contradictions between 
classes, accepting, instead, the apparently functional-organicist model of society that 
Aristotle espoused, with the addition of the sphere of civil society. We will see such a 
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model again with Durkheim.
Marx accepts the conception of civil society as the realm of “egoistic man, of man 
separated from other men and from the community” (1972:40), but he does not accept 
society’s internal differentiation into the spheres of family, corporation, civil society, and 
State (especially the German state) as its final destination, or as a good thing in itself. 
Capitalist social differentiation, the increased division of labour, enables increased 
productivity, but it is productivity tied to the domination and exploitation of a class 
increasingly divested of all property rights (the proletariat) by a class increasingly 
possessed of all property (the bourgeoisie). It is pure alienation. For there to be a truly 
social emancipation rather than a merely political emancipation, State and civil society 
must themselves be done away with (51). Marx states this in theses nine and ten of the 
‘Theses on Feuerbach’ (109). The formation of the proletariat—a class to end all classes
—in the womb of capitalistic society, makes such a transformation possible. The 
collective proletarian experience of capitalism generates class consciousness in the form 
of a ‘revolutionary Sittlichkeit’; rather than the phronesis Aristotle attributed to 
experienced statesmen, the exploitation of the proletariat will produce a practical 
reaction, the educators will get their much needed education, and human activity will 
finally be recognized for its power to change circumstances.
Is such a ‘revolutionary Sittlichkeit’ likely to develop? And is such a 
revolutionizing practice as Marx describes (insofar as he actually describes it) capable of 
doing away with State and civil society, or with class as such? The events of the 20 th 
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century lend little support to such a viewpoint. Leaving this question aside, however, let 
us return to the question of Marx’s ‘strong program’ in the sociology of morality. We 
began by arguing that although Marx declines to pursue a science of morality in the 
abstract or in isolation from other spheres (i.e., especially the economic sphere), and 
though he rejects the possibility of doing this from a neutral standpoint, he does not reject 
the importance of moral criteria as such. Marx’s writings constantly try to undermine 
both ‘neutral’ economic discourse and hypocritical bourgeois moralizing. His approach 
attempts to generate a unified model. Marx shares this attitude with both Aristotle and 
Hegel, who criticize Plato and Kant, respectively, for their abstraction of moral questions 
from reality. He differs from Aristotle and Hegel, however, because he adds revolution.
Marx argues in favour of a form of revolutionizing practice that will negate 
capitalistic society and, along with it, the abstractions of citizenship and the obscurities of 
State and civil society. The bourgeois abstractions of Enlightenment rationality which, via 
social contract theory, forget history or read it upside-down, as Hegel does, must be 
exploded by praxis, which understands history and then sublates it by means of 
revolution, “ridding itself of all the muck of ages” (Marx 1972:157) so that “the present 
dominates the past” (347); only through social revolution will merely political 
emancipation become truly human emancipation.
But what is truly human emancipation? If the abstractions of contractarian and 
organicist models of social life produce a kind of forgetting, truly human emancipation 
must be a kind of re-membering. This, indeed, is what Marx describes. In a truly human 
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society, all are members, and the character of human species-being becomes fully 
transparent. The dissolution of class society leads to the constitution of a new classless 
society. While modern means of production are preserved and extended, relations of 
production are reconstituted as collectively organized endeavours.
Transparency is not merely a metaphor, here; it is the telos of the Marxian strong 
program, which is why the Marxian project is best expressed by an ocular model. 
Bourgeois society begins the process of tearing away the ‘sentimental veil’ of feudal 
society by its competitive need to constantly revolutionize the instruments of production. 
In the famous phrase, “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man 
is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations 
with his kind” (338). What bourgeois society begins, communist society completes. This 
holds particularly for bourgeois values like the ‘popular prejudice’ of human equality, for 
once social relations are revealed in their truth, they can be transformed by revolution.
For Marx, social transparency entails full possession of our human senses. In The 
German Ideology, Marx and Engels build their critique of German Idealist philosophy on 
the basis of its abstractness, its non-sensuousness. German philosophy reflects German 
society’s ‘illusory community’ (1972:124, 125, 129, 137, 139, 151, 152, 159, 161), which 
is based on an abstract and ‘imaginary’ (130, 131, 137, 158, 162, 163) conceptualization 
of social relations which have “won an existence independent of the individuals; a power 
which in the last resort can only be broken by a revolution” (159). The proletariat must 
come into direct opposition to the State in order to overthrow that State (164). 
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Overthrowing the State means doing away with the independent, estranged existence of 
human production (of commodities, the State, law, etc.), leaving only direct human 
relationships: “The reality, which communism is creating, is precisely the true basis for 
rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of individuals, insofar as 
reality is only a product of the preceding intercourse of individuals themselves” (157). 
With revolution, the good life will finally be achieved, free of abstract bourgeois 
moralizing, free of classes, State, and law; we will have a fully transparent social world.28
On the basis of this notion that pure transparency or immediacy (i.e., non-
necessity of the mediation of the State) is the condition of the future communist society, 
Marx suggests that faith will not be necessary (1972:36).29 Once reality is no longer 
hidden by ideological mist, there is no more need to believe in the invisible, or to make it 
visible by means of imagination or abstraction. In the communist society, everything is 
transparent and everything is visible.30 To produce this transparency, revolution must 
dissolve the illusory hopes of bourgeois emancipation. This is perhaps the real difference 
between Marxian messianic eschatology and its traditional religious counterparts. Rather 
28  Althusser’s critique of the “mirror myth of knowledge” (Althusser and Balibar 1979:19) is well known 
for its argument against knowledge as “the mere relation of vision” (19) and his argument that “we must 
abandon the mirror myths of immediate vision and reading, and conceive knowledge as a production” (24). 
Indeed, Althusser has a general goal of limiting the power of metaphor in his analysis (26–27). He fails.
29  Universal visibility appears to entail the non-necessity of the ‘sociological imagination’ in the 
communist society. Was this why sociology was at a certain point deemed unnecessary (and therefore 
suppressed) in the Soviet Union (cf. Zilberman 1978)? See G.A. Cohen (1980) for a related argument. Of 
course, this also implies the non-necessity of dialectical thought, as such (cf. Adorno 1973:150). In 
practice, the demand for transparency, the demand that society take on, in Feuerbachian manner, the 
attributes of divinity (i.e., omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, etc.) became the basis, in Stalinist 
Russia, for the infinite expansion of surveillance. The messianic form, concepts of faith and of hope, and a 
less ironic use of the theological, returns to Marxism with Ernst Bloch and Walter Benjamin.
30  Visibility (‘seen’) and transparency (‘seen through’) have a rather contradictory relation, of course.
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than the consummation of faith, the communist society makes faith unnecessary.
E. TRANSPARENCY VS. REFLECTION: MARX & THE THEORY OF MORAL 
SENTIMENTS
These somewhat simplistic claims about transparency bring us up against models of the 
social that are based upon a permanent obscurity or mediation in human consciousness 
due to its intersubjective and reflective character.31 In the section that follows, two such 
models will be considered. The first model is that found in Adam Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments. The second model is Hegel’s recognition model, taken primarily from 
the section of the Phenomenology of Spirit that deals with the master/slave dialectic, but 
developing under the influence of Axel Hönneth’s project, which developed from the 
work of his teacher, Habermas (1973:142–169), and focuses on Hegel’s earlier writings 
from Jena (Hönneth 1995). Marx makes the following argument with regard to these two 
sorts of models: while individual humans achieve full humanity only in social 
relationships, “the intercourse of individuals” (1972:157) does not need to permanently 
include a moment of alienation, that is, a losing of the self in otherness in order to regain 
the self. Of course, ‘in all hitherto existing societies’ the fundamental dynamic has been 
class struggle; historically, social groups have come into being in competition with other 
social groups, defined by relative positions of domination and subordination, by the 
asymmetrical distribution of property and honour, freedoms and restrictions. But this 
competitive struggle for recognition, with its necessary detour of alienation and 
estrangement, is not fundamental to human nature. The struggle for recognition can no 
31  Or due to the fallibility or one-sidedness of reason, as in Weber’s reading of modernity through the 
notion of rationalization rather than alienation (cf. Löwith 1993).
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more be successfully separated from productive labour than the theory of morality. The 
fundamental question, as he puts it in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, is 
species life, “the working-up of the objective world,” the ability to freely “form things in 
accordance with the laws of beauty” (1972:62).
In the communist society, the otherness involved in the objective world that we 
freely create by our activity involves objectification but not alienation (Lukács 
1967:xxiv). Only our own will constrains our intercourse with the world and with others; 
we have no illusions about the origins or meaning of this objective world. If there is 
reflection, it is an un-flickering reflection, without distortion. Alienation arises from 
concrete relations of production that consist “in tearing away from man the object of his 
production” (Marx 1972:62). Estrangement from others follows rather than preceding this 
condition: “an immediate consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product 
of his labour, from his life-activity, from his species being, is the estrangement of man 
from man” (63). Historical developments in labour and production initiate the fall into 
estrangement and alienation rather than these being a part of social relations as such.
Marx accepts that, historically, the phases of alienation humanity experienced in 
the different modes of production (i.e., primitive, ancient, feudal, and capitalistic), have 
enabled the emergence of the coming communist society, but this future mode of society 
will bring an end to alienation. Therefore, Marx’s notion of self-transparency, whether 
tied to the so-called ‘early Marx’ concept of ‘species life’ or not, cannot, in the end, be 
based on a reflective social psychology of the sort embodied either in Smith’s ‘man 
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within the breast’ or in Hegel’s model of recognition. The problem of recognition, like the 
problem of morality, must not be dealt with independently of economic considerations.
In his works of political economy Marx cites Adam Smith more than anyone else 
except perhaps for David Ricardo. It may not seem surprising that he makes almost 
exclusive use of Smith’s Wealth of Nations (hereafter WN) in the context of economic 
discussions, but the economic topic of Capital, the Grundrisse, and other writings, does 
not fully explain why Marx never explicitly deals with Smith’s other major work, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (hereafter TMS). He does refers to it in a footnote in Capital 
(1978:579, n.2), and the ‘tranquility’ passages in the Grundrisse dealt with below could 
easily have been addressed to passages of TMS which contain arguments about labour 
identical with ones in WN. So why does Marx ignore Smith’s theory of morality?
The simple answer follows our claim that Marx did not want to take up 
recognition as an isolated question: analyzing Smith’s theory of morals would waste time 
and confuse the reader. Marx’s strong program bars him from treating morality on its 
own. It is best treated as an ideological effect of material social relations. Treating it as an 
independent sphere simply reifies its force. In this Marx occupies a position at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Smith, whose division of spheres seemed so complete 
that it gave rise, amongst his 19th century German interpreters to ‘Das Adam Smith 
Problem’ (Teichgraeber 1981), namely, the difficulty of reconciling the basic thesis of 
WN, the human “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith 
1952:6) with that of TMS, that sympathy for others forms the basis of the moral order.
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This is all conjecture. Nowhere does Marx give an explicit explanation for 
ignoring TMS. The real question concerns the significance a combined reading of WN and 
TMS has for Marx’s critical reading of Smith, and here there are two relevant elements: 1) 
Marx claims that Smith lacks historical insight into the social basis of economic 
relations; 2) Marx rejects Smith’s characterization of work as sacrifice. After discussing 
these two critiques, based on WN, we will examine their applicability to TMS.
With respect to history, in the Grundrisse Marx criticizes the economists’ lack of 
socio-historical insight into self-interested activity in the realm of civil society:
...private interest is itself already a socially determined interest, which can 
be achieved only within the conditions laid down by society and with the 
means provided by society; hence it is bound to the reproduction of these 
conditions and means. It is the interest of private persons; but its content, 
as well as the form and means of its realization, is given by social 
conditions independent of all. (1973:156)
According to Marx, economists fail to produce a legitimate social history of the present. 
With respect to Smith, Marx makes this remark: “What Adam Smith, in the true 
eighteenth-century manner, puts in the prehistoric period, the period preceding history, is 
rather a product of history” (1973:156). According to Marx, the political economists did 
not acknowledge the way that human interaction, and in the modern civil sphere probably 
more than in any other sphere, takes place in concrete socio-historical contexts. Smith 
advances significantly over contract theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau by refusing to 
begin with an hypothetical state of nature, but he stops short of developing a truly 
historical and concrete view of social development based in real and systematic analysis 
of human history. Marx has Smith’s ahistorical claim about the universality of ‘truck, 
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barter, and exchange,’ in mind, here, which asserts the ubiquity of the pursuit of ‘private 
interest’ without taking note of the real historical conditions that have gone into 
producing the modern economic bourgeois class. Indeed, Smith explicitly brackets the 
question of the ‘originality’ of the propensity for exchange (1952:6–7).
With respect to work, Marx criticizes Smith for considering labour only as a 
sacrifice or a curse. This leads to a strictly utilitarian and instrumental view of work, in 
opposition to which “‘Tranquillity’ appears as the adequate state, as identical with 
‘freedom’ and ‘happiness’” (Marx 1973:611). The inadequacy of this utilitarian or 
instrumental view of work as only a means matches the inadequacy of the political 
economists’ view of history and follows from it. Marx continues: 
It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that the individual, ‘in his normal 
state of health...’, also needs a normal portion of work...Smith has no 
inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is itself a liberating 
activity...self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real 
freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. (611)
As part of his concept of alienation, Marx concedes that in all the forms of work that have 
characterized class society (i.e., slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour) work really 
does appear as an undesirable activity. However, taking the character of labour in class-
society as the nature of work as such signifies another failure to think through the 
historical nature of social life and the real character of human activity. We need work, and 
we need to work creatively. In fact, it is through creative work that we become fully 
human. This form of work, free from the coercion of slave, serf, or wage-labour relations, 
is not merely its opposite, that is, tranquility, leisure, relaxation, non-seriousness. Not at 
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all. For Marx, “Really free working, e.g., composing, is at the same time precisely the 
most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion” (611). Work of this sort becomes 
possible, according to Marx, when two conditions hold: “(1) when its social character is 
posited, (2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time general character, not merely 
human exertion...but exertion as subject...an activity regulating all the forces of nature” 
(611–612).
To what extent do these two criticisms apply to Smith’s TMS? Well, with respect 
to history, Marx’s criticism is, if anything, more true of TMS than it is of WN. WN 
attempts to systematically assemble and analyze a wealth of statistical and historical 
detail, that is, to carry out Rousseau’s dictum in the Social Contract, “count, measure, 
compare” (Rousseau 1968:191). TMS, on the other hand, sets out an ahistorical model of 
moral sentiments that contains a significant nostalgia for Classical Greek society, 
Stoicism in particular, but without constituting a truly historical and historicizing theory 
of moral development. Like his contemporary Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History 
of Civil Society (1995), Smith’s TMS contains significant cyclical themes.
Smith develops a truly sociological theory of morality, in TMS, but one built on 
the social imagination, rather than on creative work, or social ‘exertion as subject.’ Thus 
Marx would take the division of Smith’s economics from his social-psychology/moral 
philosophy for an evasion which enables Smith to construct a biographical but ahistorical 
model of self-consciousness and of the moral sentiments based in the individual 
imagination rather than in social and historical labour. To put it simply, Smith constructs 
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a perfectly accurate model of bourgeois morality (or of morality in aristocratic-becoming-
bourgeois society), which naturally treats the realm of morality as something distinct 
from that of the economy. This was implicit in the earlier discussion of Marx’s analysis of 
bourgeois hypocrisy. In fact, this should suggest that Smith’s failure to bring WN and 
TMS together in an explicit synthesis signifies more than Marx’s failure to discuss TMS.
It is appropriate to rehearse the basic elements of Smith’s important and 
groundbreaking sociology of morals. To begin with, the division of the economic from 
the moral sphere allows Smith to begin TMS with this rather non-economic claim:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and 
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it 
except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the 
emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or 
are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. (Smith 1984:9)
Marx writes in tones of moral outrage tempered by irony, not pity, but as a follower of 
Rousseau, Marx would agree on pity’s importance. Smith conceives of pity differently, 
and his view of society’s effect on ‘natural’ sentiments diverges greatly from Rousseau’s. 
For Smith, pity, as a pre-social human instinct, is natural, but not very powerful. In most 
circumstances, although the average person can feel pity for others, “The most frivolous 
disaster which could befal himself would occasion a more real disturbance” (136) than 
the catastrophic disappearance of an entire (far off) nation. For Smith, only social 
interaction can transform this rather ‘feeble spark of benevolence’ into a power strong 
enough to produce really sympathetic action. According to Smith, as opposed to the pre-
social and largely visually-based feeling of pity, “Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so 
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much from the view of the passion, as from the situation which excites it” (12). 
Sympathetically understanding a situation requires a socially developed power of 
imagination that exceeds the direct effects of pity.
In social situations we find ourselves compelled to use our imagination, both in 
our attempts to express our own experiences and in our attempts to understand those of 
others; for instance, we are commonly impelled to judge the veracity of another’s claims 
to be in pain. We must use our faculty of imagination, on the one hand, in order to put 
ourselves in the position of the other with respect to their experience (22), and on the 
other hand, to imagine how we must appear to them. Both feeling sympathy for and 
evoking sympathy from the other require the mediation of imagination.
Smith argues that the repeated need to make such judgments in relation to another 
person necessitates the development of an established ability to change positions, in the 
imagination, in order to view the situation “from the place and with the eyes of a third 
person, who has no particular connexion with either, and who judges with impartiality 
between us” (135). Smith calls this third, imaginary person, the ‘impartial spectator.’ We 
develop the ability to consult this ‘impartial spectator’ in the course of everyday 
interaction with others. Such an ‘impartial spectator’ is necessary for the development not 
only of moral sentiments, but of self-consciousness as such.
While the development of this ability goes some distance to socially strengthening 
the original force of our compassion, it is not particularly strong at first (26). Something 
more is needed, and, indeed, something more is forthcoming, again by means of a natural 
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development of our social natures. When we combine this ability to imaginatively take 
the position of others with our strong impulse toward self-interest, it develops into a full-
blown conscience, a desire to be able to approve of ourselves and our actions from an 
impartial perspective. Smith calls this conscience the ‘man within the breast.’32 The 
dialectical interaction of self-interest and sympathetic imagination transforms our 
impulses of self-love into the love of the “superiority of our own characters” (137). By 
combining the weak sentiment of pity with the faculty of imagination, Smith formulates 
the origins of a force capable of binding individuals to others by their desire to be able to 
approve of their own actions according to rigorous and impartial social principles 
standing above their immediate self-interest.
To return to our imaginary Marxian critique, the first thing to suggest is that Marx 
would have rejected Smith’s emphasis on the development in the imagination of the other 
person’s position. Both the impartial spectator and the ‘man within the breast’ would be, 
for Marx, bourgeois concepts applying to bourgeois characters living in relatively similar 
material conditions, encountering each other in the kind of face-to-face encounters that 
would lead to some conception and acceptance of their real, material equality. Between 
classes, by contrast, such an impartial spectator would have a ghostly existence indeed. 
Between classes, in situations of real material conflict, the imagination shows itself 
consistently incapable of achieving any such moral sympathy, serving, instead, to 
reinforce rationalizations of inequality and domination (perhaps most effectively in forms 
32  While Smith sometimes uses ‘impartial spectator’ and ‘man within the breast’ interchangeably, the latter 
introjected object is more appropriately associated with fully-developed moral capacity or conscience.
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of sentimental but hypocritical bourgeois charity), or finally revealed as an illusion hiding 
a fundamental conflict resolvable only by overthrowing the class relation entirely. Until 
their internal contradictions reach a critical limit, notions like the equality of all humans 
serve merely as justifications through mystification.
Precisely the former sort of conflict relation, one still merely simmering, not yet 
boiling over, kept Aristotle, the ‘greatest mind of antiquity,’ from recognizing the moral 
equality of women and slaves with citizens. As an earlier quote suggested, this barrier to 
sympathy for other classes cannot be surpassed “until the notion of human equality has 
already acquired the fixity of a popular prejudice” (Marx 1978:65–66), and this is itself a 
consequence of the material development of the means and relations of production, which 
has as a consequence, not a cause, the development of the social imaginary (which, do 
not forget, Marx calls a ‘popular prejudice’).
Marx rates the imagination rather low as a potential contributor to intellectual 
virtue. It is rooted in material circumstances rather than being a semi-autonomous (and 
productive) form of reason, much less a science. While Marx everywhere implicitly 
endorses the force of natural sympathy as the basis for the social bond, this force requires 
the kind of transparent situation that will allow individuals to perceive at least some 
aspect of the other directly. The first and most important condition for workers’ solidarity 
is that the sameness of conditions of labour become so clear that a ‘class in and for itself’ 
can form. The bond becomes internal to the members of the class, since they are engaged 
in shared productive labour. The role of the ‘popular prejudice’ about equality can only at 
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a certain material point become operative in this regard, as a collectively produced and 
recognized orientation toward the social world. In a class society, which is based in class 
conflict, this can only happen when opposed classes become truly visible in their 
opposition to each other, when the limits of exploitation of one by the other have been 
reached. Proletarian revolutionizing practice critically mobilizes and then dissolves 
(shows to be abstract and unreal) the ‘popular prejudice’ about equality espoused or 
imagined by the bourgeoisie. The terrain shifts (Althusser and Balibar 1979).
TMS represents interactional conflict in relatively mild form, primarily because 
Smith deals anecdotally with conflict between individuals, not classes. This coincides 
with our suggestion that Smith divides the economic sphere from the moral sphere. 
However, since Smith’s mirror conception of conscience, one constituted by internalizing 
an imaginary external position, theorizes consciousness as such, it is perfectly capable of 
offering explanations for the dynamics of conflictual and asymmetrical relationships. 
Even conflictual relations, for Smith, are structured by efforts of the imagination.  Marx 
intentionally does not develop a social psychology of this sort. For Marx, any reflective 
or mirroring aspect of the self is much more material, and not merely metaphorical or 
imaginary. In Marx, the mirroring happens to a large extent outside of consciousness, at 
the same time as it happens to consciousness. For Marx, we could say, mirrors are real 
objects, real products of human labour, and we relate to them via a real material dialectic, 
as their producers and users, producing effects in our material self-consciousness and 
orientation toward the social and material world. Instead of mirror metaphors, Marx 
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refers to forces and relations of production. Marx considers self-consciousness and 
reflection at the macro-level, as outcomes of the productive relations of the entire society.
Marx’s critique of social illusions, definitively stated in the section of Capital 
entitled ‘The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof’ (1978:76–87), derives in 
general terms from Rousseau, who first made the argument against the illusory nature of 
bourgeois consciousness, distinguishing the bourgeoisie from both the citizen and the 
natural man. Rousseau argues that culture, and society generally, which introduce 
inequality into human relations, have undermined morality by cutting off the possibility 
of a simple and straightforward relation to the self and its needs. Opposing the Hobbesian 
state of nature with his own hypotheses, Rousseau argues that in picturing a ‘war of all 
against all’ one mistakenly takes a variety of socially produced needs (i.e., those based in 
the social vices of pride, envy, and greed) for natural needs (1964:129). Marx drops the 
idea of a pre-societal ‘state of nature,’ substituting an undifferentiated ‘primitive society’ 
(cf. Engels 1942) and adding alienation from others as an initial stage of social 
development (i.e., a fall from natural to alienated sociality).
Rousseau sees the history of civilization as the gradual deterioration of morality 
and of authentic self-relation (1964:51). Marx rejects Rousseau’s nostalgia but largely 
adopts his critique of bourgeois morality (initially by adopting the term ‘bourgeois’ as a 
term of derision). For Marx, as for Rousseau, individual reflective self-understanding 
fundamentally misleads, becoming the source of all kinds of social vices posing as 
virtues. Above all, reflective self-understanding in a class society produces vanity and 
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hypocrisy; with regard to equality, hypocrisy is the illusion that one judges others by the 
same standard by which one judges oneself. On the basis of a scientific class analysis, 
some bourgeois ideologists (in training) can get as far as recognizing hypocrisy, and 
‘cutting themselves adrift’ from their class.
Again, following Rousseau, Marx sees the only way out of bourgeois illusion as 
the creation of a transparent form of society, one driven not by particular wills in 
competition with each other, nor even by the sum of individual wills, but by the general 
will. Something good can come from bourgeois society: the eventual destruction of all its 
own illusions. Although Marx does not accept Rousseau’s model of democracy, he 
accepts the ideal of a fully transparent society.
For Marx, to see the individual self as arising out of reflective relations 
fundamentally based in the imagination is to take sickness for a state of health. What 
Smith reads as the benign development of social sympathies, Marx reads as class struggle 
hidden by an ideological and one-sided conception of equality. For Marx, ‘impartiality’ 
sees only one side, and only from the outside. Formal equality renders substantive 
inequality invisible. The theory of the ‘impartial spectator’ enshrines estrangement as a 
permanent human condition. In fact, Smith argues that the real culmination of conscience 
comes in the civil sphere, in the realm of strangers. Intimate relations with family and 
friends are inadequate for the purposes of achieving a real moral impartiality, for “The 
propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be corrupted as when the indulgent 
and partial spectator is at hand” (Smith 1984:154). Here a key element of the slide from 
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the theory of moral sentiments to laissez-faire economics seems to have been 
accomplished, for Smith implies that, in the end, morality reaches its final development, 
its most impartial form, in the realm of civil society. Again, Smith does not adequately 
develop this link or its tensions (Mallory 2012).
According to Marx, however, the bourgeois conscience, or ‘man within the 
breast,’ holds to a variety of hypocritical ‘liberal’ beliefs, or popular prejudices (Marx 
1978:66) that serve to justify real inequality by means of an ideology of abstract equality 
or impartiality. This bourgeois conscience arises at a stage of history that must itself be 
superseded and does, in fact, supersede itself, for bourgeois activity is as much a form of 
revolutionizing activity as proletarian activity. The melting of solids, remember, is a 
process of bourgeois revolution, driven by the principle of competition (Panitch 2001:25). 
Smith’s bourgeois dialectic, by contrast, attempts to circumvent the revolutionary 
moment by making conscience into the endpoint of social development. For Marx, 
however, agonistic dialectical relations (i.e., in the form of class struggle) would 
presumably come to an end when, through revolutionizing practice, bourgeois conscience 
and its partner (i.e., exploitation; estrangement; inequality; fundamental guiltiness of 
social life) are transcended, along with class society, by the advent of communist society 
(cf. Adorno 1973:11, 150).
Against this strong program, Smith’s weak program contends that social relations 
are permanently structured by the detour of the imagination. Importantly, Smith 
acknowledges the fallibility of this imagination. Indeed, stretching his concept of the 
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imagination to the point of infallibility would reduce it to the utilitarianism that he 
steadily pushed to the margins of TMS. In fact, for Smith, society works, indeed thrives, 
precisely because the social dialectics of ‘impartial spectator’ and ‘man within the 
breast,’ of self-interest and self-regard, have a certain tendency to error built into their 
functioning. Here Smith’s laissez-faire conception of providence, the ‘invisible hand,’ 
comes on the scene, and a synthesis of Smith’s two great works again appears possible.
Smith’s economic and moral analyses appear to be bound by the notion of 
unintended but beneficial consequences of action. These unintended consequences are 
rooted in a certain consistent failure of thought to understand its own purposes; that is, 
reason fails to recognize the true character of its underlying motives, and consequently 
misunderstands the results of action. In the economic sphere, our admiration of utility as 
such—our tendency to imagine, admire33 and desire a utility which nonetheless exceeds 
our own possibilities of use or consumption (1984:179–180)—drives us to forms of 
productive labour that provide a surplus; the result is an increase in the material wealth of 
all. Our imagination is driven both by the natural appeal of utility for its own sake, and 
the notion, based on imagining the lives of the wealthy, that wealth will produce 
happiness. This is a deception, but “It is this deception which rouses and keeps in 
continual motion the industry of mankind” (183).
Smith’s providentialism remarkably synthesizes Rousseau’s bleak version of the 
33  Smith transforms the concept of utility from top to bottom. Some contemporary economists still have 
not assimilated this insight, especially regarding its applicability to public works projects. The fault may lie 
with Smith’s own failure to explicitly develop the relationship between TMS and WN. One avenue for 
exploring Smith’s contemporary relevance would be a comparison with Bourdieu’s conception of fields.
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mirror self and Bernard de Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees (1957), rendering a more 
benign judgment on the nature of social life than either of his predecessors. Self-
interested actors find themselves producing more than they can consume, “and thus 
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society” (Smith 
1984:185). At the same time, rather than being lost in envy, greed, and vanity, like 
Rousseau’s bourgeoisie, Smith’s citizen, compelled by the formal egoism of civil society, 
its status as a ‘society of strangers,’ develops capacities of impartiality and fairness. Self-
interested activity advances not only the material interests of society, it also produces an 
unexpected moral surplus. It is important to note, of course, that Smith did not have 
absolute faith in the ‘invisible hand,’ and registered a variety of concerns about future 
social developments, including the development of capitalistic monopolies, and 
alienating working conditions (West 1969). In addition, the ‘invisible hand’ does not 
ensure happiness but only social benefit or interest conceived as increases in material 
productivity and wealth (Smith 1984:184; 1952:194).
Marx criticizes bourgeois morality, however, for being hypocritical, not for its 
fallibility. Class-interest hides behind moral platitudes. The hypocrisy can only be 
cancelled by social revolution. But if Smith is correct, and we cannot escape the need to 
render the invisible (self) visible by means of the imagination, our situation is more 
complicated, for in Smith’s system, intellectual error has been turned to the service of 
society, not in Marx’s revolutionary sense that the proletarian revolution was gestating in 
the womb of bourgeois society, but in the evolutionary-adaptive sense that society was 
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turning individual-oriented activity to collective account.
Significant consequences for our conception of labour follow from Smith’s 
providential synthesis of error and social benefit. In general, apart from the minimal 
labour necessary for survival, labour must be motivated and mediated, according to 
Smith, by the imagination. The appeal of utility exceeds the use of utility (cf. Arendt 
1998:154). If there is no separating work from the imagination then, by extension, there 
is no work, even the production of a perfect work of art, that is not subject to unintended 
and misunderstood consequences. As a result, there is no possibility of bringing the 
economy under the completely rational control of utilitarian considerations, since 
utilitarian considerations are themselves always impossible to isolate from aesthetic 
considerations or from the underlying social dynamics that give them their social force. 
Smith’s remarks on the ‘man of system,’ which recall those of Aristotle on the difference 
between the perfect and the possible, are germane, here, since they place limits on the 
possibility of social engineering (cf. Giddens 1990; 2003).
Smith’s ingenious and individuating combination of utility (instrumental activity) 
and the imagination would have been read by Marx as, in the end, a way of keeping apart 
rather than reuniting mental and physical labour. This fundamental dualism (which 
appears in Weber as the divide between instrumental and value rationality, in Durkheim 
as the dualism between the individual’s biological and social being), implies that the 
social is always going on in some way behind the backs of individuals. Smith’s ‘invisible 
hand’ operates as a deus ex machina guaranteeing the functioning of the whole. By 
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limiting the efficacy of rationality as such, Smith reveals himself as a Protestant thinker: 
highly skeptical of Scholastic casuistry, but retaining a conception of providence. Social 
functioning combines rationality and irrationality and makes use of unintended 
consequences, or indirect inferences (of predestination), rather than being organized as a 
‘Great Chain of Being.’ The ‘invisible hand’ contains much more Calvin than Aquinas.
For Marx, however, this way of relating work and imagination could not be a 
synthesis, but only a chimera, a misbegotten attempt to reassemble the fragments of 
alienated humanity by conceiving of the social bond as something constituted in the 
imagination rather than through collective action, an ineffective fantasy rather than the 
creative construction of the social world and the revolutionizing domination of nature 
accomplished through praxis. Smith’s use of the imagination re-institutes the division 
between mental and physical labour as a permanent division within the self, no longer as 
the division between reason and passion, but as that between imagination and action, self-
approbation and self-preservation. In this context, the passions are conceived in such a 
way that they are constantly crossing the border between imagination and action. Recall 
that for Smith what ultimately drives the imagination is the desire for self-approbation, 
and it becomes evident that anxiety, too, is a fairly permanent aspect of self-relation, not 
solved merely by material security but only by developing virtues; by extension, 
alienation is incorporated, as a permanent possibility, into the daily round of interaction, 
but it is never wholly vanquished; the problem is how to keep the passions from crossing 
back and forth between imagination and action in self-destructive ways, and this question 
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is posed at the level of the individual (or perhaps at the level of social institutions), not at 
the level of class. Smith resolves this tension with selected elements of Stoicism rather 
than revolution. He (like Marx) fails to resolve, however, the social contradiction 
between hedonism and asceticism-Stoicism produced along with the material surplus 
attendant on society’s new industrial productivity. Not until Weber would this question 
receive sustained sociological reflection.
To turn our discussion back onto the track, however, let us return to Marx’s 
argument that Smith sees labour as the sacrifice of ‘tranquility’ (Marx 1973:611–615), for 
this conception of labour is what requires Smith to use the deceptions/seductions of the 
imagination to explain how anyone would work beyond the minimum required. For Marx 
is correct: in TMS, as in WN (which was Marx’s reference), Smith suggests that 
“Happiness consists in tranquillity and enjoyment” (1984:149). In a key element of the 
argument, however, Smith then goes on to suggest that “The great source of...misery and 
disorders...[arises from] over-rating the difference between one permanent state and 
another” (149). Again, Smith builds the idea of the permanent fallibility of reason into his 
conception of social dynamics, particularly with respect to realizing grand projects. 
Misery and disorder refer here to that case in which the ‘man of system’ attempts to make 
all of society over into a new and (delusively) preferable state.
With regard to the key question, the relationship between labour, imagination, and 
morality, Smith’s sociology of morality contends that the desire to be well-loved lies 
behind the desire for greatness, for wealth and external honours. The tranquility that 
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Smith refers to is the state of “being trusted and believed” (166), and it is available to any 
individual who practices the virtues of truth, justice, and humanity. That is, behind the 
fallibility of the imagination lies the true insight that being trusted and believed (and this 
includes trusting and believing oneself) is the highest good for the individual person. This 
insight releases one from the delusions that drive the pursuit of riches beyond one’s own 
capacity to enjoy them. Overcoming alienation, then, means a form of self-reconciliation 
accomplished by reining in one’s imagination. But this implies a very Protestant 
salvation, a split between the good life for the individual and the good life for society.  For 
Smith, the good life is always available to individuals, for “notwithstanding the disorder 
in which all things appear to be in this world, yet even here every virtue naturally meets 
its proper reward” (166). Thus there is an element of quietism in Smith, and a remarkably 
transformed version, via Stoic and Protestant elements, of the Classical notion that 
contemplation is a higher form of activity than labour. Without reverting to Classical 
forms, and while staunchly refusing the value of monastic withdrawal from the world 
(134), Smith reaffirms the notion that we may effect self-reconciliation by recognizing 
the disjunction between happiness and the search for it by means of instrumental action 
(i.e., labour as sacrifice). While the efforts of those captured by the idea of utility may 
lead to public benefit in the form of increased material productivity, the true path to 
individual happiness involves bypassing the deceptive elements of the imagination—
which keep us struggling to fulfill a series of false needs—and consolidating the moral 
gains of the imagination in the form of the clear-thinking ‘man within the breast’; stoic 
105
insight rather than revolution. Thus this peculiarly modern approach to morality tends to 
divide the individual good from the social good. In this way, the ambivalences of both 
Mandeville and Rousseau live on in Smith’s system. While he provides a sociological 
theory of morality’s development through social interaction, he provided nothing like a 
complete program for its production or maintenance at the level of society. A synthesis of 
Marx and Smith would need to produce a political notion of solidarity out of Smith’s 
notion of moral imagination and Marx’s critique of exploitation.
F. SUFFERING & WRONG: THE INFLUENCE OF ROUSSEAU ON MARX
There is another point on which to use Smith and Marx as foils for each other, and that is 
on the question of suffering. Writing in the context of 18th century mercantilism, before 
the full effects of the Industrial Revolution on society could be seen, Smith’s economic 
and moral theories were liberal theories in a conservative climate (cf. Rothschild 1992). 
Nevertheless, though Smith had nothing like the factory inspectors’ reports on which 
Marx based ‘The Working-Day,’ it remains a point of some significance, and one that 
follows from Smith’s exhortation to ‘live with strangers,’ that he is critical of excesses of 
sympathy. Against the ‘whining moralists,’ Smith offered the following optimistic 
remark: “Take the whole earth at an average, for one man who suffers pain or misery, you 
will find twenty in prosperity and joy, or at least in tolerable circumstances. No reason, 
surely, can be assigned why we should rather weep with the one than rejoice with the 
twenty” (140).34 Marx finds such a conclusion impossible, and for two reasons. First, in 
Marx’s view (and perhaps the century of industrial development between Smith and Marx 
34  See Gertrude Himmelfarb (1992) for a contemporary neo-conservative version of this position.
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explains some of the difference) the ratio of miserable to prosperous was at least the 
reverse of Smith’s numbers, and getting worse. Second, for Marx, individual and social 
good are inextricably tied. One cannot truly be had without the other. Alienation for the 
poor means alienation for the rich as well. Thus, working toward social transformation in 
the context of capitalism means sharing in suffering, not in happiness.
While, for Smith, the good society limits the visibility of suffering (i.e., we are 
compelled by the ‘man within the breast’ to limit our attempts to gain sympathy), for 
Marx, the good society is transparent, and recognizes and redresses all real suffering, not 
by illusory religious projections of justice in the hereafter, but by its direct visibility and 
society’s institutionalized responsiveness. For Smith, by contrast, imagining the suffering 
of those with whom we have no personal connection excites a sterile anxiety (140; cf. 
Boltanski 2004). It is more natural, and in a certain sense more healthy, to imagine and 
identify with the happiness of others. The situation best arranged for the development of 
moral impartiality, then, is the society of strangers. For Smith this would be the sphere 
most driven by moral impartiality; but he seems to have failed to foresee the paradoxical 
outcome of this moral impartiality, the possibility of society-wide instrumental 
detachment. While Marx provided a powerful polemic against this form of morality, it 
would take Weber to demonstrate the internal logic of this development in his analysis of 
Calvinism’s links with capitalism.
For Marx and Marxists, the starting point cannot lie in identifying with the 
imagined happiness of others, or in establishing a realm of so-called moral impartiality 
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whose basis lies in an imaginary realm. This would just be the abstract realm of 
bourgeois right, the ideology of Capital. The impartiality of Capitalist civil society is 
simply the bourgeois hypocrisy which succeeds in using ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ (i.e., 
‘free labour’) to prove that the employer has no responsibility for the well-being of the 
worker beyond the explicit limits of their contract. There are no limits to the development 
of this detached and ‘impartial’ view. As he puts it in ‘The Working-Day’: “Capital that 
has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that surround 
it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and 
final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun” 
(1978:256–257). Here is the real impartiality of civil society. This is one reason why 
Marx almost never uses the language of morality, but quite regularly uses the language of 
suffering. It is a question of making visible the real and concrete totality of social life, the 
contradiction between the forces and relations of production. Although he provokes the 
reader’s imagination with his descriptions, representing the material conditions of the 
suffering and labouring proletariat is not reducible to a work of the imagination. ‘The 
Working-Day’ depicts 19th century working conditions in England, but this making 
visible of the invisible is the work of painstaking, thorough, scientific documentation and 
analysis. The imagination is engaged in order to ‘picture’ what has been described. But it 
may also be engaged to manipulate the ‘popular prejudices’ of the bourgeoisie, their 19 th 
century sentimentality, cultivated so well in the novels of Charles Dickens. Is Marx really 
not appealing to identification in the imagination? If we follow the ‘strong program’ in 
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cultural sociology put forward by Smith and Alexander (2003), this is all we need to split 
Marx’s claims open. His texts come into view as rhetorical barrages that constantly draw 
on powerful and culturally relevant symbolism for their force.
If we follow our earlier suggestion that Marx has a deep connection to Rousseau’s 
theory of morality, it may be possible to discover the hinge between Smith and Marx by 
noting the difference between Smith’s ‘man within the breast’ and Rousseau’s ‘law of the 
heart,’ the natural sentiment of pity. While Smith’s ‘man within the breast’ is a social 
product, Rousseau’s pity is pre-social. All theories of morality that put its origins prior to 
socialization or in excess of socialization (as, indeed, Marx does), must rely on something 
like Rousseau’s concept of ‘heart,’ that is, an inwardness that is unmediated by any 
outwardness.35 According to Rousseau, “...pity is a natural sentiment which, moderating 
in each individual the activity of love of oneself, contributes to the mutual preservation of 
the entire species. It carries us without reflection to the aid of those whom we see suffer; 
in the state of nature, it takes the place of laws, morals, and virtues...” (Rousseau 
1964:132–133). Pity produces action in aid of others without the mediation of reflection. 
As civil society emerges it undermines this pre-social sociality, and a replacement can 
only be produced, as amour-propre, through a mechanism of social organization that 
establishes and maintains the sovereignty of the general will. This quick version ignores 
important complexities and contradictions in Rousseau’s thought,36 but it highlights its 
parallel with Marx and the general arc of loss and recovery in his thought, of an 
35  The contrast here is between an artificial and a natural organ: man-within-the-breast vs. heart.
36  Rousseau presents a spectrum of resolutions for politics and love in The Social Contract (1762), The 
Government of Poland (1771), and Reveries of the Solitary Walker (1778) (cf. Cladis 2000).
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inevitable fall into society and a recovery of self through the emergence of a unified form 
of society that replaces reflective sociability with collective sociality. Marx breaks from 
Rousseau by introducing the centrality of creative labour, which points beyond a ‘merely 
political’ solution (i.e., the cultivation of ‘love of nation’ that Rousseau recommends) to a 
human solution in which unalienated collective creative work founds the possibility of a 
thriving and transparent society, a species-being, to use, again, Marx’s earlier term.
For Smith, pre-social pity cannot be the ground for an unreflective impulse to 
provide aid. Pity is not strong enough for that. Action of this sort could only be 
habituated action, which is to say, already mediated by the imagination rather than 
preceding reflection. It would be something like Bourdieu’s habitus. Marx, however, 
dialectically engages Rousseau’s pre-social pity with Smith’s ‘popular prejudices,’ not in 
order to return to the state of nature, or to praise bourgeois conscience, but in order to 
develop the contradiction between bourgeois morality and the reader’s natural 
sympathies, his “innate repugnance to see his fellow-man suffer” (Rousseau 1964:130). 
In order to avoid the suggestion that what he does here is reducible to the play of 
imagination mobilized by rhetoric, but that it is the scientific and dialectical presentation 
of real suffering, which is a direct effect of the contradiction between forces and relations 
of production, Marx must work under the premise that his scholarly work sublates the 
play of imaginative reflection rather than being subordinated to it. Natural pity, whose 
antithesis is abstract political emancipation, (i.e., the appearance of bourgeois right as the 
perfection of alienation), shall re-emerge in the form of human emancipation. But for this 
110
to be the direct and transparent social bond that Marx demands, it must be a truly internal 
and objective bond, not merely a form of introjection, as with Smith’s ‘man within the 
breast.’ This can only be possible if there is a real difference between the work of the 
imagination and creative labour, between bourgeois morality and human emancipation. 
Solidarity could never be the work of imagination alone, but only the product of 
imaginative/creative work. In the end, the depiction of the poor working-conditions of 
men, women, and children in industrializing Britain is not enough to start a revolution, 
although Marx thought it could be combined with other forms of organization and 
mobilizing in order to do so.
We began our discussion of Smith by asking why Marx did not address Smith’s 
TMS. Most of the preceding discussion has attempted to present a contrast between 
Smith’s bourgeois morality of the civil sphere, a rather celebratory view of modern life 
with strangers, and Marx’s indictment of bourgeois morality as hypocritical, imaginary, 
and in need of revolutionary cancellation/realization. For Marx, all of the necessary 
analysis could be done by engaging Smith’s political economy, since WN is the text that 
addresses labour directly, the base to which bourgeois morality is the superstructure. For 
Marx, the sociology of morality cannot be a separate sociological field. It must be a part 
of a complete science of society. And the imagination cannot be taken on its own, either, 
but must be addressed in the context of creative work, understood to be social, and 
understood in a scientific manner, “not merely human exertion...but exertion as 
subject...an activity regulating all the forces of nature” (Marx 1973:611–612). When 
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Smith mistakes all labour for sacrifice he hamstrings his own ability to recognize 
suffering37 as an eradicable element of labour because he has failed to bind his theory of 
morality closely enough to his theory of economics.
Since Smith never really explained the link between WN and TMS, he left us with 
the easy target of an unexplained gap between production and imagination/recognition. 
For what may have been reasons of political prudence (Rothschild 1992), Smith left so 
many of the possible links between his two great works un-explicated that two centuries 
later the popular misunderstanding of the relationship between his moral philosophy and 
his economic theory could hardly be more pronounced. The source of the 
misunderstanding, it can be argued, lies in his failure to fully explicate the significance, 
for both moral and productive action, of the fallibility of reason and the subsequent 
tendency to misunderstand the basis of one’s happiness. Such an explication would have 
needed to give a more detailed critique of the idea of utility by means of Smith’s 
understanding of the imagination. In particular, it would have needed to develop full-
blown alternatives to the Marxian concepts of reification and alienation. It is in the 
absence of a complete explication of this sort that the two most significant mis-readings 
of Smith have developed. On the one hand classical or laissez-faire liberals have taken up 
the idea of the ‘invisible hand,’ reading only the WN, and even that selectively, ignoring 
its labour theory of value and deploying a straightforward utilitarian/rational choice 
model for human action. On the other hand, the American pragmatist tradition took up the 
37  This is not to suggest that Smith does not recognize suffering, or unequal labour relations. This is clear 
from, for instance, his well-known but still underestimated claim that “laws and governments may be 
considered...in every case as a combination of the rich to oppress the poor” (cited in Rothschild 1992:92).
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social psychology of the looking-glass self (without adequately giving Smith credit). But 
they also adapted Smith without fully understanding his point about the mediation of 
utility by the imagination (which renders our action only indirectly pragmatic), and so, 
under the influence of evolutionary theory, they fell prey to exaggerations of social 
‘process’ and ‘organization’ (cf. Cooley 1962; 1964). In short, both the pragmatists—
including Habermas’s Mead-inspired theory of communicative action (1984), which 
never mentions Smith—and the classical liberals missed this point.
If we take Smith’s social psychological account of individual conscience 
seriously, not from the overly optimistic side of pragmatism nor the overly ‘realist’ 
perspective of classical liberalism, we are left with the impression that it is not so easy to 
subsume the imagination under the rubric of creative labour. Or, rather, it becomes 
unclear how ‘creative’ should be related to ‘labour.’ For Marx, of course, this is the usual 
avenue by which to re-introduce the distinction between mental and physical labour, and 
by which to undermine his entire analysis. It is at the risk of betraying whatever loyalty 
one might have to Marx, therefore, that one accepts this as a true dilemma. In a perhaps 
mistaken turn, we shall seek clarification through a related pair of concepts, production 
and recognition. This means returning to Hegel.
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G. HEGEL & MARX ON PRODUCTION & RECOGNITION
Charles Taylor distinguishes Marx from Hegel in this way:  
Since for Hegel the subject is Geist, the Spirit of all, reconciliation must 
come through recognition, since a transformation of the whole universe is 
without sense. Marx’s reconciliation on the other hand must come through 
transformation, because his subject is generic man; and man, unlike God, 
cannot recognize himself in nature until he has put himself there through 
work. (Taylor 1975:550)
At least to start with, we will accept Taylor’s characterization as a fair contrast between 
Marx and Hegel. Juxtaposing Hegel and Marx by means of the recognition/production 
binary helps to give another angle on the relationship between imagination and work. 
According to this view, for Marx, the form of production determines the presence or 
absence of mis/recognition. In Hegel’s version, by contrast, self-consciousness is 
produced by the play of recognition, misrecognition, and nonrecognition and it is this 
dialectical play that establishes the relations of production. One iteration of this process is 
described in the master/slave dialectic outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977).
Even with the help of this initial juxtaposition, the concept of recognition sits in 
an obscure position in relation to imagination and praxis. While Smith’s theory lacks a 
notion to combat Marx’s early conception of alienation and later focus on the ‘fetishism 
of commodities,’ the situation is different with Hegel, as Marx is beholden to Hegel for 
key elements of both concepts. So while the bourgeois imagination described by Smith 
can be attacked using notions of either alienation or fetishism, Hegelian recognition is not 
vulnerable in the same way. Nevertheless, a great deal of Hegel’s dialectical account of 
self-consciousness overlaps with Smith’s account of the natural development of 
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intersubjective norms and principles from actors initially supplied only with self-interest, 
an undeveloped sentiment of pity, and the ability ‘to do and to suffer.’ To begin with, 
Hegel’s model of civil society, discussed earlier, derives in large part from his reading of 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. Recall, for instance, how in that model self-interested 
activity in the sphere of civil society led, through interaction with others, to an 
‘enlargement of character.’ But while Smith and Hegel both have a dyadic notion of the 
self coming to be in the reflection of the other’s recognition, two elements present in 
Hegel’s model are not emphasized in Smith’s. First, Hegel depicts the initial encounter—
at least in the Phenomenology (1977: ¶178–197, 111–119)—as the life and death struggle 
between two. Second, labour synthesizes this life and death struggle, understood here not 
merely as sacrifice (of tranquility) but also as self-formation. As a result, Hegel brings 
labour and self-consciousness closer together than Smith does. But just how close?
With respect to the first element, the life and death struggle, this limited form of 
the Hobbesian model38 (limited because 1) it comes not in an isolated state of nature, but 
as a moment in an already-established form of sociality, 2) is between two 
consciousnesses, rather than ‘all against all,’ and 3) leads to a different outcome, that of a 
dyadic sovereignty, the master and the slave), terminates, initially, in the death of one. 
Later, it results in the submission of one to the other. This relation of domination, in 
38  One should not forget to detect the parallel between Hegel’s master/slave model and the model 
developed by Hobbes’s contemporary, Descartes, in the first of his Meditations on First Philosophy (1993 
[1641]), where in the course of doubting whatever he can, including his own physical being, he considers 
whether his perceptions are deceits produced by an evil demon. He turns, in short, to an imaginary contest 
in which an opponent attempts to mislead Descartes about reality and existence, including his own. Both 
narratives draw implicitly, if obscurely, on the story of Jacob wrestling with the Angel in Genesis 32, as 
well as, somewhat more directly, on Proverbs 9:10 (also 1:7) ‘The fear of the LORD is the beginning of 
wisdom: and the knowledge of the holy is understanding.’ 
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which the master is given a form of recognition (as master), gives rise to a third stage; the 
newly enslaved one works for the master. The slave then develops a new form of 
recognition, recognizing him or herself in the course of working and producing things. 
The slave’s labour on nature, then, gives rise to a form of self-recognition denied to the 
master, since his recognition requires the slave. The master becomes materially 
dependent upon the slave, while the slave learns that the master’s recognition has become 
unnecessary (once the initial impulse, the coercion to work, is finished with). Of course, 
he will later be drawn back into the play of universality and particularity as he finds that 
otherness persists, and that the products of his labour have an independence of their own.
Thus Hegel moves division and conflict to the centre of his discussion, just as 
Marx does. However, he actually goes further than Marx by positing the primordial 
character of this division. There is no fall into alienation because, in Hegel’s version,  
otherness is constitutive of the self. This does not make it permanently impossible to 
understand one another, but it does make impossible the kind of social fusion, or 
transparency, that Marx appears to recommend. One of the reasons for this is that, in a 
way that Marx does not tend to acknowledge, our work on nature is always a work of 
alienation and a production of alienation. We simply cannot, by means of objectification, 
contain or control nature in the totalizing way that Marx sometimes implies. In the same 
way, our relation to others always begins with alienation, and continues to draw from 
alienation. If a passing remark may be permitted, I think that distinguishing between 
objectification and alienation is not as satisfactory a solution as Lukács tries to suggest 
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(1967:xxiv). According to Marx, however, while dialectics serves to explain the 
constitution of the self in all hitherto existing societies, since these are characterized by 
class struggle, it cannot explain species-being—or, that possibility of the human that 
exceeds all hitherto existing societies—which would be in a certain sense beyond 
dialectics, just as it is beyond class struggle. While Hegel sees all history as dialectical, 
Marx implies that in a communist society the only dialectic will be ‘from each according 
to their ability, to each according to their need.’
Marx interprets Hegel’s view of nature as a form of idealistic dualism, a 
Platonism that takes nature for a defective version of the true Ideas. In the Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts he puts it this way:
Externality here [in Hegel] is not to be understood as the self-externalizing 
world of sense open to the light, open to the man endowed with senses. It 
is to be taken here in the sense of alienation—a mistake, a defect, which 
ought not to be. For what is true is still the Idea...nature is something 
defective... (1972:103)
According to Marx, Hegel’s formalistic starting-point builds the division between reason 
and nature into his logic; in this division, it is nature that is deemed to be fallen. As a 
result, “because the conception is formal and abstract, the annulment of the alienation 
becomes a confirmation of the alienation” (99). Once again, Hegel gets it upside-down. 
For Marx, as we stated earlier, social estrangement follows rather than preceding 
alienation from the products of labour. In Marx’s conception, the struggle for recognition 
comes after the fall, as a consequence. In his own words, “An immediate consequence of 
the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life-activity, from 
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his species being, is the estrangement of man from man. If a man is confronted by 
himself, he is confronted by the other man” (63). Instead of a fallen nature, Marx posits 
the social formation as fallen. Here Marx reveals his fundamental reservations about ‘the 
social.’ That is, in a certain sense Marx preserves Rousseau’s conception of the ‘state of 
nature,’ from which we have fallen, in order to preserve the historic messianic arch of fall 
and redemption (through collective action).
We have suggested that there is no fall in Hegel. Dialectical co-constitution is the 
permanent state of human self-consciousness. We do not fall into separation. Nature is 
constituted by separation and division, by difference. Reconciliation through recognition, 
therefore, is in some ways a misnomer, since reconciliation and recognition are always 
happening, if they happen, for the first time. And these reconciliations are only ever 
partial, since their starting-point is the recognition of difference; to be a part of a whole is 
still to be a part. The hermeneutic circle may not be a vicious circle, but this is not to say 
that there is a way out of it. As Adorno writes, in Negative Dialectics, and seemingly in 
full agreement with Hegel on this point, utopia would be “a togetherness of diversity” 
(1973:150).
While Hegel’s ‘philosophy of history’ sometimes appears Whiggish, it is not quite 
a teleological account of history. Nor does it seem to be messianic. In fact, Hegel’s 
account of temporality seems to undo this sort of eschatological temporality.  This is not 
the place to offer a complete version of this argument. We need, simply, to point out that 
Hegel’s dialectic tends to highlight the difficulty of maintaining Marx’s sequence of 
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events, or of maintaining a strictly linear sequence of events at all. Just as Smith’s work 
seems to show that the work of the imagination is more pervasive than Marx wants to 
admit, so, with Hegel, issues of alienation and recognition do not seem to fit the linear 
sequence Marx needs in order to preserve his implicit narrative of fall, alienation, exile, 
and redemption. First, Marx fails to explain the source of the original fall into relations of 
domination and estrangement. How did it happen? Following Rousseau and his story of 
groups trapped together on islands by natural disasters, we can use the ‘increased volume 
and density’ argument, that competition and inequality are produced by population 
growth (as Durkheim does, later on), but this tends to drain the narrative of its fall and 
redemption trajectory precisely because of its character as an immanent and naturalistic 
history. The narrative of fall and redemption, by contrast, is necessarily transcendental. 
Time conceived as linear turns out to be more teleological than cyclical time. In the three 
volumes of Capital Marx mutes but does not do away with this element of his thought by 
avoiding references to revolution or communist society. While the Manifesto is filled with 
promises, Capital is not. Nevertheless, the Marxian project is structured according to a 
promissory motif. Capital was meant to be the fulfilment of one aspect of the promise, 
the scientific analysis of economic relations, and Marx, who questions others but does not 
explicitly bring himself into question, quietly comes to occupy the prophetic if not the 
messianic position. In the end, Marx’s dialectical time is subject to (and fits within) 
linear time. This is an important aspect of his strong program (and not only his).
This is not the moment to take up the questions of temporality and messianism. 
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These will be taken up later on, however, as we discuss the transition from a strong to a 
weak program, which may be thought of as a transition from thinking about the 
promissory quality of human relations through the ‘strong’ messianism of Marx’s 
philosophy of history to thinking about it through the ‘weak’ messianism of Walter 
Benjamin’s angel of history. For now, this can be safely bracketed from our more 
immediate question of Marx’s conception of creative labour, or of revolutionizing 
practice, which is the basis for distinguishing between production and recognition and 
for giving production priority. While Hegel’s model of the master/slave dialectic seems to 
undo Marx’s sequence, Marx’s concept of revolutionizing practice is irreducible to 
Hegel’s model precisely because Marx focuses on collective rather than individual 
struggle. In addition, there is the simple point that Marx’s empirical and theoretical work 
on the exploitation of labour must be taken seriously. While Hegel’s verdict against 
Moralität in favour of Sittlichkeit means that recognition requires a ‘concrete totality,’ 
Marx’s critique of Sittlichkeit and of Hegel’s dialectic generally was that it lacks concrete 
links to productive labour and is ultimately based in intellectual rather than material 
conflict. The master/slave struggle turns out to be just a metaphor, for Hegel.
In the last couple of decades, Hegel’s conception of recognition has drawn 
increasing attention (cf. Gutmann 1994). In general, this renewal of Hegel has come at 
the expense of Marx, who is consistently accused of economistic reductionism (e.g., 
Fraser and Hönneth 2003:2). Against this apparent reductionism, Axel Hönneth, 
following Habermas (cf. Habermas 1990a:75–82), has developed a phenomenological 
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approach to the ‘struggle for recognition’ that combines the conceptual model provided 
by the young Hegel, the materialist research of G.H. Mead, and the empirical results of 
20th century developmental social psychology (Hönneth 1995).
There are good reasons for suspecting theories of recognition of not taking Marx’s 
conception of creative labour, of productive revolutionizing practice, seriously enough. In 
Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange (2003), Axel 
Hönneth and Nancy Fraser debate issues of social justice, but sidestep the question of 
production by choosing redistribution as the foil for recognition. Their discussion takes 
place entirely within the bounds of the bourgeois liberalism Marx criticized. Dealing with 
suffering and wrong without attending to the conditions and possibilities of creative 
production turns a strong program in the sociology of morality into a moralizing form of 
discourse that is tendentially, to use Nietzschean language, based in ressentiment. 
Furthermore, this kind of discourse tends to squander its sociological abilities. While 
ressentiment is not absent from Marx’s discourse, when he points in the direction of 
praxis as opening onto human emancipation, but does not ‘fill it in’ substantively, he 
evades the demand for revenge. That the actual ‘revolutionizing practice’ of the twentieth 
century was often ‘filled in’ with ressentiment is a problem for Marx and Marxism, but as 
impressive as empirical developments in social psychology have been, they do not 
warrant dropping attention to production in favour of the redistribution/recognition 
binary. Once again, Marx’s strong program demands a unified approach.
If contemporary appropriations of Hegel have unfairly glossed Marx’s attention to 
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concrete conditions of production as ‘economism,’ Marx, for his part, did not take 
recognition seriously enough. Perhaps more importantly, Marx did not adequately 
respond to the question of desire. Labour cannot solve all the problems of recognition or 
of desire. Marx avoided a number of these problems by largely avoiding the problem of 
childhood. In his critique of child labour, the question of an unexploited childhood is 
largely a residual category. Habermas, and following him, Hönneth, seem to be correct in 
turning to the empirical and materialist attention that the American pragmatists devoted to 
the childhood formation of self-consciousness. Both Cooley’s (1962) descriptions of 
childhood acquisition of language (mostly derived from observing his own children), and 
Mead’s (1967) discussion of play and game show significant forms of social life 
preceding productive labour.
Axel Hönneth explains this lack in Marx by claiming that while Marx’s political 
historical writings were expressivist, the Marx of Capital is utilitarian, since everything 
there depends upon the objective conflict of material interests. Insofar as revolutionizing 
practice is absent from Capital’s conceptual apparatus, this seems fair. The struggle for 
the working-day is pictured as a perpetual competitive struggle over quantities. Like 
other utilitarian approaches, Capital seems at some moments to assume that desire and 
satisfaction can be treated as quantitative questions. On the other hand, however, Capital 
attempts to establish an unbridgeable abyss between exchange value and use value. But 
having divided use value and exchange value, Marx proceeds to locate exchange value in 
labour power precisely in order to establish a strict quantitative equivalence between 
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surplus value and the rate of exploitation. Use value gets left to the side, and, along with 
it, the question of human needs and desires. The next chapter will return to the question 
of use value in the context of a comparative discussion of Marx and Nietzsche.
At the same time, Hönneth argues that Marx sidelines recognition and refuses to 
acknowledge that bourgeois morality has any substance (Hönneth 2003:150). Hönneth 
dismisses this move as a tendential utilitarianism (128). Even if Hönneth is correct, 
however, that Marx’s argument seems vulnerable to an utilitarian reduction, this critique 
does not apply to the concept of praxis, in relation to which utilitarianism could only be a 
reified or abstract form of the question: ‘how shall we live?’ Marx does not fill in an 
answer to this question precisely in order to leave it open to the creativity of praxis.
The turn to redistribution, however, seems to signify the failure of praxis to 
materialize, a failure to develop forms of activity capable of re-integrating all that the 
alienated labour relations of capitalist society have succeeded in alienating. Against 
Hönneth and Fraser’s shared turn to liberalism, which recommends reform but not 
revolution in the relations of production, Marxian thought insists on retaining the focus 
on revolution. Hönneth and Fraser develop normative approaches to morality that try to 
appear as if they are strong, but to a Marxist these are weak bourgeois projects.
H. MARX & THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: MARX’S STRONG PROGRAM
While it has taken the entire 20th century to fully exhibit the failure of praxis to 
materialize in the way that Marx imagined, this failure was already becoming evident in 
Marx’s lifetime. In the absence of truly collective forms of transformative praxis, what is 
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available to one still committed to a unified approach? In the face of the failure of 
organization, Marx retreats to the territory of the intellectual virtues. Unfortunately, this 
reinstates a hierarchical differentiation between mental and physical labour.
The last line of the epigraph at the beginning of this discussion of Marx’s 
sociology of morality is the latin phrase dixi et salvavi animam meam (‘I have spoken and 
saved my soul’). Marx used this curious phrase at the end of his ‘Critique of the Gotha 
Program’ of 1875, which was a critical response to a proposed unification of two factions 
of the German Social Democratic Party. In the critique he dismantled the proposed new 
program of this party, revealing a text full of error and tautology, “hollow phrases [that] 
can be twisted and turned as desired” (1972:384). Marx was deeply pessimistic about 
unification between the Lasallean and Eisenach factions. According to István Mészáros, 
the use of the Latin phrase expresses Marx’s “radical skepticism” (1987). Marx expected 
to be disregarded, and expected that the two factions would go ahead with their 
unification, a unification that mangles theory not for the sake of praxis, but for a 
confused combination of vague idealism and realpolitik. Beyond this ‘radical 
skepticism,’ Marx’s use of this quotation contains layers of irony, outrage, and 
resignation. It also reveals Marx’s frustration with the carelessness of the document he is 
criticizing, and his devotion to scholarly integrity.39 For Marx, what holds for a scientific 
document also holds for a political document: in neither realm are hypocritical platitudes 
justifiable.
39  In Capital, after quoting Wade’s ‘History of the Middle and Working Classes’ approvingly, Marx then 
calls the historical part of the book “a shameless plagiarism” (1978:233n.4). Althusser claimed that Marx 
was “fanatical” with regard to “scrupulousness in his references” (Althusser and Balibar 1979:19).
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The sense of the phrase, if not the precise wording, comes from the book of 
Ezekiel, the Hebrew prophet of the Babylonian Exile. In the third chapter of that text, 
Ezekiel relates a series of divine commands that divide the prophet’s obligation to 
prophesy from the outcome of the prophecy. The prophet is called to speak the truth, 
regardless of the responsiveness of its addressees. If they listen, they too will be saved. 
Thus, read literally, Marx’s use of the phrase ‘I have spoken and saved my soul’  indicates 
that, beyond ‘speaking truth to power,’ in his prophetic role he takes no further 
responsibility for the political outcome of the unification of the factions of Social 
Democrats. They will only be saved if they listen to his words. Of course, a number of 
perplexities surround Marx’s use of religious phrases, which, admittedly, must usually be 
read as ironical. Nevertheless, the use of this phrase raises interesting questions regarding 
Marx’s analysis of morality. Is this the retraction of his ‘strong program?’
I concluded my initial discussion by claiming that Marx refuses to develop a 
sociology of morals that is separable from political economic considerations. The use of 
the prophetic formula Dixi et salvavi, however, could be interpreted as an assertion that 
moral ends, at least that of personal integrity, can be achieved even in the face of political 
failures. To put it in contrast with Adorno’s phrase, Marx may be read here as saying that 
‘wrong life’ can be lived ‘rightly.’ In Weberian terms, it may be tempting to interpret 
Marx as exhibiting here an ‘ethic of absolute ends.’ A more defensible reading, however, 
would be to suggest that Marx is simply continuing to deny the possibility of dividing the 
ideal from the real. The problem with the ‘Gotha Program,’ as mentioned earlier, is its 
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contradictory combination of idealism and realism. Fudging the clarity of the party 
platform, rather than being practical, actually turns the Social Democratic project into 
something impractical, a set of moral postures with no possibility of being coherently 
enacted. In short, Social Democracy here lapses into illusory flights of the imagination 
and the (opportunistic) hypocrisy of bourgeois morality; the Gotha Program only 
pretends to unite the ‘ethic of responsibility’ with the ‘ethic of absolute ends.’ It would 
seem, then, that with the turn to intellectual integrity, Marx does not give up on his 
‘strong program.’ The good must also be true, and a political program characterized by 
“slovenly editing” (Marx 1972:398) can be neither. In Marx’s work, this unification is 
made possible primarily by appearing to subordinate moral virtues to intellectual virtues.
Imagination plays a key role in the subordination of moral virtues to intellectual 
virtues. Remember, Marx retained Rousseau’s instinct concept of pity in rejecting the 
reflective social psychology developed by both Smith and Hegel. The pre-reflective 
instinct of pity is deformed, however, when labour becomes alienated and social relations 
subsequently lose their transparency via the distortions of class. In class society, morality 
develops as a reflective but socially bounded form of self-consciousness. Divided from 
concrete forms of collective action, moral discourse that is grounded in imaginative or 
speculative thought merely reflects the class position of the thinker. Not until the 
imagination has been reunited with non-alienated forms of labour will it be possible to 
speak positively, and not just critically, about morality. Thus a series of illusory forms of 
class morality are sandwiched between a pre-reflective and post-reflective morality, and 
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Marx’s strong program turns out to be a project of reclaiming natural pity by means of the 
modern intellectual virtue of critique, expressed best in the form of satirical scientism.
As a form of revolutionizing practice, however, Marx’s approach turned out to be 
unsustainable, at least insofar as the twentieth century failed to develop a truly post-
bourgeois form of revolutionizing practice. More than a decade into the twenty-first 
century, competition rather than organization remains the dominant form of 
revolutionizing practice. This is the case in the intellectual field (i.e., in universities, in 
technological development, and scientific ‘discovery’) as much as anywhere else.
In practical political terms, the subordination of the good to the true was used to 
justify a wide variety of repressive practices by socialist and communist parties and 
governments. For those who rejected Stalinism and other forms of ‘actually existing 
socialism,’ on the other hand, adherence to intellectual virtue developed into a renewed 
recognition of the division between theory and practice. Following Weber (who followed 
Kant on this), Horkheimer and Adorno made it part of the tradition of critical theory. In 
this transition from a strong to a weak program in the sociology of morals, a decisive 
principle, which has already come up in our discussion of Adam Smith, is the law of 
‘unintended consequences,’ also described as the ‘irrationality of rationality.’
The weakening of Marx’s strong program consisted primarily in rejecting the 
subsumption of moral to intellectual virtues, and in reinstating the permanent role of the 
imagination in the constitution of morality. As we shall see in the next chapters, Weber 
made this transition to a weak program by means of Nietzsche, rejecting the idea that 
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intellectual virtue could tell one how to live, reestablishing the gap between the good and 
the true as the gap between fact and value. At the same time, Weber and those influenced 
by Weber kept alive Marx’s concern with the connection between knowledge and 
hierarchical relations. In their critique of the relation between teacher and student, 
however, their conclusion was that only by dividing science from politics, theory from 
practice, fact from value, could illegitimate relationships of domination be reduced. Since 
their basis was in the necessarily asymmetrical relation between adult and child, these 
hierarchical relations could not be entirely eliminated.
At the beginning of our discussion, I argued that Marx’s strong program differed 
from the classical moral philosophy of Aristotle by its introduction of historical and 
revolutionary concepts. In order to do this, Marx followed Rousseau’s rejection of 
Aristotle’s defense of slavery: “Aristotle was right; but he mistook the effect for the 
cause. Anyone born in slavery is born for slavery—nothing is more certain...But if there 
are slaves by nature, it is only because there has been slavery against nature. Force made 
the first slaves; and their cowardice perpetuates their slavery” (Rousseau 1968:51–52). A 
linear and revolutionary conception of history can only be developed after naturalistic 
arguments justifying inequality have been refuted. Marx went beyond Rousseau’s 
conception of political formations and historical change, however, in making explicit the 
idea that history unfolds as a product of human activity. Against Rousseau’s rather 
immobile model of the democratic ‘general will,’ a social state that may or may not come, 
Marx’s conception of revolutionizing practice provided a dynamic theory of social action 
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in which the human world could become fully transparent, a constantly comprehensible 
product of human intention such that social productivity would be turned entirely to 
human ends, a system of objectification without alienation or reification.
Marx’s program depends upon a fundamental division between the capitalistic 
present and the communistic future. With regard to present society, Marx distinguishes 
the hypocritical character of bourgeois morality from the critical character of proletarian 
morality, that is, morality as indignation. Both forms are confined to capitalistic society, 
however, and cannot offer the form of morality that would prevail in the post-capitalistic 
society. That morality will be open-ended; it will be the unification of science and social 
life; the consummation of morality. Its coming into being in a truly emancipated society 
happens when one-sided class morality becomes unnecessary; the real appearance of 
morality coincides with the end of (class) morality; not imagination but praxis, not formal 
recognition but free and creative production.
Marx formulated his strong program in the sociology of morality in terms that 
refused to give the imagination a central role because he was suspicious of imagination 
isolated from praxis. Imagination in Smith’s sense operates fundamentally as a relatively 
contemplative means of developing a social bond between two individuals, and it comes 
into direct contradiction with Marx’s notion of collective activity, the shared production 
of social reality. While praxis is creative, it is a mistake to turn to a detailed analysis of 
individual social psychological faculties.
Marx remains the sociological theorist most important for turning our focus back 
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to the real conditions of work, and to the possibility of transforming social relations 
through productive activity, through praxis. In addition, Marx’s implicit conception of 
(class) character as something that can be both revolutionary and revolutionized 
distinguishes him from all conservative/cumulative conceptions of character. Finally, in 
opposition to Hönneth’s claim that Marxism becomes utilitarian, the Marxian strong 
program attempts to leave the question of use open, as a question to be decided through 
concrete solidarity building and through revolutionizing practice.
While elements of the Marxian strong program persist, the continuing failure of a 
successfully revolutionizing proletarian praxis to materialize means that other questions 
need to be taken up. This chapter addressed imagination and recognition. On the way to 
discussions of the classical sociological programs of Weber and Durkheim, the next 
chapter develops further commentary on Marx in comparison with Friedrich Nietzsche, 
with special regard to the question of the academic vocation and the will to truth.
130
CHAPTER 2: GUILT, DEBT, VOCATION, & VALUE: MARX AFTER 
NIETZSCHE
...in the first volume of Capital, in his analysis of “The Fetishism of 
Commodities”...Marx’s targets here are...those professionals and intellectuals—“the 
doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science”—who think they have the 
power to live on a higher plane than ordinary humanity, to transcend capitalism in life 
and work.
Why does Marx place that halo on the heads of modern professionals and 
intellectuals in the first place? To bring out one of the paradoxes of their historical role: 
even though they tend to pride themselves on their emancipated and thoroughly secular 
minds, they turn out to be just about the only moderns who really believe that they are 
called to their vocations and that their work is holy. It is obvious to any reader of Marx 
that in his commitment to his work he shares this faith. And yet he is suggesting here that 
in some sense it is a bad faith, a self-deception. This passage is so arresting because, as 
we see Marx identifying himself with the critical force and insight of the bourgeoisie, and 
reaching out to tear the haloes from modern intellectuals’ heads, we realize that in some 
sense it is his own head he is laying bare. (Berman 1982:116)
A. FROM STRONG TO WEAK PROGRAMS: THE GOOD & THE TRUE
The last chapter called Marx’s approach to morality a ‘strong program’ in part because he 
subsumes morality to science, the good to the true, and in part because Marx directs his 
efforts to bringing about a social revolution rather than to merely measuring the empirical 
gap between the good and the true. Any morality not rooted in fully transparent, 
undistorted and ‘right-side-up’ social relations is only the morality of a particular social 
class. While rooted in social realities, and in a sense functional for them, the validity of 
bourgeois morality is confined to its role as an ideological rationalization of prevailing 
class relations, providing sanction for their organizing tendencies, solidarities, and 
teleological “in order to” (Wood 2004:105), but obscuring their material bases and 
principles, which are historically constituted, dynamic, subject to alteration, and neither 
naturally nor divinely sanctioned. Moral rationalizations of mere bourgeois class 
tendencies, whether formulated in religious terms or not, veil the real sources of social 
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value, interpreting them with pharisaical snobbery rather than in terms of the historical 
and ongoing human activities that constitute contemporary social arrangements and 
preempt a conscious formulation and enactment of collective intention. Bourgeois 
capitalist logic represses its irrational core and bourgeois history unfolds unconsciously 
“where the labourer exists for the process of production, and not the process of 
production for the labourer” (Marx 1978:460).
To make way for true morality, for concrete ethical life (Sittlichkeit) which would 
emancipate the possibilities of the good life from the formulations of abstract morality, 
we need transparent social relations that reveal the conflict between the essence and the 
existence of social and self relation and offer the possibility that they may, for the first 
time, be put into harmony. The bourgeois revolution brings about this possibility, against 
its own intentions and in spite of its own moralizing reformist projects, as it carries out an 
immense and ongoing transformation and expansion of human productive capacities by 
means of which “All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at 
last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with 
his kind” (Marx and Engels 1972:338). This evaporation (sublimation) of traditional 
cultural life and ideology will reveal—or perhaps produce—the truth of social life. When 
this bourgeois revolution advances far enough, the resulting transparency of social 
relations, especially the visibility and polarity of class conflict, will provoke the 
proletarian revolution, which will put an end to class conflict and to merely class-based 
morality. As the American Trotskyist-Marxist George Novack put it, paraphrasing the 
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New Testament—and the question of the sublimation/persistence of the (theological) 
tradition is central when one has recourse to “poetry from the past” (Marx and Engels 
1972:439; cf. Goeghegan 2002)—“Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you 
free” (Novack 1969:74).
Thus, although on the one hand Marx attempts to confine himself to a negative 
project, the immanent critique of bourgeois morality and political economy, his project 
remains a ‘strong program’ insofar as he does not cede the validity of a separate moral 
sphere that would be independent of material conditions or subject to the expertise of 
some other kind of analyst. All talk of the good must be subjected to the dialectical 
materialist science of the true. So Marx attempts to systematically unveil the hypocrisy of 
bourgeois moralists and thereby to contribute to the completion of the bourgeois 
revolution and the preparation of the proletarian one.40
Marx follows Hegel’s critique of the abstract formalism of Kantian Moralität. The 
40  Gillian Rose provides a good summary of the usual Marxist (if not Marx’s own) position: 
Marxist theory implies that political practice follows from the analysis of class structure 
and class interests. This does not mean the derivation of ‘ought’ from ‘is,’ but that the 
universal interest is generated in the dynamic of capitalist development itself. There is, 
nevertheless, room for action, because if theory and practice are inseparable, they also 
strain towards each other, as classes-in-themselves become classes-for-themselves in the 
circumstances of crises of overproduction. The proletariat is represented as the potentially 
universal class, the class which may genuinely claim that its particular interests 
correspond to the universal interest. The question ‘What ought I to do?’ is valid within 
the mesh of theory and practice. Some of my students still pose it: whatever the particular 
class position of the individual, they yearn to find the mode of effective political action 
which will necessarily further the universal interest. (Rose 1996:61)
According to Rose this perspective “tends to assume that the intellectual, individual or class is somehow 
innocent of political practice until the theoretical work is accomplished, and the relation between particular 
and universal interest clarified” (61). However, we are already engaged in political activity, even before we 
have clarified individual, party, or class interest. Establishing a particular class as the universal class is 
already political, and the result of this act cannot be guaranteed. One cannot be certain that acting in one’s 
own interest means acting in the universal interest: “For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of 
your own damaged good, but when you act, without guarantees, for the good of all—this is to take the risk 
of the universal interest” (62).
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gap between is and ought that Kant accepts from Hume and reproduces as the antinomy 
of determinism and freedom—while rejecting and reversing Hume’s understanding of 
morality as rooted in sentiment—is just the proof, for Marx, that an abstract ought is a 
contradiction and that abstract formal logic is a kind of lying.41 In a way Marx reverts to 
William Wollaston’s pre-Humean position that “All immorality is falsehood” (Hudson 
1969:16). The true antinomies are not logical but material and they are not paradoxical 
and irresolvable, forcing the positing of a transcendental a priori, but dialectical and 
capable of resolution (through revolution). In what I am calling a ‘strong program’ in the 
sociology of morality, the good is subordinate to the true (i.e., to science), and ‘this-
worldly’ (i.e., it can be realized in the material world).
B. GUILT & VOCATION: SOCIOLOGY AFTER NIETZSCHE
Chapters three and four discuss two members of the (petty) bourgeoisie, Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim, and their sociologies of morality. Although I will argue that Durkheim, 
like Marx, has a ‘strong program,’ while Weber’s is ‘weak,’ both Weber and Durkheim 
appear to be neo-Kantians, at least insofar as they accept a version of the gap between is 
and ought that also implies a permanent gap between practical and scientific reason and, 
subsequently, in the validity of professional bourgeois sociology. Instead of viewing that 
gap as the fissure through which revolutionary energy should flow, Durkheim adopts a 
reformist/progressivist position, emphasizing the need for meliorist policies aimed at 
41  The simplest response to the claim that ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is’ has always been to point out 
that there is no such thing as an ‘is’ that is not already imbued with an evaluative charge. Indeed, both 
Durkheim and Weber accept something like this caveat without therefore rejecting the methodological 
distinction between facts and values. The methodological distinction between facts and values is just the 
evaluative starting-point that characterizes science.
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addressing inadequate levels of modern integration and regulation. Weber, by contrast, 
emphasizes the tendency for human action to have unintended consequences and 
advocates a kind of pessimistic existentialist heroism. To put it briefly, for Marx, 
revolution, for Durkheim, reform, and for Weber, decision.
I shall prepare the discussion of Weber and Durkheim by means of a comparison 
of Marx with Friedrich Nietzsche, a thinker that, like Marx, rejected both Kant and 
academic sociology (cf. their mutual distaste for Spencer and, by extension, for Social 
Darwinism), but for rather different reasons. Nietzsche’s reframing of late 19 th century 
European social philosophy contributed significantly to the ways that Weber and 
Durkheim diverged from Marx on issues of value, class, and bourgeois morality. 
Especially important, in this regard, is the relationship between Marx’s labour theory of 
value and Nietzsche’s pseudo-economism, which entails, among other things, the 
philological move by which he associates guilt (Schuld) with debt (Schulden) (1989:61–
63, 70) setting the stage for his polemic against ressentiment and ‘slave morality.’ The 
move is pseudo-economistic because Nietzsche’s ultimate view is vitalist, not economic 
(‘more life!’ exceeds utilitarian calculation). The ‘assaying animal’ is already a reactive 
form of human. The ‘pathos of distance,’ the aristocratic feeling of self-unity that 
precedes any comparison antedates the ‘propensity to truck and barter’ and to ‘value.’ 
One starts with ‘good’ and only later considers the other to be ‘bad’ by comparison. This 
is Nietzsche’s vitalist recasting of Augustine’s understanding of evil as privation. In the 
end Nietzsche is uninterested in grounding a theory of justice in a monolithic theory of 
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value (whether a ‘labour theory of value’ or a ‘value theory of labour’). The production of 
new ‘tables of value,’ the ‘transvaluation of value,’ is more original, more active, than 
calculative and comparative assessments of value. Marx, on the other hand, intended for 
the concept of ‘use value’ to avoid the reduction of human activity to economic valuation. 
He only partially succeeds in making this distinction. 
The gaps and tensions between Marx and Nietzsche on issues of conventional 
scholarship and morality, and on the origins of value, provide some of the space and 
potential energy that Durkheim and Weber used to develop their understandings of 
contemporary morality. They do this in a very general and somewhat indirect sense, since 
neither Durkheim nor Weber spend much time explicitly addressing Marx and Nietzsche. 
Nevertheless, Marxian and Nietzschean ‘regions’ of thought affected Durkheim and 
Weber’s respective views of the role of professional social scientists as they (both) 
sidestepped revolutionary or radical activity, whether Marxist political activity or 
Nietzschean ‘transvaluation of values.’ Weber and Durkheim, both suspicious of Marx’s 
economism, were influenced in varying ways by Nietzsche on the question of value. 
While Weber accepts the more Nietzschean position, Durkheim sociologizes values by 
recourse to an analysis of ritual action, locating value in a realm of the sacred distinct 
from economic behaviour.
Leo Panitch describes “Marx and Engels’s distinctive political practice...[as]...the 
combination of social-scientific analysis, based on their materialist interpretation of 
history, with engaged political writing and speaking—pamphlets, lectures...—in which 
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they tried to make current history intelligible to activists” (2001:116). What neither of 
them did, however, was to try to found academic disciplines and institutionalize them in 
the university. Isaiah Berlin, in his influential liberal biography of Marx, suggests that  
this was not really possible, even had Marx wished to have an academic career. Marx’s 
academic options disappeared due largely to external events like the death of his father 
and the political condemnation of the Hegelian left (Berlin 1963:72). So, what happens 
when scholars attempt what could only be, for Marx, the ill-advised and ill-fated project
—insofar, for instance, as it endorses the mental/physical division of labour—of 
instituting social science disciplines within the university, thus seeming to revert to the 
Kantian position on the ‘public’ and ‘private’ use of reason (1992; 1996)? To address this 
question, we must address the idea of sociology as a vocation, as well as a secondary 
idea, the relation of this ‘calling’ to guilt or debt. That is, perhaps the profession of 
sociology—professing to be a social scientist and professionalizing sociology as an 
academic discipline—is also a confession, an acknowledgement of undischarged 
responsibility or guilt. To endorse a gap between facts and values, as both Weber and 
Durkheim did, is to accept the existence of (or even to produce) unfulfilled (and perhaps 
unfulfillable) obligations.42 Adorno later formulates this as ‘the guilt in thinking,’ a guilt 
arising from the facts of modern life (1973:364).
Marx and Nietzsche rejected some element of what is involved in making this 
kind of profession (of guilt). Marx viewed it as an unjustified acquiescence to the 
42  Here both Durkheim and Weber echoed, in their personal work ethics, Kant’s claim that the highest 
form of physical pleasure, the most innocent, comes from resting after work (Kant 1974:276).
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bourgeois division of labour, one to be avoided by engaging in active political organizing. 
The guilt of the ‘professional’ scientist is just the guilt of not embracing revolutionary 
activity. Concern with individual salvation already begins to miss the point. In exchange 
for security and status one agrees to merely interpret the world instead of changing it. Yet 
Dixi et salvavi animum meam: we save our souls when we speak up and speak the truth, 
in the crucial political moment, about bourgeois hypocrisy and proletarian suffering. 
Nietzsche, by contrast, blamed the hemming-in [hemmung] of will to power by the will to 
truth, not the failure to acknowledge economic exploitation or suffering or to build links 
of solidarity with the working-class. Bourgeois intellectuals may have an admirable 
“intellectual conscience...[but]...They are far from being free spirits: for they still have 
faith in truth” (1989:150).
Weber and Durkheim knew and accepted elements of the critiques of bourgeois 
science developed by Marx and Nietzsche, but this did not, in the end, dissuade them 
from playing key roles in the institutionalization and professionalization of sociology in 
Germany and France, respectively. We can find important elements to understanding the 
professionalization of sociology in the details of the responses Weber and Durkheim 
made in the context provided by these two critiques of 19 th century Enlightenment 
science. This period of professionalization incorporated (and perhaps also encrypted) 
some of the issues and subject matter of 19th century social philosophy of ‘independent 
scholars’ and ‘learned societies,’ of socialism, radical journals, and the social gospel, 
while discarding or divesting others. The gendered differentiation/hierarchization that 
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developed in early Chicago sociology between social work and social research provides a 
paradigmatic example (cf. Deegan 1988). The optimism (hubris?) of paternalistic 
professionalizing positivist sociologists can be seen in the work of Franklin Giddings, an 
early American advocate for both quantitative methods and for its use in eugenics, as can 
be seen in the article he used to introduce the first issue of The Journal of Social Forces 
(1922). This kind of social-engineering optimism persists here and there in various 
sociologies even to the present.
Marx rejected politically bourgeois science. Still, in Marx’s terms, true members 
of the bourgeoisie are engaged in a type of revolutionizing practice. It is, however, a type 
of revolutionizing practice that undermines itself by constantly extending the reach of 
commodification into realms hitherto unexplored by the market while simultaneously 
rendering its old work uncompetitive or obsolete (as Weber knew). Thus one learns how 
to ‘sell’ ideas (cf. Horkheimer and Adorno 1988:197–198). As Marx and Engels put it in 
the Communist Manifesto, “The bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation 
hitherto honoured and looked up to with reverent awe. It has converted the physician, the 
lawyer, the priest, the man of science, into its paid wage-labourers” (Marx and Engels 
1972:338). In other words, the bourgeois vocation does away with all fixed vocations, 
even if one is a “man of science.”
Marx and Engels’ position here is rather ambiguous. A clear articulation of this 
ambiguity is found in Marshall Berman’s commentary on this position as it is found in 
Marx’s later master-work, Capital. In the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
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Berman describes the performative contradiction in which Marx and Engels 
simultaneously covet and criticize the modern intellectual’s faith in the sanctity of his 
calling (1982:116).
Many of the issues of vocation and guilt/debt that emerge in the period of 
sociology’s professionalization can be understood as a response to this tension between 
vocation and wage-labour. While Berman points out that Marx implicitly includes 
himself in the ranks of modern professionals, Marx’s account attempts to confine guilt to 
the hypocritical among the bourgeoisie without incorporating a confession of social guilt 
or debt into scientific method more generally. Marx’s science reveals suffering and 
hypocrisy, and lays blame, but evades the possibility that the scientist, too, even the one 
that ‘speaks the truth,’ may be guilty of bad faith, or may speak from a position of moral 
compromise. Indeed, Nietzsche claims that the ‘will to truth’ tends not to admit the extent 
to which the meaning of its activity derives from or parasitizes suffering and hypocrisy. I 
will discuss the limits of Marx’s strategy in terms of two critiques, first of Marx’s notion 
of class, and second of his understanding of human nature and motivation. Nietzsche is 
important to both of these critiques, and an interpretation of how Nietzsche’s writings on 
science, truth, and human motivation change the parameters of these questions may help 
us understand why both Durkheim and Weber subject issues of human classification and 
motivation to extended analysis. 
While on the one hand we can read Durkheim and Weber as responding to Marx’s 
accusations concerning the hypocrisy and mendacity of the bourgeoisie in a way that 
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partly concedes, partly defends, partly extends, it is also more than this. The ‘moralities 
of method’ (Rose 2009; Nietzsche 1966:48) that we find in both Weber and Durkheim 
were attempts to complete, correct, or otherwise sustain Kant’s notion of duty—as a 
principle that transcends mere inclination—in the context of science, but they were, at the 
same time, responses to a growing suspicion about the very will to truth that characterizes 
Marx’s project. Not only does Marx’s concept of class border on metaphysics, his 
understanding of science’s relation to rationality begins to appear naive in the light of 
Nietzsche’s critique.43 After Nietzsche we have to answer the question of the will to 
power behind the scientist’s will to truth; and Marxist conceptions of economic class 
conflict may not do enough to explain the complexities of the character, motivation, and 
self-relation of the individual scientist. Accordingly, Durkheim’s and Weber’s moralities 
of method, their pursuit of the autonomy of reason, lead them to two different neo-
Kantian conclusions: the foundational character of validity or of value. That is, in 
pursuing the ‘will to truth’ to its end (i.e., methodically carrying out hypothetical lines of 
reason), we find, at the origin of the truth, a new version of Kant’s ‘Copernican 
Revolution.’ Truth originates in an act of will, a simple assertion, whether value or 
validity, whether the individual or the collective will (Rose 2009:1–50).
In the previous chapter we addressed disputes between Marx and the theories of 
reflection developed by Hegel and Adam Smith. In this chapter, we face some of 
Nietzsche’s darker claims about the nature of human drives (i.e., that they cannot be so 
43  These days we need to keep in mind Foucault’s analysis of the ambiguities of subjectivity and 
discipline. See Butler’s critical readings of Foucault (e.g., 1990:129–141; 1997:83–105; 2005:22–26, 111–
136) and also Pearce’s preference for Durkheim’s reading of subjectivation (2001:156–157n.4).
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easily reduced to a self-formative struggle for recognition), and the possibility that 
bourgeois morality and bourgeois science may be less about economic class divisions and 
social alienation and more about the sado-masochistic nature of modern selfhood.
C. ‘TO FACE WITH SOBER SENSES’: REVOLUTIONARY VOCATION
Nietzsche is perhaps only a kind of proxy for changes in late 19th century European social 
life and thought that compelled Weber and Durkheim to craft a response to a question that 
Marx was still able to skirt, even if not exactly in the way that Mannheim suggested in 
Ideology and Utopia (1972). As I have already suggested, Marx avoided the question of 
his own scientific vocation in the same way that he avoided having to lay out a positive 
moral program: by focusing on world historical questions of revolutionary class struggle 
against the suffering of the people. For Marx it was enough to identify and analyze how a 
revolutionary class may find itself faced with its world historical role; the section of the 
bourgeois class that ‘cuts itself adrift’ is mentioned in passing and is structured around 
metaphors of visibility, unveiling, and unbinding, rather than ‘calling.’ Indeed, insofar as 
the proletarian revolution is the ‘social’ revolution—the revolution that does away with 
Klassen in its character as a vestige of religious Klēsis, the persistence of ‘sacred’ callings
—it is the kind of answer that does away with, or overcomes (Aufheben) the transcendent 
call. The industrial ‘detail worker’ must give way to the “fully developed individual...to 
whom the different social functions he performs are but so many modes of giving free 
scope to his own natural and acquired powers” (1978:458). Berman suggests that Marx 
“embraces enthusiastically the personality structure that this economy has produced” 
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(1982:96) even more than the bourgeoisie, who have a bad conscience about their 
revolutionizing activity: “In The German Ideology (1845–1846), the goal of communism 
is ‘the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.’ For ‘only in 
community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all 
directions...’” (97). Faustian free development in all directions appears as a replacement 
for the one-sided ‘vocation.’ It follows, Terry Eagleton writes, that “Marxists want 
nothing more than to stop being Marxists...Marxism is meant to be a strictly provisional 
affair, which is why anyone who invests the whole of their identity in it has missed the 
point” (2011:1–2). 
Marx emphasizes the class consciousness of the mass movement, not the 
particular calling of the individual.44 The question of individual vocation is, as Rosa 
44  Later Marxists (e.g., Lenin, Trotsky, Lukács, Luxemburg, Bernstein, Althusser, etc.) were left to deal 
with the question of vocation, as the practical demands of governing and organizing unfolded in ways that 
were increasingly difficult to confine, by repeated identifying “the workers” as the revolutionary class thus 
skirting individual anxiety about one’s calling. The problem of anxiety is addressed in chapter six.
Lenin’s “Better Fewer, But Better” [1923] channeling older understandings of calling, in which 
practices of discernment are the responsibility of the community and the church, recommended instituting 
bureaucratic standards of expertise as well as ideological tests (1968:367). Whether Lenin’s bureaucratic 
and Party-centred approach internally presaged Stalin’s methods or whether opting for the Party over the 
local soviets was merely a strategic or theoretical mistake remains a disputed question.
In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács addressed Party discipline and the Communist Party 
role in providing leadership to the revolution, arguing that “Organisation is the form of mediation between 
theory and practice” ([1922]1971:298). Theoretical disputes should be tied to concrete organizational 
decision-making and problem-solving. The organization mediates between the (spontaneous) mass and the 
individual actor, and individual vocation only makes sense when addressed as a concrete problem of 
organization (300). He emphasized the importance of party discipline (315–316), argued that in order to 
avoid developing a party along the bourgeois pattern (active leaders and passive mass) the party must 
engage the “total personality” (320), and depicted the party as the solution to the problem of vocation, for
The party as a whole transcends the reified divisions according to nation, profession, etc., 
and according to modes of life...by virtue of its action. For this is oriented towards 
revolutionary unity and collaboration...Its closely-knit organisation with its resulting iron 
discipline and its demand for total commitment tears away the reified veils that cloud the 
consciousness of the individual in capitalist society. (339)
At the close of the essay Lukács endorses the need for Party purges. Nigel Gibson and Gillian 
Rose argue that Lukács (and later Adorno) return to neo-Kantian ethical imperatives (Gibson 2002:280, 
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Luxemburg put it, “the angle of the isolated capitalist” (1973:34). For a Marxist, the call, 
in nuce, is simply this: “Workers of the World, unite!” (cf. Lenin 1968:78). This is not a 
matter of attending to the ‘still, small voice’ of conscience, but of responding to the harsh 
everyday realities of economic exploitation. The call, then, is neither ‘inner’ nor 
‘transcendental.’ Neither the bourgeois nor the proletarian that becomes a revolutionary 
responds to a call so much as he or she faces reality ‘with sober senses’ and goes ‘where 
the action is.’ In Lenin’s “What is to be done?” [1902] the question of the relation 
between “spontaneity” and “consciousness” renders the idea of vocation an unnecessary 
mediation. Here he advocates exposures over calls: “To catch some criminal red-handed 
and immediately to brand him publicly in all places is of itself far more effective than any 
number of ‘calls’...Calls for action...in the concrete, sense of the term can be made only at 
the place of action...Our business as Social-Democratic publicists is to deepen, expand, 
and intensify political exposures and political agitation” (1968:51). Recognizing 
(collective) job insecurity and exploitation, and that, as the saying goes, ‘we must hang 
together or we will hang separately,’ becomes the main focus, not anxiety about one’s 
291n30; Rose 2009). See also the recently reissued ‘Tactics and Ethics’ (2014) written by Lukács in 1919.
The “reform or revolution?” question is also relevant, here. Luxemburg accused Bernstein of 
inventing this either/or (Luxemburg 1973:8) as well as the question of “ethical” socialism. According to 
Luxemburg, Bernstein’s revisionism returns to bourgeois morality as to an “ethical simulacra” (58). Siding 
with reform against revolution involves (opportunistic) acceptance of the social distribution of roles and an 
abortive or merely opportunistic break with one’s (inherited) social position (contemporary labour unions 
continue such debates). Luxemburg suggests that “dialectics and the materialist conception of 
history...make Bernstein appear as an unconscious predestined instrument, by means of which the rising 
working class expresses its momentary weakness, but which, upon closer inspection, it throws aside 
contemptuously and with pride” (62). In other words, Bernstein unconsciously and accidentally enacts his 
vocation (like Judas), providing rhetorical flair to a crucial narrative moment in history.
According to Trotsky: “A revolutionary Marxist cannot begin to approach his historical mission 
without having broken morally from bourgeois public opinion and its agencies in the proletariat” (1969:26). 
In short, revolutionary movements require a revolutionary notion of vocation involving a kind of break or 
conversion. After the break, the binding to the party.
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vocation. We must replace abstract bourgeois understandings of the individual actor, 
solipsistically concerned with his vocation, frantically meditating and skimming self-help 
books—late capitalism’s version of the Robinsonades Marx discusses in Capital—with a 
real historical understanding of how society comes to produce such an anxious individual 
(Marx 1973:83–84) for whom the question of personal vocation is also a question of 
personal salvation.
Whether rightly or wrongly, Weber and Durkheim did not (or could not) skirt (or 
sublate) the question of individual vocation in the same way. While they accepted the 
idea that the origins and justifications of social arrangements could only be formulated 
and understood in historical and empirical rather than divine or metaphysical terms or in 
the abstract terms of 18th century social contract theories, they both saw Marx’s class 
analysis as inadequate. Their sociological queries required an account of vocation that 
would be responsive to more than a century of Enlightenment considerations of 
individualism and autonomy, and though they acknowledged the growing autonomy of 
the economy, they did not accept the degree to which Marx conceived of economic class 
as developing into an absolute ‘master status.’ There is little to suggest, for instance, that 
either saw any convincing evidence that a revolutionary form of ‘class polarization’ was 
developing. Weber, of course, wanted, on the one hand, to distinguish between ‘Class,’ 
‘Status,’ and ‘Party,’ and on the other hand to see capitalistic economic action as part of a 
broader social process of disenchantment and formal-legal rationalization (cf. Löwith 
1982). Durkheim, on the other hand, saw capitalism as anarchic, generating not so much 
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a disenchanted ‘iron cage’ as a generally under-regulated or anomic society (cf. Rose 
1992:xiii). Despite these apparently opposing interpretations of modernity, neither saw 
the working classes as a positive revolutionary force capable of bringing about the 
fulfilment of individual freedom, in part because they held rather conventional bourgeois 
notions of the irrationality of the masses and the power of demagoguery.
For Weber and Durkheim, the question of scientific vocation and the social 
guilt/debt/responsibility it entailed—what Adorno called “the need in thinking” (Adorno 
1973:408), a society-wide condition of “matter out of place” (Douglas 2002:44) which 
Durkheim diagnosed as “abnormal forms” of sociality and as the “forced division of 
labour” (1984:310–322)—cannot be adequately resolved by economic or productivist 
notions of capitalist expropriation and accumulation, or by the notion of total social 
revolution, especially one tied to a prophetic philosophy of history. For Weber and 
Durkheim, the need to treat vocation in immanent terms disqualifies future-oriented 
social utopias from being sciences. As Durkheim wrote in his Latin thesis on 
Montesquieu, “a discipline that looks to the future lacks a determinate subject matter and 
should therefore be called not a science but an art” (1960:4; cf. Benjamin 2003:27).
The modern notion of an immanent vocation, a self-calling, which Marx 
attempted to revolutionize/sublate by denying the validity of bourgeois individualism, 
and which Weber and Durkheim attempted to clarify or strengthen in rather different 
ways, is rooted in the humanist tradition of 18th century Enlightenment philosophy, a 
significant strand of which involved anti-clericalism, anti-monasticism, and the 
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development of new and secular scholastic vocations (e.g., Diderot’s Encyclopedia 
project). Its immanence, part ‘this-worldliness’ (instead of ‘other-worldliness’) and part 
‘inner-worldliness’—instead of what Riesman (2001) called ‘other-directedness’—is part 
of an emergent modern discursive formation sometimes called ‘subjectivation’ that 
includes Luther’s Reformation-instigating affirmation of individual faith and the 
individual experience of grace, Descartes’ Cogito, and a whole series of conceptual and 
practical moves that individualize and internalize the focus and source of vocation. I am 
not opening up the historical question, here, but starting from this ‘result.’
D. AUTO-INTERPELLATION: THINK FOR YOURSELF
At the close of the 18th century, the debate around Enlightenment (see Schmidt, ed. 1996) 
produced an important formulation of a peculiarly modern and ‘secular’ replacement for 
the inner-worldly experience of divine grace, a formulation that, at the same time, 
reached back to pre-Christian, Classical thought. In this version of a secular (i.e., late 
Protestant) Enlightenment concept of grace—mending the diremption of law and ethics—
enlightenment is the experience of rationally confirming one’s own principles, the 
experience of ‘thinking for oneself.’ The issue, here, is not philosophical debates about 
solipsism, or the question of other minds, but the peculiarly modern experience of 
solitary thought and the social appearance of ‘freedom of thought.’ The Kantian 
formulation, Sapere Aude! (‘Dare to Know!’), emerged within the epistemological frame 
based upon individual certainty developed by Descartes: not Medieval ‘faith seeking 
understanding,’ but ‘doubt seeking certainty’ (cf. Walsh 2005:35–52). Yet it was clear to 
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classical sociologists like Weber and Durkheim that in this solitary search for certainty, 
the medium is the message: the solitude/isolation in which ‘thinking for oneself’ occurs 
belies all claims to have successfully developed a reconstructive social-moral synthesis.
While Kant did not draw all of the vocational consequences of his use of Horace’s 
phrase as the slogan for Enlightenment, he argued for a notion of vocation understood as 
a kind of auto-interpellation, a self-calling. For Kant, each of us was called by our own 
faculty of reason, to ‘grow up’45 and think for ourselves. Kant was content, at the time, to 
confine freedom of thought to what he called the ‘public use of reason,’ (1983:42) and 
professed obedience to the Prussian monarch, but he persisted in asserting that the free 
use of one’s reason is a universal human vocation. For Kant and other Enlightenment 
philosophers, thinking for oneself means producing our moral principles, our duties, our 
sense of obligation, right, responsibility, legitimate authority, and so forth, through the 
use of our reason rather than from divine revelation (or any other heteronomous source of 
authority). In this life we are not, as the Blues Brothers claim, ‘On a mission from God.’ 
Or at least, if we are, our only access to the details of this mission comes through the use 
of our reason.46 This entails individual and societal self-determination.
Kant begins his essay “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?” by 
defining enlightenment as emergence from a “self-imposed immaturity” (1983:41). Kant 
calls immaturity that which, out of laziness and cowardice, accepts “a pastor to serve as 
45  Habermas invokes the notion of Enlightenment as emancipation from “self-incurred immaturity” when 
he describes the stage of adolescent skepticism as characteristic of modernity (Bernstein 2001:79).
46  In The Social Contract (1968), Rousseau formulated the question of an autonomous or self-called 
vocation in political terms as the problem of the ‘general will’: how can social bonds be rendered 
legitimate? How can the people be sovereign? How can both the call and the answer have the same source?
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my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on” (41). According to 
Kant, critical thought is a moral vocation. Kant’s three critiques combine to reaffirm the 
classic claim of harmony between the good, the beautiful, and the true. At the same time, 
Kant introduces a new element of legitimate disarticulation or ‘trisection’ (Bernstein 
1997) to reason. This harmony is achieved in their common orientation towards the 
activity of judging. In the third Critique Kant suggests that “judging strains the 
imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly 
transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral feeling)” (1987:128). ‘Enlightenment’ 
calls us to realize this vocation. Each individual is called to intellectual maturity, but 
enlightenment calls us collectively, as a public. And since it is difficult for “any 
individual man to work himself out of the immaturity that has all but become his 
nature…that the public should enlighten itself is more likely” (Kant 1983:41).
Enlightenment requires, writes Kant, “the freedom to use reason publicly in all 
matters” (42). For the sake of order, that the government may guide the affairs of the 
community toward certain ends, one must remain a passive instrument in one’s ‘private’ 
civic post: “Here one certainly must not argue, instead one must obey” (42). But the 
scholar ought to have “complete freedom, indeed even the calling, to impart to the public 
all of his carefully considered and well-intentioned thoughts” (43). To halt ongoing 
questioning directed at the elimination of error “would be a crime against human nature, 
whose essential destiny lies precisely in such progress” (44). Obedience to an existing 
order can only be provisional, as the social order is itself ultimately subordinate to 
149
humanity’s rational vocation: “A man may put off enlightenment with regard to what he 
ought to know, though only for a short time and for his own person; but to renounce it for 
himself, or, even more, for subsequent generations, is to violate and trample man’s divine 
rights underfoot” (44). This statement was part of Kant’s effort to both recognize the 
‘enlightened’ policy of Frederick the Great, and to ensure the continuance of the relative 
freedom of the university from control by the censor. It reinforces Kant’s attempt to 
identify (while disarticulating) moral and intellectual virtue and illustrates his 
understanding of how one ought to behave as an academic.
Of course Kant was not particularly adventurous in personally endorsing 
extensive shake-ups in the everyday roles of average people. His enthusiasm for 
Rousseau’s philosophy and for the French Revolution was, in practical terms, rather 
muted, and he is usually read as primarily arguing that he and other philosophers like him 
be allowed to study and think in peace, and that they not be subject to censorship. His 
general attitude towards ‘the people’ retained the idea of their ‘necessary tutelage.’ 
Nevertheless, this notion of the autonomy of individual reason, and the deontic morality 
of universal duties or categorical imperatives developed “within the bounds of reason 
alone,” undergirds the next two centuries of attempts by social and political thought to 
frame a notion of social (rather than natural or metaphysical) morality and human 
autonomy after the ‘Death of God.’ His position deeply marks later attempts by social 
theorists to enunciate the vocation of science in relation to morality even as they bring to 
bear various metacritical considerations and divergent conclusions.
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At the end of the revolutionary 19th century, social theorists were unable to 
formulate their notions of autonomy in quite the same terms. They had, among other 
things, to deal more radically than Kant with the question of authority, especially the 
authority of reason. In what sense can an immanent vocation be binding, but also 
sufficiently motivating? What is it about the nature of internal and non-transcendental 
personality/subjectivity, whether internal/immanent to ‘the social’ (i.e., democracy; the 
‘general will’) or to the ‘self,’ that can produce autonomy? What is the relationship, if 
any, between autonomy and morality?
Marx accepted Kant’s requirement of intellectual virtue, but rejected the one-
sidedness and the abstraction of Kant’s approach. Kant failed to think through the social 
and economic bases of bourgeois freedoms; his transcendental deduction failed to give 
full weight to the dependence of bourgeois freedoms upon concrete social relations of 
domination. ‘Thinking for oneself’ suggests that one start from the position of the 
isolated bourgeois individual. Consequently, Kantian morality amounts to an abstract 
negation of material conditions in the form of the demand that moral action be a product 
of reason itself, free of any material motivation. This puts him in an awkward position at 
times vis-à-vis the Aristotelian notion of habituation, at least insofar as he is attempting to 
outline his concept of practical reason. Self-sufficient practical reason is, as Adorno puts 
it, “a validity that has submerged its genesis,” it is “secretly social” (Adorno, in Bernstein 
2001:153). Kant has not seriously asked about his own conditions of possibility. As was 
pointed out in the previous chapter, Marx followed Hegel’s critique of Kant in demanding 
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the negation of this negation—that is, the negation/sublation of the abstract ‘think for 
yourself’ dictum—not the negation of material conditions by an act of abstract 
autonomous reason but the negation of abstract reason by the transformation of material 
conditions through revolutionary class (collective) struggle. Only revolutionary 
transformation could give the categorical imperative a real content; only a real revolution 
(and not just a revolution in the mind) could establish a ‘kingdom of ends.’
E. AFTER DARWIN: DRIVES, WILLS, & THE SOCIAL
Kant’s notion of autonomy as a kind of ‘good will’ still had mostly to do with the 
classical problem of weakness of will (akrasia). Here will is understood as distinct from 
inclination. A will formed around inclination, an hypothetical imperative (e.g., ‘if it feels 
good, do it’), lacks moral validity. A truly good will commits to a categorical imperative, 
to the fulfilment of a duty performed out of a reverence that is “self-produced by a 
rational concept, and therefore specifically distinct from feelings of...inclination...” (Kant 
1964:69). Marx’s reading of Kant, as has already been noted—a reading that paralleled 
Marx’s critical reading of Aristotle’s failure to understand slavery—is that the freedom to 
think for yourself was, insofar as it was not a mere abstraction, founded on the basis of 
concrete bourgeois freedoms (from the kinds of demands placed upon the proletarian 
worker) that were ‘secretly social.’ Within the capitalist system of production, however, 
these bourgeois freedoms can never be made available to everyone since they depend 
upon the lack of freedom of the working classes and their subjection to the demands of a 
permanently destabilizing labour market. Only a revolution could provide the social 
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conditions for the full and concrete flowering of autonomy across all of society, and only 
the self-conscious solidarity of a revolutionary working class could overcome the 
weakness of individual wills in order to bring about that revolution.
Marx structured his understanding of autonomy with a critique of Kant, but also 
by responding to contemporary developments in evolutionary theory. Marx called 
Darwin’s On The Origin of the Species an “epoch making work” (Marx 1978:323n.1), 
and in a letter to Engels, he suggested that “Darwin’s book is very important and serves 
me as a basis in natural science for the class struggle in history” (quoted in Hofstadter 
1955:155). He focused on the historical process of adaptation, however, and on the 
difference that our creative “tool-making” capacity (352n.2) makes to human history as 
opposed to natural history, as well as emphasizing the difference between animal 
behaviour and human behaviour. To what extent are the ‘organs’ of the social 
qualitatively different from natural adaptations? Above all, we live not just in a natural 
‘environment,’ but in a social ‘world.’ ‘Nature red in tooth and claw’ may be the story of 
natural history, but human history, made by humans, whether characterized by 
cooperation, competition, anarchy, despotism, hierarchy or equality, is a human 
construction. Modern manufacturing transforms the human worker into a “crippled 
monstrosity” (340); and these peculiar social shapes result from the historical working 
out of creative human activity. This premise underlies Marx’s early ‘humanist’ writings—
like the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, which pre-dated the 1859 publication 
of Origin of Species, and where he writes of alienation, of a human free in his “animal 
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functions” (Marx and Engels 1972:60) but not in his creative human activities—as well 
as the later ‘scientific’ writings, in which our creative powers operate in conditions of 
exploitation, distorted by social relations of domination.
Even rejecting Marx’s early ‘humanism’ does not give us a view of the human as 
essentially driven by domination and conflict. The impulse to creative activity and an 
instinct of self-preservation constitute Marx’s basic theory of drives. Domination and 
conflict are secondary processes driven by natural or artificial scarcity rather than 
primary impulses. Although in the previous chapter I highlighted Marx’s critique of 
Aristotle, when it comes to his notion of human nature we find, in fact, a modified 
Aristotelian notion of the human as teleologically aimed at awakening “his slumbering 
powers” (Marx 1978:173) and developing broad-ranging creative productive capacities. 
Marx’s most important modification of the Aristotelian view is his Rouseau-inspired 
rejection of the argument for ‘natural’ masters and slaves and attendant development of a 
labour theory of value. He understands mastery, in addition, socially and historically, not 
naturalistically. He takes up Kant’s notion of autonomy in these terms. Most importantly, 
Marx historicizes human drives and gives priority to creative activity, that is, to 
production,47 as “the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment” 
(1973:94). As he puts it in the Grundrisse:
47  Habermas limits this position to the young Marx:
...the young Marx assimilated labor to creative production by the artist, who in his work 
externalizes his own essential powers and appropriates the product once again in rapt 
contemplation...Only this assimilation of labor to a model with normative content allows 
him to make the decisive differentiations between an objectification of essential powers 
and their alienation. (1990a:64)
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Production not only supplies a material for the need, but it also supplies a 
need for the material. As soon as consumption emerges from its initial 
state of natural crudity and immediacy—and if it remained at that stage, 
this would be because production itself had been arrested there—it 
becomes itself mediated as a drive by the object. The need which 
consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The 
object of art—like every other product—creates a public which is sensitive 
to art and enjoys beauty. Production thus not only creates an object for the 
subject, but also a subject for the object. (92)
The bourgeois subject’s inclination to transcend mere inclination, then, would itself be 
caught up in the historically constituted system of production and consumption: “Thus 
production produces...the object of consumption, the manner of consumption and the 
motive of consumption. Consumption likewise produces the producer’s inclination by 
beckoning to him as an aim-determining need” (92; cf. Castoriadis 1997).
When the theory of evolution is synthesized, however, with the modern political 
philosophical tradition built on the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, and others, who 
re-envisioned the relationship between reason and the passions (cf. Hirschmann 1997; 
Tilmouth 2007), and collapsed the distinction between will and inclination—but without 
historicizing it, as Marx had done—strength of will (whether instinctive or social) tends 
to look like a bigger problem for autonomy than weakness of will.48 On Hobbes’ reading, 
human desire, conceived of as insatiable, leads inexorably, in the pre-political ‘state of 
nature,’ to a war of all against all. Freedom, in the form of the free individual pursuit of 
insatiable desires, unconstrained by political control, leads to self-destruction. Autonomy 
48  Does weakness or strength of will produce more problems for morality? Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd 
(2001 [1961]) attempted to adjudicate this issue; Habermas, an anti-Nietzschean, sides with weakness of 
the will (i.e., lack of ‘motivation’) as the real problem in his attempt to outline a “postconventional 
morality” (1998:114–118); Heidegger, of course, considered the will itself to be a modern concept (1977).
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is saved by sacrificing it, by subjecting ourselves to a political leviathan, giving up 
natural rights in exchange for social safety. Our will/passion is too strong and too anti-
social to be allowed to be free in this sense. When we synthesize the Hobbesian premise 
with Darwin’s theory of natural selection, the resulting conceptualization of instinctual 
drives implies that alienation and society are coeval. Survival in society becomes a matter 
of compromises and any and all social arrangements that produce stable social relations 
necessarily bind the individual will to collective demands and enshrine inner conflict, a 
‘fall’ from Eden that has always already happened (cf. Rousseau 1979:39–40). No social 
revolution could eliminate the internal tension between social demands and individual 
drives, between socially assigned vocation and individual impulse, without destroying 
society altogether.
This version of the problem of harmonizing or synchronizing social relations and 
self-relations is often called ‘the problem of order.’ For Marx, however, and for others 
who theorize the human as being essentially and primordially pro-social, what is at stake 
is not the problem of how to establish society (conceived as regulation), but the problem 
of the kind of conflictual social relations that have been built up in the historical present. 
Marx’s optimism about the possibility of overcoming the present conflict and alienation 
derives from his view that our creative and cooperative inclinations could, ultimately, 
overcome our tendencies to fear, greed, pride, and so on. His version of the triumph of 
reason (the good will) over the passions involves collective action, of course, but Marx’s 
view of the strength and form of the individual instincts left him relatively sanguine about 
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the long-term problems posed by human nature. If capitalism had solved the problem of 
scarcity, what was needed was simply to release individual members from artificially 
produced isolation, alienation, and want, and to provide them with opportunities to 
exercise their creative drives (cf. Bergson, Fromm, etc.). In other words, the problem still 
falls within the realm of akrasia, the weakness of the will of the isolated actor. Marx’s 
critique of Kantian morality is just that no individual, living in the conditions of 
artificially maintained scarcity and competition, could have the strength of will to follow 
an abstract categorical imperative. What is more, real contradictions in social relations, 
not a primordial dualism of human nature (whether posed metaphysically or 
sociologically, as in Durkheim), produce the contradiction between ‘good will’ and 
‘inclination.’ The main obstacles to social revolution and the reign of equality and justice 
are not greed, fear, and pride, on their own, but the relations of production that make 
isolation and alienation the predominant affective states of capitalistic societies. Both 
Weber and Durkheim take more pessimistic views on harmonizing instincts, social 
demands, and conditions of life. They work, broadly speaking, with the more pessimistic 
(and less historicized) reading of the nature of human instinctual drives that developed as 
a synthesis of Hobbes and the Darwinian theory of evolution. Enter Nietzsche.
F. BOURGEOIS CRUELTY: SUPPRESSION OF PITY OR AGGRESSION 
TURNED INWARD
Nietzsche introduces a new twist on the Enlightenment dictum that we learn to think for 
ourselves. Nietzsche argued that the Enlightenment project of thinking for oneself, 
thinking consistently, being logical, being obedient to one’s own premises, keeping 
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promises,49 knowing and telling the truth, and so on, does not ‘come naturally.’ On the 
contrary, it is a kind of cruel victory over nature: “reason, seriousness, mastery over the 
affects, the whole somber thing called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of 
man: how dearly they have been bought! How much blood and cruelty lie at the bottom 
of all ‘good things’!” (Nietzsche 1989:62). Indeed, binding thought to a priori categories 
of reason, and binding morality to the idea of an absolute duty emerging from that use of 
reason (not from inclination), may already signal a nihilistic submission to life-denying 
values rather than autonomy. Nietzsche viewed Kant’s idea of freedom, as independence 
from or triumph over physical ‘inclination,’ as a perverse form of cruelty and self-
punishment. At the same time, Nietzsche acknowledged that it also meant that we became 
interesting. So the twist given to the notion of autonomy, of vocation as auto-
interpellation, by the late 19th century emergence of the Nietzschean strand—and the later 
Freudian iteration—of the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ is to suggest that reason, in the 
form of a ‘will to knowledge/truth,’ may not, pursued as an end in itself, provide the best 
insight into morality, vocation, or autonomy, precisely because faith in ‘truth’ tends to be 
naive about the character of human drives. The twist can be summed up in Nietzsche’s 
remark about Kant that “the categorical imperative smells of cruelty” (65). Instead of 
producing autonomy, the bourgeois morality of Kantian deontology was a doctrine of 
self-enslavement.50 Instead of autonomy and (social) morality being ultimately 
49  At first Nietzsche puts promise-keeping in a different category (calling it ‘conscience,’ not yet ‘bad 
conscience’), but he fails to maintain this distinction throughout the Genealogy (Butler 1997:208–209n.3).
50  The Kantian sociologist Habermas claims communicative rationality as an end in itself. In his view the 
drive to communication rather than the ‘will to power’ serves as the motivating force for the ‘will to truth.’ 
Against Nietzsche, Habermas contends that lying is parasitic on sincerity, no matter how prevalent 
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compatible, as both Kant and Marx thought (although at different levels of analysis, since 
for Marx, morality would simply be subsumed by transparency and autonomy), Nietzsche 
saw them as mutually exclusive (59) and chose autonomy over morality.
“We are unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge,” writes Nietzsche in the 
opening lines of On the Genealogy of Morals (15). When we do gain glimpses of 
ourselves, we do not find solidarity, the unity of class consciousness in-and-for-itself that 
had previously been hidden under an ideological veneer sealing and concealing the facts 
of our class position, but an internal and perhaps permanent division rooted in instinct, in 
an anonymous will to power, anterior to any particular social formation, a will to power 
as destructive as it is creative. As for self-preservation, Nietzsche refused to give this 
priority: “Physiologists should think before putting down the instinct of self-preservation 
as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living thing seeks above all to discharge its 
strength—life itself is will to power; self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most 
frequent results” (1966:21). Adding to this, Nietzsche also warned against “superfluous 
teleological principles” (21), which would include a ‘laws of history’ reading of Marx.
Marx also believed that bourgeois morality had hypocrisy and cruelty at its heart, 
but his reasons were different. Nietzsche rejected the 18th century arguments that 
constructed morality out of a theory of natural sentiments, like pity. Marx tacitly accepted 
elements of these sentiment-based theories—especially Rousseau’s—while rejecting 19 th 
century bourgeois moralization. Bourgeois morality cruelly suppressed the development 
dishonesty, deception, illusion, ideology, and so on, may be in a particular society. On no other basis could 
we get communication going in the first place and, on the Habermasian reading (based upon Mead, Piaget, 
etc.), communication is a “motivationally satisfying” (Bernstein 2001:79n.6) end in itself.
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of active and practical sentiments of pity or sympathy for others and rationalized 
alienation from our fellow creatures and from our species-being. This was my point in 
contrasting Marx with Smith’s theory of the ‘impartial spectator.’ Marx’s immanent 
critique of bourgeois hypocrisy used and implicitly endorsed ‘natural’ sentiments of pity 
and sympathy (embedded in an implicitly Aristotelian model of human development) and 
this appeal to the reader’s (conflicted bourgeois) sympathy for suffering sustains the force 
of his writing. On Nietzsche’s view, by contrast, bourgeois morality suppresses or turns 
our  instincts of aggression inward. The 18th century turn to moral sentiments of pity and 
sympathy was already slavish (1989:19). From a Nietzschean standpoint Marxian notions 
of social solidarity and egalitarianism are idealizations that deny the anonymous drives 
underlying human motivation, drives that include aggressive and destructive impulses. 
On Nietzsche’s view, the communistic ideal of universal equality differs from the 
aristocratic hierarchy of natural inequality because the cruelty of slave morality (whether 
bourgeois or communist) includes a primordial lie, the denial of the will to power, while 
the aristocratic cruelty of the simpler master morality is honest, if a bit ironic. As the bird 
of prey might say in response to being called evil by the lambs upon which they prey: 
“‘we don’t dislike them at all, these good little lambs; we even love them: nothing is 
more tasty than a tender lamb’” (45).
Slave morality replaces the master’s distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ with the 
reactive distinction between ‘good’ and ‘evil,’ and it replaces honest and courageous self-
relation with universal ‘truth’ (cf. Wood 2004:143–145). Denying their own aggressive 
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impulses, communists and socialists attack the powerful for their insatiability, deeming 
their greed and violence to be the source of all social evil. According to them, capitalism 
continually generates artificially high levels of inequality and suffering by a division of 
labour that deforms workers and siphons off an unfair share of society’s production. Their 
‘will to truth’ aims, ostensibly, merely to reveal the sources of evil, sources hidden by 
‘ideology.’ On Nietzsche’s view, however, they can do this only by first concealing their 
own primordial ‘will to power.’ Consequently, Marx’s subordination of morality to truth 
appears to originate in nihilistic ressentiment (Nietzsche 1989:161).51
Marx criticized Kantian, Hegelian, and Smithian morality for abstract reductions 
of morality to class-based rationalizations that can only be negated by revolutionizing 
those class relations. For Nietzsche, however, negating the abstractions of bourgeois 
morality in order to bring about a society of communistic equality amounts to completing 
the victory of slave morality by negating those aspects of aggression and individual 
mastery that persist in the form of a (priestly/capitalistic) asceticism. Bourgeois hypocrisy 
and greed do not purify the proletariat or turn its ressentiment into something noble, nor 
will communist revolution do away with the will to power. It will simply deny it and 
deform it, rendering it ignoble.
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche suggested that the negation of abstract 
(ascetic) bourgeois morality and the emergence of concrete (hedonist/communist) 
equality merely extends and completes the transition from a logic of sado-masochism (cf. 
51  Calling Marxism a ‘politics of resentment’ is now a favourite conservative pastime (e.g, Scruton 
2006:150–160).
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Horkheimer and Adorno 1988:81–119) to that of nihilistic hedonism, from priestly ‘slave 
morality’ to that of the ‘last men,’ who claim to have invented happiness, and who sit and 
‘blink’ (Nietzsche 1954:129). Instead of delivering personal autonomy via collective 
autonomy, equality in the form of a conforming ‘mass man’ amounts to a reversion to 
sub-human irresponsibility and passivity,52 a passivity structured by a will to power 
whose energies are now dedicated to self-negation.
For Nietzsche, the move from priestly asceticism to the ‘last man’ is a transition 
from ‘active’ to ‘passive’ nihilism. According to Marx, by contrast, the proletarian 
revolution will end alienated labour and artificial social hierarchies and lead to the 
emancipation of the creative and productive energies of individual and collective alike. 
While human history may be a history of class struggle, this process of ‘natural selection’ 
will end with the communist revolution. On the vitalist Nietzschean reading, however, 
this view (willfully) misunderstands the origin of values (in will to power) and so also 
misunderstands the dynamics of institutionalizing something like communism. Instead of 
releasing free, cooperative, creative activity, centralized power and planning requires a 
systematic self-negation of will to power that could only produce something like the 
purges and show trials of Stalinism, which ritually enact this self-negation in the form of 
self-accusations and sensational confessions of guilt. Stalinism, then, would not be a 
contingent and unfortunate development, but an inevitable return of the repressed, a 
return prompted by the crisis of meaning that emerges in the long transition between 
52  The translator Kaufmann points out, here (59n.2), the Nietzschean concept of autonomy developed by 
David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd (2001). See also H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine (1895) for a nearly 
contemporary fictional account of a society of ‘last men.’
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these two stages of nihilism, the long drawn-out ‘death of god.’ Indeed, the efforts of 
some 20th century communist movements, with their Party and their ‘cult of personality,’ 
have sometimes resembled the desperate efforts of priestly ascetic morality to save itself 
from the ‘cultural decadence’ of the hedonistic consumer culture of liberal capitalism.
Whose reading of modernity and whose rejection/sublation of bourgeois morality 
should we accept? Much depends on how we handle questions of asceticism and guilt, 
questions intimately related to our understanding of human nature, and at the core of the 
question of the vocation of the social scientist. Would a truly proletarian revolution free 
bourgeois society from the guilt of its own hypocrisy? Would the appearance of real 
equality negate the guilt of bourgeois domination? Is Marxism a theodicy in the sense of 
making modern capitalism a ‘stage’ in world historical ‘progress’ (e.g ., Eagleton 
2010:136–137)? Terry Eagleton argues that a main strength of Marxism is its ability to 
simultaneously acknowledge the horrors and the charms of liberal modernity (2009b:69–
70). What would really happen if you negated the ‘logic of Capital?’ According to 
bourgeois ideology, negating the profit motive means negating ‘incentive’ as such (cf. 
Žižek 2000:17–21). Does Marx’s political economy complete the nihilistic will to truth, a 
nihilism slowly gaining self-consciousness? Nietzsche argued that the negation of the 
asceticism of capitalistic production also negates the formula by means of which human 
suffering was given a meaning through guilt:
The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that 
lay over mankind so far—and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning! It 
was the only meaning offered so far...it placed all suffering under the 
perspective of guilt...man was saved thereby, he possessed a meaning...the 
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will itself was saved...We can no longer conceal from ourselves what is 
expressed by all that willing which has taken its direction from the ascetic 
ideal: this hatred of the human, and even more of the animal...a will to 
nothingness, an aversion to life... (Nietzsche 1989:162–163)
A revolution that did away with our guilt, then, the basis of our asceticism, might do 
away with our meaning, and with our academic vocation, as well. But in what sense is 
‘guilt’ the question, for Marx? And is the communism that Marx envisioned really a 
playground of undisciplined hedonism (cf. Pearce 2001:161–176)?
If we follow my earlier claim that Marx subordinates the good to the true, then we 
will subordinate moral guilt to economic debt. This means, to begin with, that Marx 
rejects the bourgeois apportioning of guilt (i.e., the myth of meritocracy) as hypocritical. 
In targeting and exposing bourgeois hypocrisy through ‘immanent critique,’ Marx targets 
and exposes conservative and ideological uses of guilt, in order to release revolutionary 
motivation. On this view, Marxist critique releases suffering from its meaning as the guilt 
of those who suffer, rendering fresh energies available for revolutionary action instead of 
self-ab/negation. The crucial consideration remains the question of economic 
exploitation. The moral guilt of individuals is merely derivative. Capitalism and 
commodification pose problems for meaning, and the bourgeois revolution melts all that 
is solid. If there is guilt, it lies in the system that produces unnecessary suffering and in 
those who occupy privileged positions within that exploitative system. Putting an end to 
economic exploitation will lead to a flowering of meaning through the proliferation of 
free and creative human activity. In the short run the guilt of the bourgeois intellectuals 
may be addressed by cutting oneself adrift from one’s class position and eschewing 
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positions of privilege.53
One of the problems of this view, however, is that the practice of many Marxists 
and other anti-capitalists has not been to subordinate the good to the true, but to remain 
within the moral binary of good and evil, reversing the valence but remaining within 
“moralistic anti-materialism” (Pearce 2001:162). The good burgher becomes the evil 
capitalist. Indeed, Marx’s own texts, such as “The Civil War in France,” ([1871]1972) 
often depict class relations in stark terms of good and evil, heroism and villainy. This 
continuing moralization of suffering in terms of the guilt and evil of the bourgeoisie fails 
to go (as Marx certainly intended to do in the scientistic volumes of Capital) ‘beyond 
good and evil,’ and remains, on a Nietzschean reading, a reactive action that is parasitic 
upon the revolutionizing practice of the bourgeoisie (i.e., proletarian solidarity of this sort 
derives from bourgeois solidarity) and also—as Carl Schmitt’s (1996) agonistic argument 
would have it—upon a political realm structured by the distinction between friend and 
enemy rather than upon a solidarity positively generated through praxis. From this 
perspective it is no surprise, then, that, although the 20th century saw many revolutions, 
none of them have done much to eliminate capitalism.
Instead of generating a critical-revolutionary class polarization, the ongoing 
bourgeois revolution has produced a globalizing consumer society and new forms of 
political totalitarianism and ethno-nationalism. Do these attest to an historical crisis of 
meaning or of practical action, or of both? If a crisis, should we understand it in Marx’s 
terms or in Nietzsche’s? For Marx, the crisis of meaning is rooted in bourgeois hypocrisy, 
53  cf. Agamben’s reading of St. Paul’s notion of messianic vocation (Agamben 2005).
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in capitalism’s incapacity to address the destructive aspects of its own revolutionary 
activity, and in the fact that its purported freedoms remain abstract and/or commodified. 
Insofar as the logic of capital is a logic of commodification and exchange value, 
meaningful social relations will be distorted, obscured, and suppressed, and bourgeois 
revolution will continue to brew mass movement and social revolution. Still, even if this 
is the case, and surely capitalism does continue to brew anti-capitalism, capitalism still 
appears the more dynamic and subversive force, perhaps precisely because of its 
hypocrisy, its ability to make contradiction productive. Anti-capitalism, on the other 
hand, appears a perpetually commodifiable form of reaction (cf. Heath and Potter 2005).
A Nietzschean reading of the last century and a half would likely interpret the 
ongoing process of commodification as a transition, turned quagmire, from ‘active’ to 
‘passive’ nihilism, a passage-way turned waiting-room between asceticism and hedonism 
(cf. Marcuse 1964; 1966; Bell 1978) that transforms their guilty tension into an endlessly 
‘productive’ relationship whose nihilism may only be fully manifest in a return of the 
repressed arriving in the form of environmental catastrophe or resource exhaustion. A 
Nietzschean reading would also be permanently skeptical about whatever kind of popular 
revolutionary ‘mass’ might emerge from these contradictory developments.
G. USEFUL NIHILISM, NIHILISM OF USE: AUTONOMY &/OR MORALITY
For both Marx and Nietzsche it appears at first as if value is the key to the dynamics of 
modernity. On this front, both claim to subordinate moral guilt to economic debt, 
suggesting that it is a mistake to focus on morality rather than on the economic debt that 
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it veils and misrepresents. For Marx, value itself appears in a deceptive form. Capitalistic 
representations of exchange value and the credits and debits made visible by the market 
veil use value, labour, and the hidden debits and credits functioning within capitalist 
exploitation. But what does Nietzsche mean with his genealogical claim about Schuld and 
Schulden? There is something behind guilt/debt for Nietzsche, too: the will to power.
The question of value is a 19th and early 20th century question. It is not a problem 
of classical moral philosophy, or even of early modern philosophy. Hobbes is a useful 
starting-point for tracing the emergence of value as a central philosophical concept 
because of 1) the centrality of his notion of self-interested ‘reckoning,’ and 2) his non-
teleological concept of human nature, which replaced the idea of a telos with the 
existence of fears and drives. But it is a concept and a question that really gets going in 
the second half of the 19th century (cf. Heidegger 1977:70; Rose 2009:8; Adorno 
2001:121). Claims about the recency of ‘values’ tend to be made by conservatives 
concerned with ‘relativism’ (cf. Etzioni 2001:xiv) and the decline of ‘thinking’ 
(Heidegger 1977) or with the supposedly more stable concept of ‘virtue’ (Himmelfarb 
1996). Nevertheless, it is possible to accept the basic history-of-ideas claim about the 
concept without endorsing the political project that tends to provide the context for the 
claim (cf. Lambek 2008).
So, Marx and Nietzsche both attempted to subordinate the question of morality to 
the question of value. Marx proceeded by attempting to develop a science of economic 
value—the ‘labour theory of value’/‘value theory of labour’ (the second phrasing helps to 
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emphasize the historical process of commodification, the emergence of ‘value’)—that 
would reveal the nature of the relationship between use value and exchange value, unlock 
the secret of ‘surplus value,’ and render economic exploitation visible. Again, it is an 
issue of deception and ‘unveiling.’ Bourgeois morality is revealed as an ideological 
apparatus that misdirects our attention, focusing on abstract concepts containing an 
abstract universality. Liberal individualism grants formal equality (whether in moral, 
economic, or political questions) in order to ignore substantive inequality.
To develop his criticism, Marx needs to accept the revolutionary bourgeois notion 
of value, the tendency of economic value, determined through processes of 
commodification, to reduce all interactions to exchanges, and all qualities to quantities. 
Instead of directly pursuing a moralistic (e.g., Dickensian) project of nostalgic attacks on 
the depredations of the industrial revolution, Marx accepts the priority of value to 
morality. Bourgeois morality, even when it attacks capitalist excesses—as, for instance, in 
the Romantics, young Wordsworth, or Blake (Thompson 1997)—fails to understand the 
inner logic of capital and the intertwining of bourgeois morals with economic values. For 
Marx, however, the science of historical materialism demonstrates that the (materialist) 
truth of productive labour is the fundamental source of value. The self-negating character 
of bourgeois ‘creative destruction,’ the nihilism of bourgeois use values that are always 
and at an ever increasing rate reconverted into exchange value, turns out, ultimately, to be 
a useful nihilism, which ends by unveiling the really prevailing social relations of 
exploitation, setting the stage for revolution. 
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Nietzsche, by contrast, re-narrates, or ‘transvalues’ prevailing moral theories. This 
entails endorsing the activity of valuation rather than the value of productive labour. For 
Nietzsche, value and valuation precede morality as activity to passivity/reactivity. The 
question of the “value of morality” (Nietzsche 1989:19) is answered by pointing to the 
activities of “Setting prices, determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging” 
(70) that led to the emergence of human thought. Valuation is prior to morality and 
labour, and the truth of value lies in the activity of valuation. Further, moral values are 
just one kind of values. To reach our highest human possibilities, we must surpass them:
...we need a critique of moral values, the value of these values themselves 
must first be called in question...What if a symptom of regression were 
inherent in the ‘good’...so that precisely morality would be to blame if the 
highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man was never in 
fact attained? So that precisely morality was the danger of dangers? (20)54
One reading of these two perspectives would have it that Marx’s distinction between use 
value and exchange value, and his interpretation of exchange value as rooted in labour, 
avoids the more fundamental (and relativist) question of the origin of values in valuation. 
Close to Adam Smith in treating the human as the ‘assaying animal,’ Nietzsche’s caustic 
remarks about utility push on weak spots in Marx’s labour theory of value. First, there is 
the fact that Marx defines use value as the history of uses we have found for things. 
According to Nietzsche, starting with use is already to miss the origin (Ursprung) of 
values in the activity of valuation, not in use. This reading reduces Marx’s theory, once 
again, to an historicizing utilitarianism.
54  This is the kind of possibility that Marx’s contemporary Dostoyevsky considered and rejected in novels 
like Crime and Punishment (1991 [1866]) and Demons (2008 [1872]).
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Going still further, for Nietzsche even the activity of valuation has a prior origin. 
Here, where Smith brackets the question of a more original foundation of human nature, 
prior to activities of ‘truck, barter, and exchange’ (which is, in fact, already very different 
from Nietzsche’s ‘assaying animal’) Nietzsche pushes on, and locates the origin of “the 
right to create values and to coin names for values” in the “pathos of nobility and 
distance...the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher 
ruling order in relation to a lower order” (1989:26). Value, or the activity of valuation, 
originates in “the protracted and domineering fundamental total feeling” (26). In other 
words, value originates in the pleasure of successfully exerting one’s will. This could 
sound like Marx’s notions of ‘revolutionizing praxis,’ or ‘creative action.’ The closest 
equivalent, in Marx, is his famous architect-as-bee image. Here there is a pleasure, 
perhaps, in planning, in building, in creating, but no explicit focus on an experience of 
class domination. By contrast, as Raymond Geuss suggests in his admirable essay on 
“Nietzsche and Morality,” by claiming that valuation originates in the ‘pathos of 
distance,’ Nietzsche places the origin of positive values in relations of class domination:
So originally slavery is not just instrumentally necessary in order to 
provide (for instance) leisure for members of the upper classes to produce 
and appreciate various cultural artefacts, but rather slaves were a kind of 
social-psychological necessity because only if the members of a group 
have others to look down on and despise as wholly inferior will they be 
able to create positive values. (Geuss 1997:5)
Geuss is pointing out that ‘master morality’ is just as secretly social as ‘slave morality.’ 
This notion of a ‘pathos of distance’ that takes creative pleasure in domination of one 
order over another would signify, for Marx, merely the alienation experienced by the 
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ruling class. Marx, one could say, saw only Eros at the heart of the human drive, while 
Nietzsche also saw something darker, not quite Freud’s Thanatos, but the will to power. 
For Marx, something like a death drive is not primordial, but a deformation, a product of 
alienation. Nietzsche, however, speaks of “power and consciousness of power” 
(1989:113), and locates valuation not merely in the creative activity of making, but in the 
maximization of the feeling of power; what is more, valuation consists of reversals, and 
of transvaluation, as when slave morality was able to invert and transform the noble 
categories of good and bad into evil and good: “All good things were formerly bad 
things; every original sin has turned into an original virtue” (113). Uninterested in 
questions of economic exploitation, Nietzsche gives us a theory of social revolution and 
transformation whose crucial distinction is that between self-negating and self-
overcoming values.
To see more precisely how Nietzsche’s argument applies to Marx, we need to 
remember that Nietzsche’s argument rests on placing the activity of ‘valuation’ prior to 
the ‘will to truth.’ On this reading the ‘will to truth’ is just one form of valuation, one 
manifestation of the will to power. Since the first step on this path toward the truth is the 
denial of the personal will (i.e., the claim to be disinterested, objective, scientific and so 
on), the first step on the path to truth is a lie. Since this lie concerns the very activity of 
valuation (i.e., the scientist claims to describe but not evaluate), its basic core is nihilistic:  
it wills to will nothing. Consequently, the victory of the ‘will to truth’ as a form of slave 
morality means the victory of a life-denying nihilism, the replacement of noble values 
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with slavish ones. This means a self-negating civilization. About “the history of the next 
two centuries” Nietzsche wrote, playing the prophet, “I describe what is coming, what 
can no longer come differently: the advent of nihilism” (Nietzsche 1968:3). Furthermore, 
he argued that the heart of all these self-negating values is the question of utility:
All the values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world 
estimable for ourselves and which then proved inapplicable and therefore 
devaluated the world—all these values are, psychologically considered, 
the results of certain perspectives of utility, designed to maintain and 
increase human constructs of domination—and they have been falsely 
projected into the essence of things. (1968:13–14)
Although Nietzsche is not talking directly about Marx, it is easy to argue that ‘use 
value’—the form of value that Marx historicizes (1978:168) but still tries to shield, at the 
semantic level, from the market—would qualify, for Nietzsche, as just another form of 
self-negating value, not the ‘natural’ domination of the strong over the weak, but the 
‘constructed’ domination of use value over free instinctual expression (cf. Bataille 
1991:63–77). It is a form of domination that attempts to constrain the constitutive activity 
of the individual will, falsely claiming that there is something empirically true, objective 
and valuable about utility in itself. The utilitarian will to truth, dedicated, here, to a kind 
of quantitative maximization and distribution of uses—and surely this is one version of 
communism—turns out to be self-negating (cf. Nietzsche 1968:351).
The previous chapter cited Hönneth’s (2003) suggestion that Marxism tends 
toward utilitarianism because Marx places so much emphasis on unified class interests 
and on the means-end rationality that this entails. Habermas suggests as much in arguing 
that the ‘purposive rationality’ of the ‘productionist’ paradigm is obsolete, that 
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communicative rationality provides the real foundation for human sociality and solidarity, 
and that creative productive activity (praxis) derives from the nature of communicative 
reason. On this view, Marx’s productivism bypasses the problem of meaning by relying 
on a romanticized notion of craftsmanship (echoes of which will be heard again in the 
final chapter, on practice).55 According to Habermas, even the later Marx’s labour theory 
of value tacitly retains a neo-Romantic nostalgia about handicraft activity:
Marx eventually gave up his orientation to the prototype of craftsmanlike 
praxis taken from the past. But he still inconspicuously incorporated the 
questionable normative content of this notion of praxis into the premises 
of his labor theory of value, making it virtually indiscernible. This 
explains why the concept of labor as well as its inherently purposive 
rationality has remained so ambiguous in the Marxist tradition. (PDM 
1990a:66)
Habermas’s general point is that the division of rationality into value rationality and 
purposive rationality misses the dependence of both of these forms of reason on 
communicative rationality. What is more, Marx’s productivist focus assumes ‘value 
theory’ (and all of its attendant problems) as an element of his concept of praxis (65).
Habermas’s theory of communicative action owes much to Hannah Arendt, who 
critiqued Marx for reducing all forms of human activity to labour. Arendt pointed out 
that, insofar as Marx’s concept of use value retains the notion of value, it is already a kind 
of use ‘on the market,’ and subject to exchange. In other words, insofar as all uses are 
socially conditioned, they are uses with a social ‘currency,’ and already ‘exchange 
values,’ even if society has not differentiated or explicitly articulated an expressly 
55  See Veblen (1964 [1914]; 1973 [1899]) for an argument that, with some debts to Rousseau, combines 
an agonistic social theory of ‘invidious distinctions’ with a normative conception of craftsmanship.
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‘economic’ sphere. In addition, insofar as the concept of use itself involves a 
foreshortening of our awareness of the forms of human activity, of the difference between 
use and meaning, between “in order to” and “for the sake of” (Arendt 1998:154),56 we 
need to consider the possibility that Marx’s economism leads him to misunderstand the 
nature of the crisis of modernity. In Nietzsche’s terms, again, making use value into a 
master category involves a denial of the primordial nature of willing. Arendt, by contrast, 
who finds Nietzsche’s notion of will suspicious, argues that Marx has failed to perceive 
the existence of qualitatively different kinds of human activity (i.e., labour, work, action, 
thinking). In any case, if Marx’s use value is already a form of—or on the way to 
becoming a form of—exchange value, and if, conversely, exchange is just the ultimately 
irrational form of use generated by the logic of capital—if both already involve a 
fundamentally instrumentalizing process—then Marx is enough of a utilitarian to be 
accused of lacking, like all utilitarians, a good answer to the question, ‘what’s the use of 
use?’ This creates problems for our discussion of science as a vocation, since use, or 
usefulness (e.g., ‘why don’t you do something useful with your time instead of asking all 
these questions?’), instead of providing us with an immanent motivation or calling, 
appears to generate a vicious question-begging circularity that, in addition, reduces 
vocation once more to a form of social conformity.
Of course, such a view misses the dynamism of Marx’s understanding of history, 
and his view of use values as just those uses our collective activity has generated, uses 
56  Allen Wood (2004:104–106) makes similar remarks about ‘in order to’ not to contrast utility with ‘for 
the sake of,’ but in order to argue that Marx is an Aristotelian.
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which continue to be modified (currently still through bourgeois revolution). It is telling 
that Arendt, in her critique of Marx’s notion of labour, has nothing to say about his notion 
of ‘revolutionizing practice.’57 Even if this concept is inadequately articulated, in Marx, 
its place in his thought challenges Arendt’s central claim that Marx changes the definition 
of the human from animal rationale to animal laborans (Arendt 1998:86–87), as well as 
her claim that the only fundamental distinction for Marx is the one between productive 
and unproductive labor, and, finally, her claim that Marx was “...hoping all the time that 
only one more step was needed to eliminate labor and necessity altogether” (87). On 
Arendt’s reading, this leads to the fundamental contradiction in Marx:
The fact remains that in all stages of his work he defines man as an animal 
laborans and then leads him into a society in which this greatest and most 
human power is no longer necessary. We are left with the rather distressing 
alternative between productive slavery and unproductive freedom. 
(1998:105)
Famously, Arendt contended that Marx’s communist society would be a society of 
‘hobbyists’ (118n.65). Recall that the previous chapter pointed out that Marx accused 
Adam Smith of viewing labour purely negatively. The critical remarks against Smith’s 
view of work as sacrifice were made in the Grundrisse, which Arendt may or may not 
have read when she was writing The Human Condition. In any case, Arendt accuses Marx 
of the same drive to eliminate labour, and goes as far in her claim that Marx reduces all 
action to labour as to suggest that his famous line about what distinguishes architects 
from bees is an offhand remark that lacks relevance to his labour theory (99n.36).
57  Calling Marxism the ‘philosophy of praxis’ derives primarily from Italian Marxists, especially Gramsci 
(1971) and Labriola. See Lobkowicz (1967) for a history of praxis ‘from Aristotle to Marx.’
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Arendt’s critique of Marx has some problems (cf. Walsh 2008:348). For one thing, 
it depends upon sweeping claims such as the following: “...the question of a separate 
existence of worldly things, whose durability will survive and withstand the devouring 
processes of life, does not occur to him at all” (Arendt 1998:108). Extensively engaging 
with such an assertion would take us too far afield from the current project, but suffice it 
to say, for now, that it follows from Arendt’s refusal (in The Human Condition) to discuss 
the uniqueness of capitalism as an economic system, or to accept the centrality of the 
‘mode of production’ as a category of history. Arendt’s analysis of Marx’s version of the 
varieties of vita activa is only as good as her recognition of his specific claims about 
historical means, modes, and relations of production, as well as the specific forms of 
labouring that develop under conditions of totalizing commodification. Arendt takes 
Marx’s analysis of the logic of capital and of the specifically circular forms of activity 
(i.e., the ‘devouring processes’) that accompany it, to be the only form of action Marx 
can conceive. In this way she reserves praxis for her own applications, defining it as 
‘action’ in relation to poiesis (i.e., ‘work’), and labour.
Whatever the weaknesses or unfairnesses of Arendt’s analysis, she is not wrong in 
detecting insufficiencies in Marx’s explanation of human action and social change. 
Marx’s entanglement with value theory continues to draw Marxism towards 
utilitarianism, even though Allen Wood convincingly argues against describing Marx 
himself as utilitarian (2004:147ff). The elliptical nature of Marx’s references to 
revolutionizing practice resist systematization, but this has not stopped systematizing 
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Marxists from engaging, as Arendt puts it, in “absurd scholasticism” (Arendt 1965:61) or, 
on the other hand, from following in the tradition of the French Revolution and becoming 
“professional revolutionists” (258–265), a vocation on which Arendt pours considerable 
scorn. Arendt blames “professional revolutionists” for continuously derailing the truly 
new element of modern revolutions, the local council, or soviet. What is more, Marx’s 
vulnerability to Nietzsche’s critique of the ‘will to truth’ brings up some serious 
questions. Can we save our souls by speaking the truth? What relationship is there, in any 
case, between the scientific vocation and revolutionizing practice? What’s the value of 
sociology? What’s the use?
On Arendt’s reading, the crucial flaw in Marx’s theory, in addition to reducing all 
forms of action to labour, was his conflation of the arrival of political freedom with the 
end of poverty. Ultimately, though it was Lenin who “when asked to state in one sentence 
the essence and the aims of the October Revolution, gave the curious and long-forgotten 
formula: ‘Electrification plus soviets’” (65), the final aim of 20th century socialist 
revolutions became abundance rather than freedom, electrification, that is, plus 
dictatorship by the Communist Party.58
This discussion of Arendt, which may have seemed a sudden rabbit-trail after our 
comparative discussion of Marx and Nietzsche, has highlighted utilitarian tendencies in 
Marx, tendencies that parallel Nietzsche’s arguments about modern nihilism. These 
remarks about the soviets return us to our central questions about moral autonomy, human 
58  According to Žižek’s Lacanian argument, “Marxian Communism, this notion of a society of pure 
unleashed productivity outside the frame of Capital, was a fantasy inherent to capitalism itself” (2000:19).
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motivation, and the possibility of an immanent vocation. Arendt claims that the 
emergence of local councils is the determinate and novel result of modern revolutions, 
the new thing that was born. For Arendt, the possibility of participatory democracy made 
available by the appearance of local councils is also the best chance for modern human 
societies to develop a world of non-instrumental human action that is intrinsically 
motivating and sufficiently bounded so as to develop capacities for responding to the 
natality of human action.
We must bracket this discussion of Arendt to return to the sociological 
mainstream of our discussion. The next chapters develop discussions of Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim, who try, in turn, to provide answers to the question of sociology as a 
vocation that are also sociological claims about morality and responses to what appear to 
be both existential threats to and opportunities for the meaning and stability of modern 
social life. I have been suggesting that their projects were complicated by the ambiguous 
legacy of 19th century social thought. One of the most ambiguous questions, the very so-
called ‘social question,’ was the question of suffering and its relation to human nature. 
Indeed, the question of human suffering has been in the background of this discussion of 
Marx and Nietzsche. Do Weber or Durkheim succeed in foregrounding the question of 
suffering? Arguably not. We turn to Durkheim first.
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CHAPTER 3: SACRED VOCATION & ANIMAL LIFE: DURKHEIM’S STRONG 
PROGRAM
Thus, it seems the vocation of sociology is to open a new way to the science of man. 
Until now, we stood before these alternatives: either to explain the higher and specific 
faculties of man by relating them to lower forms of being—reason to sense, mind to 
matter—which amounted to denying their specificity; or to connect them with some 
reality above experience that we postulated but whose existence no observation can 
establish. What placed the mind in that difficulty is that the individual was taken to be the 
finis naturae. It seemed there was nothing beyond him, at least nothing that science might 
discover. But a new way of explaining man becomes possible as soon as we recognize 
that above the individual there is society, and that society is a system of active forces—
not a nominal being, and not a creation of the mind. To preserve man’s distinctive 
attributes, it is no longer necessary to place them outside experience. Before drawing that 
extreme conclusion, at any rate, it is best to find out whether that which is in the 
individual but surpasses him may not come to him from that supraindividual, yet 
concretely experienced, reality that is society. To be sure, it cannot be said at this moment 
how far these explanations can be extended and if they can lay every problem to rest. 
Equally, however, it is impossible to mark in advance a limit beyond which they cannot 
go. What must be done is to try out the hypothesis and test it against the facts as 
methodically as possible. This is what I have tried to do. (Durkheim 1995:448)
Society has no justification if it does not bring a little peace to men—peace in their hearts 
and peace in their mutual intercourse. (Durkheim 1957:16 [1950:55])
In the same way that the natural sciences permit us to manipulate the material with which 
they deal, so the science of moral facts puts us in a position to order and direct the course 
of moral life. (Durkheim 1974 [1906]:65)
...all individuals, however humble, have the right to aspire to the superior life of the 
mind. (Durkheim quoted in Riley 2002:359)
The university’s vocation, in the strongest sense of the word, and the scientific 
specialization of its sociological group, make it not merely a place of research, but an 
actual model of the reciprocity that is to free society from the dispersive tendencies of 
economic anomie. If Durkheim saw ‘professional groups’ as containing the principle of a 
future ethics, this was by way of importing the vocational ethic of which the professor, 
the preacher and the judge served as example. The sociological institution was the 
scholarly society become laboratory and model for the sociability of all. (Rancière 
2012:149)
A. SOCIOLOGY AS ‘MODEL FOR THE SOCIABILITY OF ALL’
The previous two chapters followed Marx’s attempt to establish a ‘strong program,’ a 
science of the social that subordinates the moral to the scientifically true. Chapter one 
argued that Marx focused on exposing hypocrisy via immanent critique: ideals claimed 
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by bourgeois moralists neither match nor even orient the practices of everyday social life. 
At the same time, Marx satirizes, even in the scientistic Capital, making interpretation 
difficult, although nothing like his ironic and often pseudonymous Danish contemporary, 
Kierkegaard, who directs his readers to take authorship as part of the text and part of the 
interpretive task, highlighting subjectivity while entangling truth, text, and author. What 
does a text mean if the author does not mean it? While Kierkegaard’s authorial personae 
thematize tensions between truth, beauty, and goodness—or aesthetics, ethics, and 
religion, as in Either/Or (1987)—the puzzles of subjectivity, and the unstable standpoints 
of authorship—a phenomenology of subjectivity, not of (World) Spirit (i.e., against 
Hegel’s ‘System’)—Marx mostly just brackets authorship, subsuming the good and 
beautiful to the true, even when crossing literary genres.
Chapter two moved to questions of authorship and vocation that Marx dealt with 
only at the level of society as a whole. Relations of production under capitalism are 
relations of alienation. Class morality does not come to terms with praxis, with its own 
creative action, but reifies social structures. The artificial demands of the capitalistic 
division of labour trap individuals in alienated forms of activity, transforming them into 
‘crippled monstrosities’ unable to explore their ‘slumbering powers’ or realize the true 
nature of human production. When we collectively recognize the economic exploitation 
embedded in prevailing relations of production we realize, at the same time, the 
collective capacity to revolutionize these relations.
On the ‘humanist’ reading, Marx saw human activity as expressive, not 
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vocational. According to Fromm, Marx envisioned “...the complete abolition of the 
lifelong submersion of a man in one occupation. Since the aim of human development is 
that of the development of the total, universal man, man must be emancipated from the 
crippling influence of specialization” (Fromm 1966:42). Advocating for revolutionizing 
practice makes it hard to conflate the scientific vocation with a particular job in the 
currently existing division of labour. Marx can only be used with difficulty to justify 
pursuing and holding—as an end in itself (i.e., as a permanent calling)—a tenured 
university chair in sociology in a neo-liberalizing university. Commitment to science and 
truth is justified only as a form of strategic political engagement that responds to the 
needs of the revolutionary class (or perhaps forms its political vanguard). Commitment to 
the bourgeois institution and social class remain ambiguous, for greater loyalty is claimed 
by organizations with radical intent and active solidarity with the working class. Lukács 
and Althusser provide classic and disputed examples of academics that committed 
themselves, at some level, to the authority of the Communist Party, in this regard.
I earlier suggested that Marx’s taciturnity concerning the scholastic vocation and 
his own social position was not available in the same way to the next generation of 
European scholars. Insofar as scholars like Durkheim and Weber made individual 
commitments to sociology as a profession and to the university as a bourgeois institution
—and were granted some success in this regard—they were compelled to give more 
explicit answers to questions concerning the vocation, responsibilities, and limitations of 
institutionalized social science as well as to the question of their own personal vocation. 
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The justification an author gives for sociology as a profession—as an answer to the 
question ‘How should one live?’—points, although not necessarily without contradiction, 
toward the author’s sociology of morality. There is a kind of necessary symmetry 
between sociology as a vocation and the sociology of morality (cf. Friedrichs 1970:289–
328). The following chapters describe how Durkheim and Weber made sense of and cases 
for sociology, and how this was intertwined with their understanding of sociology’s 
relationship to and knowledge of morality. In this chapter we turn to Durkheim.
Jacques Rancière contends that Durkheim saw practices embodied by scholarly 
research groups like his own as both laboratory and model for the morality of future 
society (2012:149). Not only does Durkheim endorse and defend institutionalized social 
science, he argues that scientists, in part through specialization, occupy a privileged 
position from which to ascertain the true meaning and direction of society’s moral ideal. 
Against Marx’s Goethean critique of specialized vocations, Durkheim asserts that “In a 
word, we have endeavored to open, as far as regards sociology in France, what Comte 
would have called the era of specialization” (1973:15). At the same time, of course, in 
Division of Labour Durkheim criticized the current ‘forced division of labour’ (1984). 
What he criticized, however, was not specialization, but unregulated competition between 
artificially isolated (egoistic and anomic) individuals (cf. Marx’s notion of ‘free labour’) 
who were forced to take whatever work was ready-to-hand and would keep them alive.
Durkheim criticized his society, desired extensive and even radical reforms—even 
if also influenced by elements of conservative thought (Nisbet 1965:23–28)—and 
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reserved for scientists the authoritative critique of society’s failures to live up to its moral 
ideals. But while permitting exceptions, he described individual deviation from society’s 
ideals not as exceeding those ideals, or as potential moral leadership, but as inferior: 
“...there is no individual conscience that exactly translates the communal moral 
conscience, which is not, that is to say, in some degree inadequate. From this point of 
view, as I have already indicated, each one of us is immoral” (1974:78; cf. Kierkegaard 
1987:339–354). Durkheim sides with totality rather than infinity when he uses the normal 
as a synonym for the moral. His use of suicide rates as a proxy for moral disorder is 
similarly bound to the idea of societal unity (1961:72). At the same time, Durkheim 
endorses the freedom of individual conscience (1974:61), distinguishing the egoistic cult 
of the self from the emergent collective sacred, the cult of the individual. From this 
standpoint, it would be incorrect to suggest that Durkheim considered sociologists to be 
candidates for sanctified Comtean priesthood. Nevertheless, a strong sense of the 
importance and validity of the academic vocation persists in Durkheim’s writings.
Still, the new or emergent in society, including emergent moral values, derives not 
from individual parts, but from the ‘new being’ constituted by the societal whole. 
Furthermore, “if there is such a thing as morality, it must necessarily link man to goals 
that go beyond the circle of individual interests” (Durkheim 1961:65). Society must 
constrain us before it can enable us. This connects him to the broad tradition in which 
Marx falls, but while Marx considered the novelties generated within bourgeois society to 
be products of a coercion that could only be done away with by means of radical political 
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and social revolution, Durkheim’s “principle of ontological novelty” (Callegaro 
2012:458) marks every society as producing surplus value and meaning as it actively 
constitutes itself as a symbolic (and therefore real) whole through collective experiences 
and representations. But the surplus, in the case of modernity, is not a class of 
gravediggers for existing class society, but a new moral being that will complete the 
reformation and regulation of a society that has still not come to terms with its new ideal, 
the cult of the individual and the sacredness of the person.
Modernity’s new moral energy comes as an attribute of the new social reality sui 
generis that exceeds the sum of social parts. The new morality does not have its origins 
in academia, even if scientists turn out to be the best analysts of existing moral realities. 
Scientists are no more moral than non-scientists (even if Durkheim demanded a lot of 
himself and his followers). Their scientific efforts may generate analytic authority but not 
a special moral authority (so Rancière goes a bit far). In any case, nowhere does 
Durkheim suggest that the moral ideals of modern bourgeois society are mere hypocrisy, 
deserving to be dismantled by scientific critique and replaced with academic life as a 
model of sociability. Morality is real. Even societies in a pathological state have a 
morality appropriate to them. Thus, on the other hand, the scientific vocation cannot be 
confined to social critique. Social critique must proceed on a social basis, on the basis, 
that is, of a scientific acknowledgement and interpretation of underlying socio-moral 
realities and emergent moral norms. Here is where, in Durkheim’s view, Marx fails. Marx 
fails because he, along with other socialists, confuses analysis with sentiment. Durkheim 
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makes this argument in his incomplete lectures on socialism. 
B. MARXISM AS ‘CRY OF GRIEF’: LABOUR THEORY OF VALUE OR 
RITUAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
In his lectures on socialism, Durkheim argues that socialism is not scientific. Socialism 
concerns itself with the future, with remaking society completely, but lacks an empirical 
object of study. It involves utopian schemas and systems rather than attention to facts. 
These utopian systems grow out of the sentiments of the theorists. Facts and observations 
merely illustrate the governing idea:
The truth is that the facts and observations assembled by theoreticians 
anxious to document their affirmations are hardly there except to give 
form to the arguments. The research studies they made were undertaken to 
establish a doctrine that they had previously conceived, rather than the 
doctrine being a result of the research. (1959:5)
Durkheim tacitly uses Marx’s59 definition of religion as the ‘heart of a heartless world’ 
against him, suggesting that socialism is “...a cry of grief...uttered by men who feel most 
deeply our collective malaise” (1959:5). Laissez-faire economists work from the opposite 
direction, relying on unexamined sentiments attaching to a particular (abstract) notion of 
individual autonomy. In both cases passion lies at the origin of the system, passions that 
search for explanations without subjecting the passions themselves to scientific analysis.
If socialism expresses collective distress (1959:6), and forms an object rather than 
a work of science, is this expressed distress historically unique? If it is just one more 
manifestation of an eternal condition (i.e., the poor’s resentment for the rich) then 
nothing, presumably, can be done about it. If it is unique in history, however, perhaps it 
59  La Socialisme was an incomplete lecture series that Durkheim began in 1895 and abandoned in 1896. 
The section on Marx, whom, according to Mauss, “he knew well already” (1959:2), was never completed.
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may be remedied. Here Durkheim makes an important and characteristic move. While 
socialism is an unscientific expression of sentiment, it needs to be treated scientifically, 
not just as a matter for curiosity, but “also, in order to find appropriate remedies” (6). 
While Durkheim distinguishes science and non-science as reason and passion, this has 
nothing to do with neutrality. Science, like other professions, needs to synthesize nomos 
and eros, discipline and attachment. Science, as a product of society, has obligations to 
society and must be answerable to it. Science needs to be objective rather than subjective, 
but it can still make policy recommendations. As a kind of fact, society’s relations are 
subject to explanation and remedy.
Much depends on the notion that society is a whole whose parts may be 
understood in relation to the whole. This image is not quite reducible to organicism, 
however. Organic metaphors are just that (cf. Bauman 2005). Indeed, Durkheim claims 
that sociology’s models of part and whole, of system and function, owe nothing to 
biology (1974:1–2); certainly Plato’s city, which precedes modern biology, suggests as 
much with its analogy between justice in the city and justice in an individual. What we 
have, in the case of society, is une chose, a thing, the most general of all social facts, a 
certain kind of underlying unified reality involving a social bond, a degree of solidarity, 
and collective consciousness.
Durkheim approaches socialism as the effect of an underlying ‘social state.’ It 
needs to be approached in the same way that he approached suicide, marriage, religion, 
crime, and punishment (1959:7). We need, to begin with, a working definition. He settles 
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on one that includes all doctrines that would bind or organize the economic functions, 
connecting them to social direction and consciousness/conscience:
We denote as socialist every doctrine which demands the connection of all 
economic functions, or of certain among them, which are at the present 
time diffuse, to the directing and conscious centers of society. (13)
He distinguishes between connection (rattachement) and subordination to leave room for 
forms of socialism (e.g., Marxism, anarchism) that are suspicious of the State, and 
centralized authority, but also because this fits his claims regarding scientific objectivity 
(i.e., socialism needs to be a clear object of scientific analysis and treated as a moral 
current indicator) and his concept of modern political life as a communicative network.
We should distinguish Durkheim’s notion of objectivity from Weber’s (see the 
next chapter), since Durkheim thinks that one transcends the merely subjective and gets 
at a truly scientific ‘angle’ (biais) on objective social facts by going deeper. Thus, in DL,
we have studied social solidarity through the system of juridical rules...in 
the search for causes, we have set aside all that might be too much affected 
by a personal view or by subjective appraisal, so that we might get at 
certain facts of social structure that lie deep enough to qualify as objects of 
comprehension and hence, of science. (1984:xlii; cf. Davy 1957:xlix)
Here ‘law’ is taken as the visible, external symbol of the inward social fact. Instead of 
bracketing individual values, we ‘deepen’ our scientific engagement by finding objective 
(i.e., valid) measures of underlying social realities. ‘Value-relevance’ is a simpler 
question for Durkheim than for Weber, for Durkheim felt that he could detect and also 
interpret the basic moral currents of modern society. With his metaphor of surface and 
depth he suggested that the ‘rise’ of socialist activism indicated the basic problem to be 
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addressed, that of economic regulation. As he put it at the end of the unfinished socialism 
lectures: “The problem must be put this way: to discover through science the moral 
restraint which can regulate economic life, and by this regulation control selfishness and 
thus gratify needs” (1959:151). As we shall see, Weber did not have such an optimistic 
view of the possibilities of rational regulation. For Weber, conflict and contradictory 
value-positions also exist below the social surface, and in a fundamental way.
Durkheim takes law as a signifier for which the social fact is the signified. As 
Davy suggests, this moves us from the ought to the normal (1957:li–lii). By this means, 
Durkheim transforms the is/ought distinction into the normal/pathological distinction, 
thus appearing to render the question of morality immanent to society. But, as Davy 
points out, reading Durkheim as strictly positivistic involves discounting his later 
accounts of ideals “that in the end assume the function of transcendency” (liv). This 
‘function of transcendency,’ however, must not involve utopian schemes. While Marx’s 
immanent critique of bourgeois hypocrisy overlaps with Durkheim’s critique of the 
‘forced division of labour,’ Marx’s refusal of bourgeois vocation and his demand for 
revolution contrast with Durkheim’s embrace of scientific specialization, his reformist 
agenda, and his basic endorsement of the validity of bourgeois morality.
Durkheim viewed socialism as a ‘cry of grief’ expressing a real and urgent 
modern collective sentiment, but lacking a scientific analysis. His claims, in this regard, 
have to do with property rights, where we find one of the important divergences between 
Marx and Durkheim. For both of them, ultimately, everything belongs to society. As 
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Durkheim puts it, “property, in its origins, can only be collective” (1957:164). Both Marx 
and Durkheim mounted serious critiques of modern capitalism, but Durkheim blamed—
in spite of his critique of inheritance—the incomplete process of producing an 
autonomous individual, not private property (in the form of capital). Modern society must 
move beyond formally liberal individuals, developing a balance of integration and 
regulation in which, through the work of civic and professional life, individual’s rights 
are produced and maintained and worshipped as sacred.
Against the labour theory of value and property rights, Durkheim argues that 
property originates in ritual action, through the production of sacred things that express 
and represent the life and essence of the group. For Durkheim, property is rooted in the 
fundamentally “sacred nature of appropriation” (163). A labour theory of value could 
only be a late product, derived from a desacralization or profanation of property: “By 
degrees, this sacredness residing in the things themselves passed into the persons: the 
things ceased to be sacred in themselves” (171). If, originally, society managed to express 
the sacredness of its own nature in things, and if individuals, then (e.g., in feudal society) 
belonged to things (e.g., to the land) rather than the reverse, and gained their sacredness 
from their relation to things, this has been gradually reversed. Durkheim points to the 
Roman patriarchy, the pater familias, and then to the development of moveable (rather 
than landed) property. Finally, it is the individual that is sacred, and the things associated 
with the individual gain their sacred character from their owner. What Marx did not 
recognize is that modern commodity fetishism merely represents a disordered last 
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resistance to the ‘creative destruction’ of capitalism, which will end, through new forms 
of (professional) integration and regulation, by making the individual sacred rather than 
the commodity. Durkheim’s question, then, is how to maintain and complete the 
development of the cult of the individual by discovering how the sacredness of the 
individual may be “legitimately communicated to the things” (173) over which 
ownership is claimed. Here his critiques of contract and inheritance are crucial. A great 
deal is absent from his analysis of modern social and economic development, of course 
(cf. Foucault 1995:23). There is no significant discussion, to begin with, of the role of 
colonialism or gender in both the international and the familial division of labour. There 
is also no adequate discussion of processes of commodification. Durkheim’s notion of the 
cult of the individual and his various remarks about cosmopolitanism, which seem 
naively optimistic regarding the potential of citizenship and the nation-state to transcend 
rather than generate racism and invidious ethnic difference, are too vaguely elaborated to 
be of much use. Nor does his distinction between the cult of the self and the cult of the 
individual give us much means of elaborating an analysis of ongoing processes of 
commodification. Nevertheless, the broad lineaments of his argument, that the origins of 
property and, indeed, of all economic value judgements, lie in ritual action, forms a 
powerful counter to Marx’s secular theory of the relationship between labour and value. 
To explore Durkheim’s theory of modern morality further, particularly his divergence 
from Marx’s polemic against bourgeois morality, we turn, here, to his re-reading of Kant, 
in which he attempts to redeem modern bourgeois morality by grounding it in social 
190
relations, actions, and collective representations. Durkheim’s reading of Kant derives, in 
part, from his ritual theory of property, which generates a different critique of bourgeois 
abstraction than the one developed by Marx.
C. SOCIOLOGIZING THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: DURKHEIM’S 
IDEA OF SOCIAL AUTONOMY
Much of Durkheim’s work can be seen as the enthusiastic translation of Kant into 
sociological terms. Epistemologically, this meant relativizing Kant’s categories (Kant 
1965) in order to present knowledge as socially produced and socially bounded. In The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life (hereafter EFRL), Durkheim suggested that inter-
societal variation in conceptions of time and space and in basic logical categories implies 
that “the categories are essentially collective representations” (1995:15). He linked the 
notion of causality to the reproduction rituals of various societies. According to 
Durkheim “the ritual precept is reinforced by a logical principle that is none other than 
the intellectual aspect of the ritual one. The authority of both derives from the same 
source: society” (371). Our confidence in the notion of causality comes from the ritual 
power and regularity of our festivals of social collective representation. For Durkheim, 
this meant that the knowledge of phenomena was confined, in a particular way, to 
knowledge of social appearances. This position disturbs the epistemological certainty 
about appearances that Kant had tried to establish through his critical approach. However, 
it seemed to Durkheim that “a sociological theory of the idea of causality, and the 
categories more generally, both diverges from the classical doctrines on this question and 
accords with them” (372). From this perspective, the category of ‘cause’ is both 
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relativized (bound to a particular social type and historical moment), and made into an 
objective reality (a collective product that could not have been produced by individuals 
out of the ‘regularity’ of their experiences). Durkheim felt he had accomplished a 
reconciliation between apriorists and empiricists. He attempted this reconciliation 
because he was unwilling, under the influence of the positivism of his predecessors 
Comte and Spencer, to accept Kant’s non-empirical approach to ‘social questions’ like 
morality and he thought he could synthesize Hume’s is/ought distinction with Kant’s 
categorical imperative by grounding it in social authority.
Durkheim was influenced by 19th century sociologists like Spencer, but did not 
follow their tendency to read morality through an utilitarian lens. Instead he follows 
Adam Smith and Kant, who both reject prudential considerations as the ground of 
morality. Again Durkheim arrives at a kind of Kantian conclusion, but replaces ‘reason’ 
with ‘society.’ If morality surpasses prudence or utility, this is because society, the source 
of morality, is higher than the individual. The Kantian ‘moral law within’ (Kant 1956) 
becomes the collective conscience and an individual’s experience of it measures their 
internalization of (or ‘disciplining’ by) society’s aims.
Durkheim rejects utilitarianism in favour of an empirical and historicized notion 
of morality, “For the fact that morality varies from society to society certainly shows that 
it is a social product” (1961:86–87). Rather than a product of abstract reason, “the 
morality of each people is directly related to the social structure of the people practicing 
it…Each social type has the morality necessary to it, just as each biological type has a 
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nervous system that enables it to sustain itself” (87). Durkheim also rejected the notion of 
an original social contract. For Durkheim, basic facts tend against the plausibility of this 
scenario. Society pre-exists every individual. We are born into society rather than joining 
it. The language of contracts must be learned before it can be deployed. Social contract 
theorists like Locke and Rousseau recognized the pre-existence of society, but still 
formulated Protestant notions (Rosati 2007a; 2007b) in which individuals join or assent 
to the social contract at an ‘age of assent.’ Durkheim saw modern contracts as an 
emergent and under-regulated social form needing to be re-integrated and regulated. He 
criticized inheritance, and called for mandatory forms of charity (e.g., progressive 
taxation), but stopped short, as we have seen, of a fundamental critique of modern 
property relations and did not acknowledge the ‘iron cage’ of capitalism recognized by 
Weber and Marx, with its social incitement to the endless pursuit of profit, an incitement 
that fits awkwardly within his typology of social disorders (anomie, egoism, etc.).
Rejecting the Protestant approach to contracts, and criticizing Spencer’s 
understanding of social development, Durkheim argued that “the contract is not sufficient 
by itself, but is only possible because of the regulation of contracts, which is of social 
origin” (1984:162). Society makes contract possible, not the other way around. This 
appears to put Durkheim at the other end of the spectrum from Hobbes. From the first, 
Durkheim limits individual self-interested activity to a narrow range of physical needs, 
and since he rejects the notion of an a priori social contract he has no need to imagine an 
initial struggle between individual wills. Originally, “individuals acted only because they 
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were urged on by one another, except in cases where their behaviour was determined by 
physical needs” (285). Nevertheless, Durkheim’s view that when unconstrained by social 
norms and lacking an integrated set of social bonds, we will be driven mad by limitless 
instinctive drives and subject to infinite and insatiable desire, resembles what Hobbes 
calls vanity, which Rousseau, by contrast, saw as a social product. Society exists, for 
Durkheim as for Hobbes, to bring peace, and as he puts it, “Society has no justification if 
it does not bring a little peace to men—peace in their hearts and peace in their mutual 
intercourse (Durkheim 1957:16). For Durkheim, this peace comes primarily through the 
internalization of social norms (i.e., through regulation and discipline).
Durkheim’s critique of social contract theories boils down to a critique of 
unsociological notions of individual autonomy, so his translation of Kant into 
sociological terms needs a sociological solution to Kant’s assertion that morality cannot 
exist without autonomy. Observing that “liberty itself is the product of regulation” 
(Durkheim 1984:320), a premise driving much of Western thought, at least since Plato, 
Durkheim concludes that only society can provide a liberating regulation. He takes 
liberty, or autonomy, to be “the subordination of external to social forces” (321). External 
forces include the ‘natural elements,’ but also the natural and instinctive drives. In 
Habermas’s Parsons-inflected language, Durkheim translates the Kantian concept of 
autonomy to mean “a symmetrical relationship between the moral authority of existing 
social orders and a corresponding self-control anchored in personality systems” 
(Habermas 1998:67). Rather than action determined directly by a ‘good will’—informed 
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by a universal practical reason—autonomy, in the double sense of the capacity to regulate 
both external and internal nature, originates in social forces: “The only power that can 
serve to moderate individual egoism is that of the group” (Durkheim 1984:337). Freedom 
appears when individual will conforms with social will: “Institutionalized values must, as 
Parsons will say, correspond with internalized values” (Habermas 1998:67).
Social forces that simultaneously constrain and vivify produce individual 
autonomy (Durkheim 1973:231n.4). They do not entail transcending society itself, except 
when, in moments of collective effervescence, particular actors embody society in the act 
of surpassing itself. Paradoxically, moral questions retreat during these founding 
moments of social feeling, which produce and perhaps revolutionize collective “moral 
harmony” (Durkheim 1995:213). Society transcending itself may also transcend the 
moral order, producing “superhuman heroism” or “bloody barbarism,” “sublime or 
savage” (213). One cannot predict what will come of the collective ‘passion’ that 
Durkheim calls ‘effervescence.’
Every society generates social autonomy, enabling individuals to transcend the 
limits of their physical bodies in overcoming nature (within and without), but individual 
autonomy in the specific sense that concerned Kant emerges only in societies with a 
highly advanced division of labour and a correspondingly low level of shared collective 
consciousness. In modern society, the corrective for the consequently low degree of 
integration and regulation has been the rise of the ‘cult’ of the individual and of 
individual moral autonomy (what Kant called ‘Enlightenment’). For Durkheim, Kant 
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expresses the notion of individual moral autonomy without understanding its sources.
Durkheim responds to Kant’s painstaking logic, his analytic of the categorical 
imperative as the moral principle par excellence (Kant 1956; 1964), by asserting that, as 
undeniable as this analytic of intention may be in its articulation of the notion of the 
‘good will’ as the only form of the good that can be praised without qualification, this 
thinking about intention remains a social product, a posteriori rather than a priori to its 
social possibility and desirability. Kant’s very pride in the rigour of his thought, 
Durkheim might suggest, derives from his social setting. Take the examples that Kant 
(1956) uses as evidence of the moral autonomy of the will, but precisely not as grounds 
of the ethical (which must remain free of the empirical) (e.g., keeping a promise; 
choosing death over betrayal; achieving sexual abstinence in the face of capital penalty): 
each of Kant’s examples provide evidence of an autonomous moral will formed through 
the power of collective sentiment over individual inclinations. They demonstrate socially 
supported autonomy, a priori only in the sense that they are based in social conditions 
that pre-date the individual. Kant’s solution, writes Durkheim, is “logically possible; but 
it has not and never will have anything to do with reality” (1961:113).
Of course, this is entirely Kant’s point. His ‘kingdom of ends’ (1956) must 
necessarily remain hypothetical, ideal, and conceptual. Durkheim wants to reconcile, 
however, the material and the transcendent realm. He also wants to provide a theory of 
morality that is distinct from self-interest, but thinks this is possible when we 
conceptualize the person as social and socialized through and through, and individual 
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personalities as resulting at “...the point of convergence for a certain number of external 
forces” (Durkheim 1961:11), so that the collective good is not a mere construct or the 
sum of individual self-interested calculations (producing a social contract). From Kant’s 
perspective, this can only be done at the expense of freedom. From Durkheim’s point of 
view, only close attendance to facts and to material reality, closer than that of the theorists 
of self-interest Kant wants to refute, enables a theory of morality not rooted in disguised 
individual self-interest. The obligatory character of morality is not rooted in the force of 
an autonomous will reasoning from maxims to categorical imperatives. Rather, “the rules 
of morality are norms that have been elaborated by society; the obligatory character with 
which they are marked is nothing but the authority of society, communicating itself to 
everything that comes from it” (Durkheim 1973:162). Even apparently ‘self-interested’ 
reason has authority only on the basis of its social foundation.
For Durkheim, the motivating energies and the retrospectively developed social 
ideals for both morality and vocation emerge from effervescent moments of collective 
assembly and from the practices that sustain societies as “permanent and organized 
crowds” (1961:62), locating, forming, and shaping social members from the outside 
through discipline and from the inside through attachment. Durkheim purported to have 
discovered a principle of socially immanent processes by which, in modern society, 
individual autonomy might be successfully generated within a fully developed cult of the 
individual, “a religion in which man is at once the worshiper and the god” (1973:46).
Again, Durkheim replaces Kant’s notion of the autonomy of reason, of an inner 
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sense of duty, with the authority of society over its members: “Morals do not look like 
obligations to us...we can have no sense of duty––unless there exist above us a power 
which gives them sanction” (1957:73). Against Kant’s view that a moral duty must 
transcend the laws of nature (understood as a kind of mechanistic determinism), 
Durkheim argued that “The autonomy an individual can enjoy does not, then, consist in 
rebelling against nature...To be autonomous means, for the human being, to understand 
the necessities he has to bow to and accept them with full knowledge of the facts” (91).
Durkheim retains a dualistic conception of humanity, but not one limited to the 
old passion/reason pairing. Instead, Durkheim opposes ‘individual being’ to ‘social 
being.’ The individual being is just the physical organism, whose activities and needs are 
strictly limited to the sphere of physiology. Both passion and reason can be found, and 
reconciled, within ‘social being.’ Durkheim draws two consequences from this dualistic 
premise: “In the realm of practice, the consequence of this duality in our nature is the 
irreducibility of the moral ideal to the utilitarian motive; in the realm of thought, it is the 
irreducibility of reason to individual experience” (1995:16). Durkheim’s dualism runs 
orthogonally through the classic reason/passion divide, giving us a fourfold tension 
between social and individual passions, and between social and individual reason.
In Durkheim, the sentiments and inclinations that Kant had rigorously excised 
from the grounds of morals—and gingerly allowed back in as the object or result of 
habituation to the moral law as reverence or respect—return in collective form. Shilling 
and Mellor point out that “While Durkheim followed Kant in recognizing the need for 
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individuals to ‘reach beyond’ their natural selves if they were to become moral, however, 
Durkheim viewed moral rules as emotionally grounded products of society” (1998:195). 
We saw this in our discussion of Durkheim’s analysis of socialism. Moral feeling grounds 
moral law, but as a collective sentiment rather than an individual product. Durkheim 
provides the macro-counterpoint to Smith’s microanalysis of moral sentiment in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1984). However, what for Smith was still an individual (if 
intersubjective) phenomenon is for Durkheim a phenomenon that could only arise at the 
group level and by means of group-level action. The feeling of self-transcendence that 
Kant attributes to practical reason’s success in determining the will, signals the individual 
embodiment of the ritually generated collective sentiments that ground moral action.
Even if one follows and accepts Durkheim’s theory of collective sentiments, what 
makes these sentiments moral? And how, in the event of conflict between different 
collective sentiments, would we distinguish moral from immoral group-level emotions? 
In what way could science adjudicate a social and (passionate) dispute over morality? 
Initially, at least, Durkheim harmonizes science and morality through the concept of 
health. If society as a reality sui generis may be treated as an independent whole, then 
social health and moral well-being are the same thing. Rejecting utilitarian morality at the 
individual level, he seems to re-instate it at the collective level. 60 Moral ends are really 
collective ‘health’ needs. Each society has its balance, its appropriate morality, its 
60  Kant’s suggestion that the end of promising would be the end of society (1956) can also be read as re-
instating utilitarianism at the collective level. Erving Goffman, by contrast, provides a micro-sociology of 
promising that provides a morality of the ‘interaction order’ (1983) that, while ostensibly based upon 
Durkheimian premises, may just as well have been linked to Levinas (Raffel 2002).
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particular kind of health. Science helps us to comprehend this balance.
D. SOCIAL ENGINEERING, SORT OF: DURKHEIM, EDUCATION, & THE 
SECULARIZATION OF MORALITY
Science is a moral vocation for Durkheim, as for Kant, but the vocation is not to  
complete a thought experiment concerning a ‘kingdom of ends’ that transcends present 
society. Each society has a morality that suits it. To try to transcend this is silly: “The 
notion that the Romans could have practiced a different morality is, really, an historical 
absurdity” (Durkheim 1961:87). We saw this earlier in the chapter in our survey of his 
reading of socialism as a utopian and unscientific expression of social suffering. In his 
early thesis on Montesquieu he puts it this way:
What is more desirable for a human being than to be sound in mind and 
body? Only science can tell us what constitutes good mental and physical 
health. Social science, which classifies the various human societies, cannot 
fail to describe the normal form of social life in each type of society, for 
the simple reason that it describes the type itself; whatever pertains to the 
type is normal, and whatever is normal is healthy. (1960[1893]:7–8)
This perspective persists in later work—although combined with a continued attempt to 
limit sociology’s prescriptive role, particularly as regards the future (1973:42)—as 
Durkheim develops his peculiar adaptation of Kantian insight and empiricism. He 
defends science as a moral force capable of bridging the gap between empirical reality 
and moral ideals, between is and ought. In the Introduction to DL he writes that 
To regulate relationships with our fellow-men there is no need to resort to 
any means save those that regulate our relationships with things; reflective 
thinking, methodically applied, suffices in both cases. What reconciles 
science and morality is the science of morality, for at the same time as it 
teaches us to respect moral reality it affords us the means of improving it. 
(1984:xxviii–xxix)
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In the lectures on Moral Education he continues to insist on the moral uses of science:
In recent times, science has often been accused of amorality. It is not, as 
people say, by learning how bodies fall or how the stomach digests that we 
will learn how to behave toward other men…Without mentioning the 
moral sciences, which can also be understood positively and guide men’s 
actions, we have just shown that even the physical and biological sciences 
can play an important part in the formation of moral character…Societies 
are part of nature…therefore, natural science can indeed help us better 
understand the human realm, and equip us with precise ideas, good 
intellectual habits which can help us in directing our behavior. (1961:265–
266)
Durkheim posits science as a product of modernity that provides ways of reflecting on 
morality. Reflective thinking comes at its right moment. Kant is placed in historical 
context. His ideas of moral autonomy are the ideas appropriate to a society that has begun 
to make the individual sacred. The sovereign individual is, as Nietzsche wrote, the late 
fruit of human history. Kantian autonomy emerges along with a growing ability to think 
reflectively: “the more emancipated we are from the senses, and the more capable we are 
of thinking and acting conceptually, the more we are persons” (Durkheim 1995:275). The 
duty to keep promises, thus, is not an accidental element of Kantian morality and it needs 
to be historicized (e.g., from covenant with God to social contract).
At the end of Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, at the point where the lecture 
notes trail off, Durkheim suggests that our moral development in this direction will 
continue, as the idea of justice develops into that of charity, and as society comes to 
“exercise complete dominion over nature, to lay down the law for it and to set this moral 
equality over physical inequality” (1957:220). Science—as one of those social forces that 
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allows the social to subdue nature, even nature in us (our sensations)—assists in the 
development of moral autonomy. Durkheimian moral autonomy, however, is not Kantian 
to the core, for its origin and sustaining force is social. He is optimistic concerning its 
continuing development, which he reads as the sublimation of justice into charity: “it is 
certain that the depth of feeling of human fraternity will go on increasing, and that the 
best amongst men are capable of working without getting an exact recompense for their 
pains and services” (220). Charity (altruism) will continue to grow in importance, until it 
“ceases, as it were, to be optional…and becomes instead a strict obligation” (220).
Durkheim defends sociology from accusations of amorality, but he also tries to 
establish specific limits. In his analysis of the guild form (what he called the 
‘corporation’), he suggests that “The sociologist’s task is not that of the statesman. 
Accordingly we do not have to set out in detail what that reform [to the corporation] 
should be. We need only indicate its general principles as they appear to emerge from the 
facts just stated” (1984:l). Durkheim does not intend this as a statement from an ivory 
tower. Indeed, he concludes the new preface to DL with precisely the opposite assertion, 
that the laws of the statesman are useless unless they rest on a firm basis in moral life: 
No notable innovation of a legal kind can be introduced unless we begin 
by creating the body needed for the creation of the new law. This is why it 
is otiose to waste time in working out in too precise detail what that law 
should be....How much more important it is to set to work immediately on 
constituting the moral forces which alone can give that law substance and 
shape! (1984:lvii)
This curious language referring to the creation of a social body ready for new laws infers 
a complicated relationship between sociology and the social. While it is clear that 
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Durkheim saw his work as a moral vocation, the limits or justifications of this vocation 
are murkier. Alexander Riley uses a Weberian typology to suggest two possible models of 
Durkheimian intellectual vocation, the ascetic and the mystic. On Riley’s reading, 
Durkheim approached his work ascetically, as an instrument of social destiny rather than 
as its (mystic) ‘vessel.’ In writing of the team of researchers that Durkheim had 
assembled by the early teens of the 20th century, Riley writes that
Personal correspondence between the members indicates that the Annee 
itself, and the emphasis on collective work of which it was the clearest 
manifestation, was seen by Durkheim and by the other members of the 
religion cluster...as a direct realization of just the kind of modern 
intellectual space wherein moral and even sacred force could be 
generated. (2002:369)
In other words, Durkheimian sociological research was organized by more than just local 
solidarity or ‘professional ethics.’ On Riley’s reading, Durkheim and his disciples 
practiced sociology as a “quasi-monastic activity” (373) in which researchers combined 
their efforts in a way that exceeded individual or egoistic projects (369). In particular, and 
as the Moral Education lectures describe, Durkheim developed an educational program 
that he thought could provide the crucial phase of socialization for ushering in the new 
secular morality that France needed. According to Riley, the influence of Durkheim’s 
project on French society was not negligible:
Durkheim had some success in getting this pedagogical and moral 
program enacted in the French system, and some disciples would attempt 
to carry on the banner after his death. So, for example, in 1920 Paul Lapie, 
who was director of primary education and a former contributor to the 
Annee, instituted a course on sociological morality at the Ecoles Normales 
Primaires, the national training ground for future teachers of the 
elementary schools, that was aimed in part specifically at replacing the 
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religious curriculum on morality. (358)
Although not unopposed—by Durkheim’s contemporary Henri Bergson, for example 
(Riley 2002:358n.6)—the Durkheimian school’s influence on the French educational 
system lasted until the 1930s, taking part in the period of broad intellectual political 
influence that characterized the French Third Republic (1870–1940), what Mukherjee 
calls “the Republic of professors” (2006:9).61 We turn, then, to Durkheim’s theory of 
moral education, which forms a key element of his ‘science of morality’ and leads into 
his theory of the form of democracy that constitutes a scientific alternative to socialism.
In the Moral Education (1961) lectures, Durkheim takes up education and 
morality together, bound to each other by the project of producing moral citizens. As a 
scientific question, it is a matter of determining how to produce moral citizens in an 
entirely rational manner, that is, in Durkheim’s terms, in an entirely secular manner, 
concerned not with our duties to our gods, but with our duties to each other. While 
science cannot exhaust reality, Durkheim asserts the right of science to study everything, 
and claims that it is a mistake to view any aspect of reality as “irrational in its essence” 
(1961:5). While Weber places ‘values’ in a non-rational realm, Durkheim extends his 
rationalist principle to morality. For Durkheim the basis of morality is to be found in the 
needs of society for a healthy [eudaemonic] relationship with itself. This principle 
accommodates considerable variation, as societies have a variety of forms and therefore a 
variety of appropriate moralities.
61  Mukherjee sees the Durkheimians as, ironically, naive about social realities, and as failing to think 
through the problem of evil (2006:34). He quotes Bauman’s (2005:372) explanation that, when Durkheim 
was writing, there was still reason to trust Society as the promoter of morality (rather than evil).
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If morality is a natural phenomenon, and as such accessible to reason, this is not 
necessarily to say that it can be taught in a purely rational way. Here, as elsewhere, 
Durkheim is a gradualist, not a revolutionary. Secularization of morality is the goal, but 
how do we accomplish this? At first, Durkheim suggests, “the task was conceived as a 
purely negative operation. It seemed that to secularize education all that was needed was 
to take out of it every supernatural element” (8). Implicit, here, is a critique of the 
Enlightenment notion that morality can be reduced to a matter of the seen and the unseen 
(this contains an implicit critique of Marx and of revolution). On this view, reason simply 
‘shows’ what was previously hidden. Reason, as a secular form of ‘revelation,’ can 
destroy the illusions of religion and reveal the truth. In this naive view of the secularizing 
process, “A simple stripping operation was supposed to have the effect of disengaging 
rational morality from adventitious and parasitical elements that cloaked it and prevented 
it from realizing itself” (8). However, religion is not “simply overlaid upon moral reality” 
(8). Instead of being a merely visual ‘screen,’ religious symbols are intertwined with 
moral reality. According to Durkheim, “these two systems of beliefs and practices have 
been too inextricably bound together in history...for the separation to be so easily 
consummated” (8). Without recognizing and addressing this intertwining, education 
carried out as ‘stripping operation’ will produce, as Adorno and Horkheimer were to 
argue, “disenchantment but not liberation” (Bernstein 2001:87). In this regard, current 
French policies on the separation between religion and public life, as in the banning of 
certain types of religious head coverings from public spaces, show no sign of any 
205
ongoing Durkheimian influence, perhaps because Durkheim had little to say about 
religious pluralism and perhaps the modern nation-state—and its ‘secular’ sacred—was 
not quite what Durkheim thought it was.
Durkheim argued that, instead of merely eliminating religious notions as a kind of 
superfluous excess, we need to find rational substitutes for them (1961:9). In removing 
the religious element, one must take care to preserve the dignity or sacredness of the 
moral idea. Without dignity and respect, moral ideas lack a vehicle and they do not move, 
either themselves or us. Drawing on his metaphor of social ‘currents,’ Durkheim suggests 
that rationality without sacredness or dignity is like a dried-up spring. A rational morality 
lacking prestige and respect risks undermining the confidence and inspiration of the 
teacher and, subsequently, the teacher’s authority and capacity to teach. To teach the 
principles of a powerful but secular morality––“to make the child feel their reality 
without recourse to any mythological intermediary” (11)––religious notions must be 
replaced with equally prestigious secular notions. Further, rationalized morality “must, 
through the very fact of secularization, become enriched with new elements” (11). 
Religious morality kept society in existence, but insofar as it deeply misunderstood the 
sources of moral energies it produced “mediocre moral ideas” (13).
True collective moral health requires an inspiring vision, an ideal (13). But the 
only religion possible today, Durkheim argued, is the “religion of humanity” (1973:51). 
The ongoing division of labour has developed the individual sphere of action so 
extensively, providing so much space for unique personal development and freedom of 
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thought that the only remaining object of worship left is the human person itself. Not 
even rites and prejudices remain:
The communion of spirits can no longer be based on definite rites and 
prejudices, since rites and prejudices are overcome by the course of 
events. Consequently, nothing remains which men can love and honor in 
common if not man himself. That is how man has become a god for man 
and why he can no longer create other gods without lying to himself. (52) 
We should note the indirect reference to Nietzsche, here. Against Nietzsche’s notion of an 
ongoing ‘transvaluation of values,’ Durkheim posits the emergence of a particular set of 
modern values around rationality and the cult of the person (who is definitely not the 
‘Overman’). However, now the problem is to develop and teach reason in a way that does 
provide some work—if not the ‘transvaluation of values’––for new members. For 
Durkheim, that work should extend reason while simultaneously extending morality and 
developing new moral content. Durkheim’s optimism about rationality’s contribution to 
moral justice is clear: “rationalistic faith reacts on individualistic sentiment and 
stimulates it. For injustice is unreasonable and absurd, and, consequently, we are the 
more sensitive to it as we are more sensitive to the rights of reason” (1961:12). 
Nevertheless, the problem remains of explaining the affective force of reason. Why 
should it, and its tasks, inspire us? Kant, of course, thought that reason, in the form of an 
internal moral law, inspired respect all on its own. For Durkheim, however, respect for 
reason must be rooted in social forces, in energizing experiences of collective 
effervescence, experiences of unified social relations that live on in the form of 
permanently orienting idealizations.
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Let’s take a closer look at Durkheim’s Moral Education lectures, which analyze 
the socialization process, ostensibly the system that generates the affective force of 
reason. In thinking about the building blocks of a secular morality, we note Robert 
Bellah’s helpful characterization of Durkheim’s theory of morality as having three basic 
elements: attachment, discipline, and autonomy (1973:xxxix). According to Bellah, “It is 
only in connection with the third element, autonomy or self-determination, that the 
modern secular morality comes fully into view” (xl). Autonomy synthesizes attachment 
and discipline, in a “perennial dialectic of nomos and eros” (xxxix). In order to get a 
clearer understanding of Durkheim’s notion of autonomy as the goal of modern secular 
morality, this dialectic of nomos and eros may be profitably contrasted with Sigmund 
Freud’s more pessimistic and Nietzschean binary of eros and thanatos.
Before we turn to a comparison with Freud, however, let us go a little further with 
Durkheim’s theory of socialized autonomy. Morality, for Durkheim, ensures regularity in 
conduct (1961:27). Beyond regularity, which all customary behaviour has, moral rules 
must originate outside the individual person, in law, in God, in a professional association, 
in science, and so on. We do not feel free to alter it. It is beyond personal preference. That 
is, beyond simple regularity, morality involves an authority able to compel obedience that 
exceeds strictly utilitarian considerations. Here Durkheim’s sociologized Kantianism 
returns: “One must obey a moral precept out of respect for it and for this reason alone” 
(30). Regularity and authority combine, for Durkheim, in the “spirit of discipline” (31). 
This ‘spirit,’ according to Durkheim, is an end in itself. Limiting our appetites with the 
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‘spirit of discipline’ sets free our capacity for regularity and work.
Durkheim attempts to present a secular version of morality that, while perfectly 
rational and immanent, retains the dignity of religious morality. How does the ‘spirit of 
discipline’ fit with this? First, in presenting a naturalistic account of the need for morality 
as a constraint to the instincts, Durkheim preserves his rationalistic approach. Of course, 
Durkheim’s tendency to admire orderliness and regularity as ends in themselves makes 
him vulnerable to Bauman’s claim (2000a; cf. Levinas 1979) that Durkheim makes 
morality indistinguishable from custom, thereby erasing the true kernel of moral 
obligation, the traumatic ‘ethical demand’ of the other that constantly threatens to (and 
does) interrupt our routinized solutions to the reality of infinite possibility matched with 
limited capacity (Bauman and Donskis 2013). Nevertheless, Durkheim writes that 
“Duties are not fulfilled intermittently in a blaze of glory. Genuine obligations are daily 
ones” (1961:34). Far from being an ‘ethical demand,’ the blaze of glory, the socially a 
priori experience of collective effervescence, is beyond good and evil, while being the 
fount of moral energies. Here Durkheim’s concept overlaps with Weber’s notion of 
charisma, which in other ways differs considerably in its view of social energies.
The ‘ethical demand’ Bauman adverts to could only be an a posteriori 
reconstruction of the admittedly traumatic experience of collective effervescence, a 
posteriori in the same sense as the Reason for which Durkheim provides us with a fully 
sociological account. Individual and societal forms and capacities of reason emerge 
through social and relational practices that generate social and emotional bonds. One 
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elementary property of this new being, a property internal to its self-relation, is a form of 
rationality, a confident thought pattern, a logic. More than a mere habit of perception, 
categorical rationality, the possibility of syllogistic and causal thinking, results from 
social bonds themselves produced by ritual action performed in unison by actors who call 
themselves into being as social members by virtue of these ritual actions (cf. Rawls 
2004). As they call themselves into being, they call into being and produce images of a 
new reality, society sui generis (i.e., Society’s first word is ‘I am that I am’). 
Having established a ‘spirit of discipline,’ as well as attachment to society and its 
forms (of reason and of identity) through ritual and practical socialization, the modern 
State’s task is to liberate individuality by generating individual autonomy: “Far from 
tyrannizing over the individual, it is the State that redeems the individual from society” 
(1957:69). Having established a ‘spirit of discipline’ through a ‘necessary tutelage’ (Kant 
1996), the individual inspired by society’s ideals explores the freedom made possible by 
the regularity and stability of a well-ordered life in common with others. Indeed, it is the 
modern task that “each be freed from an unjust and humiliating tutelage, and that, in 
holding to his fellows and his group, a man should not sacrifice his individuality” 
(Durkheim 1957:72). Still, Durkheim tries to steer clear of a “mysticism” about the State, 
which he associates with Hegel (54). In the case of the modern aim of exploring 
individuality, “whilst this aim is essentially positive, it has nothing transcendental about it 
for the individual consciousness, for it is an aim that is also essentially human” (69). It is 
at the same time not a question of an individual taking himself, in an egotistical and self-
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interested way, as an absolute. The cult of the individual remains a moral vocation, the 
basis for a civic morality, a “communion of minds and wills” (69) around a shared ideal, 
the project of celebrating and exploring human individuality and not a solipsistic egoism.
Proof of the difference between ancient and modern morality lies in the different 
weight given to types of crime. In Roman society, the most heinous crimes were those 
against the group or State. As for crimes against the individual, murder and theft being 
the most relevant, “The proof of the slight moral dignity attached to them is seen in the 
lack of any severe penalties for their infringement” (111). In modern society, however, 
“the human person is the object of a sacred respect” (113) and there is an attendant 
decrease in the rate of homicide. But rates of assault and theft have gone up (for the same 
period). This shows that the decline in the mystic worship of the state has outpaced the 
emerging worship of the individual, which still remains too weak to replace it.
Durkheim’s reading of the history of morality, law, and punishment runs along a 
different track than Nietzsche’s (or Freud’s). The previous chapter claimed that Durkheim 
had to deal with Nietzsche in a way that Marx did not. Durkheim needed to deal with the 
problem of his vocation in a more detailed manner because of the kinds of questions that 
Nietzsche and others asked about human motivation, and the claims they made about 
instinctual life (e.g., will to power). Durkheim, as opposed to Marx’s Aristotelianism, 
more explicitly historicizes human nature. Against the notion of a gradual ‘civilizing 
process,’ but also against Nietzsche’s ‘genealogy’ of morality, Durkheim suggested that 
the desire for violence is actually socially produced:
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...political beliefs, the sentiment of family honour, the sentiment of caste, 
and religious faith—all these may often in themselves carry the seeds of 
homicide...they predispose him to violent demonstrations and bloody 
acts....It has often been held that this uncouthness is a remaining vestige of 
brutishness, a survival of the tooth-and-claw instincts of animal nature. In 
reality it is the product of a well-defined moral culture. Animals 
themselves are not as a rule violent by nature, but only when the 
conditions of their life make it necessary. (1957:116).
Insensitivity to or pleasure in human suffering arises, for Durkheim, from a particular 
social world, and not from a universal will to power or death drive (116). While, for 
Durkheim, instincts only become infinite drives when they are not limited by appropriate 
social controls, for Freud and Nietzsche, the drives are always already infinite. According 
to Durkheim: “The totality of moral regulations really forms about each person an 
imaginary wall, at the foot of which a multitude of human passions simply die without 
being able to go further. For the same reason—that they are contained—it becomes 
possible to satisfy them” (1961:42). Society is not formed by an utilitarian social contract 
that limits the fulfilment of the appetites as an entirely regrettable compromise driven by 
reason of the scarcity of social goods (see Durkheim’s remarks on Bentham, 35–36).62
Durkheim conceded a permanent “dualism of human nature” (1973:149–163) that 
Marx never did. But he resolved the Nietzschean issues of ressentiment and will to power 
by developing a theory in which the constraint of our instincts may cause pain and 
increasing inner tension, but (perhaps) without needing to damage them, and with the 
positive result of creating and unleashing new social energies and new pleasures of 
peaceful sociability associated with these social energies. These new energies do not 
62  Durkheim can also be compared to Foucault (1978; 1979), for whom power relations are generative, 
perhaps infinitely, but not by this criterion justified (cf. Dews 1984; Pearce 2001:156–157n.4).
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simply constrain and deform/modify instinctual drives, replacing the pleasure principle 
with a reality principle. They bring new energies and new social ideals. These new 
energies are generated in particular kinds of social situations. See, in this regard, 
Durkheim’s relatively positive reading of ‘mass psychology’ in his concept of ‘collective 
effervescence.’ For this reason, we should not be surprised that Durkheim places more 
importance on elementary school (and the public system) than on the earliest familial 
context (e.g., the Oedipal complex) as the crucial period for the development of morality. 
The family can “evoke and organize those homely sentiments basic to morality” 
(1961:19), but only in the public school system, when children are capable of intellectual 
conceptualization yet still extremely suggestible, is it possible to effectively train children 
to be moral members of modern society. The combination of suggestibility and 
intellectual capacity makes this the ideal stage for developing morality within children.
Reason, rather than being the ‘slave of the passions,’ as Hume famously 
suggested, can be the site and the source of new energies that are distinct from and 
capable of constraining instinctual energies. Our attachment to moral ideals is not 
reducible to instinctual drives ‘turned inward,’ as in Freud’s concept of the super-ego, or 
Nietzsche’s depiction of slave morality. Durkheim’s view of the relationship between 
instinctual energies and social forces culminates in his theory of ‘secondary groups,’ or 
‘corporations’ (also translated as guilds). In Durkheim’s view, properly regulated social 
activity generates and releases energies. Unsocialized instinct spends itself, without 
satisfaction, in chaotic activity. In a nod to the destructive aspects of instinctual drives, 
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Durkheim admits that “we may like a fight” (1957:24). Indeed, the unsocialized 
individual is unlikely, contra Hobbes, to find his way out of conflict by means of cold 
reckoning. Instead, he is likely to live a life that is nasty, brutish, and short, not just in 
Hobbes’s imaginary state of nature, but in reality as well, in certain social circumstances 
(cf. Turnbull 1972). Our individual reason, left unsocialized, will prove too weak and 
incapable of regulating itself by logical concepts to recognize the value of a pacifying 
social contract. Indeed, Durkheim claims that “the more highly and the more profoundly 
men are socialized...the more those joys [of peace] are prized” (1957:24–25). The real 
motives for cooperative group activity, then, come from being raised within such an 
environment. They are what MacIntyre (1984) describes as goods that can only be 
appreciated from inside a practice (or form of life). We come to prize the rewards of 
society by living in it, not by living outside of it (in a state of nature). It is only because 
we have already been socialized into the same body of sentiments, practices, and beliefs, 
that we take such pleasure in each other’s company. This position meshes well with 
Durkheim’s assertion that individual personality does not exist outside of the social. 
Rather, individuality emerges through the development of a particular kind of society, the 
modern society which has grown to worship the value of the individual. Entering the 
social does not diminish the individual, or entail a simple exchange of freedom for 
security. On the contrary, (modern) society creates individuals with rights. Indeed, we 
need to “dispute the postulate that the rights of the individual are inherent, and to admit 
that the institution of these rights is in fact precisely the task of the State. Then...We can 
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understand that the functions of the State may expand, without any diminishing of the 
individual” (Durkheim 1957:57).
The notion that the social State provides things not possible in the ‘state of nature’ 
is already present in the Hobbesian Leviathan—the image implies the emergence of 
‘giant’ capacities—but whereas Hobbes emphasizes the sacrificial restraint of nature, 
Durkheim’s emphasis on the social creation of new energies suggests that “society thus 
feeds and enriches the individual nature” (60) at the same time that it disciplines and 
dominates it. The trick is to balance this so that the individual’s desire is identical with 
the desire of the state, and thus feels like a light cloak (61; cf. Weber). Durkheim’s later 
view, expressed in the ‘Dualism of Human Nature’ essay, appears to be more pessimistic 
on this score than the earlier Professional Ethics lectures, but does not explicitly 
repudiate his earlier position.
According to Durkheim, modern theorists of natural right, from Hobbes and 
Rousseau to Kant and Spencer, are mistaken in their understanding of the historical 
growth of group life. Rights are not natural. The state of rights “depends entirely on the 
state of public opinion” (67). Rights are in a state of evolution, and “progress is always 
going on” (68). While, indeed, secondary groups (like the Church) have tended “to 
absorb the personality of their members” (65), “it is the State that redeems the individual 
from the society” (69). To draw attention back to the earlier part of this section, it is 
worthwhile to contemplate the deep contrast, here, between Durkheim’s conception of the 
State as the redemption of individuality, and Freud and Nietzsche’s understanding of the 
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State as submerging, repressing, or otherwise dissipating instinctual energies. Their 
differences make Durkheim an advocate of democracy, Nietzsche an advocate of 
aristocracy, and Freud into a pessimistic stoic.
On the basis of the preceding premise, that the State redeems the individual from 
society, Durkheim suggests that democracy is the appropriate political form for modern 
social life, and for the elaboration of the cult of the individual. Durkheim defines 
democracy not as direct rule by the people, but as a government in which the State, as the 
organ of social thought, establishes continuous lines of communication with the people, 
thus allowing the greatest possible degree of reflection instead of social control through 
traditional habits (1957:90–91). Taking a position that resembles the communicative 
emphasis of his contemporaries, the American pragmatists—although also differing from 
them in significant ways (cf. Stedman Jones 2004)—Durkheim argues for democracy’s 
moral superiority: “Because it is a system based on reflection, it allows the citizen to 
accept the laws of the country with more intelligence and thus less passively. Because 
there is a constant flow of communication between themselves and the State, the State is 
for individuals no longer like an exterior force” (1957:91).
Falling back on the standard critique of mass society, however (which the concept 
of collective effervescence otherwise mutes), Durkheim emphasizes the need for an 
organic division of labour, and especially the need for secondary professional groups to 
intercede between the individual and the state, and to insulate the individual from the 
State. According to Durkheim, “secondary groups are essential if the State is not to 
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oppress the individual: they are also necessary if the State is to be sufficiently free of the 
individual” (96). In a state of unchecked populism, “the State then becomes merely an 
offprint...Its role is no longer that of elaborating new ideas” (98).
We need not spend much time with Durkheim’s theory of democracy, which is 
relatively undeveloped, although, indeed, he did see it as solving the puzzles around the 
gaps between the ‘general will’ and government by a State that arose from Rousseau’s 
revolutionary theories of democracy. For Durkheim, all is well when State power is held 
in place and limited by the countervailing force of healthy ‘secondary groups.’ Between 
‘regional groups’ and ‘professional groups,’ Durkheim sided with ‘professional groups,’ 
these being, in his view, the more effective intermediary between State and individual:
...the regional districts have not the same importance...the population has 
become so mobile...The permanent groups, those to which the individual 
devotes his whole life, those for which he has the strongest attachment, are 
the professional groups. It therefore seems indeed that it is they which 
may be called upon to become the basis of our political representation as 
well as of our social structure in the future. (1957:96–97)
We return, here, to the high hopes which Durkheim had for the vocation of sociology:
The way of life immediately surrounding us is not even the life that is of 
deepest concern to us...What matters far more to us, according to the 
functions we have to fulfil, is what goes on at scientific conferences, what 
is being published, what is being said in the great centres of 
production..the grouping that is merely regional is rapidly declining. (102–
103)
On Durkheim’s view, the ongoing division of labour would lead professional life to 
become ever more important. Here Durkheim seems, on the one hand, too concerned to 
decide between regional and professional groups, and on the other hand too optimistic 
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about the solidarity generated by working life. There is also a misplaced confidence that 
the professional group model guarantees competence (104). Much of this confidence, it 
must be supposed, lies in the outcome of the events of the ‘Dreyfus Affair.’ Durkheim 
was one of the signatories to the declaration protesting the conviction and punishment of 
the Jewish French army officer. Here is one of his summary judgements:
If, therefore, in recent times, a certain number of artists, and especially 
scholars, believed they had to refuse to concur in a judgment whose 
legality appeared to them suspect, it was not because...they attributed to 
themselves some sort of special privilege and a sort of eminent right of 
control over the thing being judged. It is because, being men, they intend 
to exercise all their human rights and retain before them a matter which is 
amenable to reason alone....more jealous of that right...because in 
consequence of their professional practices....they are accustomed by the 
practice of the scientific method to reserve their judgment as long as they 
do not feel themselves enlightened, it is natural that they should yield less 
easily to the sway of the masses and the prestige of authority. (1973:50)
This early successful intervention in political life by a group of ‘public’ intellectuals 
presumably fuelled much of Durkheim’s optimism about the power of secondary groups 
to balance levels of regulation, integration, and communication between the State and the 
individual, thus ensuring, in the long run, the healthy and full development of the modern 
cult of the individual. This optimism dwindled during the years of the First World War, 
and would have dwindled still further, no doubt, had Durkheim lived to see Fascism and 
Nazi anti-Semitism arrive in force. In the wake of the 2nd World War, Erik Erikson, in his 
searching and now classic psychoanalytic biography Young Man Luther, attempted an 
account of vocation that synthesized historical and psychoanalytic perspectives. 
Doubtless reflecting the prevalent concern (cf. Arendt’s 1963 ‘banality of evil’ thesis) 
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about the ‘man in the grey flannel suit,’ Erikson mocked “...the make-believe identities 
proffered in many occupational and professional schools...streamlined adaptiveness 
proves brittle in the face of new crises. What academic institutions teach and preach often 
has little to do with the immediate inner needs and outer prospects of young people” 
(1958:114). The problem of ‘flexible conformity’ is addressed in chapter five, in the 
context of the concept of ‘character.’
E. ANIMALS, MORALS, & COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATION: A GOOD 
ANIMAL?
In the socialized society, no individual is capable of the morality that is a social demand 
but would be a reality only in a free society. The only social morality that remains would 
be at last to finish off the bad infinity, the vicious system of compensatory barter. But the 
individual is left with no more than the morality for which Kantian ethics—which 
accords affection, not respect, to animals—can muster only disdain: to try to live so that 
one may believe himself to have been a good animal. (Adorno 1973:299)
The spelling is Gex-Nats’enaghinlht'i (rabbit-one-clubbed-once; “once” as in number of 
times). The former village was at Lee’s Corner which is known as Lhulh-Gunlin (where 
there are lhulh; lhulh were small fish which existed in the stream there). I assume the 
place “Stone” was a place with many rabbits like many other places and this place at 
Stone was one of the places remembered as a site where an elderly woman clubbed a 
rabbit. This is what I was told. The actual clubbing of a rabbit may have been 
remembered because it is not the Tsilhqot’in way - to club any mammal is offensive to 
the animal. Although when elders hear the name “Gex-Nats’enaghinlht’i” mentioned, 
they laugh. There is a section in the story of Lhindesch’oysh about dealing with a rabbit, 
but it requires more research because it’s difficult to understand and I haven’t 
documented how Tsilhqot’in hunted rabbits the respectful way. It seems that the way the 
rabbit was treated in the story was because the rabbit persisted in continuing its 
destructive ways. Prepared rabbit skin is not recommended for use on infants and this in 
itself leads one to think that rabbits are not one of the highly respected mammals. [Linda 
Smith, personal communication, November 2011]
What does it mean to be a good animal? What does it mean to have good relations not 
just with other humans, but with all the others in this world? What kind of animal is the 
modern human? Are we a new species? Are modern societies new kinds of living beings? 
And if “the grouping that is merely regional is rapidly declining” (Durkheim 1957:103), 
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are modern nations the heart of the present? Or will nations give way before a modern 
cosmopolis, or a new empire? We have been discussing Durkheim’s theory concerning an 
emerging morality, a morality appropriate to modern social relations. This modernity 
emerged through violent industrialization and colonization, through the expropriation and 
destruction of lands and peoples, and to top it all, Durkheim probably wore a beaver hat. 
But it is not clear that Durkheim really understood what a relationship was. What if our 
relations with animals and others were treated as real, in themselves, and not just 
symbolic, not just ways of representing human relations? The passages that head this 
section are meant to turn our attention to some absences in Durkheim’s sociology of 
morality. What is left out of the formula that society, as a unified set of human relations, 
‘constrains and enables.’ What if there were more relations to account for?
Durkheim develops his notions of democracy, of a tripartite social divided and 
balanced between State, secondary groups, and individuals, from his basic ideas about 
society as a reality sui generis, a reality whose inner affective unity (as a community of 
feeling) emerges from collective ritual action. The following sections of this chapter 
conclude the discussion of Durkheim’s sociology of morality by raising some questions 
about these underlying premises, most richly formulated in his magnum opus, EFRL.
Around the centenary of EFRL, Durkheim’s sociology of religion remains 
foundational to the field, and his approach to sociology has more defenders and advocates 
than it has had in decades (e.g., Alexander and Smith, eds. 2005; Rawls 2004). This is so 
even though there is a significant problem with a crucial ‘element’ of Elementary Forms, 
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Durkheim’s claim that totemism is the elementary religious form. Indeed, as Robert Alun 
Jones points out, when EFRL was published it was already “at least two years after the 
existence of totemism itself had been brought into serious question” (2005:290). Jones 
points out, especially, the confusion of kinship issues with issues of anthropomorphism 
and zoomorphism (302). Since then there have been numerous influential critiques of 
Durkheim’s theory, including by influential heirs to the Durkheimian legacy like Lévi-
Strauss (1963:5) and Evans-Pritchard (1964:viii). Here, however, we begin by pointing to 
the importance of the North American Indigenous emphasis on “the relations all around
—animals, fish, trees, and rocks—as our brothers, sisters, uncles, and grandpas” (LaDuke 
1999:2), over the structuralist position that reduces “all the relations” (Lévi-Strauss 
1963:215) to structural elements of myths best understood by the neutrally observant 
European social scientist. Like the ‘natural resources’ that continue to be claimed by 
colonizing powers, cultural ‘myths’ provide the material with which anthropologists 
produce books and careers.
European anthropology’s criticisms of Durkheim aside, then, the following 
section suggests that Durkheim’s approach tends toward a double and related 
suppression. First, Durkheim’s anthropology only goes one way, importing the cultures of 
non-Europeans as a kind of commodified ‘natural resource’ for use in European self-
examination and cultural production. In Latour’s terms (2010), Durkheim’s approach 
lacks anthropological symmetry. In particular, he fails to thematize the process of modern 
ritual commodification through which European anthropologist colonizers appropriated 
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indigenous knowledges and practices, using them to produce the manuscripts which 
Durkheim himself used in developing his own career and privileged social status. In our 
terms, it lacks answerability, even if it makes strides in developing an ‘ethnological 
imagination’ (Kurasawa 2004) and was a ‘progressive’ and relatively non-ethnocentric 
position for the time. It still elides non-European acts of social self-interpretation and 
symbolic representation, subsuming the anthropological material to the European project 
of ‘enlightened’ collective self-representation (cf. King 2003). Second, and further to the 
first claim, Durkheim’s theory of totemism participates in a kind of residual speciesism 
and in, as Wolfe puts it, “repressing the question of non-human subjectivity” (Wolfe 
2003:1; cf. Haraway 2003). Durkheim’s notion of totemism, particularly the claim that it 
operates primarily as collective self-representation, set the sociology of religion on a 
course of simultaneously Eurocentric and anthropocentric narcissism from which it has 
seldom wavered. Re-reading this model may help us orient to a sociology of religion that 
does not translate the animal into the symbol of the social precisely as a way of avoiding, 
by compartmentalizing, the question of animality (inside a dualism) and that does not 
focus exclusively on the constitution of social identity while remaining silent about the 
encounter with difference. Durkheim too easily presumes a collective subjectivity, too 
easily subsumes otherness as a part of a unified whole, thereby begging his own question 
with respect to societal self-constitution (cf. Luhmann 1995).
Durkheim’s reading purports to sublimate but also, in fact, suppresses animality, 
literally incorporating it into the body of the social. In this way, he reproduces 
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contemporary turn-of-the-century European attitudes towards animals and animality. 
Indeed, his essay on dualism and human nature states this explicitly: social life limits 
animal instincts by counterposing collective energies generated through unified ritual 
action. But is it possible that operations that Durkheim analyzed as totemic naming may 
indicate something other than societal narcissism? Is it possible that naming practices and 
apparently symbolic images may exceed collective self-representations and that plants, 
animals, or other aspects of ‘nature’ may be more than merely ready-to-hand symbolic 
material? Durkheim’s focus on society sui generis skirts discussion of ways that 
collective symbolic life might explore our relations with nature, animals, each other. In 
this section we will explore this in the context of his theory of religious life. While 
Durkheim conceived of humans as feeling animals, and included these feelings within 
and at the foundation of our rationality, particularly through theorizing the human as a 
kind of herd animal possessed of collective passions, his view of rationality may have 
tied it too tightly to these collective feelings, suppressing analysis of the ways 
unsocialized and individual animal feelings, impulses Adorno describes as the drive to 
consider oneself to be a ‘good animal’ (Adorno 1973:299), may interrupt or persist within 
our symbolic, collective, moral life.
The Stone Indian Reserve, two miles from the home where I spent much of my 
childhood, is located in the central interior of British Columbia. It is one of six main 
Tsilhqot’in First Nations communities. The Stone63 community resides on a spot 
traditionally called Gex-Nats’enaghinlht’i, which, as Linda Smith explains, can be 
63  Sometimes pronounced ‘Stony.’ It is now more officially called Yunesit’in.
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translated as “rabbit-one-clubbed-once” (once refers to one blow, not to ‘once upon a 
time’). Elders respond to this name with provocative ambiguity. On the one hand, in the 
Tsilhqot’in tradition, clubbing a mammal is considered disrespectful, so the name might 
be taken to refer to a kind of sacrilegious act. On the other hand, mention of the name 
Gex-Nats’enaghinlht’i typically generates laughter among Tsilhqot’in elders, which 
suggests that, at least these days, the more absurd or ironic elements of the story evoked 
by the name may carry the semantic charge rather than its character as a compact and 
profound morality tale. What follows marks the polysemy of such traditional place names
—I have nothing to say about classifying Tsilhqot’in religio-political life and my 
discussion avoids as misguided any question of whether we are dealing with ‘animism’ or 
‘totemism,’ etc.—and their evocative imagery of human and animal relations with 
reference to the broad and ironic context of North American colonial history and to 
ongoing First Nations discussions and declarations concerning colonialism and human 
kinship with the natural environment. To paraphrase Nietzsche, assuming that truth is a 
rabbit—what then?64 That is, assuming that the symbol is not just a symbol, what might 
this mean for our understanding of collective representation, for morality, for the 
boundaries of the social?
EFRL is Durkheim’s last major work, and his magnum opus. Published in 1912 
(1915 in English), it preceded Freud’s Totem and Taboo, whose four essays were first 
published together in 1913, the fourth essay of which, “The Return of Totemism in 
Childhood” contains several references to Durkheim, including one reference to EFRL 
64  “Assuming that truth is a woman—what then?” (Nietzsche 2006:311).
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(Freud 1950:113). EFRL analyzes early anthropological research such as Spencer and 
Gillen’s The Native Tribes of Central Australia (1899), Tylor’s Religion in Primitive 
Culture (1958 [1891]), as well as the direct textual analysis of religious documents in W. 
Robertson Smith’s (1889) Lectures on the Religion of the Semites and Frazer’s The 
Golden Bough (1963 [1890]). As discussed earlier, EFRL develops both a sociology of 
religion and a social epistemology. In both cases, Durkheim frames his position as a third 
option. In the case of his theory of knowledge, he presents his sociological view as a 
synthesis of Kant and Hume, of ‘apriorism’ and ‘empiricism.’ In his theory of religion, he 
rejects, rather than synthesizing, views which he places under the broad categories of 
‘animism’ and ‘naturism.’ These views of religion treat it as an hallucination, whereas it 
is, in Durkheim’s view, something real, for no social institution can rest on an error.
In defining religion, Durkheim begins by sidelining the supernatural, the 
mysterious, or Gods. These are common but not essential attributes of religion. He also 
brackets magic, which often overlaps with religion, but lacks the ‘end in itself’ (rather 
than egoistic) qualities possessed by a unified religious community, a church whose 
members share a common faith. Rites and beliefs are what constitute a religion and 
produce a unified community. At the same time, rites and beliefs produce fundamental 
divisions between things, the division between the sacred and the profane, a division 
more fundamental than that between good and evil or health and illness—or good and 
bad, pace Nietzsche—since “The energies at play in one are not merely those 
encountered in the other, but raised to a higher degree; they are different in kind” 
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(Durkheim 1995:36). The system of religious things exceeds a system of relations in 
which “there are only differences” (Saussure 1986:118), for we find an independent 
system of values with a reality sui generis; neither is it merely a matter of rank, for 
Subordination of one thing to another is not enough to make one sacred 
and the other not. Slaves are subordinate to their masters, subjects to their 
king, soldiers to their leaders, lower classes to ruling classes, the miser to 
his gold, and the power seeker to the power holders...[but] there is nothing 
in those relations that is religious in a strict sense. (Durkheim 1995:35)
 
Religion lies beyond mere things on which we place a high value. It is of a different order 
than the economic. It has a sui generis quality. For Durkheim, value depends upon 
validity (Rose 2009), that is, a differentiated substratum of the sacred and the profane 
generated by means of collective rites that produce powerful shared emotions and 
memories on the basis of which our deepest intellectual intuitions (i.e., our capacities of 
reason) are created. We are not just talking about the elementary forms of religion, but 
about the bases of human knowledge, the very doors of social perception. This socially 
situated and relational knowledge avoids full-blown relativism because Durkheim 
believes himself to be identifying universal a priori conditions for any social relation, and 
the principles of this “placing in relationship...in itself...always a delicate operation that 
requires precautions and a more or less complex initiation” (1995:38). Rites of initiation, 
“which are practiced by a great many peoples” (37), are at least quasi-universal, and 
social life appears to depend upon these rites, to depend upon social members being 
“born again in a new form” (37).
After establishing this preliminary definition, Durkheim backtracks, arguing 
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against making animism the original form of religion, as in accounts of the origins of 
religion as 1) attempts to interpret dreams, 2) cults of the dead, or 3) an anthropomorphic 
instinct. These accounts reduce religion to illusory hallucinations. Instead of a projective 
and anthropomorphic hallucination we find, Durkheim claims, almost the opposite: “far 
from being primitive, anthropomorphism is the mark of a relatively advanced 
civilization” (64). So we must not be driven by instinct to project our own image onto 
things, living or non-living. With respect to the form first assumed by deities, “most 
often, one would say that the animal form is the fundamental form” (64). One could more 
easily posit a zoomorphic instinct than an anthropomorphic one at the origin of religion.
If religion does not originate in a simple projective instinct, neither does it 
originate, in Durkheim’s view, in ‘naturism,’ that is, as an attempt to interpret or express 
natural forces and phenomena. Naturism does, however, attribute some legitimacy to 
experience. That is, religion is not based entirely in hallucinations, as in animism.
Although Durkheim addresses a variety of liberal ‘enlightenment’ theories of 
religion he does not, in EFRL, address the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ approaches found 
in those, like Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, who contend that religion is more than a kind 
of benightedness, but in fact a form of wish-fulfilment, an imaginary substitute for a real 
if denied wish. This symptomatic wishing indicates, ultimately, a kind of sickness (of the 
will). While Durkheim comes close to Freud’s idea that modernity necessarily involves 
high and painful demands upon the instincts, his view of social energies is somewhat 
closer to Marx, at least in thinking of social forces independently of individual drives. In 
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the end, as argued earlier, it is a ritual, not a labour theory of value that we find in 
Durkheim. For Durkheim, religion is present in all societies precisely because it is coeval 
with all forms of social membership organized around unified collective belief. Religion 
is not inherently a sickness or a delusion. It is based upon a well-founded experience, the 
experience of collective unity and of powerful shared emotions. Religion helps to create, 
express, and represent a unified collective social being. It does this in part through 
generating unified images (collective representations) of that social being. In order to do 
this, according to Durkheim, the human “started out thinking of himself [sic] in the image 
of beings from which he specifically differed” (65).
Durkheim suggests that habitual contact makes animals involved in the hunting 
and fishing life of the community into the best candidates to become the collective 
emblem, something “representable by a design” (235). On his view, the choice derives 
from the ready-to-hand: “It...seems likely that each group took as its emblem the animal 
or plant that was the most plentiful in the neighborhood of the place where it usually 
assembled” (236).65 Animals and plants were chosen because of their familiarity to the 
group and because they could be represented visually. Animals were best suited for this 
purpose (235). Plants come second, because, in non-agricultural societies, Durkheim 
reasons, they are of secondary importance. In short, as candidates for totems, “Plants and 
animals were perfect” (236). On the other hand, “the sun, moon, and stars were too far 
away and seemed to belong to a different world. Further, since the constellations were not 
65  Writing originates, on this view, in branding and tattooing, and as an emblem of unity, not of difference. 
See also de Certeau (1984), who suggests that branding is about domination rather than unity.
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differentiated and classified, the starry sky did not present objects different enough from 
one another to be serviceable in designating all the clans and subclans of a tribe” (235). 
Here Durkheim implicitly critiques Kant’s notion that something so abstract could serve 
as confirmation and emblem of moral unity and purpose, as expressed in Kant’s famous 
claim that ‘starry heavens above me and the moral law within me’ are the two things that 
naturally arouse awe and respect. These feelings could only be a late and abstract 
development in a complex society with a complex division of labour.
Durkheim’s discussion leaves out, of course, the possibility, embraced by many 
indigenous societies—as well as the Jewish and Christian scriptures—that the signifier 
(the animal or plant) has its own signifiers, that the transferential or mediating object is 
also a producer of signifiers. We are interacting with the earth, with the rocks, trees, and 
animals; they may ‘talk back’ (even if our logocentrism tends not to recognize their 
inscriptions), as Van der Veen emphasizes in an article in World Archaeology entitled 
“The Materiality of Plants: Plant–People Entanglements” (2014). We are not just ‘using’ 
them in order to talk to ourselves; it is not just about collective unity, or symbolically 
mediated self-relation, but about ‘revelations’ concerning the relatedness of things. Read, 
for example, a section of poetry from Peter Morin, a contemporary poet and artist of the 
Tahltan Nation, whose territory lies in the northwest of British Columbia:
Just know that wherever you are:
You are on your land
You are the names given by the land
Your footsteps are part of our spoken language (2009:33)
Nowhere does Durkheim broach the possibility that naming practices that involve 
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animals might, indeed, serve as memorializations of particular types of encounters 
between the human and the non-human. These names may serve as guides not just, or 
even primarily, to collective self-representation, or to establishing the sacredness of the 
group, but guides to a relational ontology or a relational epistemology, a way of 
continuing to encounter, explore, and relate to the nonhuman, to the persistence of 
otherness within every unity. While Durkheim makes room for the otherness of a ‘whole 
that is greater than the sum of its parts,’ his whole and part remain anthropocentric in 
their focus. His ‘cult of the person’ is still too dualistic and ‘spiritual,’ and his ‘social 
forces’ are still ‘against’ nature. The social subordinates nature, making use of it for social 
purposes. Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1988) claim that the ‘humanistic’ Enlightenment 
obsesses over the domination of nature also applies to Durkheim’s theory of religion. 
Indeed, his conception of the sacred and the profane is entangled, in a way that continues 
to deserve attention, in a set of binaries that accompany a particular trajectory of Western 
civilization with respect, for example, and not only for example, to sex and gender 
differences (e.g., Sydie 1988). As Kristeva puts it with regard to the related separation 
between the pure and the impure, this bifurcation “displaces (or denies) the difference 
between the sexes” (1982:82). Without turning aside to discuss this claim more 
thoroughly, we must simply register the suggestion that while Durkheim identifies 
processes that generate social unity and/as social binaries, he tends to neglect how, rather 
than simply generating unity, collective representations in his sense may be constantly 
deflecting and displacing both internalized and externalized social contradictions (cf. 
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Razack 2008). Some influential contemporary Durkheimians continue supposing that 
there is nothing outside binaries (e.g., Alexander and Smith 2003).
Durkheim’s explanation of the understanding develops in a slightly different 
direction, at least at first. It opens up an interesting space, as part of his project of 
sociologizing Kant, for the notion of kinship. Here the notion of ‘kinship’ replaces what 
Kant described as subsumption under a concept:
I begin to understand only if it is possible for me to conceive of B in some 
way that makes it appear to me as not foreign to A but as united with A in 
some relation of kinship. The great service that religions have rendered to 
thought is to have constructed a first representation of what the relations of 
kinship between things might be. (Durkheim 1995:239)
Unfortunately, however, Durkheim does not retain the familial element which would see 
the totemic animal itself as literally akin to the members of the clan, rather than merely 
symbolizing and facilitating the unity or identity of the clan. When he discusses kinship, 
later on, it is with regard to establishing the identity of the social, not a general 
connection or kinship ‘between things,’ (a possible ‘unity in diversity’ à la Adorno). For 
Durkheim, the final answer with respect to rationality is an anthropocentric one: “What 
was essential was not to let the mind be dominated by what appears to the senses, but 
instead to teach the mind to dominate it and to join together what the senses put asunder” 
(239). On this note, let us carry our discussion of totemic naming a little further.
On the one hand, Durkheim tells us not to underestimate the power of the totem: 
“The totem is not simply a name; it is an emblem, a true coat of arms” (111). Members of 
the group represented, on Durkheim’s view, by the totem, testify to their identification 
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with the totem by engaging in imitative activities: “Indeed, generally the members of 
each clan seek to give themselves the outward appearance of their totem” (114). It is not 
merely an emblem, it is religious. Totems “are used during religious ceremonies and are 
part of the liturgy” (118). Durkheim concludes, of the totem, that “It is the very archetype 
of sacred things” (118). However, Durkheim argues, the totemic representation originates 
in group feeling, and is not a faithful representation of the totemic animal, but an 
expression of this feeling. When a member of a clan represents the totem visually, “he 
does so simply because he feels the need to represent the idea he has by means of an 
outward and physical sign, no matter what that sign may be” (126).
Durkheim’s focus on feeling underwrites his claim that the basic religious 
distinction is that between the sacred and the profane. Sacredness is founded on powerful 
collective emotions. But these powerful emotions, in fact, lie prior to their bifurcation 
into sacred and profane forms. Indeed, these emotions can go in various directions 
(1995:213). Durkheim’s insistence on a dualistic model, as if that is all that collective 
energies produce or involve, cannot eliminate the ambiguity at its source in collective 
effervescence. It preserves, within the concept of the sacred, a deep-seated ambiguity. In 
this regard, Massimo Rosati points out a problem with the sacred/profane category: 
insofar as the profane is considered to be evil, where does ‘everyday life’ go? According 
to Rosati, “it seems the dichotomy between the sacred and the profane must be extended 
to a trichotomy...Unfortunately, nothing in Durkheim’s thought suggests that we can see 
things this way” (2005:72–73). Everyday life has a hard time fitting in the binary.
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Durkheim deals with the ambiguity of the sacred by positing two kinds of 
religious forces, the pure and the impure. These have come to be called, in connection to 
the College de Sociologie, and especially the work of Georges Bataille, the ‘right sacred’ 
and the ‘left sacred’ (cf. Pearce 2001:218–239). At first Durkheim suggests that there is 
“...the sharpest possible contrast, up to and including the most radical antagonism” 
(1995:415) between these two kinds of sacred forces and things. On the one hand, there 
are the pure objects of the ritual life, on the other hand, the impure objects, dead bodies, 
women during menstruation, and so on. However, he continues:
the pure and the impure are not two separate genera but two varieties of 
the same genus that includes all sacred things...not only is there no radical 
discontinuity between the two opposite forms, but the same object can 
pass from one to the other without changing its nature. The impure is 
made from the pure and vice versa. The possibility of such transformations 
constitutes the ambiguity of the sacred. (Durkheim 1995:415)
According to Durkheim, the kinship between these two forms of the sacred originates in 
the fact that these objects are merely representations of collective emotional states, “the 
states of collective euphoria and dysphoria” (417), celebration and mourning. Certainly 
the concept of the left/right sacred is also an attempt to deal with the problem of suffering 
and evil. The distinction is ingenious, but questionable. In particular, Durkheim offers no 
means of empirical verification. Leaving that question aside, let us turn back to our 
earlier intuition. Bracketing assertions about social unity and collective feeling, what if 
the ambiguity, the ambivalence of human relations, had less to do with the sacred/profane 
distinction or with unified collective emotional states (cf. Agamben 1998; 2005) than 
with the open-endedness of everyday encounters with the other, with permanent gaps in 
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the ‘sacred canopy’ (Berger 1967) of our social identity? Supposing that truth were a 
rabbit (that one clubbed once)? What then?
This returns us, it seems to me, to claims about collective sentiments that are 
organized, in spite of Durkheim’s resistance to the claim, around the notion that society is 
a kind of organism. Durkheim’s sociology—with respect to both religion and morality—
both is and is not a zoomorphic theory. On the one hand, he describes the State as taking 
on more and more functions in a manner analogous to the evolution of organisms, “What 
a far cry from the instrument of government in a society such as our own to what it was 
in Rome or in a Red Indian tribe...The social brain, like the human brain, has grown in 
the course of evolution” (1957:53). Noting, in passing, the problematic quality of his 
rather simplistic evolutionary imagery depicting processes of social differentiation, which 
presumes greater collective intelligence in modern societies, I point out that Durkheim 
argues repeatedly that sociology gains its object sui generis from the fact that “society is 
not a simple collection of individuals, but a being which has its life” (quoted in Callegaro 
2012:455). On the other hand, he resisted the notion of a social super-organism, an idea 
best associated with Kroeber, and now with Robert Sloan Wilson (2002). Again, 
Durkheim insisted both that the choice of totem is arbitrary and that to conceive of 
society as an organism is to use a metaphor. He argued that the reality of society 
coincides with its capacity to produce and sustain collective self-representations, 
generated and demonstrated in ongoing practices, both those of the everyday and those 
performed on special ritual occasions. He rejected, however, the notion that these 
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collective representations could entail the self-expression of the totemic animal itself, or 
that it could be a kind of dialogue, or a dance, or a ritual precisely with the animal, or 
animality (Agamben 2004), or, to be clear, with whatever the totemic thing is. For 
Durkheim, sacredness is the crucial element, and “The sacredness exhibited by the thing 
is not implicated in the intrinsic properties of the thing. It is added to them...It is 
superimposed upon nature” (1995:230). More needs to be done, it seems to me, to 
critically interpret the relationship between forms of life and forms of (moral) feeling, 
whether collective or individual, human or non-human. What I am suggesting is that we 
push Durkheim, in our interpretation of his work, towards acknowledging the relevance 
of other ‘forms of life’ to the social.
Durkheim is not without sympathy for our animality. His late essay “The Dualism 
of Human Nature,” (1914) expresses as much, bordering on a tragic view of modernity. 
For Durkheim, “society cannot be formed or maintained without our being required to 
make perpetual and costly sacrifices” (1973:163). Indeed his prophecy is that
...since the role of the social being in our single selves will grow ever 
more important as history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there 
will ever be an era in which man is required to resist himself to a lesser 
degree, an era in which he can live a life that is easier and less full of 
tension. To the contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort in the 
struggle between the two beings within us to increase with the growth of 
civilization. (163)
I leave the masculine language in on purpose, for there is more than an accidental 
linkage, it seems to me, between Durkheim’s version of dualism and the various other 
social binaries (sexual, gendered, species, racial, etc.) that have required internal and 
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external struggle, domination, and repression. Durkheim seemed to have as little to learn 
from women as he did from animals, notwithstanding various ‘progressive’ aspects of his 
approach. When we attempt to think through the link between this pessimistic declaration 
about internal personal conflict with other more positive claims that Durkheim made 
about modernity, in particular about the growth of the cult of the individual, these other 
binaries should be on our minds. In particular, we should keep these binaries—which 
Durkheim implicitly endorses along with his distinction between the animal and the 
social—in mind as we assess the place of sentiments, whether collective or individual, in 
morality. I have been suggesting that Durkheim’s religious sociology, his political 
sociology, and his moral sociology, all presuppose a formal suppression (which he 
presents as a sublimation) of animality and of social plurality. But Durkheim’s view of 
collective feeling is confused at best. Even if there was once a state of unanimity, could 
this ever be verified? And if there were, how could we be sure it was not, in fact, a form 
of ‘cruel optimism’ (Berlant 2011)? This is not to say that there is no such thing as shared 
feelings, or something we might call unanimity, but that a social morality, a political 
system, a religion, based on social unity are, at best, utopias. His dualism places all moral 
feelings on the side of the social, not the animal, finally siding with Hobbes against 
Rousseau and Smith. Even if he gave us the option of judging an entire society to be in a 
pathological state, as, no doubt, he would have judged Nazi Germany, what are the 
grounds for such a judgement? If it is simply a view from the outside, from another and 
antagonistic society, where is the sociology? Where is the science? Much depends, here, 
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on whether we accept Durkheim’s claim that sociology can offer a kind of insight into the 
moral stuff of the social. Early on in this chapter we discussed Durkheim’s critique of 
socialistic science. Socialism is not scientific, Durkheim claimed, because it has no 
object. It is a cry of grief, and a set of prescriptions for the future, but it has no object in 
the present. It does not take presently existing society as its object of investigation. But is 
it the case that sociology, as Durkheim conceived it, had a unified object, a fully-fledged 
society, complete with self-referential symbols, to study? Or is it, rather, as Walter 
Benjamin contended, that the sociologist who wants to understand the present, who turns 
to face the social, turns to face, as the symbol of collective self-awareness, the Klee 
painting, “Angelus Novus?” Here is the full text (minus the Scholem epigraph) of 
Benjamin’s famous ninth thesis on the philosophy of history:
A Klee painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as 
though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly 
contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are 
spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned 
toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single 
catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in 
front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make 
whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it 
has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer 
close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his 
back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This 
storm is what we call progress. (Benjamin 1968:257–258)
Remember the violent history of the present. Remember the rabbit that one clubbed, 
once, the rabbit of history, perhaps. The object that sociology has to study is a pile of 
debris; a catastrophe; wreckage upon wreckage. At the beginning of this chapter I cited 
Rancière’s contention that Durkheim saw his own scholarly research practices as a model 
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for the moral society of the future (Rancière 2012:149). I have tried to think through and 
to query Durkheim’s understanding of 1) the ‘stuff’ of morality, and 2) the vocation of 
sociologists of morals. In chapter six, we will return to the relationship between emotion 
and morality, in our discussion of the ‘affective turn.’ That chapter will argue that ‘moral 
sentiments’ do not solve the problem of the sociology of morality. Before we turn to that 
argument, however, we turn to Durkheim’s contemporary, Max Weber, who provides an 
important argument against equating morality with unified collective sentiment. In 
turning to Weber, we find someone who went further in acknowledging the extent of 
social plurality, and consequently attempted to further circumscribe the sociological 
vocation, moving from what I have called a ‘strong’ program, to a ‘weak’ one. Weber’s 
‘weak’ approach arises from more boldly facing the ironic outcomes of contemporary 
processes of rationalization and specialization. Weber concludes that, in the face of the 
irreducible pluralism of modern life, each person must make their own decision, choose 
their own vocation, assess their fitness for it, and do this without knowing whether it 
would be good for society, or moral.
238
CHAPTER 4: ‘BY THE GRACE OF THOSE WHO FOLLOW’: (WEBER’S 
‘WEAK PROGRAM’) CHARISMA AS ANSWERABILITY?
On the contrary, I am most emphatically opposed to the view that a realistic “science of 
ethics,” i.e., the analysis of the influence which the ethical evaluations of a group of 
people have on their other conditions of life and of the influences which the latter, in their 
turn, exert on the former, can produce an “ethics” which will be able to say anything 
about what should happen. (Weber 1949:13)
I prefer Weber to Marx because he is neither millennial nor apocalyptic. By showing that 
within ‘bourgeois’ society there are significant resources for moral responsibility, Weber 
restores a dialectic missing from Marx’s work. (Alexander 1989:3)
...so long as life remains immanent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of 
an unceasing struggle of these gods with one another...the ultimately possible attitudes 
toward life are irreconcilable...their struggle can never be brought to a final conclusion. 
Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice. (Weber 1958a:152).
A. INTRODUCTION: VALUE PLURALISM AS PERMANENT CONFLICT
If Durkheim thought that sociology was in a position to make positive policy 
recommendations, Weber wanted to limit sociology (and science [Wissenschaft] 
generally), to clearly presenting the decision-points facing each individual within society. 
While Durkheim (1957) argued that justice, as charity, is destined to be the driving ideal 
of modernity, Weber argued that, instead of emergent and convergent social values, 
careful analysis of the possible evaluative attitudes one can take reveals insurmountable 
contradictions in modernity that cannot be resolved rationally. Understanding the various 
positions, Weber suggests, leads “often with greater probability to the awareness of the 
issues and reasons which prevent agreement” (1949:14). Weber saw no way of making a 
‘scientific’ assertion about the objective priority or value of charity for modern society. 
Science can only ensure a ‘thorough’ examination of the evidence, one guided by the 
ethical imperative to clearly present the distinction between statements of fact and value 
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judgements (9). As Davydova and Sharrock put it, “Whilst Durkheim ultimately related 
values to the society (primarily its social structure and the function of integration) 
apparently establishing an opportunity for scientifically inspired criticism...Weber 
admitted no rational way to settle conflict between rival values” (2003:359–360). 
In this chapter I will argue, however, that the method of accountability that Weber 
embodied belies his claims about the irrational and decisionistic nature of moral meaning. 
Just as I suggested that the priority of relation exceeds Durkheim’s attempt to provide a 
literally domesticated model of morality, so Weber performatively contradicts himself in 
his attempt to present the social bond of charisma in value-neutral terms. His fixation on 
strength and power as brute force or as a relation of domination seems to have blocked 
his own nascent insights into other weak but transformative social powers.
I do not really know what Alexander means (1989:3) by claiming that Weber was 
less millennial or apocalyptic than Marx. Presumably he means that Weber was a realist. 
Presumably he is referring to Weber’s rhetoric of responsibility, but Weber dreamt of 
power, and of holy fire. He simply despaired of their arrival. Instead, he feared a long, 
icy, disenchanted future. In this chapter I will argue that, read somewhat against the grain, 
Weber provides a ‘weak program’ in the sociology of morality, and that his central 
concepts contain a redeemable and surprisingly messianic kernel, which both embodies 
and points us in the direction of our favourite residual moral category, answerability.
Durkheim sociologized Kant. Weber read him through Nietzsche. Durkheim 
approached collective consciousness as a reality sui generis which then had to be 
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interpreted (in psychologistic ways) as collective sentiments. Weber assumed that we 
must study the individual as the “sole carrier of meaningful conduct” (Selznick 1992:78) 
and his use of ‘ideal types’ avoids realist questions about consciousness. As Selznick puts 
it, “Weber’s own contributions...had little to do with empathy or introspection...” (78).
Durkheim salvages so much from the philosophical and the religious tradition by 
means of his sociologism. Aristotle, Kant, natural law, all sorts of traditional doctrines 
find themselves redeemed in Durkheim’s work, from the Division of Labour to the 
Elementary Forms. On Durkheim’s reading, they were just waiting for those crucial 
insights: God is society; reason is socially constituted; moral reality is rooted in the needs 
of the social whole. For Weber, by contrast, neither the forces of history, nor the evolution 
of human society, nor the unfolding of reason, comes with a moral guarantee. For 
Durkheim, every society has a morality appropriate to it. For Weber, however, societies 
are capable of painting themselves into corners from which there is no morally redeeming 
exit. While Durkheim thought that the energy of collective effervescence was necessarily 
domesticated into moral structures, as we shall see in our discussion of charisma (and its 
routinization), Weber was far less optimistic about the capacity of modern social 
processes to produce a morally enchanted social unity. Modern rationalization unfolds the 
logic implicit in a particular starting-point. It is not a cab from which we can simply 
disembark half-way in order to attend a midnight mass at our local church. Weber’s 
commitment to the scholastic vocation verges on nihilism, but retains, in the midst of a 
deep pessimism, a sediment of quasi-metaphysical/theological faithfulness reminiscent of 
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a saying of his contemporary, the Orthodox Athonite monk Staretz Silouan (1866–1938): 
“Keep your mind in hell, and despair not” (Sophrony 1991:298; quoted as the opening 
epigraph in Rose 1995). Durkheim, rather naively, thought significant religious 
differences would disappear as all were assimilated in the emergent religion of humanity 
and cult of the individual. Weber saw a disenchanted world of iron and steel, both literal 
and logical, whether encasing or encaging us, in which the logic of capital, and the 
broader processes of rationalization, produced neither a universal ethic, in Durkheim’s 
sense, nor a morally clarifying class polarization, in Marx’s sense.
Rather ironically, Weber’s attempt to carefully circumscribe the boundaries of 
scientific assertions about morality has commonly (and mistakenly) been equated with 
the most optimistic forms of scientistic positivism. As Scott has it, Weber’s 
methodological position was “buried under its positivist reception” (1995:73). The 
proximate sources of the confusion have been the ambiguities involved in the Weberian 
terminology of ‘value-freedom’ and ‘ethical-neutrality.’ In fact, Weber’s pessimistic view 
of reason directly opposes positivist optimism, which exploits the is/ought gap in order to 
grant science unlimited authority to engage in social engineering or to relieve scientists of 
personal political responsibilities. Both uses serve to relax the tension between science 
and politics. Weber, by contrast, maximizes the tension by emphasizing the double 
obligation posed by the immanent demands of the spheres of both science and politics. 
Rather than laying claim to a God’s eye view objectivity, Weber attempted, in a context 
of apparently irreducible pluralism, to set the stage for a fair fight, one in which 
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professors do not coerce their students politically or otherwise manipulate their 
impressions of society’s basic conflicts. Weber is far from denying the importance of 
evaluative ‘bias.’ As Scott explains, the crucial point is “honest recognition of the fact 
that science gives those values no warrant” (73).
Durkheim easily matched Weber’s personal asceticism, indeed, had arguably 
achieved a more harmonious synthesis of internal and external demands, but he addressed 
the question of sociological vocation at the disciplinary level rather than at the level of 
the individual sociologist. His understanding of the social precluded the relevance of 
individual motives to an overall understanding of social facts and forces. The division of 
labour had to be understood at the level of society, and vocational recommendations 
apply at the level of general policies (e.g., in education) even if we experience them as 
individual internal struggles. For Weber, by contrast, an adequate justification at the level 
of the discipline itself could not be given (1958a:143). The ‘value’ of science, whether for 
individuals or societies, cannot be proven scientifically.
According to Weber, the social sciences developed, historically, to address 
practical problems. This often amounted to devising a way of evaluating governmental 
policies. They gradually moved away from direct practical considerations, but without 
adequately recognizing and formulating the logical distinction between is and ought. At 
first a belief in natural law hid the is/ought distinction. Later on, with the development of 
Darwinian theory, the belief in a clear evolutionary principle that could apply to human 
societies performed the same obscuring role (Weber 1949:51). In the first case, being was 
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identified with the normatively right. In the second case, this role fell to becoming or the 
emergent; Weber calls the second form “ethical evolutionism” (52). Weber rejects both of 
these views. Ought can be derived from neither being nor becoming.
Even if we reject the possibility of social scientists providing absolutely 
‘objective’ accounts of culture or cultural ideals, however, social scientists can still 
analyze the meaningfulness of proposed ends in light of the historical context and 
situation, and they can “determine (naturally within the limits of our existing knowledge) 
the consequences which...the means...will produce in addition to...the proposed end” (53). 
These insights into the meaningfulness of particular ends and the consequences of 
particular means can be offered to the social actor, who must then make her or his own 
choice about the best course of action in full light of the particular values entailed (by the 
meaningfulness of the end and the consequences of the means) in each course of action. 
According to Stephen Turner “The important point is that this kind of idealization 
of...meanings...is interpretive and sociological rather than normative” (Turner 2010:73).
Weber’s frustrating methodological writing, which flirts with his own category of 
“pedantic ‘ratiocinating’” (1949:176), does not always offer as much insight as one might 
hope. It is riven by internal tensions, not least because of its polemical tone. However, 
Weber systematically indicates his flesh and blood involvement in the questions about 
which he writes: “Every meaningful value-judgment about someone else’s aspirations 
must be a criticism from the standpoint of one’s own Weltanschauung; it must be a 
struggle against another’s ideals from the standpoint of one’s own” (60). In contrast, 
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Durkheim has more to say about resistances to science than about how scientists will tend 
to resist each other. In his own scholarly disputes, of which there were many (most 
famously with Gabriel Tarde), Durkheim’s tone tends to be that of incredulity at the 
failure of others to understand his position. His position is that of the innocent accused.
On this question of guilt and method, broached in chapter two, it is no accident 
that the second section of Weber’s methodological critique of Eduard Meyer [1905] 
directly links the problem of ‘historical causality’ and “the question of penal guilt” (168). 
By Weber’s estimation, these two questions share a logical structure since they are both 
‘anthropocentric,’ or concerned with the causality of human ‘actions’ in concrete 
situations. Of course criminal law has the additional issue of responsibility, or ‘guilt.’ 
This extra issue of ‘guilt’ is value-relevant, for us, for it hints at Weber’s meditation on 
his own responsibility or guilt as an individual actor. Durkheim confidently parried 
suggestions concerning the ‘amorality’ of sociology. Weber, the anxious Protestant, tied 
himself in methodological knots, recognizing, before Durkheim, the existential crisis 
which lay on the European horizon.
Weber is concerned, throughout his critique of Meyer, with the question of the 
historian’s method of selecting elements of history as significant enough to be studied. In 
what sense are the letters between Goethe and Frau von Stein of historical interest, he 
asks? And how is this to be understood in comparison with Marx’s Capital? Which is 
more important, historically? For Weber, methodological questions are moral questions, 
not simply causal ones (i.e., which is historically ‘significant’?). They ask about the 
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properly scientific agent as much as they ask about objectively correct procedures or 
properly scientific actions. They ask about ‘subjective’ guilt and innocence, sloppiness 
and diligence. Weber and Durkheim are both reduced, ultimately, to a ‘morality of 
method,’ with Weber obsessively attached to his vocation as a value, and Durkheim to his 
vocation as a matter of validity (cf. Rose 2009). Weber does not justify social science as 
such (does not claim it has social validity), but he tries to justify his personal vocation, as 
we shall see, on the basis of his demonic/daimonic self-sameness. Durkheim, on the other 
hand, does not address his personal calling, but justifies the validity of sociology on the 
basis of his notion of scientific practice as a social agent of super rational reflection.
Weber fits within what I have been calling a ‘weak program’ because he believes 
that it is impossible to be “absolutely ‘objective’” (1949:72) about social phenomena. His 
belief in the impossibility of ‘ethical neutrality’ drives his methodological imperative 
(Sollen) that social scientists not engage in ethically motivated activism in their capacity 
as scientists (52). Indeed, the most influential ‘strong’ methodological positions (whether 
‘Marxist’ or ‘communitarian’) tend to derive precisely the opposite conclusion and often 
from the same sources in the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ that formed the basis of Weber’s 
own argument. Weber, however, subjects himself to analytical suspicion, and turns this 
self-questioning into his main intellectual and methodological value.
Weber’s attempt to formulate a methodological distinction between facts and 
values has typically been read somewhat anachronistically as if it was written before 
Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach. I say somewhat anachronistically because, although the 
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Theses were published before Weber’s methodological essays (but in 1888, after Marx’s 
death), it is not clear that Weber was familiar with them. He does refer repeatedly to both 
Capital and the Communist Manifesto in the methodological essays. In any case, the 
point is the same: Weber was familiar with what he called the “optimistic syncretism” 
(57) of empirical knowledge and cultural ideals, and his rejection of this synthesis was a 
considered one. Weber rejected, as well, the idea that the theory of evolution entailed the 
progressive emergence of a social ethic.
Weber claims that scientists can, without internal contradiction, prescribe or 
create for themselves the boundary between pursuing their own ‘will to truth’ and 
enforcing that same pursuit on others. This boundary divides scientific practice and the 
limits of education, of learning as Bildung: “The fate of an epoch which has eaten of the 
tree of knowledge is that it must know that we cannot learn the meaning of the world 
from the results of its analysis, be it ever so perfect; it must rather be in a position to 
create this meaning itself” (57). Lecturers, however, are teachers, not meaning creators. 
Meaning creation is a task for each individual, not a scientific activity.
It is not as if scientists have actually succeeded in confining themselves to 
analysis, without making judgements about meaning: “It is true that in our sciences, 
personal value-judgments have tended to influence scientific arguments without being 
explicitly admitted” (54). “But it is a long way” Weber continues, “from this 
acknowledgement of human frailty to the belief in an ‘ethical’ science...which would 
derive its ideals from its subject matter and produce concrete norms by applying general 
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ethical imperatives” (55). Here is the critical hinge. Can this distinction be achieved? 
Weber sets it as the goal: “The capacity to distinguish between empirical knowledge and 
value-judgments, and the fulfillment of the scientific duty to see the factual truth as well 
as the practical duty to stand up for our own ideals constitute the program to which we 
wish to adhere with ever increasing firmness” (58). So long as the distinction is made 
explicit, and everyone is made “sharply aware” (59), then “the practical evaluative 
attitude can be not only harmless to scientific interests but even directly useful, and 
indeed mandatory” (59). It is, then, for Weber, not a matter of either absolute objectivity 
or absolute engagement (60), but of distinguishing between scientific analysis and 
practical evaluation as far as possible, while engaging in both forms of activity. The 
whole point, for Weber, is that the scientific field should be a place where “political 
antagonists can meet...and carry on scientific work” (60).
B. VOCATION AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE FACT/VALUE 
DISTINCTION
Weber’s final version of these positions came in the “Science as a Vocation” lecture, 
delivered after the end of the First World War, and shortly before his death in the 1918–
1920 flu pandemic. It is worth going through this lecture in some detail, since it helps to 
emphasize Weber’s more explicit concern with the individual calling. “Science as a 
Vocation” begins with a consideration of the “external conditions” required for someone 
to pursue an academic vocation, posing the following question: “What are the prospects 
of a graduate student who is resolved to dedicate himself professionally to science in 
university life?” (1958a:129). Beginning with external, material conditions, Weber 
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somewhat playfully addresses Marx: “Here we encounter the same condition that is found 
wherever capitalist enterprise comes into operation: the ‘separation of the worker from 
his means of production’” (131). First among the scholastic means of production is the 
library. A scientific vocation can only be pursued if one has access to the storehouses of 
knowledge (today this would include access to online scholarly materials). For a 
particularly wealthy person, it might be possible to build one’s own library. Still, one will 
need to gain access to public and private archives and other ‘means of production’ (i.e., 
equipment for experiments and calculations, access to experts, research assistants, lecture 
halls, students).
Having access to the means of production, one then needs to be able to accept the 
tendency for mediocrity to triumph. According to Weber, the “laws of human 
cooperation” (132) dictate that academic appointments usually go to mediocrities or at 
least the number two or three candidate instead of the top candidate. Weber appears to be 
saying something permanently pessimistic, here, about the nature of human institutions. 
To have a vocation is to accept that only an inner (non-divine, and also non-social) 
calling could ultimately hold up, as your vocation is likely to be under-recognized by 
society. His comments appear to reflect both pessimism about the possibility of a merit-
based society as well as personal resentments concerning social appointments with which 
Weber disagreed.
Weber then addresses the problem of the dual demands of teaching and 
researching. The short discussion clearly sides with research. Teaching is “a personal gift 
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and by no means coincides with the scientific qualifications of the scholar” (134). He 
goes on: “I have a deep distrust of courses that draw crowds...Democracy should be used 
only where it is in place” (133–134). With this focus on research in mind, Weber suggests 
that the first element of the inner calling (although inseparable from the need to submit to 
the triumph of mediocrity) is the ability to devote oneself to a specialization. This is still 
a kind of external condition, since it is “conditioned by the facts that science has entered 
a phase of specialization previously unknown and that this will forever remain the case” 
(134). This claim about specialization could imply a necessary detachment from 
revolutionary political struggle. For, whereas Weber’s contemporary Lenin turns, at this 
juncture, to the tactics and strategies that might advance the cause of proletarian 
revolution, Weber turns to one’s unique and inner call: “whoever lacks the capacity to put 
on blinders, so to speak, and to come up to the idea that the fate of his soul depends upon 
whether or not he makes the correct conjecture at this passage of this manuscript may as 
well stay away from science” (135). Inner devotion to the task replaces party discipline. 
This clarifies in what respect Weber is a liberal and in what respect he is not (we are 
bound illiberally to our vocation).
Beyond enthusiasm, inner discipline, and one’s ability to make a rigorous 
conjecture, however, there is the need for an intuition, and this cannot be forced. Indeed, 
it may be a dilettante that actually has the intuitive insight (and this is one more reason 
why one must put up with the triumph of mediocrity). Enthusiasm and work give reason 
to hope for a breakthrough insight, but these are only necessary, and not sufficient, to the 
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vocation, and have no direct means of forcing the issue. Neither, on the other hand, can 
‘personality’ replace ‘devotion to the task,’ or force the ‘gift of grace.’
In art there is no progress, so an artist does not have to worry about being 
surpassed. However, even if one has the good fortune of making a scientific discovery, a 
scientist works towards being surpassed: “it is our common fate and, more, our common 
goal” (138). This is part of the “thousands of years” (138) long process of 
intellectualization and disenchantment that our world has been undergoing. It is present 
already in “the concept...a handy means by which one could put the logical screws upon 
somebody” (141). But while this had inspired the Greeks with hope of discovering the 
eternal truth, it cannot inspire us in the same way. Instead of inspiring, the concept 
disenchants. Next came the rational experiment, “a means of reliably controlling 
experience” (141). To the Renaissance, to da Vinci, “science meant the path to true art...to 
true nature” (142). Once again, this was an inspiration. But now: “Who—aside from 
certain big children who are indeed found in the natural sciences—still believes that the 
findings...could teach us anything about the meaning of the world?” (142). Weber 
tragically concludes that the one with a vocation for science is, by this very fact, cut off 
from spiritual fulfilment, for “Redemption from the rationalism and intellectualism of 
science is the fundamental presupposition of living in union with the divine” (142). 
Science cannot bring forgiveness. Here, again, Durkheim would have disagreed.
A few notes about Weber’s English language ‘reception’ provide some context for 
thinking about vocation and value-neutrality in both individual and world-historical 
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terms. In contrast to his friend Georg Simmel, who received considerable attention, 
Weber remained largely unknown or ignored in North America, during his lifetime, 
where sociology was emerging along with American Pragmatism and the Social Gospel 
movement (Turner and Turner 1990). While a number of Simmel’s essays appeared in 
translation in the early years of the American Journal of Sociology, Weber’s writings 
were hardly even reviewed, much less translated or published (cf. Tribe 2006). In 1927 
the American economist Frank H. Knight published General Economic History, an 
English translation, based upon students’ lecture notes, of the last course (Winter 1919–
1920) that Weber taught at Munich University. But the publication, in 1930, of Talcott 
Parsons’ English introduction and translation of Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, followed by Parsons’ ‘voluntarist’ synthesis of Weber and 
Durkheim, The Structure of Social Action (1968 [1937])—in which Weber was presented 
as pivotal and profound, but too pessimistic—set the initial tone of Weber’s reception in 
English-speaking sociology.
The Parsonsian synthesis, along with Parsons himself, was to become 
institutionally very powerful in American sociology. At the same time, the events of the 
Second World War seemed to support Weber’s pessimism against Parsons’ optimistic 
synthesis. In appropriating Weber’s emphasis on values for use in his theory of system 
integration, Parsons deemphasized the notion of unintended consequences embedded in 
Weber’s ironic linking of the origins of modern capitalism to Calvinist salvation anxiety. 
The apparent failure of the structural functional synthesis and the reintroduction of 
252
Weber’s notion of Western pluralism as riven by fundamental conflicts began to emerge 
as early as the post-war appearance in 1946 of the Gerth and Mills collection of English 
translations and the 1949 translations of Weber’s methodological writings by Herbert 
Gans. Both of these collections tended to problematize the synthesis of Durkheim and 
Weber around voluntarism and values, since they detailed the extent to which Weber saw 
value pluralism as a problem for contemporary society as well as for contemporary 
science and its relationship to the political, questions Parsons had bracketed and set aside. 
This dilemma was more explicitly announced and analyzed in Alvin Gouldner’s 1962 
article in Social Problems, “Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value-Free Sociology.”
The resurgence of ‘conflict theories’ paralleled the rise of Cold War ideology, 
which had one of its early culminations in Senator McCarthy’s Anti-Communist crusade. 
Social scientific considerations of social integration began increasingly to acknowledge 
the importance of deep-seated social conflicts. The relatively conservative conflict 
theories of Lewis Coser (1956)—who argued, following Simmel, that conflict was 
productive—and Robert Merton (1968 [1949]), who developed the concept of ‘latent 
function,’ also served to modify Parsons’ approach to the ‘problem of order.’ Gouldner 
went further than these Simmel-influenced introductions of conflict, but while he 
provided an important critique of the sometimes glad-handing Parsonsian synthesis, he 
did not endorse Weberian methodology against the bad faith of Cold War methodology. 
Gouldner, along with C. Wright Mills, helped to lead the 1960s American reformulation 
of sociology as a moral-political vocation. The fact/value distinction, on Gouldner’s 
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reading, had been an American smoke-screen for conservative, apathetic, and morally and 
politically bankrupt scholarship.
The attack on Parsons spearheaded by Mills and Gouldner was not the only strand 
of scholarship to criticize scientific claims to neutral objectivity. In an article published in 
2003, Davydova and Sharrock outline the ‘Rise and Fall of the Fact/Value Distinction,’ 
describing three other streams of work critical of the fact/value distinction that emerged 
in post-war period: 1) The phenomenology/ethnomethodology of Schutz and Garfinkel 
which emphasized the entanglement of norm following and cognition; 2) Peter Winch’s 
(1958) Wittgensteinian approach, which “undercut the idea that sociological descriptions 
were themselves purely empirical, rather than integrally evaluative” (Davydova and 
Sharrock 2003:358; see Louch 2000 [1966]; Searle 1969); and 3) MacIntyre’s and 
Charles Taylor’s rejections of the fact/value distinction in favour of teleological notions 
of human flourishing. Alasdair MacIntyre put the discussion in an historical perspective, 
arguing that only modern non-functional (i.e., non-Aristotelian/teleological) definitions 
of the human can separate is and ought. The idea of value-neutrality could only make 
sense in a society where tradition had been fragmented: “In other words, the ‘no ‘ought’ 
from ‘is’ principle is valid for a modern self alone” (Davydova and Sharrock 2003:367). 
MacIntyre’s solution is to move back to the Aristotelian question of ‘the good’ and away 
from the modern (Kantian) question of ‘right.’ As we shall see in a later chapter, he 
makes this move largely by means of his conception of ‘practices.’ That is, if Kantians 
confine themselves to a liberal reading of individual autonomy, in which the basic 
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principle is that of treating others as ends in themselves, for an Aristotelian, we must 
assess the value, as an end in itself, of particular social practices. 
These critiques provide background to the following discussion of Weber’s 
attempt to formulate the concept of charisma in both a value-relevant and a value-neutral 
manner. In spite of these critiques of the fact/value distinction, the concept of charisma, 
taken up by social scientists at about the same time, was largely mobilized in value-
neutral terms and treated as a nonmoral, and perhaps even anti-moral, or socially 
dangerous (e.g., Schiffer 1973) property. An exception was the work of Philip Rieff, 
which, while originally drafted during this same period (he stopped work on it in 1973), 
remained unpublished until after his death. I draw on this critical reading of Weber to 
suggest a modification of the concept of charisma in the direction of my residual but 
persistent concept of answerability.
C. CHARISMATIC ANSWERABILITY
In what follows, I try to develop an immanent critique of Weber’s weak program. In 
simplest terms, while my own weak program endorses Weber’s attempt to keep 
sociologists from misusing their role as experts, I follow the critiques of ‘value-free’ 
social science that perceive layers of moral evaluation in purportedly neutral terminology 
and description. With respect to charisma, I argue that a fuller sociological account would 
position charisma as a phenomenon exhibiting a kind of weak moral structure, related to 
the answerability of the gift relation, to charisma conceived as a societal quality, an 
interpellating ‘gift of grace’ that may circulate within a community, and which may take a  
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variety of forms, each of which 1) activates a kind of ethical self-relation, 2) includes 
some ‘image of redemption,’ and 3) can be distinguished from those forms of ‘personal 
magnetism’ that ‘merely’ cause excitement and, as Greenfeld puts it, “the propensity for 
unreflective imitation” (1985:117; cf. Shils 1965).
Weber tied his notion of authority to the concept of legitimacy, which he defined 
in terms of power, the state, and the monopoly of the use of force (1958a:78). It is tied, 
ultimately, to the ‘hopes’ and the ‘fears’ (79) of potential followers and disciples, which 
are mediated by processes of legitimation. Legitimation, however, is addressed only at 
the level of discourse, not in a dialectic with what Bourdieu calls “the objective structure 
of the relations...Weber thus reduces the question of legitimacy to one of representations 
of legitimacy” (Bourdieu 1987:126). In attempting to be ‘value-neutral,’ Weber 
discounted phenomenological differences between (moral and non-moral) forms—what 
Bourdieu would call habituses—of obedience or followership (Weber 1978:241–242). In 
trying to demonstrate ‘value relevance,’ by contrast, he emphasized the importance of 
talented heroic leaders for the vitality, even the survival, of human societies, and his 
suspicion of the talents of ‘the people.’ There is tension, here.
Weber brings the tension between value-freedom and value-relevance to a head by 
claiming that charisma is defined by “how the individual is actually regarded by those 
subject to charismatic authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples,’” (quoted in Strauss 
1965:55) but that, in the case of Joseph Smith, founder of Mormonism, he “cannot be 
classified in this way [as charismatic] with absolute certainty since there is the possibility 
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that he was a very sophisticated type of swindler” (55). Why is it not possible, according 
to Weber, for Smith to be a charismatic swindler, so long as his followers accept his 
performance (cf. Chryssides 2012)? This question demonstrates the ambiguity of Weber’s 
approach, for he appears to reserve interpretive authority for himself rather than deferring 
to the followers, whose attachment to their leader is treated as being basically internal 
and non-rational (Weber 1978:245). Leo Strauss (1965:55–56) fastened upon this tension 
in Weber’s definition and exemplification of charisma and used it as evidence of the 
impossibility of value-neutrality. Strauss’s challenge to Weber is that ‘appearing to have 
charisma’ and ‘pretending to have charisma’ are fully compatible. Strauss makes the 
Goffmanian point (Goffman 1959; cf. also Joosse 2012) that sincerity is irrelevant to the 
charisma (defined as success) of Joseph Smith’s performance. Weber implies, however, 
that sincerity is necessary to charisma: Joseph Smith may have been a charlatan because 
he may not have believed in his own revelation. On my reading, Weber’s remark about 
charlatanry shows him to be on the right track, even if sincerity is not quite the right 
concept for the job of exploring charisma. Instead of taking Strauss’s reading of Weber as 
nihilistic (Strauss 1965:42), I take it that Weber had an incomplete understanding of the 
relational qualities of charisma (cf. Madsen and Snow 1991:5) and its potential to take on 
democratic, rather than demagogic or patriarchal forms. Weber could not explore the 
moral potential of a relational charisma because he ignored the role of relational 
processes in generating social energies (e.g., through childhood socialization; through 
community practices), deferring instead to formally mystical (i.e., non-sociological) 
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sources of inspiration (i.e., one’s daimon), which is to say, by “invoking Nature” 
(Bourdieu 1987:130) or referring to the inner ‘calling.’ Just as Weber took for granted, 
rather than investigating or thematizing Nietzsche’s conclusion of a fundamental 
fragmentation of philosophical standpoints, leaving only a bleak and non-rational 
decisionism (Factor and Turner 1979), he also assumed a fundamentally non-rational 
distinction between forms and social sources of authority
On my reading, against the notion of charisma as epitomized by a certain type of 
heroic leader that dominates followers on the basis of appearing to have extraordinary 
qualities—a role Weber arguably coveted for himself, although vexedly,66 whether in his 
political aspirations, in his role, along with Marianne, as host of an intellectual ‘salon,’ or 
in his rigorous and demanding, if not dazzling, lectures—it is possible to pose a 
sociological ‘ideal type’ of charismatic relation, or ‘relational charisma,’ conceived as a 
uniquely important form of intersubjectivity, entailing an ongoing (artful and reasonable) 
generation, evocation, and distribution of social obligations. Many of the lineaments of 
this type of relation may be found in Mauss’s theorization of gift economies (1969; cf. 
also Derrida 1994; 1995; Joas 2001; O’Neill 1998; Parsons, Fox, and Lidz 1972). 
Charisma appears, here, to be just as sociologically conditioned as Weber’s two other 
66  The question of intellectual charisma underpins the dissertation and forms a subtext to the following 
chapters on character, affect, and practice. To what extent are relations of domination necessary or 
productive in the student-teacher relationship? This is relevant when, as in the opening chapter, we think 
about questions of transference (Lacan 1977) and of [auto-]interpellation. The role of the ‘master’ is one of 
the underlying themes of Foucault’s later studies and lectures (1988; 2001; 2005; 2010; 2011). The question 
of intellectual influence has also been the subject of a number of sociological studies (Bourdieu 1988; 
Collins 2000, 2002; Lamont 1987). Members of Yale’s ‘strong program’ have begun formulating a cultural 
model of ‘iconic’ intellectuals (e.g., Foucault) and ‘iconic power’ (Bartmanski 2012; Bartmanski, 
Alexander, and Giesen 2012), which deserves to be closely analyzed in relation to charisma.
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forms of authority. Even if it may also appear as a revolutionary movement (Weber 
1978:245), it comes not through outside agitation, an irruption, but as an immanent and 
moral social development. As such, a ‘charismatic society’ would offer an alternative to 
the false dualism of libertarian and communitarian debates (cf. Rose 1996) as well as to 
populist vs. elite debates. That is, charismatic relations may contain a minimal moral 
content in their structure of call and response, and rather than displacing or replacing 
‘traditional’ forms of authority (i.e., ‘law’), they ‘refresh’ and extend social obligations 
(without being ‘conservative’ or failing towards functionalism).
This, at least, is Philip Rieff’s position (2007). Rieff argues for a 
phenomenological but also ‘ideal type’ distinction between charismatic inwardness 
(answerability) and asymmetrical domination (or fascist fusion and permissiveness) as 
between different kinds of experiences (cf. Rose 1996:13), a distinction that could, in 
principle, be empirically verified—if not ‘instantiated.’ Here I follow Weber’s notion of 
the ‘ideal type’ as something that one does not find in its ‘pure’ form—but which cannot 
be confined to the merely empirical. If the charismatic relation is potentially also an 
ethical one, it leads, in addition, to an element of metaphysical speculation (cf. Rose 
1996:9; Žižek 2008:xi). What is more, charismatic answerability may in principle be 
traced to specific forms of practice, but here the empirical task would be to distinguish 
those forms of practice that reproduce social relations of domination (Rose 1996:60) 
through a legitimating performative magic (cf. Bourdieu 1990a:177–198) or an 
overwhelming (performative) show of force, from those that contribute to the generation 
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and circulation of ‘gifts of grace’ in a society whose members democratically generate, 
recognize, respond to, and share in social pleasures and obligations. Against Bourdieu’s 
sometime insistence on the exclusively disenchanting role of sociologists in unveiling 
and then denouncing the ‘hidden injuries of class,’ and according to whom agonistic 
struggle underlies all social interaction within a field, is it possible that the self-critique 
generated by the semi-autonomy of the sociological field may also generate forms of 
non-hegemonic quasi-enchantment, especially around the thematics of answerability? 
One may even discover the possibility of graceful forms of relation that exceed 
historically asymmetrical forms of domination, extending our capacity to view affairs 
“from the standpoint of redemption” (Adorno 2005:153). Bourdieu (following Levi-
Strauss) seems to miss this element of idealizing enchantment in his reading of Mauss, as 
Rancière has polemically pointed out (2012). We shall give Bourdieu’s conception of 
practice a hearing in a later chapter, and we shall see, there, just how ‘minimal’ our claim 
to a distinction between moral and nonmoral practices might become. 
In the meantime, what help can Rieff’s phenomenology of charisma offer to the 
project of thinking about answerability? To begin with, Rieff attends to a broader range of 
uses than those who have followed from Weber’s initial deployment of the term. Rieff 
argues that charisma is a collectively sustained moral quality, a ‘transliteration’ of sacred 
interdictory authority into social life. Without being reducible to ‘collective 
effervescence,’ charisma is a collectively produced and sustained quality of culture. 
While there are problems with Rieff’s view, especially his fixation on authority as such, 
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Rieff uniquely articulates three problems with Weberian and post-Weberian analyses of 
charisma. First, undue attention has typically been given to the leader-follower 
relationship, at the expense of the relational and cultural elements of charisma. Second, 
phenomenologically speaking, charisma cannot be adequately understood as a kind of 
undifferentiated amoral power embodied equally by figures that enable collective 
transgression and by those who manage to transform and deepen individual and collective 
structures of moral self-relation. Following Rieff, one can argue that charisma embodies a 
type of moral structure, albeit a ‘weak’ one (i.e., a form whose content cannot be 
extensively specified), such that the ideal or ‘pure’ type of charisma can be minimally 
distinguished from other individual powers of ‘personal magnetism’ as well as from 
Durkheim’s concept of ‘collective effervescence.’ Finally, if the moral structure of 
charisma is accepted, it follows from this that it is incoherent to attempt to examine 
charisma from a simplistically ‘value-free’ perspective. Extending Rieff’s analysis, I 
argue that we should move beyond Weber’s conception of an inverse relationship 
between charisma and democracy (cf. Pfaff 2002).
The modern concept of charisma has been with us for a little over a century. 
Derived from Greek terms used in the New Testament (e.g., charis and charismati, which 
are usually translated as grace and gift, respectively),67 its modern usage originates with 
67  The key passage is I Corinthians 12. Chapter 12 is followed by the chapter on ‘love’ (agape), the Latin 
translation of which is caritas, a word with links to charismata (in other words, the resolution of the gifts of 
grace back into grace, from the individual reception of grace (charisma) to the collective giving of grace 
(caritas). As Paul has it, if one has received a gift without also receiving (being filled with) love, one has 
nothing, has become a ‘resounding gong.’
Potts’ History of Charisma (2009) provides a more extensive discussion of the term and its pre-
Christian roots, including the presence of a shining and lovely god named Charis in The Iliad and the 
appearance, in The Odyssey, of charis as a gift of grace bestowed upon Telemachus by Athene (2009:13).
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the 19th century German Protestant theologian and historian Rudolf Sohm (1892; 1895 
[1887]). Following New Testament usage, Sohm emphasized the plurality of charisma in 
the form of multiple gifts given for the spiritual edification and vivification of the 
individual and the religious community. Its use in sociology begins with Max Weber’s 
modification and elaboration of the concept, in writings produced between 1910 and his 
death in 1920, as an ideal-type of legitimate authority (in contrast to traditional and 
rational-legal authority) vested in an individual leader.
The concept of charisma has been repeatedly revisited by a variety of social and 
political thinkers, with ambiguous results. The ambiguity of the term is partly due to the 
fact of its incorporation into the everyday lexicon since the 1960 American Presidential 
Campaign, when Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., used it to describe John F. Kennedy (Turner 
2003:6). Popular usage throughout the latter half of the 20th century has continuously 
mobilized and constrained its academic deployment (cf. Bendix 1967). It has been 
adopted by political pundits in the popular media as a crucial adjective for distinguishing 
a category of political leaders/candidates and in the business and management world 
where it is used in ‘leadership studies.’
In spite of Talcott Parsons’ early claim that charisma was already a fully empirical 
concept (1968 [1937]:668–669), scholars have continually felt the need to re-work the 
concept in order to effect a full sociological annexation and application (e.g., Friedland 
1964; Burke and Brinkerhoff 1981; Riesbrodt 1999; Turner 1993; Smith 2000). Even 
administrative and management science ‘leadership studies’ express this need, where 
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charisma functions as a standard conceptual resource (e.g., Beyer 1999a, 1999b; Bligh 
and Kohles 2009; Bryman 1993; Conger 1989; Conger and Kanungo 1998; Emrich, 
Brower, Feldman and Garland 2001; Halpert 1990; Howell and Avolio 1992; Pastor, 
Meindl and Mayo 2002), but where engagement with the conceptual debates or the 
historical sources and resources is uneven and reliance on popular usage is heavy.
Rather than arguing that making the concept ‘fully sociological’ involves making 
it more scientistic, I will argue that the richest sociological reading of charisma (at least 
as it appears in the form of accounts), short of an empirical examination of concrete 
charismatic practices (e.g., Wright and Rawls 2005), involves a careful hermeneutic of 
the cultural tradition from which the concept has emerged. On my view, the main 
problem is not that charisma is a residual category, as Stephen Turner has argued (1993; 
2003; 2007a)68, but that most scholars have failed to take the cultural context of the 
concept seriously enough. This failure appears most vividly, ironically, in the place one 
would most expect the cultural context to have been taken seriously, Philip Smith’s 
(2000) application of the “strong program” (Smith and Alexander 2003) in cultural 
sociology to the concept of charisma. Using the concept of culture as a ‘relatively 
autonomous’ sphere, Smith discusses the narrative structures mobilized in the rhetoric of 
three twentieth century public figures commonly described as charismatic: Adolf Hitler, 
68  In order to operationalize charisma, Turner suggests that the charismatic leader is someone capable of 
transforming risk perceptions amongst followers. This turns charisma into a game theoretical concept, and 
opens it to empirical testing by cognitive neuroscience. Like, Weber, however, Turner gives no sociological 
explanation for charisma’s origins, continuing to imply that it is a sociologically inexplicable irruption. 
Associating it with an open-ended notion of risk, Turner ensures that it remains, as in Weber, a nonmoral 
concept with a formal non-relation to the law.
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Winston Churchill, and Martin Luther King, Jr. Smith argues that charisma needs to be 
understood in terms of the deployment of symbolic binaries of good and evil. On this 
reading, attributions of charisma depend upon successful links being made between 
prospective ‘charismatic’ individuals and culturally predominant salvation narratives. 
However, Smith avoids any concrete discussion of charisma’s own position as a concept 
within a narrative structure and context.69 He offers no definition of the term, nor any 
history of its usage, and he makes no distinction between public (or scholarly) 
‘attributions’ of charisma and ‘actual’ possession of charisma. Smith is so eager to get to 
his relative autonomy of culture thesis that he does not bother to discuss the cultural term 
that he found ready-to-hand and is already hammering away with. He may be taking 
culture seriously—and Smith is not the first to do this, although the ‘strong program’ 
tends to under-cite predecessors (e.g., on leadership, see Klapp 1964)—but he does not 
take charisma seriously as a cultural concept, and he leaves some of the same elements of 
charisma in obscurity that Weber does. The most striking evidence of Smith’s un-
seriousness is his failure—shared with the vast majority of other sociological theorists of 
charisma—to go behind Weber to the cultural sources from which the concept has been 
derived. As a result, Smith accepts the three key but questionable elements of Weber’s 
approach mentioned earlier: 1) an exclusive focus on leaders; 2) an assumption that 
charisma is a non-moral quality; and following from this, 3) an ostensibly value-neutral 
approach (i.e., the assumption that in making an attribution of charisma the social 
69  See Baehr (2008) for a useful discussion of the way that Weber developed his sociology of charisma 
through a creative transformation of the mid-19th century discussion of Louis Napoleon’s ‘Caesarism.’
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scientist is not making a moral judgement. How else could the social scientist assess both 
King and Hitler as charismatic?).
While I am skeptical of a number of elements of Rieff’s approach, in mobilizing 
the ‘sacred’ and in taking seriously the Judeo-Christian foundation of the concept of 
charisma, he has initiated a more profound engagement with the question of the cultural 
and the social than the strong programmers. As a result, his approach, although it deals 
with collective aspects of the social, evades Smith’s claim that such approaches tie 
charisma too closely to social structure (Smith 2000:102). Under the influence of Freud, 
Durkheim, and Kierkegaard, Rieff argues that charisma is a kind of collectively produced 
and maintained quality of culture with a fundamentally moral and religious or spiritual 
character, as the primary means of mediating the relationship between the sacred and the 
social. Charismatic culture regulates individual self-relation by formulating, producing, 
and expressing interdictory energies. This is best expressed by the Kierkegaardian notion 
of inwardness. This position is directly opposed to Stephen Turner’s attempt to link 
charisma exclusively to risk-taking (conceived without reference to morality or religions) 
and transgression (of previously accepted limits). According to Turner, charismatic 
leaders embolden their followers; they give them new permissions (2007a). Rieff, by 
contrast, offers a reading of charisma as the moral production of fresh interdicts. The 
question might be, then, whether charisma is about risk and transgression or about faith 
and guilt. Rieff’s approach highlights the fact that studies of charisma have given undue 
attention to the leader-follower relationship at the expense of the collective and cultural 
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elements of charisma. Fixating on men coming down from mountains, grasping pulpits, 
and leading marches misses the ambiguity inherent in everyday public attributions of 
agency, too easily conflating the existence of charisma with its attribution, and missing 
relational elements entirely. Smith is partly correct to point out that charisma should be 
understood “in a cultural way as the product of symbolic structures” (2000:103), but 
reductive when he accepts the doxa that it is “a moral bond of duty linking followers to 
leaders” (103). According to the cultural tradition, one still alive, for instance, in the 
Christian charismatic church movement, visible and official leadership of a group is but 
one manifestation of charisma.
Furthermore, formulations that depict charisma as a kind of undifferentiated 
amoral power seem to lose the phenomena they are trying to describe. We are left with no 
way of distinguishing between Hitler and Martin Luther King, between a Mafia 
Godfather—which almost all of us, even those of us involved in organized crime (cf. 
Chambliss 1978), know primarily through popular culture depictions, in any case. Was 
Tony Soprano charismatic? Or was it James Gandolfini?—and an effective community 
organizer, when we accept the notion that charisma is embodied equally by figures that 
transform perceptions of risk in order to enable collective transgression and by processes 
that transform and deepen individual and collective structures of moral self-relation or 
conscience, or what Rose (1996) describes as a process of ‘mourning’ becoming the law. 
A leader is a leader is a leader. Rieff argues, however, that there is a fundamental 
difference between authority relations that generate conformity and those that generate 
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inwardness. This could be a way of giving charisma a kind of moral structure, albeit a 
‘weak’ one (i.e., a form whose content cannot be extensively specified), such that ‘pure’ 
charisma can be distinguished from other powers of ‘personal magnetism’ (as well as 
from Durkheim’s concept of ‘collective effervescence’). As a point of observation, 
rejecting the moral structure of charisma, it seems, goes hand in hand with a ‘value-free’ 
perspective (such as Turner attempts, piggy-backing on Weber). Nothing could be more 
in harmony with capitalistic exchange, nor more in conflict with democratic projects, 
than to approach charisma as a neutral individual power of domination or fascination. On 
the view of charisma that Rieff develops, nothing could be more anti-charismatic.
Against the value-free approach to charisma as a kind of amoral social energy 
originating in and emanating from an individual leader, Rieff conceives of charisma as a 
quality of culture that emerges and remains embedded in concrete forms of practice. 
While leadership is one aspect of what Rieff calls the ‘charisma of culture,’ charismatic 
practices take a number of forms, each of which binds members of a group to one another 
with mutually beneficial effects, while simultaneously limiting, rather than expanding, 
individual proclivities for transgressive-conformist collective acts (expanding inwardness 
instead). According to Rieff, charismatic communities, rather than defining themselves 
against an other, are characterized by democratically universalizing tendencies. This links 
charisma not with the decisionistic leader-follower model offered by Schmitt’s friend-
enemy concept of the political (1996), but with Gillian Rose’s understanding of the 
political: “...politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your own damaged good, 
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but when you act, without guarantees, for the good of all—this is to take the risk of the 
universal interest” (1996:62). The universal, here, is not the pre-established ‘us’ (vs. 
‘them’), such as the fraternally enabled transgressive violence of ‘brothers in arms,’ but 
more like what Rancière has in mind with the notion of the assertion of equality by the 
‘part that has no part’ (2007).
In order to develop the already mentioned criticisms of charisma studies (i.e., their 
leadership fixation; their insistence on the amorality of charisma; their value-freedom; the 
supposedly inverse relationship with democracy), we will begin with the source, Weber’s 
own development of the concept of charisma, taking the leader/follower focus first. In 
Economy and Society, Weber defines charismatic leadership as one of the “three pure 
types of legitimate domination” (1978:216). This form of domination, as opposed to 
traditional or legal-rational domination, is understood as “resting on devotion to the 
exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (216). Now it follows from 
Weber’s methodological individualism that one take the meaning of individual 
orientations to social action as the starting point. It is not as clear why this would mean 
that charisma needs to be understood as a type of authority originating in and wielded 
entirely by individuals, but this is opening Weber’s claim (241).
Weber’s discussion is caught up in the twin binaries of tradition/charisma (i.e., 
charisma as breaking up a sedimented order) and charisma/bureaucracy (i.e., bureaucracy 
as rationalizing, routinizing and draining charisma of its energy). It is also shaped by the 
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emphasis he places on the role of individual actors in political life. But these moves do 
not necessarily follow from his definition of ‘social action’ as actors mutually oriented 
with respect to the meaning of action. As a result, we can question Weber’s confinement 
of charisma to leader/follower relationships without needing to question his 
methodological individualism. Weber’s own writing hints that this individualistic 
conception of charismatic authority has real limitations.
In the summer of 1917, while the tide was turning against Germany in the First 
World War, Weber published a series of articles in the Frankfurter Zeitung on the current 
and future possibilities for German leaders (1978:1381–1469). In these articles Weber 
maintains a steady critique of ‘arm-chair’ political windbags, incompetent monarchs (i.e., 
Kaiser Wilhelm II), and self-serving bureaucrats. He argues that the returning soldiers 
should have a place in German political life (1382–1383), but exhibits considerable 
pessimism about the possibility that those with a real ‘vocation’ for political life will find 
their rightful place in a Germany dominated by bureaucrats living ‘off’ instead of ‘for’ 
politics. Weber does not consistently defend the importance of ‘leadership,’ as opposed to 
what Habermas would call ‘democratic will-formation,’ however, since Weber blames the 
rise of bureaucratic power on Bismarck’s methods during the course of his long 
domination of German political life. That is, if we take Bismarck as one of Weber’s 
prototypes for charismatic leadership (cf. ‘Caesarism’), what is at stake is less the 
routinization of charisma than the political infantilization of German society. Weber 
argued that when Bismarck was finally forced from power in 1890, he
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left behind him a nation without any political sophistication, far below the 
level which in this regard it had reached twenty years before [i.e., in 
1870]. Above all, he left behind him a nation without any political will of 
its own, accustomed to the idea that the great statesman at the helm would 
make the necessary political decisions. (1392)
Weber suggests that there was an alternative to the bureaucratic take-over of political life 
but it was cut off by the charismatic Bismarck’s machinations. Bismarck’s leadership 
style produced a Germany, Weber writes, “...unaccustomed to sharing, through its elected 
representatives, in the determination of its political affairs. Such participation, after all, is 
the precondition for developing political judgment” (1392). Here Weber makes the same 
argument that Kant made in his ‘What is Enlightenment?’ essay (1996), that individual 
and even democratic autonomy can be developed by practice and participation combined 
with the restriction of paternalistic or repressive control from the top. Here, as well, lies 
the possibility that charisma may be generated by collective and participatory forms of 
social interaction rather than originating in extraordinary individuals who succeed in 
commanding a following on the basis of their unusual gifts.
Instead of moving past his leader-follower focus, however, Weber reinforces it 
with two well-known elements of his political sociology. On the one hand, he argues for 
the inevitability of the bureaucratic take-over of authority. On the other hand, although he 
advocates giving the vote to the returning soldiers and suggests that the valorization of 
honour and solidarity is best done through trade unions, he ascribes ‘irrational emotions’ 
to the ‘masses’ (1978:1459–1460) and emphasizes their vulnerability to demagoguery. 
This generates a highly ambiguous relevance for charisma, especially with regard to its 
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origin. On the one hand, Weber accepts that it is through collective struggle (in the trade 
unions) that the value of honour and solidarity come to be felt and understood. On the 
other hand, Weber criticizes the masses for their suggestibility. He has a similar 
ambivalence for political parties (which are, in his view and in that of his student, Robert 
Michels, inevitably run by a small core group) and for ‘interest groups.’ For Weber, these 
associative forms tend to undermine the possibility of effective political life precisely 
because they lower the possibility that the right sort of leaders will find their way into the 
decisive political positions.
Weber’s entire discussion, however, relies on an implicit but rather convoluted set 
of metaphors of energy flows and sources, blockages, desires, lacks, and all of this in a 
‘value-free’ mode! Weber claims that “it is not the politically passive ‘mass’ that produces 
the leader from its midst, but the political leader recruits his following and wins the mass 
through ‘demagogy.’ This is true even under the most democratic form of state” (1457). 
But should this claim be taken at face value? To begin with, the notion that the ‘mass’ is 
simultaneously politically passive and emotionally volatile and suggestible is vulnerable 
to Weber’s own well-known cautionary and critical remarks about the use of organic or 
collective metaphors of the social (16). In addition, what does Weber mean by “the most 
democratic form of the state?” Reasonably speaking, he could have meant, at most, the 
most democratic state ‘so far,’ but he regularly implies a kind of knowledge of the 
possible limits of democracy as such. He claims that participation in political decision-
making is required for developing political judgement, but he vitiates this notion by 
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suggesting that it is best done through representation.
Ultimately, Weber fails to support his claim that charisma originates in the 
individual and that its origin is daimonic and therefore sociologically inexplicable, 
instead of demotic and of social origin. This point should be noted well: while Weber 
treats the effects or proofs of charisma sociologically, he positions the origins of charisma 
within the individual (as a kind of self-relation) and then brackets this ‘inner calling’ from 
sociological analysis. As a result, Weber precludes the possibility that charisma in its pure 
form could have a fundamentally democratic manifestation or meaning, but he can only 
do this by giving charisma a miraculous or daimonic origin. Weber thus makes the 
condition of charisma’s appearance coeval with its ‘fall.’ It is only ever as stable as the 
individual self-relation that is its basis, and this basis is always unstable. Stable, everyday 
social relations as such suck the life from charisma. If Jesus brings the Holy Spirit, Paul’s 
institutional success is vampiric (which is why the community must endlessly take 
communion, like vampires70).
Weber’s genius theory of charisma, with its aristocratic elements, likely reflects 
the influence of Nietzsche and his conception of ‘will-to-power,’ but it also reflects the 
influence of Rudolf Sohm’s Protestant reading of the charismata, which is that the 
institutionalization of the division of gifts in a visible (Catholic) Church meant a 
submersion of the spirit that only ended with Luther. Ironically, however, Weber reads the 
Reformation’s ‘priesthood of all believers’ as unleashing inner anxieties about salvation 
70  In this image we can see the ambiguity of a notion like routinization, and the importance of the 
metaphors we use for its interpretation (e.g., the debates about how to translate stahlhartes Gehäuse, 
whether as ‘iron cage’ or as ‘steel-hard casing’).
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in a way that contributed to the formation of an ‘Iron Cage’ of capitalist bureaucracy and 
instrumental rationality. As Martin Riesebrodt argues (1999), Weber follows much of 
Sohm’s reading of charisma. But where Sohm’s is a triumphalist, orthodox (Protestant) 
Christian reading, according to which charisma has been miraculously preserved and is 
now coming into its own, Weber’s reading is pessimistic and fatalistic. Weber’s 
pessimism, however, is arguably a product of his failure to recognize the limitations of 
his own conception of social science’s highest achievement, the possibility of value-free 
presentations of the meaning of particular social actions. Habermas (1984) has argued 
that this is a consequence of Weber’s failure to develop an adequate typology of forms of 
rationality. The pragmatist Habermas would have us replace the Weberian secularization 
of the pneuma (the spirit of the social) into individual charisma, with communicative 
rationality. What is proposed, here, as answerability, lies in excess of the communicative.
Weber approaches charisma just as he approaches his other ideal types: “How the 
quality in question would be ultimately judged from any ethical, aesthetic, or other point 
of view is naturally entirely indifferent for purposes of definition. What is alone 
important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject to charismatic 
authority, by his ‘followers’ or ‘disciples’” (1978:241–242). As we shall see, Philip Rieff 
claims that it is only on the condition that one allows the concept of charisma to be 
distinguished by its bearing a certain amount of moral content, or at least possessing a 
moral structure, that it is possible to give it an adequate treatment as a coherent category 
of phenomena. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Weber himself seems to lean in this direction 
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with his remark that Joseph Smith may have been a swindler, and with his deep concern 
with the question of having a true vocation. Rieff asserts that charisma embodies a form 
of autonomy, a moral quality of inwardness, which involves the recognition of and 
resistance to ‘evil’ within oneself (i.e., Rieff associates this with an aspect of what Freud 
called the ‘death drive’), and the capacity to assist others who are similarly struggling for 
self-recognition. This quality of inwardness may be subsequently linked to answerability, 
the notion that binds the dissertation as a whole. 
D. CHARISMA: RISK OR HOLY TERROR
Taking Philip Rieff as a guide, it would seem that Stephen Turner’s association of 
charisma with the concept of risk elides an important phenomenological distinction 
between moral and non-moral fear, between risk to one’s body and risk to one’s soul. 
This is a distinction maintained especially well in the theological tradition, but there is no 
reason to confine it to a theological context. Rieff describes it as the difference between 
“the terror in our lives and holy terror” (2007:6). There is a difference that makes a 
difference between the various fears that we have for our own physical safety and 
security and what may be called holy terror, or “fear of the evil in oneself and in the 
world” (6). It is what Ivan Illich, following the Christian Scholastics, called “filial fear,” 
in contrast with “servile fear” (2005:96). It is the fear of being at fault. It is somewhere in 
the background when we lock up our possessions so as not to tempt someone else rather 
than to prevent our own material loss. Holy terror is the fear invoked by Jesus when he 
says “But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better 
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for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the 
depth of the sea” (Mt. 18:6; see also Mk. 9:42, Lk. 17:2).71
Thus, Rieff would accept Turner’s claim (1993:247) that risk may be put prior to 
interdiction, only if we specify risk as the danger that one’s own powers pose to oneself 
and to others. Interdiction only follows such a recognition of danger because the risk is 
internal. For both Rieff and Illich, fear of the self (rather than the fear of fear) provides 
the fundamental basis for submission to charismatic authority, and such a fear can only be 
a moral fear, the product of a credal “charismatic tradition,” what Rieff calls a faith/guilt 
complex. For this reason, a charismatic leader does not merely enable followers to 
overcome fear by deeds of power. On the contrary, charisma makes us capable of Holy 
Terror. By contrast, Turner follows Weber in reading charisma primarily as a 
transgressive. Turner, along with popular culture, takes Hitler’s charismatic status for 
granted. For Rieff, by contrast, this misses the key distinction between transgression and 
interdiction. According to Rieff “This is why it is so ambiguous to consider Hitler, for 
example, as a ‘charismatic.’ He is a figure of the demolition, and what follows—the 
leader of an anti-credal organization” (Rieff 2007:117–118). According to Rieff, Hitler’s 
essentially transgressive leadership relieved the German people of filial fear while 
affirming collective conformity as obedience through transgression. Rather than what 
Rieff calls “fresh interdicts,” Hitler destroyed the moral order by means of the cracks in 
71  “Filial fear” refers to the child’s fear of the parent, the fear of doing something that will cut him or her 
off from the parent (and as such, lies at the origin of the Freudian super ego). Nevertheless, because injury 
to the weak and vulnerable is just what, in the millstone passage, causes the breach between the child and 
the parent (i.e., the God), this exemplifies filial fear. Filial fear is precisely what is inoperative in situations 
of child abuse (cf. Young-Bruehl 2012). Its absence is most formally horrifying in religious leaders.
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the its foundation (e.g., its anti-Semitic conditions of possibility).
Rieff’s posthumously published work, with some important caveats, helps to 
correct a fundamental elision in Weber’s concept of charisma and in his work as a whole. 
Rather than arguing that charisma is a ‘residual category,’ as Turner does, Rieff argues 
that Weber mistakenly made traditional and charismatic authority into polar opposites. 
Importantly, Rieff opens up the possibility of seeing the collective properties of charisma 
without subsuming it to Durkheim’s notion of collective effervescence. While 
Durkheim’s collective effervescence, like Weber’s charisma, is a fundamentally amoral 
category, Rieff defines charisma as an essentially moral force and provides significant 
criteria for distinguishing it both from other social forces and from various kinds of 
ecstatic leader-follower relationships.
Like Parsons (1968) and Shils (1975), Rieff draws upon the possibility of a 
Weber-Durkheim synthesis. Unlike Parsons and Shils he concludes by criticizing both 
Weber and Durkheim, and avoids a merely functional conclusion. That is, his discussion 
cannot be reduced to the ‘problem of order,’ to Parsons’ emphasis on ‘values,’ or to Shils’ 
concept of ‘office charisma.’ Like Philip Smith’s ‘strong’ cultural sociology reading, 
Rieff’s reading emphasizes the fundamental relationship between charisma and culture. 
Rieff’s reading fundamentally differs from Smith, however, whose reading ultimately 
explains away charisma by means of an oversimplified version of charisma’s narrative 
structure (i.e., as a fully externalized contest between good and evil) (Smith 2000:105). In 
the end Smith follows Weber, Turner, and the others, in defining charisma as an amoral 
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quality defined by success in recruiting and retaining obedient followers.
Turner emphasized the aggressive (1993:253) and risk-taking/transforming 
character of charismatic leaders. Philip Rieff contends, by contrast, that the essential 
aspect of charismatic authority is that the hero or prophet leads the way in submitting to 
the law and generates through this submission not only a transformation of risk and new 
promises of success but also new self-recognition of failure (i.e., consciousness of sin). 
While charismatic figures probably do introduce something new, they are not, 
fundamentally, destructive figures. Rather than overturning the law or the tradition, 
charismatic figures re-invigorate it; they embody and rejuvenate the law and the 
charismatic culture that inspires (faith) precisely through the recognition of limits and 
failure (guilt), what Rieff dubbed the ‘faith/guilt complex.’ To return to our privileged 
example, if Hitler sanctioned new forms of violence against an innocent victim, Martin 
Luther King called Americans to a heightened recognition of collective and individual 
guilt, and not merely in order to feel guilty as an end in itself, but in order to bind oneself 
to ‘fresh interdicts,’ to higher standards. It was, in Gillian Rose’s terms, a work of 
mourning, the constitution of an experience in which “we would have to discover and 
confront our own fascism” (1996:48).
Weber consistently uses Jesus as the prototype of charismatic leadership, but his 
interpretation of his activities is rather unorthodox. Those convinced by Weber’s “anti-
law” presentation of the “It is written...but I say unto you” formula would do well to 
review the explicit teachings of the Sermon on the Mount (Gospel of Matthew, chapters 
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5–7). When Weber paraphrases Jesus (1978:1115) he actually performs the re-interpretive 
act that his quotation is meant to exemplify. In other words, the revolutionary act here 
might well be Weber’s act of re-interpretive reversal (an act of trangression but not an act 
of charisma).72 Contrary to Weber’s implication, the form of the phrase appears to have 
been a common rabbinic form in the time of Jesus, and an illustration of the ‘interpretive 
imperative’ involved in maintaining or reproducing any tradition whatsoever. In addition, 
the Sermon on the Mount seems intended (like other rabbinic teaching) to deepen the 
commandments rather than overturn them. In fact, New Testament biblical scholarship 
suggests that almost all of the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount can be found in the 
teachings of other contemporary rabbis (Stoutenburg 1996). This corresponds to 
developments in Old Testament scholarship since Weber’s time as well, as Peter Berger 
pointed out in 1963, in an article on Israelite prophecy that details the fact that, in contrast 
to the isolated opposition to social institutions depicted by Weber, Israelite prophets were 
fully embedded within Israelite religious institutions.
Importantly, Rieff’s model of charisma directly opposes the ‘state of exception’ 
model of sovereignty according to which the force of law is ultimately not subject to law, 
and legality operates within an indeterminate grey zone. This model disqualifies the 
‘Hitler as Charismatic leader’ argument, and distinguishes a charismatic development 
from a mere ‘Escape from Freedom’ (Fromm 1941). Charisma must be, for Rieff, a 
legitimate and moral force. In contrast to Schmittian notions of sovereignty, charisma is 
the miraculous “exception to the exception” (Honig 2008), the act of voluntarily rejecting 
72  Rieff uses the term ‘deathwork’ to describe this kind of interpretation of a culture (2006).
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an opportunity to exercise raw power in order to submit oneself to a moral order. The 
charismatic word expresses “fresh interdicts”—rather than merely transgressive or new 
words of power—that rejuvenate the social covenant. The charismatic or prophetic act 
renews the tradition, and prophetic fulfilment fulfils the covenant of a people with itself. 
Disputes about the specific meaning of fulfilment are different from disputes about the 
meaningfulness of the traditional system as such. This ‘exemplary’ aspect, a point 
overlooked by Turner but not by Weber, points to the possibility of a restored self-
relation, something not contained in Turner’s dyad of transformed risk and possibility. 
Both Weber and Rieff call this, translating charisma literally, the ‘gift of grace.’
Perhaps most importantly, Rieff’s re-reading of charisma transforms the meaning 
of success. While Weber made charisma equivalent with success, Rieff makes room for 
forms of success that look much like failure. The “charisma of perception,” argues Rieff, 
is, in fact, the “recognition of guilt” or failure (2007:38). We must not forget that Jesus’s 
earthly mission culminates with his crucifixion. The resurrection does not undo the 
crucifixion, it generates success through failure. This is a radical transformation of risk 
indeed. For Turner, the cycle of success (1993:253) must go on and on. For Rieff’s 
conception of charisma, by contrast, it is failure that goes on and on.73 Against Turner’s 
distinction of the prophet from the charismatic hero—“The message is ‘follow me’ in the 
case of the hero, ‘heed my warning’ in the case of the prophet” (Turner 1993:245)—Rieff 
argues that the heroic and the prophetic form of charisma are closely linked. The hero 
also gives warnings and the prophet also demands, in a way, followers. In this light, 
73  For a novelistic portrayal of this thesis, see Shusaku Endo’s The Samurai (1982).
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Weber’s opposition of charisma to reason, law, and discipline, take on a very different 
appearance. Instead of being suffocated by reason, law, or discipline, charisma is bound 
to their institutionalizing processes through its character as the self-recognition of failure. 
Here Rieff introduces a very different opposition, that between cultural movements of 
transgression and therapy and cultural movements of interdiction and remission, and he 
argues that Weber’s typology of authority should have included the distinction between 
interdictory and transgressive forms of charismatic authority. According to Rieff, the 
condition for transgressive charismatic authority is not necessarily ‘traditional’ authority; 
it can also emerge from interdictory charismatic authority (2007:76–77). From this 
viewpoint it follows that charisma, as an interdictory structure, can also be understood as 
a moral structure, which we confine, here, to the possibility that charismatic relations 
may be understood as forms of answerability (and not simply transgressive or 
interdictory). Rieff’s faith/guilt complex, which institutionally maintains recognition of 
one’s own guilt, differs, here, from Smith’s model of culture, which structures the 
good/evil distinction according to the in-group/out-group binary. Smith’s ‘salvation 
narrative’ lacks any notion of good and evil as an ‘inner’ or ‘inward’ problem. Instead, it 
is a ‘relatively autonomous’ narrative that is used functionally for ‘othering.’
Dividing transgressive and interdictory forms obviates part of Weber’s claim that 
charisma be approached in a ‘value-free’ manner. While sociology remains incapable of 
technically adjudicating between transgressive or interdictory forms of charismatic 
authority, the conceptual distinction is clear enough and it is certainly possible to develop 
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empirical research along these lines (cf. Archer 2003). Weber’s claims about discipline 
may serve to clarify this point. According to Rieff, Weber misrepresents discipline when 
he suggests that it is characterized by neutrality. The problem, here, is that Weber 
conflates neutrality with objectivity. Against Weber’s methodological writings on 
scientific objectivity as ‘value-freedom,’ Rieff suggests that:
We can now see more clearly what is wrong with Weber’s conception of 
objectivity, for objectivity in culture is the truth of resistance—what 
Kierkegaard called subjectivity. Every cultural truth must be a truth of 
resistance...objectivity of the scholar or scientist is anything but neutral 
and passive. (2007:177–178)
From remarks on the discipline of sociology, it is a short turn to charisma and discipline. 
Although charisma is, along with traditional and rational-legal authority, one of Weber’s 
three ideal types of legitimate authority, and as such commands and produces obedience, 
Weber does not explain the extent to which he includes obedience under the category of 
discipline. This leads to problems when Weber claims that “Discipline as such is not 
hostile to charisma or to status honor” but it is “intrinsically alien to charisma” 
(1978:1149). Weber makes this statement because he understands discipline as 
‘impersonal,’ and ‘unfailingly neutral.’ It puts itself at the service of anyone that “claims 
its service and knows how to promote it” (1149). Still, that does not clarify discipline’s 
relation to obedience, especially with respect to Weber’s contrast between rationality and 
charisma.
Weber views discipline—which must be understood here first in military terms—
as essentially, not contingently, neutral (1150). Discipline neutralizes: “For Rome, the 
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turning point [from honour to discipline] is symbolized by the legend of the execution of 
the consul’s son who, in accordance with the ancient heroic fashion, had slain the 
opposing commander in individual combat” (1151). Although discipline is not essentially 
hostile to charisma, it will ultimately  come into conflict with it, since charisma (here, in 
its heroic form, tied to honour) retains the right to irrational acts (i.e., individual 
heroism). The site of the decisive battle between discipline and charisma is literally the 
battlefield, and it is in war that discipline demonstrates its ultimate superiority over 
charisma: ‘men of conscience’ defeat ‘men of honour’ (1150).
Rieff sees Weber’s distinction between discipline and charisma as a misreading. 
Weber overlooks the fact that discipline of the sort that he describes is not a pure form of 
neutral, instrumental rationality, but a transgressive form of action. It does not so much 
institute neutrality—such that even the consul’s son is subject to the same rule as anyone 
else—as license slaughter and rationalize transgression: 
To write, as he [Weber] did, that ‘the discipline of the army gives birth to 
all discipline,’ is to dismiss the opposing connection between discipline 
and discipleship. Rationalized transgressiveness becomes the primal form 
of social action. Man-killing, one of the two supremely transgressive 
fantasies, becomes enactable; ‘culture’ thus destroys itself. (Rieff 
2007:144)
It is already a mistake to link charisma with warrior’s honour, but it is a catastrophic error 
to take military discipline as the prototype of discipline. According to Rieff, “War is a 
collective transgressive...transgressive professionals may develop codes of ‘honor’...But, 
despite such codes, warfare as such is culturally subversive, and its discipline 
transgressive” (143). Military discipline produces “a mere actor, playing his role, not a 
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creator of resistances with his own truth set against the tempting assaults of experience. 
Superego and instinct reunite. The perfectly disciplined one will do whatever he is 
commanded to do. He feels no guilt. He is not immoral” (144). This sort of actor is better 
called ‘self-alienated’ than ‘disciplined’ (145), which returns us to the question of 
Weber’s unexplained ambiguity about the relationship between obedience and discipline. 
While he characterized the follower of a charismatic leader as obedient, this is portrayed 
as an ultimately irrational bond in comparison with the neutrality and rationality of 
discipline. There is a remarkable incoherence in this distinction. Rieff introduces the (also 
ambiguous) notion of inwardness in order to clarify and make explicit the tension 
between obedience and discipline. The tension here is, in short, the dilemma of 
civilization: in war murder becomes a commandment. To unquestioningly obey an order 
to kill, one must avoid inward reflection at all costs. One must become an Eichmann. 
Rieff locates the essential ambiguity here: “No side can be spiritual victor in a war, it is 
the most transgressive of all human events and yet one that no large-scale credal 
organization has been able to renounce when the death-dealing is in defense of its own 
interdicts” (143). Here Rieff succeeds, by means of the notion of inwardness, in 
articulating the question of civilization beyond Freud’s dualism of eros and thanatos. 
Against Weber, Rieff argues that
in the development of Western culture, the meaning of discipline cannot 
be separated from its credal animus. The conformity of action in mass 
organization is anti-credal. Deep individuality cannot exist except in 
relation to the highest authority. No inner discipline can operate without a 
charismatic institution. (2007:24)
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The real meaning of discipline is not rational calculation toward a given end, then, but in 
the case of ancient Israel, at least, covenant. With respect to war, charisma is a limit and a 
constraint, although one which has thus far never been ultimately successful.
Let us not forget that a certain devaluation of ‘everyday’ reality underlies Weber’s 
conception of charisma, which defines and implicitly praises charisma as 
‘extraordinariness.’ In fact, most of Weber’s work is accomplished as soon as he begins 
by defining the charismatic as the extraordinary, against which background the everyday 
can only appear (or disappear) as lack. With this starting-point, charisma’s fate is already 
decided: routinization is inevitable and means either the death or the reversal of charisma. 
Weber definitionally divides charisma from the everyday at the same moment that he 
divides it from everyday people. In opposition to this devaluation of the everyday, Rieff 
argues that in the interdictory form of charismatic authority, the “charisma of perception” 
(2007:131) institutionalizes charisma without inverting or reversing it (62). Following 
Edward Shils74 and his concept of ‘office charisma,’ Rieff’s model has charisma enriching 
rather than being inverted by everyday life. For Rieff, charisma can only be effective if it 
is institutionalized.
Rieff makes the case for the positive effects of charisma’s institutionalization not 
to argue against Weber’s pessimism about bureaucracy and modernity, for he is as 
pessimistic as Weber about charisma’s present possibilities, presenting them in a manner 
similar to Turner’s sometime description of charisma as ubiquitous but trivial in 
modernity. Rieff’s pessimism differs from Weber’s, however, because of his skepticism 
74  Rieff’s Master’s Thesis supervisor at the University of Chicago (Zondervan 2005:14).
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about the notion of routinization and about Weber’s understanding of charisma. For Rieff, 
modern bureaucratic/therapeutic society institutionalizes a false and transgressive form of 
charisma. Rieff re-frames contemporary rationality, highlighting not just the ‘irrationality 
of rationality,’ but, in a perspective that bears considerable resemblance to Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s “Dialectic of Enlightenment” argument, the transgressive elements of 
rational-legal (bureaucratic) authority as well. The bureaucratic routinization of 
(transgressive) collective energies does not drain them out, it institutes them in the form 
of elaborate transgressive/conformist procedures (discipline without inwardness) that 
provide society-wide opportunities for de-responsibilized sado-masochistic aggression. 
According to Rieff, this process operates as surely in liberal therapeutic society as it does 
in modern totalitarian states.
According to Rieff, modern totalitarian and liberal states share the rule of 
‘values.’ The problem with Weber’s typologies of authority and rationality is that the 
concept of value hides a similarity rather than establishing a distinction. Weber’s concept 
of values is already a form of nihilism, one that transforms a creed into an exchangeable 
commodity. Justification is turned into legitimation. This suspicion of values is not 
merely Marx and Aristotle’s distinction between use value and exchange value. For Rieff 
(as, earlier, for Arendt), use (or function) is already caught up in a commodification 
process according to which everything is exchangeable: “‘Value’ is a word for unlimited 
exchangeability with other values. Values give no stability. They fluctuate in the values 
market” (2006:11). Turner’s notion of risk fits into this market model.
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E. CHARISMA & COLLECTIVE EFFERVESCENCE
Talcott Parsons posited values as the stabilizing factor in society. Rieff reverses this 
position. He argues that values are essentially destabilizing. This position entails the 
rejection of the Durkheim-Weber synthesis developed by Parsons and also by Edward 
Shils (cf. Riesebrodt 1999:3). It also involves rejecting the idea that charisma is 
equivalent to collective effervescence. Rieff owes much to Durkheim and is influenced by 
the syntheses of Weber and Durkheim developed by Parsons and Shils, but his reading of 
charisma and collective effervescence is fundamentally non-synthetic, if only because he 
rejects key elements of both Weber’s concept of charisma and Durkheim’s concept of 
collective effervescence. The main difference between Rieff’s approach and a synthesis 
of charisma and collective effervescence rests in his persistent assertion that interdictory 
charismatic authority is a fundamentally moral force. Collective effervescence, by 
contrast, is, for Durkheim, the emotional-transcendental source of morality, and thus 
precedes morality. Effervescence, the pre-moral fount of social energies, is ritualized and 
interpreted later on. It is, in Victor Turner’s sense (1969), a liminal and transitional space.
Charisma in Rieff’s sense, however, differs from collective effervescence 
precisely in the fact that it produces an individualizing disciplinary structure (not unlike 
Foucault, here, who is Rieff’s ‘opposite number’) which is not in any simple sense 
reducible to the functional demands of either a social ‘organism’ (Durkheim) or a social 
‘system’ (Parsons). The demands of a social ‘organism’ or ‘system’ may just as easily be 
transgressive as interdictory. Here it is important to note that Rieff’s emphasis on the 
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transgressive element in the bureaucratic and on the instability of values is absent in the 
Parsons-Shils synthesis. According to Rieff, charisma is not merely the necessary 
collective energy that society generates for itself in order to fulfil its functional 
requirements. It is an interdictory and individualizing form of collective energy. In other 
words, while interdictory charismatic authority may be a form of collective 
effervescence, not all collective effervescence is charismatic.
In his discussion of charisma, Shils had altered the Weberian metaphor by making 
charisma into something that was dispersed but not reversed when it became 
institutionalized (Shils 1975:133). For Shils, charisma and its routinization are related as 
a kind of tidal ebbing and flowing. Charisma flows into institutions, gradually weakening 
as it disperses. This is close to Rieff’s view in the important and Durkheimian respect that 
this version links the everyday and the extraordinary as an organically related dialectical 
pair (i.e., sacred/profane) that generate and regenerate each other instead of being mere 
opposites. Weber’s ‘routinization of charisma,’ by contrast, lacks the faith that charisma 
(as collective energy) may be ritually renewed. Life’s meaning, for Weber, emerges 
through punctuated special revelation. His view of charisma as an original source of 
energy that is tied to a particular authoritative leader exemplifies his allergy to dialectical 
concepts which could accommodate more complicated energy flows between people.
According to Rieff’s long historical view, charismatic culture displaced a culture 
of ‘earth magic,’ driven by societal self-deification (ancient Egypt is his example). What 
follows and is now displacing charismatic culture, in turn, is a modern 
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transgressive/therapeutic culture that attempts to produce an individual who can 
experience remission without guilt. Both the culture of ‘earth magic’ and the culture of 
transgression and therapy tend to undo our capacity to recognize our own (moral) limits.
Durkheim understands the sacred in terms of society’s collective self-
representation and self-valorization, and views collective effervescence as the periodic 
appearance and self-presentation of the shared emotions necessary to keep society going. 
This does not satisfy Rieff. The independence of the sacred from the social is not merely 
a matter of the technical difficulty of representing a large collectivity to itself. As Hunter 
suggests, Rieff divides the sacred from the social and conceives of culture as the means 
by which the sacred is ‘transliterated’ into the social:
Occupying the space between the sacred and the social, then, culture 
provides the texts, literal and otherwise, by which those transliterations are 
interpreted, understood, and made real to people. In experience, culture 
exists as the habitus within which human beings come to understand 
themselves. (Hunter 2006:xix)
The sacred is not merely society’s self-worship by means of collective self-
representation, and the gap between the social and the sacred is not merely a consequence 
of the invisibility of the social, the impossibility of a direct presentation of the social to 
itself and the consequent necessity of a symbolic representation. On the contrary, social 
orders are the “visible modalities,” Rieff argues, of “otherwise invisible sacred orders” 
(2006:2). In other words, the social order is a kind of effect of the sacred order, 
irreducible to societal “self-worship” except where the social order has become a 
transgressive order, an order in the midst of dismantling its own inner principles.
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A sacred or credal order inaugurates the individual formation of inwardness, not 
the mere acceptance and internalization of traditional mores, or conformity to the 
ascendant social order. Thus, for Rieff, in contrast to Durkheim, individuality (as 
inwardness) is not the late product of differentiation and organic solidarity, but is coeval 
with the sacred, emerging in fear and trembling as the discovery of one’s capacities for 
good and for evil (2007:21). Rieff’s concept of the sacred exceeds Durkheim’s notion of 
morality as a social fact that exists outside and over against the individual. Charismatic 
institutionalization involves both recognition and renunciation of instinct, an instituted 
consciousness of and resistance to the ‘death drive.’ This differs from the depersonalized 
fusion of Durkheim’s collective effervescence, which may with equal ease result in 
“actions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism” (Durkheim 1965:241).
F. BY THE GRACE OF THOSE WHO FOLLOW: THE POSSIBILITY OF 
DEMOCRATIC CHARISMA
Rieff did much to re-work charisma as a sociological concept, refusing to treat it as the 
sociologically inexplicable appearance of extraordinary individuality within the social, a 
matter of the relationship between leaders and followers, but he remained, like Weber, 
mistrustful of ‘the people,’ most obviously in his sweeping rejection of student activism 
in the 1960s. He placed ‘charismatic perception’ against ‘public opinion,’ which he saw 
as a form of outwardness without a corresponding inwardness. Charismatic perception, 
he argued, was available to everyone in charismatic culture. Culture depended “upon the 
charisma of which all of us, in our ordinariness, are capable” (2007:223).
Taking Rieff’s hyper-pessimism about ‘therapeutic society’ with a grain of salt, it 
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is still possible to extract from his general model of charisma a conception of democratic 
charisma, a charisma that would depend upon the everyday miracle of inwardness, not 
the self-sufficiency of a formally autonomous subject, but the inwardly (and outwardly) 
answerable actor, institutionalized as awareness of and resistance to ‘murderous’ urges, 
the recognition of the ambiguity of the daimonic, the possibility that the inspiration one 
obeys may also be the temptation one resists, with help. Such a democratic miracle would 
oppose the transgressive magic of collective violence. The literature exhibits very little 
support for a democratic conception of charisma, however. It is well-known that Weber 
viewed the relationship between democracy and charisma as one of tension bordering on 
straightforward opposition. Against his fundamentally authoritarian principle of 
charismatic legitimacy, Weber posed democracy as an ‘anti-authoritarian interpretation.’ 
But he argued that this anti-authoritarian attitude is coeval with (and by implication 
subordinate to) the emergence of bureaucratic authority. That is, he equated the transition 
from followers’ formally passive ‘recognition’ of the leader (i.e., in both traditional and 
charismatic forms of authority) to their formally active ‘election’ of the leader with the 
transition to bureaucratic authority. Weber suggests that “The Transformation of 
Charisma in a Democratic Direction”75 is just one of the stages—the most important 
transitional type being “plebiscitary leadership” (1978:267)—“which normally leads into 
the path of rationality” (269); thus the appearance of democratic tendencies signals the 
end of ‘genuine charisma’ and the beginning of ‘rational-legal’ bureaucratic authority.
75  This is a section heading applied to Economy and Society by the English translators. It is rendered more 
literally as “The Anti-Authoritarian Reinterpretation of Charisma” (1978:266; 301n.13).
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Rieff’s reading of charisma makes much of Weber’s interpretation appear 
unnecessary. However, since Weber refuses to countenance the possibility that ‘primary’ 
charisma is a collective rather than an individual power, or that it is ultimately 
interdictory rather than transgressive, he sees participatory democracy as a retrograde 
retreat from the high peaks reached by inspired leadership. Stephen Turner follows Weber 
in this direction when he describes charisma as something that becomes “audience 
relative” (1993:251). Turner’s implicit acceptance of the capitalistic operating frame 
vitiates his own claims about the transformative capacities of the wielders of charisma. 
This also makes Turner a rather misleading resource in attempts to link charisma to 
democracy. I have been arguing, with the critique of the leader-follower fixation and of 
amoral/anti-structure conceptions of charisma, that the ‘need in thinking’ about charisma 
is less a matter of making it ‘scientifically testable’ and more a matter of thinking through 
its possible relationship to democracy, especially as one examines particular kinds of 
political practice. Linking charisma to the demos moves it in a sociological direction, as a 
thing that both comes from and returns to the social world (as the gift that we give 
ourselves, the moral debt that we must hope, collectively, to inherit). Weber’s ‘value-
neutral’ approach (1978:241–242) reduces it to an individual form of authority which 
finds legitimacy in manifestations of power. In Weber’s view, for charisma to become 
democratic its original character must be reversed (and thereby lost):
The basically authoritarian principle of charismatic legitimation may be 
subject to an anti-authoritarian interpretation, for the validity of 
charismatic authority rests entirely on recognition by the ruled, on ‘proof’ 
before their eyes...The personally legitimated charismatic leader becomes 
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leader by the grace of those who follow him since the latter are formally 
free to elect and even to depose him. (1978:266–267)
Following Rieff, however, it seems possible that democratic rule “by the grace of those 
who follow” may be the origin and the fulfilment of charisma rather than its inversion, its 
arrival in substance rather than its sedimentation into form. On the other hand, it may turn 
out to be one of those residual categories that keeps the fulfilment of the sociology of 
morality just out of reach. On this note, the dialectic of moral forms and substances, the 
next chapter turns to a related example, the recent situation and character debate, to ask 
whether there are any traits that are not relationally and/or situationally generated.
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CHAPTER 5: CHARACTER, SITUATION, & MID-20TH CENTURY SOCIAL 
THEORY: AN ARGUMENT FOR WEAK CHARACTER & TRANSFORMED 
SITUATIONS
And suddenly, in view of these reflections, Ulrich had to smile and admit to himself that 
he was, after all, a character, even without having one. (Musil 1997:159)
A. SITUATION VS. CHARACTER: AN ONGOING DEBATE
What does it mean to possess personal qualities like charisma? There is an ongoing 
debate in contemporary moral philosophy about whether character traits exist. On the 
skeptical side, situationists argue against the existence of character traits. Thus Gilbert 
Harman (1999; 2009) argues that in everyday life we are commonly guilty of what, 
following Ross and Nisbett (1991), he calls the ‘fundamental attribution error,’ which 
entails mistakenly explaining someone’s actions in terms of their character rather than by 
means of the situation in which their action arose. Similarly, in Lack of Character (2002), 
John Doris argues that while there might be something that could be called ‘local traits,’ 
in the sense of consistently patterned behaviour tied to specific contexts, the evidence for 
‘global traits’ is thin, and there are good reasons why ‘local traits’ should be thought of as 
behavioural regularities but not as traits of character.
The emphasis on situational variations in behaviour is supported with evidence 
from social psychological research, including Kurt Lewin’s work (Lewin, Lippitt, and 
White 1939; Lewin 1939, 1943, 1965; cf. Glenn 2006), Solomon Asch’s pioneering 
studies of opinions and social pressure (1952), Stanley Milgram’s obedience experiments 
(1963; 1974), Philip Zimbardo’s prison experiment at Stanford (2007), and a variety of 
more recent experimental studies. Situationists argue that this research undermines the 
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idea that people actually possess character traits in the sense of durable personal 
dispositions that persist over time and that manifest themselves consistently across a 
broad or ‘global’ range of contexts.
When Milgram finds that most people will follow the orders of a man in a white 
coat and administer what they think to be painful and often suspect to be dangerous or 
life-threatening electric shocks to a stranger, or when experimental subjects that have 
been randomly assigned identities as either prisoner or guard quickly begin to exhibit a 
variety of sadistic or masochistic behaviours, situationists argue that the situation, not the 
character of the individual, needs to be examined (Upton 2009a:104). Change the 
situation, they contend, and you will change the behaviour.
Defenders of character traits, by contrast, tend to be virtue ethicists (e.g., 
Athanassoulis 2000; Foot 2001; Hursthouse 1999; Kamtekar 2004; Upton 2009a, 2009b). 
If situationism emerges from the psychological side of mid-century social psychology, 
virtue ethics emerges from mid-century moral philosophy, especially the Anglo revival of 
Aristotelian philosophy initiated by G.E.M. Anscombe (1981 [1958]:26–42) and others. 
Drawing on Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics, virtue ethicists argue 
that character, once properly defined and understood, plays a significant role, alongside 
situation, in structuring and guiding human behaviour. While they concede some ground 
in the face of empirical social science, they persist in arguing for the importance of the 
concept of character for thinking about morality. Thus Candace Upton follows Doris in 
suggesting that while ‘global’ character traits may be in scarce supply—and this merely 
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confirms Aristotle’s suggestion that true virtue is rare—empirical evidence suggests that 
“human behavior is highly intra-locally consistent” (Upton 2009b:187). Upton argues, 
against Doris—who admits to local traits, but does not want to call them ‘character’ traits
—that retaining the concept of character is important because of the moral element 
inherent in all trait attribution. As she puts it, “all relevant and plausible attempts morally 
to appraise ultimately trace back to trait attribution” (185–186). In other words, even if 
we make many mistakes when attributing certain character traits to others (or to 
ourselves), we necessarily make character attributions of some kind whenever we try to 
make moral evaluations of action; so rather than simply turning all of our attention to 
situation-analysis, we should also fine-tune our notions concerning character traits.
While this debate draws on social science research, it is generally carried on as a 
philosophical dispute. Situationists typically carry out their arguments within the either/or 
parameters of ‘p’ or ‘not p,’ producing a discourse that is part analytic philosophy and 
part positivist empiricism. Either character or situation must be the explanation for 
consistencies in behaviour. It cannot be both. Philosophy’s job is to clarify common sense 
attributions, and to clear up the mistaken beliefs about character upon which they are 
based, mistaken beliefs that contribute, in a circular fashion, to the misleading 
confirmation of those beliefs. According to Harman, “ordinary thinking about character 
traits has deplorable results, leading to massive misunderstanding of other people, 
promoting unnecessary hostility between individuals and groups, distorting discussions of 
law and public policy, and preventing the implementation of situational changes that 
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could have useful results” (1999:330).
The situation or character debate suffers from two main shortcomings. On the one 
hand, when situationists draw on social psychology, they draw almost exclusively on the 
psychological branch, ignoring the psychoanalytic and sociological branches, thus 
perpetuating an unhealthy division already well-diagnosed in the 1970s (House 1977). 
This psychological focus allows situationists to work at the level of the individual while 
giving the misleading impression that their explanation (i.e., ‘situation’) is social; it is 
also the basis for approaching character and situation as competing rather than potentially 
complementary notions. In addition, while virtue ethicists tend to be more alive to the 
possibility that situation and character might be complementary, the either/or structure of 
the debate contributes on both sides to a narrowly moral and non-sociological 
understanding of character, involving often fairly arbitrary distinctions between character 
and various ‘non-moral’ conceptions of ‘personality’ (cf. White 2005; Hunt and White 
2000). This attempt to add precision to the parameters of the discussion simply puts 
blinders on it, and the failure to preserve the rich polysemy of common usage (of the 
concept of character) or the breadth of the social science tradition produces artificial 
logical problems rather than scientific accuracy.
This chapter argues, first, that character and situation can be seen as complementary 
rather than competing sociological frames (cf. Appiah 2008:33–72). Secondly, the term 
character should be understood and developed within the full variety of its everyday uses 
rather than reduced to a narrowly technical application. Finally, against (but by means of) 
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everyday usage, I point the paradox that in certain contexts we morally approve of ‘weak 
character,’ understood in the context of acts and practices that constitute emancipatory 
character reversals. Exemplary, in this regard, are acts of apology and forgiveness.
So what about this polysemy? Dictionaries tell us that character derives from a 
Greek word meaning ‘stamping-tool,’ and bears the general sense of ‘marking,’ or of 
being ‘marked.’ Taken as a moral element, character may be something one has or does 
not have, or that one has a lot of. Thus we can say that someone has ‘a lot’ of character or 
that they ‘lack’ character, or we talk about ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ character. Or we talk, still in 
a moral sense, but now more qualitatively than quantitatively, of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
characters, of virtues and vices; we may call someone ‘generous’ or ‘greedy,’ and both are 
attributions of character. On the other hand, character can be taken, in a non-moral sense, 
as what marks one’s peculiarity. We refer to the local eccentric as ‘a real character.’
For sociological purposes, it is important to be able to refer to either individual 
character or social character. But the collective usage of the concept of character tends to 
be left out of the character/situation debate. This corresponds to moral philosophy’s 
tendency to operate at the level of the individual. The psychoanalytic use of the term 
character tends to be left out, too. Psychoanalysis and psychiatry took character in the 
direction of a new set of typological classifications, whether those of ‘anal,’ ‘oral,’ and so 
on, or those detailed in the various editions of the DSM, offering us an ostensibly non-
moral use of the term character, sometimes interchangeable with ‘personality.’
We will turn first to the last two uses of character (social character and 
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psychoanalytic character) used together by Erich Fromm. We turn from Fromm to 
Hannah Arendt’s approach to social phenomena, then to Erving Goffman’s performative 
understanding of character, then conclude with suggestions that link a concept of ‘weak 
character’ with situation via a concept of ‘practice.’ The chapter derives from the 
conviction that the debate in moral philosophy could benefit from a deeper engagement 
with both the social science tradition and with everyday language. Both situationists and 
virtue ethicists have tended to misunderstand or underestimate the insights available to 
them from this broader tradition. What follows is an attempt to demonstrate a few of the 
possible additions to the discussion that can be drawn from a very rich period of 
twentieth century social theory, from work done during the Second World War and in the 
two or three decades that followed it.
B. CHARACTER, SOCIAL THEORY, & THE HOLOCAUST
Many sociological discussions and debates from the mid-twentieth century focused on 
questions of character and personality. Importantly, they were debates about character 
carried out after Nazism, after Stalinism, and ‘after Auschwitz.’ These debates provide 1) 
an historical (and biographical) perspective lacking in the contemporary philosophical 
debate—which tends to rely on the one-time only snapshots provided by individual 
psychology-focused social psychological experimentation—and 2) a variety of models of 
the social and of the relationship between the individual and society.
With respect to models of the social there are, on the one hand, models of character 
constructed through syntheses of Freud and Marx. On the other hand we find interesting 
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versions of situationism, including Hannah Arendt’s political conception of totalitarian 
domination and Erving Goffman’s dramaturgy. The former are constituted by combining 
Marxist political economy with a form of depth psychology, and involve a variety of 
material dialectical or quasi-dialectical patterns applied to the person’s relation to self and 
the relation between individual and society. Examples of this type of approach include 
Eric Fromm’s Escape from Freedom (1941), Adorno et al.’s The Authoritarian 
Personality (1950), David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (2000 [1951]) and Character 
and Social Structure (1953) by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Arendt and Goffman, by 
contrast, eschew depth psychology, preferring to focus on the peculiarities of particular 
(and historical) social forms and associated practices, as, for example, in Arendt’s 
analysis of modern revolution, participatory democracy, and totalitarianism (1968), or in 
Goffman’s study of practices of impression management in modern commercial society 
(1959). Other approaches from that period include Shibutani’s interactionist model 
(1961), and Parsons’ attempted synthesis of psychoanalysis and systems theory (1964). 
This paper focuses on a peculiar version of the situation/character debate that appears 
when reading Arendt’s concept of totalitarianism alongside what members of the 
Frankfurt School called the ‘authoritarian personality.’ Although the debate carried out in 
this earlier context does not provide a simple solution to the current debate, it enriches the 
discussion of both character and situation with its historical scope, its dialectical 
elements, and the diversity of its conceptual insights.
Mid-twentieth-century social science, (as well as social and political thought 
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viewed more broadly) makes for both fascinating and frustrating reading. Among other 
things, rapid expansion and professionalization (in both its bureaucratizing and its 
scientizing movements) coincided with the appearance of some fundamental conceptual 
problems. Attempted syntheses, the Parsonsian, for instance, rose and fell, introducing 
divisions (or differentiations) that have, for the most part, continued to expand. The 
balkanization of social psychology (between sociological and psychological approaches) 
exemplifies this process. Rapid development of technical procedures and capacities for 
dealing with large data sets and populations did nothing to solve these conceptual 
problems, and it is, in fact, fundamentally implicated in them.
One of the major conceptual problems encountered in the mid-century was what 
could be called, in contrast to the Hobbesian ‘problem of order,’ the ‘problem of over-
conformity.’ While assessments of the value of conformity had been declining for some 
time, partly in response to Nietzsche’s work of the 1880s, which named and described the 
‘last men’ of modern mass society, this tendency developed into a full-blown crisis of 
faith for the social sciences through the experiences of the two World Wars. This crisis 
involved the problem of a particularly destructive fusion between society and the 
individual, the whole and the part. The European experiences of Fascism and Stalinism 
inverted the classical ‘problem of order,’ rendering it the problem of over-socialization 
(and how to avoid it), over-conformity, and excessive obedience to authority.
Current exponents of situationism are alive to the problem of conformity, but they 
tend to miss the ways in which total (and ‘totalitarian’) situations can be read as questions 
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of ‘social character.’ Most importantly, a ‘total situation’ involves a peculiar reciprocal 
relationship of the whole and the part, society and individual, social character and 
individual character that is distinct from the problem of the situation as it is usually 
framed (even when situation is defined as the ‘cultural equilibrium’). However, it 
constitutes one possible ‘working through’ of the logic of situational determination.
Before the theories (and realities) of 20th century ‘totalitarian’ phenomena, 
sociology commonly managed the tense relation of whole and part with a conceptual 
distinction like that between ‘social control’ and ‘the crowd.’ While ‘social control,’ 
mobilized by Edward Ross in his 1901 (2009) study of the same name, was theorized as a 
principle of purposeful order, sometimes a kind of ‘invisible hand,’ sometimes the work 
of an intellectual and ethical elite, ‘the crowd,’ classically theorized by Gustave Le Bon 
in 1895 (1960), is a kind of unruly part of the whole, understood primarily as an irrational 
force only indirectly amenable to social control. Social control was read as the rational 
response—even if not in the form of an explicit social contract (cf. Durkheim 1984:149–
175)—or force of the social in response to its irrational counterpart.
Auschwitz bankrupted the distinction between ‘control’ and ‘crowd’; after the 
Holocaust, political and social thinkers faced the apparent fusion of the supposed 
rationality or purposefulness of social control with the supposed irrationality or 
purposeless and destructive energy of the crowd, into an insatiably imperialistic and 
internally genocidal political form. The following section addresses two ways that social 
thought during and after the Second World War attempted to address this ‘attack of the 
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blob’—Pitkin’s (1998) highly analytic summary term for Hannah Arendt’s assessment—
and to use, or to defer, the concept of character.
Erich Fromm (1900–1980) and Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) were both born and 
educated in Germany and were both forced out of Germany after Hitler’s rise to power. 
Fromm arrived in the United States in 1934, along with other members of the Frankfurt 
Institute for Social Research. Arendt arrived in New York in 1941. As Jewish thinkers 1) 
educated in a German scholastic and cultural tradition; then 2) expelled for their 
Jewishness; then 3) working in an unfamiliar, unprecedented, and ‘uncultured’ form of 
society, Arendt and Fromm had to come to terms with the impulses of their respective 
intellectual formations under conditions of deep ambivalence. An interesting version of 
the tension between character and situation plays out in their different responses to these 
experiences. Erich Fromm’s mid-war classic, Escape from Freedom (1941), developed a 
socio-psychological explanation of the rise of fascism. A decade later, Hannah Arendt 
countered with her socio-political concept of totalitarianism. 
While Fromm and Arendt agree on the importance of modern Western economic 
developments, industrialization in particular, they match their attention to economy with 
very different partners. Fromm partners a Marxian sensitivity to alienated labour and 
class position with existentialist humanist psychoanalysis. Arendt combines attention to 
economic structure with analysis of the peculiarities of political form. Their arguments 
overlap, interlock, and complement, but bear within them opposed views on character.
Fromm’s 1941 Escape from Freedom tries to explain the rise of Nazism and to warn 
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about similar trends in other places, especially the United States. It is driven by the 
premise that not only individual but also collective or social character traits exist, and that 
“The concept of social character is a key concept for the understanding of the social 
process” (1941:278). Fromm takes his notion of character from Freud. As such, it is not 
to be understood in the sense of “the sum total of behavior patterns” that a single person 
displays, but in reference to “the dominant drives that motivate behavior” (163). Fromm 
diverges from Freud on two main points. First, he identifies different fundamental human 
drives: ‘love’ and ‘work.’ Freud also mentions love and work, but, in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle (1967 [1920]), these appear as sublimations of the cruder and less 
social underlying drives of eros and thanatos. Fromm rejected the idea that thanatos, the 
‘destructive’ ‘death drive,’ was fundamental. For Fromm, love and work are not 
sublimations, they are the underlying drives. We are driven to connect with others, and to 
engage in creative activity. Secondly, Fromm tries to synthesize Marx and Freud by 
viewing character structure at the level of the social, especially at the political-economic 
level of class, and places less importance on individual psychological experiences.76 
Members of a class have a characteristic set of experiences, and their average character 
structure forms around that set of experiences.
According to Fromm, we are forced to dynamically adapt our basic drives—to 
connect with others and to express ourselves creatively—as we collide with social reality. 
We form our character structure through this process: “human energy is shaped by the 
76  Fromm’s concept of character prefigures Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and his psychoanalytic 
sociology bears considerable resemblance to Bourdieu’s ‘socio-analysis.’
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dynamic adaptation of human needs to the particular mode of existence of a given 
society. Character in its turn determines the thinking, feeling, and acting of individuals” 
(Fromm 1941:278). Individuals may not even be conscious of this deep and underlying 
structure. What is more, “He may not even commit any overt...acts...Nevertheless, any 
close analysis of his behavior, his phantasies, dreams, and gestures, would show 
the...impulses operating in deeper layers of his personality” (163). Character, in this 
model, refers to a kind of underlying potential. The Authoritarian Personality, the 
American-focused study partially based upon Fromm’s approach, puts it this way: 
“personality is mainly a potential; it is a readiness for behavior rather than the behavior 
itself” (Adorno et al. 1950:7). In Escape From Freedom, Fromm is interested in a kind of 
sado-masochistic or authoritarian character that he believes to have been prevalent in pre-
Hitlerian Germany, making it ‘ready’ for Fascism.
Fromm combined Freud’s theories of the dynamics of character with a Marx-
inspired sensitivity to class divisions, trying to identify the characteristic opportunities 
and frustrations experienced by particular sectors of the population, and arguing that the 
lower middle classes of Europe have a higher drive to destructiveness “proportionate to 
the amount to which expansiveness of life is curtailed” (1941:183); he claimed that “The 
root of destructiveness in the lower middle class is easily recognizable as the one which 
has been assumed in this discussion: the isolation of the individual and the suppression of 
individual expansiveness” (184–185).
Fromm’s basic thesis combines sensitivity to relations of production with a 
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psychoanalytic perspective: “The automatization of the individual in modern society has 
increased the helplessness and insecurity of the average individual. Thus, he is ready to 
submit to new authorities which offer him security and relief from doubt” (206). With 
regard to the phenomenon of Nazism, Fromm attempts a dialectical analysis, arguing, 
against one-sided political or psychological explanations, that “Nazism is a psychological 
problem, but the psychological factors themselves have to be understood as being molded 
by socio-economic factors; Nazism is a political problem, but the hold it has over a whole 
people has to be understood on psychological grounds” (208).
On Fromm’s reading, the sado-masochistic character of the German working-class 
and lower-middle class remained dormant until the economic, social, and political turmoil 
that followed the First World War. Although most of the labour movement voted for the 
Socialist or Communist parties before Hitler’s rise to power, the socialist emphasis on 
autonomy and solidarity was, according to Fromm, “not what many of these workers 
really wanted on the basis of their personality structure” (281). According to Fromm, 
their authoritarian character structure meant that they really wanted an established 
authority, a strong leader. Their underlying character structure explains why they turned 
so quickly to Hitler. Here, with one move, Fromm sweeps away the interpretation of 
social psychology research that grounds much of the previously mentioned moral 
philosophy debate. In Fromm’s view, which focuses on underlying drives rather than the 
sum of behaviours, Milgram’s and Zimbardo’s experiments confirm an underlying 
authoritarian character structure waiting to manifest itself when given the opportunity.
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This different interpretation is based upon the two distinctions already mentioned 
between the psychological-individualism that philosophical situationism relies upon and 
the more broadly sociological approach dealt with here. Fromm’s psycho-sociological 
approach is 1) based upon an analysis of character at the level of the society, including its 
history and its class structure, and 2) upon a notion of character as an underlying deep 
structuring of natural human drives; it is on the one hand an ostensibly neutral, non-moral 
concept of character (but in fact merely raises the moral evaluation to the level of the 
social), and on the other hand it incorporates the notion that character can have a divided 
or conflictual structure, rather than needing to be unified, and non-contradictory, as is 
usually argued in the case of character defined as an individual’s possession of various 
virtues. Having a particular psychological character structure does not mean having 
particular moral virtues, it means the outcome of dynamic adaptation to circumstances, to 
the sum-total of one’s situations and experiences. In this particular context (i.e., Germany 
after World War I), having character turns out to be a problem.
The problem of the authoritarian personality, of course, is the tendency for this 
character structure to give rise to fascist regimes. The major American study based upon 
Fromm’s work, The Authoritarian Personality (1950), a project led by Theodor Adorno 
as part of a larger project headed by Max Horkheimer—both fellow members, with 
Fromm, of the displaced Institute for Social Research, the ‘Frankfurt School’—attempted 
to assess and analyze underlying attitudes. Surveys were carried out through in-depth 
interviews in order to indirectly get at levels of prejudice among Americans, levels of 
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Anti-Semitism, in particular. They measured these levels using something called the f 
[fascism]-scale, and analyzed subjects as being high or low, authoritarian or liberal, on 
the f-scale. The point was to get a sense of American society’s susceptibility to an 
authoritarian political structure and also to publicize and to warn against this possibility. 77
Fromm advocated, along with others from that period, like David Riesman, for a 
kind of ideal and autonomous character structure where the underlying drives to love and 
work find their outlet in a world that does not generate structural or situational 
frustrations, and that offers opportunities for individual self-expression and exploration 
instead. His solution to the authoritarian personality problem is not articulated in specific 
and practical suggestions, but its over-all tenor is situationist, and it problematizes the 
notion of character and situation as an either/or scenario. 
Theodor Adorno goes further. For him, following Benjamin (1978), the very notion 
of personality or character, even of identity itself, reflects conditions of social 
domination, and smells of fatalism. It is not that he agrees with the situationists, who 
argue that character does not exist. Character exists, but in ambivalent and distorted form, 
as a result of relations of domination. In Negative Dialectics Adorno puts it this way:
But what has been objectified in men, from their reflexes and against their 
reflexes—their character or their will, the potential organ of their freedom
—this undermines freedom too. For it embodies the principle of dominion, 
to which men progressively submit...Identity, the condition of freedom, is 
immediately and simultaneously the principle of determinism. There is a 
77  Critiques of this line of research (e.g., Martin 2001) tend to call it circular and self-confirming, more 
activist tract than searching social science research. This critique, applicable to Adorno et al. as well as to 
more recent studies (e.g., Altemeyer 1981; Lakoff 2002), is strong, but does not detract from the 
importance of this set of arguments for thinking about character and for deflecting the positivist-empiricist 
approach (whether for or against character-realism) in favour of an interpretive-empiricism.
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will insofar as a man objectified himself into a character. Toward himself
—whatever that may be—he thus becomes something external, after the 
model of the outward world of things that is subjected to causality. 
(1973:216–217)
Adorno spells out the ambiguity of character’s relation to freedom, a freedom mediated 
by relations of domination in which we experience our character as fate. An end to such 
relations of domination might signal, in a certain sense, the end of character as fate. 
Would it mean the end of character? For the moment, let us turn to Hannah Arendt’s 
attempt to articulate a political rather than a psychological explanation of Fascism.
Hannah Arendt offers a concerted effort to think a non-psychological explanation 
for Nazism. Like Fromm, Arendt argues that Germans between the wars experienced 
unprecedented isolation and loneliness. Among other things, industrialization uprooted 
workers and eliminated many kinds of skilled work. But while Fromm argues that the 
division into classes produced a certain character structure in certain classes, Arendt 
argues that capitalist development had gone beyond Marx’s notion of class polarization 
and had done away with class altogether, leaving an utterly atomized mass of individuals. 
This atomized mass was vulnerable to totalitarian rule not because of their particular 
character structure but because of their objective position, their situation, or, better, their 
lack of a situation, their lack of a world: lacking a class position, they lacked the 
possibility of solidarity with others, of membership in a group that offered possibilities 
for acting together: “modern masses are disintegrated by the fact that they are ‘masses’ in 
a strict sense of the word....they do not have common interests to bind them together nor 
any kind of common ‘consent’” (1953a:81). Totalitarianism, then, does not arise as an 
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‘escape from freedom,’ but as a political system that rushes into a vacuum from which 
freedom was already gone. To make sense of that claim, we need to discuss Fromm and 
Arendt’s different conceptions of human sociality and human freedom.
In a 1953 article on social science technique, Arendt claimed that “sociology from 
its beginnings showed a marked tendency to explain political institutions and historical 
developments in terms of psychological types” (1953b:304). In Arendt’s view, 
psychology has ‘invaded’ the social sciences. In any case, both sociology and psychology, 
Arendt claims, “have their origin in a liberalism that viewed politics...under the dual 
category of society and individual. Men became mere parts of a society that conditioned 
or determined the individuals, as the whole determines its parts” (304). Arendt does not 
buy this view, indeed, she generally viewed dialectical moves of this sort with suspicion.
For Arendt, explaining fascism requires something other than a socio-psychology of 
character structure. Fascism needs to be explained at the political level, as a novel 
political form. She called this new political form totalitarianism. Totalitarian rule, Arendt 
suggests, completes the elimination of the space between people where political action 
can appear. That space is the world created by work. For Arendt, the political is not an 
abstract macro-dialectic between the individual and society. It is something that happens 
between people in concrete situations. Among other developments, the transformation of 
all forms of activity into labour—partly a matter of de-skilling and partly a matter of the 
increasing impermanence of material products, which are immediately consumed or 
taken up again in the re-production process—meant the disappearance of the world where 
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this could happen. Industrialization increasingly takes everything up into a production 
process without any longer creating a stable world or situation in which relationships 
between people can take the form of political action. This view undergirds her skepticism 
about Marxism, discussed briefly at the end of chapter two.
According to Erich Fromm, modern society is a society of individuals, freed from 
all kinds of traditional coercive relationships. For Fromm, freedom looks like this: “When 
one has become an individual, one stands alone and faces the world in all its perilous and 
over-powering aspects” (1941:29). In this moment of freedom, the solitary individual 
faces the prospect of personal responsibility for herself, of refusing the comfort of being 
absorbed into the collective. The problem, according to Fromm, is that although modern 
life has removed the external constraints on individual freedom, the internal constraints, 
the typical psychological character structures, remain. Afraid of their freedom, Germans 
were desperate for an external authority that could quiet their internal anxiety.
For Arendt, as we shall see in a moment, the problem of totalitarianism is not inner 
fear but external terror. Against Fromm’s atomistic notion of freedom conceived of as 
‘free will,’ that is, the paradoxical notion of having a will that is stronger than oneself, a 
paradox that Durkheim tried to solve with the notion of ‘social forces’ (and the relation 
between ‘social forces’ and Arendt’s notion of sociality should be elaborated), Arendt 
conceives of freedom as the freedom to begin something. Arendt offers a model of 
sociality as companionship, and of freedom as acting together, on the basis of a principle 
(rather than an internal psychological motive or drive) and in a way that brings something 
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new into the world. This is the unique (political) capacity that humans possess. In other 
words, freedom is not an inner quality or possession of a solitary individual, or something 
inherent or lacking in their character; it is an outer thing. It has to happen out there, in the 
world, between people, when we engage in action.
According to Arendt each political form has a different kind of between, a different 
res publica or ‘public thing,’ and a different basic experience that arises there. So the real 
question with regard to fascism is not how it matches with a particular psychological 
character structure, but whether or not it is a new form of political organization. Perhaps, 
Arendt suggests, totalitarian government is just another version of tyranny, or ruling by 
fear. But that seems not to be the case. There is another option. Perhaps totalitarianism is 
a political form beyond all previous political forms: “we could also say that it has 
exploded the very alternative on which all definitions of the essence of governments have 
been based...the alternative between lawful and lawless...” (1953b:306). Totalitarian 
government is still based upon law, but no longer positive law. Rather, it is based upon 
laws of History and Nature, laws of historical movement. Through the theories of Marx 
and Darwin, law changed its meaning: “from expressing the framework of stability 
within which human actions and motions can take place, it became the expression of the 
motion itself” (310). ‘Total terror’ (310) is required to translate such a notion of law as 
the movement of History or Nature into a political reality. As a political form somewhere 
between the lawfulness of non-tyrannical government and the lawlessness of tyrannical 
government, totalitarian domination rules through terror, the secret police, the predictably 
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unpredictable invasion of private spheres. This is done ostensibly to root out covert 
opposition, but is in fact carried out in the absence of real opposition. In this context, 
“Guilt and innocence become senseless notions” (310). Totalitarian domination destroys 
the space between people, who can no longer act together because they can no longer 
trust each other. Totalitarianism is the formless political form that does away with the 
political; it is truly the ‘attack of the blob’ (Pitkin 1998)
So what about character? Arendt speculates about character with remarkable 
reluctance. Character, like the truth of another's heart, can never be known for sure 
(1968:128). Tacitly rebuking the Frankfurt School theorists of the ‘authoritarian 
personality,’ Arendt claims that “we do not know the extent of character transformation 
under a totalitarian regime” (135). We can observe the operation and function of the 
totalitarian secret police, and understand the operation of the secret as a political 
technique within the shapeless totalitarian political form, but we cannot measure how this 
fits with “the secret desires and the secret complicities of the masses in our time” (135). 
As for the ‘authoritarian personality,’ Arendt rejected its relevance to either the Soviet or 
the Nazi situation. While authority involves restrictions and limits on freedom, 
totalitarian domination seeks to do away with freedom entirely. In this context, relations 
of authority, which entail some freedom in the fact that they need to be at least minimally 
legitimated, no longer make sense. What one has instead is sheer domination.
The ‘planned shapelessness’ (100) of the totalitarian form is based upon a 
confusion of lines of authority by means of the multiplication of offices. As a result, 
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instead of a hierarchical chain of command, totalitarian domination “leads to a state of 
affairs in which every citizen feels himself directly confronted with the will of the 
Leader” (103). This is precisely the goal of totalitarian domination, “to organize the 
infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all of humanity were just one 
individual” (136). Among other things, Arendt implies that viewing the social as a 
dialectic of individual and society, of part and whole (i.e., Fromm’s logic) is the logic of 
totalitarianism. In 1950, Arendt argued that
Social scientists, being normal men, will have great difficulties to 
understand...that [under totalitarian domination] behavior patterns and 
motives that usually are identified, not with the psychology of some 
specific nation or class as some specific moment of its history, but with 
human psychology in general, are abolished or play a quite secondary role. 
(1950:61)
Totalitarianism does away with psychology as such, as a human thing. Character becomes 
irrelevant.78 Against the sado-masochism of the authoritarian/automaton model, Arendt 
suggests, with regard to the camps, that “the distinguishing line between persecutor and 
persecuted, between the murderer and his victim, is constantly blurred” (151). A sado-
masochistic character structure, and the depth psychology upon which it is based, is 
simply unnecessary. Arendt’s ‘character study’ of Eichmann, which elaborated her 
‘banality of evil’ thesis, suggested that, rather than possessing any sadistic tendencies, 
Eichmann lacked any real character, just as he lacked the very capacity to think (1963).
Some dissatisfaction may linger, concerning Arendt’s claims. After all, doesn’t her 
explanation, like Fromm’s, rest on a set of assumptions about the basic psychological 
78  See chapter one on Marx and character.
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experiences of Germans, especially what she refers to as the experience of unbearable 
loneliness? Arendt argues that isolation becomes unbearable loneliness when “all human 
activities have been transformed into laboring” (1953b:323). This transformation of all 
activities into labour has presumably been developing since before the Industrial 
Revolution. Both Fromm and Arendt recognize the importance of industrialization and 
the increasing division of labour, but while Fromm emphasizes the appearance of the 
individual, Arendt emphasizes the disappearance of the world created by work.
Both Fromm and Arendt see humans as fundamentally social, requiring intercourse 
with each other. They differ, however, on the meaning and valuation of individuality. For 
Arendt, freedom is between people, and in the possibility of beginning something. 
Personhood appears in this between. For Fromm, freedom is utter individual (existential) 
self-determination. From Arendt’s viewpoint, Fromm misses the heart of sociality since 
he accepts the modern understanding of the ‘problem’ of freedom, a problem which arose
when freedom was no longer experienced in acting and in associating with 
others but in willing and in the intercourse with one’s self, when, briefly, 
freedom had become free will...from action to will-power, from freedom 
as a state of being manifest in action to the liberum arbitrium, the ideal of 
freedom ceased to be virtuosity...and became sovereignty. (Arendt 
2000:454)
While Fromm considers creative action to be one of the fundamental human drives, he 
does not emphasize, as Arendt does, that this creative work, which may often be carried 
out alone, is the (world-creating) condition rather than the consummation of freedom 
(conceived by Arendt as acting together). According to Arendt, loneliness, the lack of 
companionship, leaves us with logic alone, an ability to reason from premises but not to 
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have ‘experiences’ or even to think. Instead of having recourse to a psychological 
explanation involving a distorted and sado-masochistic self-relation, Arendt’s actor 
simply lacks the capacity to think or judge. In the realm of totalitarian domination, a kind 
of strange and inhuman logicalness develops that is incapable of incorporating human 
experience or practical judgement. In this realm, where no one can trust anyone else,
ice-cold reasoning and the ‘mighty tentacle’ of dialectics...appears like a 
last support in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied 
upon. It is the inner coercion whose only content is the strict avoidance of 
contradictions that seems to confirm a man’s identity outside all 
relationships with others. (1953b:326–327)
While this sounds psychological, Arendt would argue that it is not. Rather, it is based on a 
concrete notion of sociality (not ‘the social’) that operates between people in specific 
public spheres. A policy of terror without any real threat to fight against destroys the 
space between people, destroys the difference between the guilty and the innocent, 
destroys the possibility of companionship, and destroys the capacity of people to think. 
Under conditions of totalitarian terror one is left, Arendt argues, with logic, but without 
the capacity to connect this to a world of real experiences, experience (in Arendt’s sense) 
being impossible under totalitarian terror since real experiences require companions and 
conversation. In Arendt’s analysis, totalitarian movements provided the political identity 
that the atomized masses lacked—since they were no longer associated with any class—
rather than a psychological identification with authority to which certain personality 
types were vulnerable. Instead of an escape from freedom in the face of spiritual anxiety, 
it was a response to absolute displacement and material terror. Incapable of thinking or 
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of having experiences, these actors should, in many cases, not even be considered as 
acting from self-interested motives.
It is important to remember, in all of this, that while Fromm’s Escape From 
Freedom was composed and published before the worst events in Nazi Germany had 
been carried out or, subsequently, discovered by the advancing Allied forces, Arendt had, 
in much of the writings we have been referring to, access to a considerably more 
developed history and set of interpretations of both Nazism and Stalinism. This 
constitutes a serious caveat to direct comparisons of the two explanations. Still, The 
Authoritarian Personality, based partially upon Fromm’s psychoanalytic framework, was 
first published in 1950, around the same time as Arendt’s first writings on totalitarianism. 
The point of this discussion, however, has not been to set up these competing 
interpretations in order to decide between them, but to demonstrate, with some context, a 
situation in which character became a subject of debate and a means of thinking about 
sociality. Among other things, the importance of the concept of character, whether it 
really exists or not, rests in the way that we can use it, or not, to develop precisely the 
capacities for thought, reflection and judgement that concerned both Arendt and Fromm. 
The current debate has largely missed this interesting alternative between a psychological 
and character-driven reading of fascism that emphasizes individuality and free-will and a 
political reading that deemphasizes character while emphasizing the peculiarities of 
political form and defining freedom as acting together. Missing this way of framing the 
debate, as I have mentioned, means missing macro-questions about social eventfulness. 
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The next section links analysis of world-historical events with that of everyday situations.
C. PERFORMATIVE CHARACTER: GOFFMAN’S ‘WHERE THE ACTION IS’
We turn, now, to an examination of some similarities between Arendt and the work of 
Erving Goffman. This will lead back to our starting-point, the moral philosophical 
character/situation debate and its narrow use of social psychology.
It is a little unusual to suggest points of similarity between Hannah Arendt and 
Erving Goffman. Nevertheless, Arendt and Goffman fall under the broad umbrella of 
situationism, both deemphasizing substantive and internal notions of character in favour 
of action, performance, and the intersubjective realm. While Goffman has been used to 
support an exclusively situationist position by Gilbert Harman (2009), however, that is a 
misappropriation. Goffman’s concept of a ‘moral career,’ for instance, rather than 
providing a conveniently appropriated situationist argument, links situations together in a 
biographical chain whose continuity is mediated by social reflections on character. Thus a 
better reading combines Goffman with Arendt, re-establishing the complementarity of 
situation and character by adding a performative and non-psychological concept of 
character to Arendt’s notion of ‘acting together.’
Goffman’s dramaturgical model of social interaction, while not a political model, 
focuses on concrete processes of cooperative interaction, and the underlying assumptions 
necessary in such contexts. The key text here is a long essay called ‘Where the Action Is’ 
(1967). This text supports Candace Upton’s claim (2009b:185–186), mentioned at the 
beginning of the chapter, that the notion of character, as an aspect of moral evaluation 
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concerning traits, is an extremely persistent element of social interaction.
Against the realism of the psychological social psychology tradition of Ross and 
Nisbett, Goffman resists the notion that social psychology should operate in a 
demystifying manner to expose ‘real reality.’ While he distinguishes sociological analysis 
from the ‘common sense’ view of, for example, sincerity and insincerity, he would not 
formulate this as a ‘fundamental attribution error.’ For example:
...to say that lay imputations are impulsive and unsound, and that over 
time and across various situations the individual might not, in fact, 
maintain the character he currently manifests, is quite true but quite beside 
the point. I am here not concerned with whether a given individual does or 
does not possess a specified characteristic, but with how notions about 
character function in daily life. (Goffman 1967:234–235)
Character has a kind of paradoxical quality, Goffman suggests, for 
On the one hand, it refers to what is essential and unchanging about the 
individual—what is characteristic of him. On the other, it refers to 
attributes that can be generated and destroyed during fateful 
moments...Thus a paradox. Character is both unchanging and changeable. 
And yet that is how we conceive of it. (238)
 
Society needs to read character in this way, says Goffman, in order to ensure that we 
come to our situations, our interactions, with “some enthusiasm and concern” (238). The 
concept of fatefulness introduces the recognition that certain situations necessarily 
produce consequences for one’s reputation, that is, for social assessments of one’s 
character. In other words, sometimes character is simply a necessary part of the situation. 
Goffman brackets any empirical claims about the character structure of certain classes 
(contra Fromm). He shares this with Arendt. But, in a kind of qualified support for virtue 
ethicists, Goffman suggests that the question of character will always be in play (as 
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reputation):
Individuals must come to all their little situations with some enthusiasm 
and concern, for it is largely through such moments that social life occurs, 
and if a fresh effort were not put into each of them, society would surely 
suffer. The possibility of effecting reputation is the spur...And yet...if 
society is to persist, the same pattern must be sustained from one actual 
social occasion to the next...Individuals must define themselves in terms 
of properties already accepted as theirs. (238–239)
 
An important gap opens between contemporary situationists, who argue for the 
importance of institutional responses to social problems (Harman 2009:241), and 
Goffman and Arendt. On my reading, Goffman and Arendt suggest that although 
institutions are important, just as important is that these institutions leave space for 
‘action’ and ‘interaction,’ that is, for the achievement of character in fateful situations and 
for the appearance of something new, for making a beginning. And beginnings can only 
ever be institutionalized after the fact of their appearing.
Goffman and Arendt indicate different ways that the possibilities for achieving 
character (what Arendt calls ‘acts of greatness’) disappear. While Arendt describes a 
situation in which the space between people completely disappears, Goffman suggests 
that, while ‘total institutions’ may suppress interactive space, or render it largely invisible 
(1961), and commercial society may trivialize that space, it cannot disappear altogether 
(see also Riesman 1952). On the one hand we have Arendt’s notion of totalitarian 
domination, a shapeless organizational form, a de-institutionalizing institution that 
replaces the real world with a fiction, leaving no space between people. On the other 
hand, Goffman describes a commercializing organizational form, which brings
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the final mingling of fantasy and action...On the arcade strips of urban 
settlements and summer resorts, scenes are available for hire where the 
customer can be the star performer in gambles enlivened by being very 
slightly consequential. Here a person currently without social connections 
can insert coins in skill machines to demonstrate to the other machines that 
he has socially approved qualities of character. These naked little spasms 
of the self occur at the end of the world, but there at the end is action and 
character. (1967:269–270)
The point of these last lines of the essay seems to be to say that, even if one trivializes it, 
even at ‘the end of the world’ (whether in Arendt’s sense or not), action and character are 
still operating. Indeed, Arendt herself consistently affirms the permanence of the human 
impulse for freedom through the very human capacity to make new beginnings (1998). 
The real gap here, it seems, may be between Arendt’s political and Goffman’s non-
political conception of action. Even here, however, it is possible to read Goffman as 
advancing an implicitly political critique of contemporary Western life, an implicit 
critique that comes out repeatedly in some of his dense aphoristic statements as well as in 
the overall tone of texts like Stigma (1963) and Asylums (1961).
Goffman offers a non-psychological version of character to an Arendtian reading of 
action and situation. His treatment of character is non-psychological because of its 
performative emphasis, but also non-moral, because although it returns to the 
intertwining of character with the virtues, they are conceived here as the prizes (or 
punishments) awarded for successful (or unsuccessful) performances rather than as 
straightforwardly moral qualities. At the same time, these virtues would retain some 
minimal degree of moral charge. If, on the Arendtian conceptual scene, the primary 
virtues are intellectual ones (i.e., capacities of thought), the primary virtue under 
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examination in ‘Where the Action Is,’ is courage. Goffman points out that “The hero of 
character is not likely to be the man on the street” (1967:266). The primary actors that 
win the reputation for courage are those on the margins of society, those who engage in 
daring acts of bravery. Bank-robbers, for instance, gain the respect of law-abiding 
citizens, (and are romanticized in folk music) but at the cost of being hunted down by the 
agents of ‘law and order.’ These desperate characters, working on the margins, help to 
constitute the framework of social discourses on character by providing us with 
opportunities for ‘vicarious fatefulness.’ As Goffman puts it, on the edges of society are 
groups of people who stage a fateful scene, “a scene in which we project our dynamics of 
character” (267). In this way, “A frame of reference is secured for judging daily acts, 
without having to pay its penalties” (266). Goffman claims that this kind of “Vicarious 
experience re-establishes our connection to values concerning character” (268). Those 
“misguided enough to seek out all types of fatefulness” (266) add flesh and blood to the 
commercially packaged romantic figure on which the rest of us depend. Their payment, 
in the form of self-respect, arises from the contrast between 
On one side...the safe and silent places...on the other all those 
activities...requiring the individual to lay himself on the line...It is from 
this contrast that delinquents, criminals, hustlers, and sportsmen draw their 
self-respect. Perhaps this is the payment in exchange for the use we make 
of the ritual of their performance. (268)
Goffman has been read as undermining the distinction between true and false, between 
the masks we don and the reputations we acquire in particular social situations and the 
true self that lies behind these masks and these reputations (cf. MacIntyre 1984). He has 
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also, and perhaps in some ways more correctly, been read as a conservative (cf. Goffman 
1974:14), someone who, though recognizing the harsh price those on the margins pay so 
that those in the centre can re-charge their system of values, sees this as unavoidable. 
Arendt has faced similar accusations of amorality, as well as conservatism, and from a 
variety of directions. Regardless of the legitimacy of these accusations, and in certain 
contexts the labels may be fair enough, Goffman and Arendt together offer a way of 
thinking about the relation between situation and character that can invigorate current 
debates. This means, at least, giving more credit to the potential permanence and 
relevance of ‘character talk’ than situationists are generally willing to countenance. 79 It is 
useful, in this context, to think through the connection with courage, especially as it 
relates to the contrast drawn earlier between Fromm’s notion of existential fear and 
Arendt’s concept of totalitarian terror. In a very crucial sense, fear and courage are 
concepts that require us to think about the intertwining of character and situation.
It is important to note Goffman’s observation that in modern society, acts (or 
performances) of courage are related to social marginalization. Marginalized risk-takers, 
Goffman suggests, participate in a societal metanarrative about admirable personal 
qualities. This metanarrative involves a paradox. On the one hand character refers to 
stable and unchanging attributes. On the other it refers to situational attributions made in 
fateful moments and subject to profound reversals. This paradox seems to be a permanent 
feature of social life, and it is as true of courage as of other socially admired qualities.
79  Goffman’s performative approach to character, courage, and criminality, based on a Durkheimian 
notion of the normality of crime, might also be compared to Schmitt’s (1996) political theory, with its 
decisionistic approach to character (i.e., the friend/enemy decision).
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When Goffman points out the link between attributions of courage and 
marginalization, he also indicates something about the fragmentation of character 
qualities. Against an Aristotelian notion of the ‘unity of the virtues,’ according to which, 
if one does not possess all of the virtues, one does not really possess any of them, 
Goffman outlines the situational and performative circulation of character attributions, 
suggesting the paradoxical and perhaps contradictory quality of character.
Since Hannah Arendt is allergic to paradoxes, she prefers to simply avoid 
psychology and separate the idea of character from what she refers to as ‘deeds of 
greatness.’ Like Goffman, she also separates morality from deeds of greatness, thus 
lending us a model with a similarly restricted (but not entirely absent) role for morality in 
the sphere of action. Both offer narrations of sociality in which judgements are made 
about acts performed in the face of the unknown. These narrations also lend us a means 
of reflecting about courage, freedom, and justice. Goffman suggests that attributions of 
courage are, as the source of self-respect, the payment made to the marginalized. The 
implicit question is whether this is just, or whether this signifies the underlying collective 
cowardice of a society. Goffman avoided open discussions of justice, preferring to focus 
on other concepts. In one of his most well-known essays, ‘On Face-Work,’ he focuses on 
the concept of face, suggesting that “Perhaps the main principle of the ritual order is not 
justice but face, and what any offender receives is not what he deserves but what will 
sustain for the moment the line to which he has committed himself, and through this the 
line to which he has committed the interaction” (1967:44).
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Goffman tells us that character and action are still present, even in the trivialized 
activities of commercialized society, even in the nickel slot machines. Extreme 
situationists argue, however, for the possibility of action without character. Doris quotes 
Aristotle in order to affirm this possibility: “a tragedy is impossible without action, but 
there might be one without Character” (Aristotle, in Doris 2002:209n.36). What we have 
seen from Goffman, however, suggests that as soon as we lay claim to a part in a social 
narrative, we are committed to demands concerning character, whether anonymous and 
formal or idiosyncratic and peculiar. We are compelled to reflect on situations,  but by 
means of the concept of character. I will return to this discussion of courage and 
character in the conclusion of the chapter. Before that, I would like to revisit the 
situationist position as articulated in moral philosophy and in psychological social 
psychology, especially with respect to a different virtue/vice pair, honesty and deception.
D. SITUATIONISM, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, & THE EVERYDAY LANGUAGE 
OF CHARACTER
At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that moral philosophy has tended to draw on 
a very narrow range of empirical research. It also exhibits a certain naivete about 
methodological issues. For instance, moral philosophers tend to accept the idea of a ‘view 
from nowhere.’ Gilbert Harman suggests that “there is a clear conceptual difference 
between what people generally think about character and personality and what is actually 
the case” (2009:237). While he is on solid footing in suggesting that studying ‘folk 
psychology’ about character and personality is not identical with attempts to study 
character and personality systematically and scientifically, this is not the difference 
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between naive common sense and reality. As Goffman says, although the “common sense 
view has limited analytical utility” (1959:59), this does not mean that the sociological 
view is privileged in an absolute sense: “The crucial sociological consideration, for this 
report at least, is merely that impressions fostered in everyday performances are subject 
to disruption. We will want to know what kind of impression of reality can shatter the 
fostered impression of reality, and what reality really is can be left to other students” (66). 
Even if Harman turns out to be one of these “other students,” he would do well to 
recognize the reasons for Goffman’s caveats.
Harman argues, with respect to violent civil strife between ethnic groups, that we 
should avoid explanations based upon character: “If we attribute the...violence to ethnic 
hatred [i.e., character], we may very well doubt that there is anything we can do. If we 
understand the way the violence arises from the situation, we may see more opportunities 
to end the conflict” (2009:237). While it is fair enough to suggest the importance of 
situations, Harman is offering a false dichotomy. The psychoanalytic notions of character 
I have already discussed (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950, which examined the roots of anti-
Semitism and other forms of prejudice) already criticize the notion that some mysterious 
quasi-biological character is a causal factor explaining prejudice. Character need not be 
reduced to a naturalistic form. Harman focuses so intently on the ‘fundamental attribution 
error’ involved in common sense interpretations that he overlooks the fact that socio-
psychological studies have routinely made character assessments based upon the 
assumption that situation and character are fundamentally intertwined. According to these 
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studies, character structure arises from the interplay of person and situation.
Harman argues that “To the extent that we are interested in improving the lot of 
mankind it is better to put less emphasis on moral education and on building character 
and more emphasis on trying to arrange social institutions so that human beings are not 
placed in situations in which they will act badly” (Harman 2009:241). This sounds 
practical, but who are ‘we?’ If he refers to academic research and discourse, this is 
already the case. Contemporary sociologists of all sorts consistently take situationist 
positions. Situationism is an important aspect of the position of the classical Frankfurt 
school, differing from Harman in that Harman avoids specific political economy 
questions by means of the neutral terminology of social institution and situation. 
Consequently, Adorno’s critique of identity’s connection to social domination goes much 
further than Harman’s suspicions about character talk. Instead of skirting serious 
historical and material questions of inequality and domination, critical theory is 
consistently mindful of them when formulating hypotheses about character structure. 
Regardless of the validity of the conjectures about deep character potential, their 
materialist premise holds their speculative and potentially metaphysical nature in check.
Along this line, one problem with the position taken by Harman is the potential 
paternalism involved in the notion of “arranging social institutions.” On the one hand, 
this elides critical theory’s recognition of the central question of domination (in the 
arranging of social institutions). On the other hand, Goffman and Arendt seem to suggest 
that although institutions are important, it is just as important that institutions leave space 
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for non-institutionalized action. In this space there should be room, on the one hand, for 
the kinds of fateful situations that Goffman describes, in which character can be won or 
lost, and on the other hand, for the Arendtian activities of promising, forgiving, and 
beginning again (Arendt 1998). The attempt to institutionalize or micro-manage this kind 
of action leads, in Arendt’s view, at least, in the direction of totalitarian domination.
Situationists have good reason to suggest that we have a marked tendency to make 
poor judgements of character based upon the behaviour of others. Harman suggests that 
“it would be best simply to replace thought and talk about virtuous character traits with 
thought and talk about virtuous acts and other responses, because ordinary thinking about 
character traits is such a mess” (2009:241). While the emphasis on acts seems reasonable, 
this is not a merely philosophical rumination; how would this replacement be 
accomplished and what sort of social policies would it require? Would a social 
transformation in which ordinary thinking and talking no longer dealt in character and 
personality require draconian methods of implementation? Might it, perhaps, signal 
precisely the ‘end of the world’ (as well as of ‘persons’) Arendt and Goffman refer to?
I tend to agree with Harman insofar as he argues for the validity of certain 
suspicions about the concept of character. Certainly, in the political realm, as he suggests, 
it seems more fruitful to evaluate the candidate’s policies than to evaluate the candidate’s 
character. But, then again, arguably the problem is not so much the focus on character as 
such as it is the exclusion of attention to policy and the presence or absence of transparent 
and responsive government. Whether or not we call it a matter of character, predictability 
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of behaviour (i.e., in the form of promise-keeping) is a permanent element of policy 
debate. If the politician is a liar (or even just acts like one, without having a lying 
‘character’), the platform becomes meaningless. The idea of a public sphere in which the 
arrangement of the situation made it irrelevant whether or not someone was a ‘liar’ or 
made it impossible to get away with lying might be appealing, but what sorts of 
(coercive) arrangements might be required to ensure such a predictable and perfectly 
transparent process, especially if one focuses primarily on changing the way we talk 
about the political? Directing the criticism at the content of talk about candidate’s 
character actually (ironically) avoids the more fundamentally situationist question of the 
set of social arrangements that allow or give rise to particular forms of talk (e.g., Who 
owns or controls the major communication media? How are campaigns financed?), or 
that limit substantive democracy and ensure the irrelevance of public debate.
This is no time to get caught up in a base/superstructure debate. So long as we are 
focused on the level of talk, we know that Habermas has travelled an important distance 
in elaborating Kant’s categorical imperative with regard to lying, and has established 
normative reasons why the arrangement of the public sphere might be structured so as to 
require a predominance of ‘criticizable validity claims.’ This hypothetical realm seems to 
lessen the relevance of honesty as an internal character trait, but it does nothing to 
eliminate it as a performative element of public discourse. The case remains that the 
persistence of social life appears to depend upon a complex interplay of trust and 
mistrust, reputation and anonymity, deception and revelation, character and action. This 
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interplay is itself mediated by sophisticated performative scenes and settings. This is the 
character of the political situation. The effect on elections and policies of the voting 
public’s tendency (or not) to make ‘fundamental attribution errors’ is a complex empirical 
question.80
If we move from the political realm to the scientific realm, this complex interplay 
exhibits some peculiar elements having to do with what situationism implicitly accepts as 
the relationship between social science and common sense, between social scientists and 
the general public. With respect to lying, it is not an accident that the bulk of the 
psychological experiments upon which the situationist position is based depend upon a 
calculated deception of the experimental subject, and precisely in order to ensure the 
‘truth’ of the outcome. The lenience with which we view this deception follows from the 
trust (or mistrust) we have for the integrity of social science generally. But the same sorts 
of suspicions we might cultivate concerning the relationship between politicians and the 
public can be cultivated with respect to scientists and the public.81
Ross and Nisbett’s The Person and the Situation (1991) is one of the main social 
psychological resources from which moral philosophical situationism is derived. Ross 
and Nisbett argue, and Harman and Doris and others follow them, that lay conceptions of 
80  For interesting analyses of the power of cultural interpretive frames in political life, see the studies of 
American elections made by Lakoff (2002, 2004) and Alexander (2010).
81  There is also the possibility that people can become so used to social research that they suspect a 
situation of being a set-up and therefore ignore it. In this regard, consider this cautionary tale, staple of 
research methods textbooks:
At the University of Washington in Seattle in 1973, a male student accosted another 
student on campus and shot him. Students on their way to class did not stop to aid the 
victim, nor did anyone follow the assailant (who was caught anyway). When the campus 
reporters asked some students about their lack of concern over the murder, they said they 
thought it was just a psychology experiment. (Diener and Crandall 1978:87)
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character are like lay physics. According to Ross and Nisbett, 
the main interactional notion of lay physics—namely, the intuitive force of 
‘momentum’—is the utterly mistaken notion that a force applied to an 
object gives it a store of energy that gradually dissipates. The correct 
notion (that of inertia) requires that objects at rest remain at rest and that 
objects in motion remain in motion, unless some other force is applied. 
(1991:8)
Ross and Nisbett argue that both lay physics and lay social psychology have a certain 
success in predicting what will happen, but both are based upon fundamentally mistaken 
underlying principles. In fact, the lay physics notion of ‘momentum’ is analogous to the 
lay social psychology notion of ‘character’ or ‘disposition.’ The problem with both 
involves presuming that a certain ‘thing’ exists within the object, whether a ‘store of 
energy’ or a ‘character structure.’ It is a problem of reification. What distinguishes lay 
psychology from lay physics, however, is that lay psychology involves a certain 
circularity, an element of self-fulfilling prophecy:
...the characteristics of actors and those of the situations they face are 
typically confounded—in ways that contribute to precisely the consistency 
that we perceive and count on in our social dealings. People often choose 
the situations to which they are exposed; and people often are chosen for 
situations on the basis of their manifest or presumed abilities and 
dispositions. Thus, clerics or criminals rarely face an identical or 
equivalent set of situational challenges. Rather, they place themselves, and 
are placed by others, in situations that differ precisely in ways that induce 
clergy to look, act, feel, and think rather consistently like clergy and that 
induce criminals to look, act, feel, and think like criminals. (1991:19)
Here Ross and Nisbett suggest that ‘looping effects’82 of character attribution tend to 
82  The term ‘looping effect’ appears in Goffman’s Asylums, but is more commonly associated with Ian 
Hacking’s “The Looping Effects of Human Kinds” (1995). Hacking’s use does not seem to be related to 
Goffman’s, although their views tend, in general, to be compatible. It is not a term that appears in Ross and 
Nisbett, who have something rather narrower in mind than Hacking does, something more like labelling 
theory, from which Hacking distinguishes ‘looping effects’ (1995:369–370). From Hacking’s perspective, it 
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ensure some success in predicting behaviour, but this success is a self-fulfilling prophecy 
rather than a legitimate recognition of character qualities. They reserve capacities of 
genuine recognition and accurate judgement for social scientists like themselves.
Ross and Nisbett’s claim about circularity in prediction implies the downplaying of 
the relevance of introspection (or thinking and judging) to one’s character. While they 
mitigate this implication in a later chapter, here they suggest that recognizing that people 
sometimes choose situations, or behave consistently out of a felt compulsion to appear 
consistent, undermines the notion of character. But isn’t it often claimed that situation-
choice is part of what demonstrates character? Indeed, this is an old conservative saw. It 
is certainly an essential element of Aristotle’s notion of phronesis, balanced on the other 
side by some notion of what is now referred to as ‘moral luck’ (Williams 1981). The 
relevance of situation-choice to character need not be read as conservative, nor even as 
Aristotelian, however, but as a minimal distinction that allows us to recognize the 
difference between unconscious and habitual action and action about which we can 
manage, in some non-trivial respect, to give an account (cf. Butler 2005). Part of what 
one assesses, then, in assessing another’s character (or one’s own), is the adequacy of the 
accounts offered for particular actions. John Doris comes close to acknowledging this in 
his chapter on ‘Situation and Responsibility,’ with a discussion of narrative integration, 
motivation and identification, but turns away from it for reasons that are unclear, apart 
from his assertion that “narrative need not be characterological” (2002:142). Ultimately 
seems that Ross and Nisbett have failed to fully recognize the difference between natural kinds and human 
kinds. I use ‘looping effects’ here as a reminder of the complex range of metaphors of circularity (including 
dialectical ones) used to describe human interaction.
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situationists persist (expressing, perhaps, an element of their own character) in insisting 
that character and situation must be decided between rather than seen as complementary. 
E. ON TRUTH & LIE IN THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC SENSE
Situationists argue that situation can explain certain persistent gaps between accounts and 
behaviour. To pick up on my earlier suggestion, however, we need to keep in mind that 
the situations used as evidence are all experimental situations in which systematic and 
carefully calculated deception has undermined the minimal conditions for the 
maintenance of (non-totalitarian) social life. Rather than relate their research to Arendt’s 
claim that part of what characterizes totalitarian domination is the collapse of the 
distinction between truth and lie, however, Ross and Nisbett make no real attempt to 
explain the relevance of lying to the experiments they use as evidence for situationism. 
They merely claim that, at the time that deception was introduced into social psychology 
experiments “no participant could have suspected” (1991:29) that this was being done. 
Seen from the vantage point of the present, such experiments can be seen as a new form 
of manipulative technique, a sort of moral bad luck, that has successfully waylaid groups 
of participants that may or may not have otherwise exhibited consistent behaviour. 
Situationist experiments, then, may demonstrate the lack (or the destruction) of character 
in their subjects, or, as Fromm argues, the revelation of a deep potential, but not 
necessarily the irrelevance of character. The lesson to be learnt might be that one should 
not trust scientists to tell the truth and, as a result, that one should not agree to participate 
in social science experiments. The really fundamental attribution error might be the 
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failure to recognize that the experimenter is a liar, even if a noble one (cf. Bok 1979).
On an Arendtian view, the subject’s capacity for experience (from which capacities 
of judgment can be developed) has been at least temporarily undermined by the 
experiments themselves, insofar as the structure of the situation itself is designed to cut 
us off from meaningful companionship. However, on the condition that the debriefing 
situation gives them an opportunity to meaningfully assess and respond to the experience, 
one could argue (as, Milgram does in response to critics) that these experiments might 
increase the capacities of subjects to think about the relationship between situation and 
character. Whether this leads to a devaluing of the concept of character or a chastened 
self-understanding that itself exhibits character development (e.g., in humility or in that 
very modern virtue, reflexivity) may be an open question. In either case, it is still partly 
by means of the concept of character that such an examination can be carried out.
The distinction between ‘lay’ and ‘scientific’ approaches to social psychology 
cannot be made as easily as philosophical and psychological situationists think. I will 
leave to the side, for the moment, as being in the field of social studies of science, the 
corresponding distinction between lay and scientific physics. For my purposes it is 
essential, however, to assert the inadequacy of what Ross and Nisbett conceive as a 
‘refinement’ and a ‘limitation’ on their situationist perspective, what they call “the 
subjective nature of situational influence” (1991:xiv). Rather than opening onto a fully 
interpretive social science model, this concept of ‘subjectivity’ is deployed as a way of 
compartmentalizing the role of hermeneutic engagement:
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The real source of the difficulty does not lie in the fact that human beings 
subjectively define the situations they face, nor even in the fact that they 
do so in variable and unpredictable ways. Rather, the problem lies in their 
failure to recognize and make adequate inferential allowance for this 
variability and unpredictability. (Ross and Nisbet 1991:82)
They present the subjective meaning attributed to situations as a constraint on social 
engineering rather than the transcendental-interpretive condition of human relations: “an 
approach that seeks to make behavior explicable and predictable must take into account 
the subjective perspective of the actor, not that of the observer or researcher” (163).
Ross and Nisbett’s failure to reflect upon the significance of social science based 
upon deception relates to another failure. While they acknowledge the interpretive 
element in everyday experience, and point out the everyday lack of reflexivity about 
interpretation, they seem to miss Goffman’s point about the need to bring people to 
interaction with ‘enthusiasm and concern.’ While they do much to substantiate and 
articulate lay social psychology’s various failures of trait attribution, situationists tend to 
miss the deep problem of meaning, a problem which is, among other things, the world-
historical problem of disenchantment diagnosed by Weber and referred to by J.M. 
Bernstein as a kind of tendential nihilism (2001:4–10). Oblivious to this problem, 
situationists happily pursue a positivist research program made modest by the 
complicating issues of subjective meaning, but without giving up the notion that, so long 
as we engage in social science with the right “experimental spirit...our role as social 
engineers can consistently be a beneficial one” (Ross and Nisbett 1991:246). I view this 
situation with more ambivalence. Even when one pursues social science ‘modestly,’ one 
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avoids an important question insofar as the primary metaphor driving social psychology 
research remains that of ‘getting behind’ common sense self-understandings (i.e., self-
deception) by means of (socially engineered) deception. While deception of self and other 
may be rife in everyday life, Goffman argues that social scientists are not, in fact, well-
equipped to eliminate this self-deception. His own stance was to eschew such a project: 
“he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true interests has 
much to do, because the sleep is very deep. And I do not intend here to provide a lullaby 
but merely to sneak in and watch the way the people snore” (1974:14).
The problem, from a Goffmanian perspective, is that the Ross and Nisbett’s 
research program undermines a basic premise of social life and successful interaction, 
which is a certain ritual deference to the identity that others project onto a situation 
insofar as they manage its basic performative requirements. Successful interaction also 
requires us to follow, with some creative variations that sometimes amount to revolutions, 
the scripts of everyday (as well as out of the ordinary) life, scripts that require us to take 
on the challenge of exhibiting character precisely because they are constituted around 
casts of such characters. They are not static or unchanging, but their basic structure is that 
of script and character. Resistance to knowledge about social life gained by 
systematically undermining this basic building block of social life, then, is more 
understandable. So, too, is the compulsive and ultimately disappointing pursuit of 
character in commercial society that Goffman describes. Ross and Nisbett recognize 
resistance to the demystification of habits of attribution (1991:131–134), but explain it as 
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the result of the pragmatic but biased shorthand we tend to use in assessing others. They 
imply that while pragmatic resistance to re-thinking character has been a perennial 
quality of social life, modern social science is uniquely poised, and for the first time in 
human history, to dismantle this resistance. This view underestimates the complicated 
historical entanglements of modernity, deception, science, knowledge, and character. First 
among the issues is the problem of disenchantment. This plays out in an interesting way 
with regard to deception and social science methods.
Situationists make the important point that we can make better predictions about 
individual behaviour on the basis of knowing key situation elements than on the basis of 
purported knowledge about individual character or personality. That is, predictions based 
upon what the average person does in a particular situation out-perform those based upon 
studying the personalities of particular individual. This is Fromm’s point, in fact: 
individual experiences and characteristics are most significantly shaped by the 
experiences they share with those in similar social positions. These experiences tend to be 
reinforced by attendant cultural interpretations, which make sense of them from within 
existing social structures. This overlap of situationism with psychoanalytic social 
psychology is missed because psychological social psychology comes to the social by 
starting with the individual.
It may only be through dialectical analyses of the ‘total situation’ that some aspects 
of situation become visible. While Fromm’s analyses can seem even more circular than 
the situationism just discussed—since the notion of deep character structure as potential 
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makes it easy to prove retrospectively and to revise prospectively in the event of 
seemingly contradictory developments—his attention to character at the level of the 
social holds an important semantic charge because his dialectical approach allows him to 
accommodate seeming contradictions and to avoid losing the phenomenon to a rigidly 
two-dimensional logic. Even if Fromm’s dialectical view of society and individual 
constitutes a residual category, it still preserves more of the phenomenon than 
situationism because it does not work on an either/or basis with respect to character (i.e., 
either it exists or it does not) and it takes seriously the deep effects of relations of 
asymmetry (domination).
Fromm’s dialectical approach views individual character structure as providing a 
view of social character structure under a microscope. This metaphor, of course, can be 
recognized as an iteration, in some ways an inversion, of what happens in Plato’s 
Republic, when Socrates looks for insight into the structure of the soul by examining the 
structure of the city. It is also seen in Hobbes's Leviathan, in his depiction of society as a 
giant man. In the general form of this dialectic, societies of a certain size and structure, a 
certain division of labour, a certain way of life, require and generate individuals with  
character traits that fit the experiences and activities that are typical for their society and 
for their social position within that society. This kind of whole/part form of social thought 
is vulnerable to its own form of two-dimensionality, as Arendt has pointed out. This 
tendency is somewhat mitigated by attention to social history and change. Against 
Arendt’s view of the dialectic, Fromm, Riesman, and others argue that a gap has 
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developed between the demands of the social structure and the peculiarities of the 
individual personality. This gap provides room for some level of individual autonomy. In 
this gap appear the kinds of activities that generate, without completely controlling, 
changes in the social structure.
Famously, Durkheim described this relationship between society and the individual 
as the source of a fundamental dualism in experience, and, indeed, sociological 
conceptions of individual and social character tend to include an element of internal 
division and internal conflict or tension, some notion, in fact, of a divided will. This is a 
point of contrast with the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics and with contemporary 
situationism, which have both consistently maintained the link between character and the 
moral virtues, which means that it almost always involves the notion of consistency and 
non-contradiction, if not a strong notion of the unity of the virtues. As a result, for both 
the philosophical tradition and for situationism, contradiction can generally only mean a 
lack of character. For the social science tradition of Durkheim, Fromm, and others, 
however, character often, if not always, involves contradiction as an essential internal 
element. In fact, contradiction may be the primary source of character’s power. Almost all 
of the character typologies produced by the psychoanalytic tradition involve character 
types constituted by contradiction, conflict, reversal, sublimation, repression, and so on. 
Actions that seem inconsistent on the surface are deemed consistent as derived from 
one’s deep character structure. This element of characterological psychology/social 
psychology tends to be overlooked by situationists, who persist in defining dispositional 
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traits as non-contradictory because they demand that they be ‘evaluatively integrated’ 
(i.e., conscious rather than unconscious) (e.g., Doris 2002:58).
This tension between the psychoanalytic tradition and both the situationist and the 
virtue ethics traditions may be the key to character’s continuing relevance. Much depends 
on accepting or rejecting dialectical (or ‘paradoxical’) constructions of the social. Trying 
to keep the different perspectives in mind engages a central ambiguity of the concept of 
character, which is that ‘mark’ of character can be understood as a sign of one’s 
subordination, a kind of fate to which one is bound, or as a sign of freedom and the basis 
for resisting and persisting in the face of externally constraining circumstance. A 
situationism that denies the existence of either moral or psychoanalytic character cannot 
articulate the agency of individual actors in terms that can be incorporated into everyday-
colloquial or formal-legal discourse. It also cannot handle the paradoxes of character 
pointed out by Goffman with respect to social performance and by Fromm, Durkheim, 
and others, with respect to individual drives and societal demands.
Situationism without some kind of concept of character also has some difficulty in 
describing or explaining the fact of society’s consistent reproduction of its basic patterns 
and meanings. Situationists rely, for the most part, on Kurt Lewin’s basic field theory 
structure, an argument set out with respect to adolescence in 1939, that relies on an over-
arching notion of culture, and systems of ‘cultural equilibrium.’ While Lewin showed a 
broad interest in sociology and psychological approaches, as well as in historical 
questions, however, later situationism withdrew much of its interest in sociology, and 
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lost, as a consequence, much of Lewin’s sense for the dialectic interplay of person and 
situation, a dialectic found, for instance, in Pierre Bourdieu’s work (1977), which features 
a closely related version of field theory, but also, in the concept of habitus, a model of 
physically incorporated or embodied fields. While the balkanization of social psychology 
may have been institutionally or professionally useful to a variety of academic projects, it 
generated an artificial dichotomy and a debate that lacks extra-disciplinary relevance.
F. SITUATIONISM & SOCIOLOGY: A CASE FOR WEAK CHARACTER
Some version of situationism, understood very broadly as the importance of context, 
environment, socialization, and so on, has long dominated sociology, and for very good 
reason. Much of sociology’s history, in fact, has been characterized by attempts to prove 
the power of the situation over against common sense intuitions about the underlying 
principles organizing social life. Thus, against the belief in a meritocracy, sociologists 
have proven the importance of social networks to success in a variety of fields (e.g., 
Granovetter 1995 [1974]). Against theories of innate criminality, sociologists have argued 
for the importance of situational factors such as poverty, peer-group influence, education, 
and other broad social-environmental factors. Against racism, sociologists have made 
historical political economy arguments about slavery and colonialism (e.g., Feagin 2000). 
Labelling theory has argued Merton’s point (1968:477) about the ‘self-fulfilling 
prophecy’ (e.g., Chambliss 1973). The list could easily become a litany. Some version of 
situationism is the default position for sociology. When Doris makes the concise claim 
that “social perception is infused with stereotypes of negligible evidential value” 
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(2002:93), he makes a point sociologists have been making for at least a century.
At the same time, however, sociology depends upon a variety of notions of 
character or personality, like the just mentioned concept of habitus, which combines, like 
Fromm’s concept of social character, a strong version of situation with a strong version of 
character. Sociology resists the individual-focused explanation of action in terms of 
individual character and responsibility that one finds amongst conservative pundits (e.g., 
Bennett 1993) and puerile leadership studies (e.g., Kilburg 2012) by means of a fully-
social and situated concept of character, but it typically does not resist the notion of deep 
internalization. Philosophical and psychological situationists ignore this fact because they 
do not engage with sociology. Where they do mention sociological situationism, as in 
Ross and Nisbett’s desultory references to Marx and Weber, they fail to recognize this 
dialectical element, reducing the relationship between Marx and Weber to the debate over 
materialism and idealism. This allows them to avoid questions of class and history and to 
focus on piecemeal (and hypothetical) social engineering projects.
Just as the situationists sidestep the macro-questions of power and domination, so 
too do they miss some of the key insights provided by Arendt and Goffman regarding 
forms of activity that cannot be successfully institutionalized (i.e., reduced to a form of 
technical tinkering). Sociology has had its own headaches in this realm, often framed as 
the question of structure and agency. One of my purposes in returning to some of the 
mid-century discussions of character and situation has been the suspicion that, aside from 
the general processes of institutional differentiation, part of the reason for the invisibility, 
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to psychologists and to moral philosophers, of sociological approaches to social 
psychology stems from a failure to successfully explore and compare the different 
approaches to sociality presented by social thinkers like Fromm, Arendt, and Goffman. I 
have attempted to present several perspectives that were developed in the mid-century 
debates and that may help to advance our understanding of the mediation between 
character and situation. I have already discussed the idea that Goffman offers to Arendt a 
usable, because performative, concept of character, one compatible with her notion of 
action. This performative concept of character can be linked, I believe, to depth 
psychological approaches once these depth psychological approaches are re-worked 
through an interpretive-hermeneutic lens such as that offered by Paul Ricoeur, Jacques 
Lacan, and others. My earlier discussions of courage and deception provide two 
substantive areas in which this interpretive-performative approach might be linked to the 
psychologically-focused social psychology experimentation attended to by the moral 
philosophy debate. In response to the ambivalences and ambiguities that attend a 
performative approach to character focused on substantive questions concerning courage 
and deception, as well as the ‘looping effects’ of socially reproduced attribution and 
misattribution, I think it fruitful to try to develop a notion that seems equally ambivalent, 
that of ‘weak character.’
The contemporary debate about character and situation has something to learn from 
the mid-century debate about totalitarianism and the authoritarian personality. Fromm’s 
concept of character structure is a rich one, as is Arendt’s political concept of 
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totalitarianism. Both imperfect, they still have something to add to the debate. In general 
terms they add history, class analysis, and rich models of sociality to a moral philosophy 
debate lacking in all three. Whatever the scientific merits of depth psychology, it has a 
potentially permanent importance for public discourse about social action for precisely 
the reasons that Goffman outlines: social life only thrives if we come to interactions with 
‘enthusiasm and concern.’ Goffman’s performative approach helps reconcile an Arendtian 
account of sociality with the concept of character.
At the same time, situationist arguments against the existence of character need to 
be taken seriously. Although they suffer from a number of blind spots regarding 
sociology and everyday discourse, the experimental research findings cannot be 
summarily discounted. The point of this chapter has not been to reject their findings, but 
to contextualize them within a broader discourse and context, broaching the possibility of 
a new and mutual engagement between sociology, psychology, and moral philosophy. To 
this end, I have discussed performative elements of character, and issues around fear, 
courage, honesty and deception. These issues suggest the need for greater reflexivity on 
the part of social scientists, and a renewed grappling with the dialectical notion that 
critical reflection on character is one of the bases for its formation. For example, in his 
chapter linking psychological realism to ethics, John Doris (2002:107–127) avoids 
addressing the paradox that correctly rejecting characterological moral psychology could 
be read as the development of prudence, that is, as character! He suggests that “narrative 
need not be character driven” (119–120), but in his speculative example he suggests that 
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“The recovering alcoholic is better able to stay sober if she cultivates relationships with 
sober people and stays out of bars, whether or not she undergoes a characterological sea-
change” (120). Oddly, he fails to address the character assessment (and the ontological 
claim) involved in the ‘recovering alcoholic’ label—grammar itself pushes us towards 
characterological decisions—and the fact that the 12-step program of Alcoholics 
Anonymous organizes itself around such labels and such ontological claims.
One further, but related shortcoming in the situationist discourse is its failure to 
deal with the primary psychoanalytic (but also sociological) preoccupation, the subjective 
experience of being caught in patterns of behaviour from which one cannot seem to 
extract oneself. Certainly a heightened attention to the importance of situation can 
illuminate new avenues of egress and provide a welcome respite to cycles of self-
condemnation and hopelessness. C. Wright Mills’ The Sociological Imagination (1959), 
with its powerful articulation of the need to bridge the gap between personal troubles and 
public issues, remains popular in introductory sociology courses for precisely this reason. 
Nevertheless, even here, concepts like integrity or the MacIntyrean ‘unity of a life,’ 
which emphasize characterological consistency, seem to be the persistent providers of 
motivating frames of self-reflection. Heightened attention to situation does not appear to 
banish the subjective importance of character or the desire to reduce experiences of self-
contradiction.
Insofar as we retain the concept of character, perhaps we should argue, against 
common usage but only by means of plunging ourselves imaginatively into it, for the 
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weakening rather than the strengthening of our characters, especially insofar as character 
is understood in the psychoanalytic socio-psychological sense as being bound 
unconsciously by the social formations we have internalized, embody, and reproduce 
(and whether or not such a thing as the unconscious exists). At the same time, the notion 
of weak character that I am suggesting accommodates much of the critique of character 
mounted by situationists, but without either ceding or claiming sovereignty on questions 
of character to/for philosophers and social scientists. That is, alongside the tendencies of 
institutionalized academic discourses to disqualify or colonize everyday discourses, and 
to accumulate and concentrate cultural capital within the university, tendencies which 
involve the ‘tendential nihilism’ outlined by Bernstein (2001), the concept of weak 
character is meant to engage everyday discourse in such a way that the social scientist 
becomes a participant in and not merely an analyst of everyday poetics. Fromm’s depth 
psychology is a part of this everyday poetics. So is Goffman’s approach to character as 
performative and paradoxical. Both, ultimately, argue for weak character, Fromm in a 
normative way, for freedom from an overly obedient conformity, and Goffman, in an 
analytic fashion, through his emphasis on the performative possibility of character 
reversals. Foucault articulated a related point in his ‘What is Enlightenment?’ essay (1984 
[1978]) when he argued that the task is to ‘think differently.’ Arendt’s formulation is more 
abrupt. The task is to think, full stop.
In a weak but substantial version of character, we would think of character in that 
literal sense of ‘marking’ or ‘stamping.’ If we want to think of its relationship to situation, 
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some concrete examples will help, like the hand-stamp one often receives when going to 
concerts, the branding of cattle, the tattooing of numbers on concentration camp 
prisoners, or the thriving tattoo culture of the early 21st century. Such concrete images 
allow us to think of a range of possible interactive relationships between character, 
identity, and situation, from the voluntary to the involuntary, from that which we can 
wash off in a day or two to that which we can perhaps never wash off or live down. We 
seek out certain attributions, and we resist others, for others and for ourselves.
If we lose either character or situation from our conceptual vocabulary, we may lose 
the capacity to ‘characterize’ a situation; on the other hand, if we continually over-
attribute character qualities, we reify behaviour, and each judgement of someone’s 
character will close us off to new and potentially contrary experiences. Situationism has 
the merit of establishing a bulkhead from which to fend off those ascriptions of character 
that arise from general systems of domination, and from those responsibilizing practices 
that explain the social arrangement in terms of the inherent or ‘natural’ qualities of 
members. Adorno, among many others, has articulated the repressive nature of identity 
under social conditions of inequality and domination. Non-sociological situationism, 
however, has few resources capable of generating flexibility in moving from the 
individual to the collective level. As a result, the move from one to the other is abrupt and 
often rather unreflexive. Doris, for instance, blames the violence of the 20 th century on a 
collective lack of social intelligence, on our ‘blitheness’ in the face of gaps between 
predicted and actual behavioural consistency (2002:102). For some reason, he neglects to 
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point out that a collectively typical ‘blithe’ attitude on this score is itself a kind of social 
character. This neglect is highlighted again a few pages later when he reports claims 
about cultural differences regarding character attribution: “it is widely argued that non-
Westerners such as the Japanese interpret behavior more in terms of situations and less in 
terms of personal dispositions” (105). Doris concludes by suggesting that 
“epistemological difficulties caused by over-attribution are associated with ethical 
difficulties—difficulties that may be ameliorated by decreased reliance on 
characterological moral psychology” (106). I support the spirit of this suggestion, but the 
issue is less a matter of ‘decreased reliance’ and more a matter of exchanging a realist 
approach for an interpretive one that sees character as a concept deeply involved in 
everyday discursive poetics. When we set about to alter the structure of this discursive 
poetics, the best self-interpretive frame is not the social engineer one, but a frame in 
which social scientists are social actors just as socially embedded as anybody else. If we 
take Fromm, Arendt, and Goffman as our guides, at least part of the time, attention to 
forms of companionship, teamwork, collective arrangements, and collective action 
constitute the way forward in our analysis of character. If we recognize some of the social 
aspects of character that Fromm points out, we will find reasons for suspecting that even 
if we accept the concept of character, we should see it as ambivalently linked to morality.
At the end of the film Angels With Dirty Faces, an American gangster film from 
1938, starring James Cagney, Pat O’Brien, and Humphrey Bogart, the gangster Rocky 
Sullivan, played by James Cagney, is sent to the electric chair. His childhood friend Jerry 
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Connolly (Pat O’Brien), a priest, accompanies him. Father Connolly has been trying hard 
to keep the young boys who idolize Rocky from following in his footsteps, so he makes 
an odd request of Rocky. He asks Rocky to act frightened when he faces the electric 
chair. If he ‘dies yellow,’ and it is reported in the newspapers, the boys who idolize him 
may lose respect for him, and not follow his path. This is Father Connolly’s idea.
Rocky refuses. He says he can’t stand the thought. Yet, on his way to the chair, he 
does it. At least, it seems like he does. He drags his feet, he shouts and cries, panicking. 
Here, in this fateful moment, Rocky shows his true colour, yellow. The boys are 
crestfallen. Their hero has turned out to be a coward.
The ending leaves it an open question whether Rocky really ‘turned yellow.’ Father 
Connolly does not know. We do not know. Yet that is the character Rocky played. In an 
extra twist, it is his display of ‘weak’ character that may finally do some good, although, 
of course, we have to admit that we don’t know what effect this disappointment will 
really have on the boys that looked up to him. This example demonstrates, I think, the 
way that character persists in social life, in specific instances, and in a variety of keys 
(Goffman 1974). It appears as part of a narrative in a film that we gather together in 
public places to watch, to escape into and enjoy, and then to discuss. This reflects the fact 
that character appears in our everyday interactions and in our fateful ones too, in our 
movie-going and in our judgements. This is also an excellent illustration of a particular 
liminal moment with regard to fear, courage, and marginalization.
Character is a part of the way we narrate social interaction. I do not think we will 
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rid ourselves of it any time soon. If we need to divide things into two kinds, into, in this 
case, character and situation, it should, perhaps, be in order to set these two things into 
dialogue. This means that it is not just a matter of fine-tuning philosophical realist 
notions of character, as Upton and the neo-Aristotelians argue, or of engineering a better 
social world, as the earnest scientific realists hope, but of participating in discourses on 
character in such a way as to enrich rather than merely to undermine or correct common-
sense understandings of human character and the human condition.
In the previous chapter, a considerable amount of space was spent discussing 
Weber’s concept of charisma in hopes that it might produce a kind of core concept for the  
sociology of morality. Can charisma be a relational and moral concept? Can sociologists 
do research to verify the ‘charismatic’ quality of an entire society? Even if we criticize 
Weber’s fact/value distinction, we must still beware of the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’ I have 
proposed the baggy notion of ‘answerability’ as a way to avoid both the naturalistic 
fallacy as well as the myth of neutrality, but this chapter, which has explored the 
complexity of the situation and character debate, adds further complications for anyone 
hoping to set out on a clear-hearted sociological journey of moral discovery. Situationism 
can help to undermine particular forms of moral judgement, but it appears to suffer from 
its own limitations.
One of the ways that we can advance and enrich our understanding of character and 
situation is to examine how it relates to the mediating notion of practice. Indeed, this was 
Rieff’s claim about charisma, that it was not a mysterious and extraordinary character 
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quality possessed by an individual, but a collectively maintained quality of culture. On 
my reading, the concept of practice might add an additional face to the phenomenon I 
have attempted to introduce with the term ‘weak character.’ An effective concept of 
practice may be the key to linking character and situation (or, in another context, agent 
and structure) in a complementary relationship. This is the subject of the final chapter. In 
the next chapter, however, we turn to affect, and to the possibility that we might solve the 
puzzle of how to do the sociology of morality by ‘getting in the right mood.’
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CHAPTER SIX: THE CARES OF SOCIOLOGY: FUNDAMENTAL MOODS OF 
SOCIAL SCIENCE?
Among the four existent Natures (trees, beasts, man, and God), the latter two, 
which alone are endowed with reason, are distinguished in that God is immortal 
while man is mortal. Now when it comes to these, the good of the one, namely 
God, is fulfilled by his Nature; but that of the the other, man, is fulfilled by care 
(cura): ‘unius bonum natura perficit, dei scilicet, alterius cura, hominis.’ 
(Seneca, Epistle 124, quoted in Heidegger 1962:243)
This is the profound secret of innocence, that it is at the same time anxiety. 
Dreamily the spirit projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing, and 
innocence always sees this nothing outside itself (Kierkegaard 1980:41 [P5; IV 
313])
A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. (Marx and Engels 
1972:335)
The only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified 
terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance. (Roosevelt, 
Presidential Inaugural Address, 1933)
Anxiety [Angst] has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about 
something. It has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech 
we use the word ‘fear’ [Furcht] rather than ‘anxiety’ [Angst] if it has found an 
object. (Freud 1959:90–91)
Would you like a quick, sure-fire recipe for handling worry situations—a 
technique you can start using right away, before you go any further in reading 
this book? (Carnegie 1948:11)
Anxiety springs from the future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost 
Present. (Heidegger 1962:395; H345)
Angst, that supposed ‘existential,’ is the claustrophobia of a systematized society. 
(Adorno 1973:24)
Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot; but yes, we 
must act as if we do. (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982:1)
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A. VALUE-FREEDOM & THE “AFFECTIVE TURN”
Can the recent ‘affective turn’ (e.g., Gregg and Seigworth 2010; Clough and Halley, eds. 
2007) in scholarship help us to rethink, or to think further, Weber’s claim that science 
takes place in a context of agonistic pluralism on questions of ‘value-relevance?’ The 
affective turn, I will argue, can assist us in exploring our earlier discussion of the deep 
tension embedded within Weber’s ascetic neo-Stoic conception of the scientific vocation, 
and some of the ways in which the structure of the fact/value distinction, when founded 
upon a particular version of existentialist authenticity, served as a melancholic solution 
by deferral of social crises of nationalism, masculinity (cf. Witz and Marshall 2003), and 
bourgeois identity (in both religious and economic terms). This chapter will attempt to 
explore this possibility of talking out and ‘working through’ the ‘renounced’ and 
‘repressed’ elements (Bologh 1990:xvi) in Weber’s model, especially the socially 
structured contradictions of ethnic, economic and sexual difference embedded within it.
Specifically, this chapter addresses the role of affect as a sort of methodological 
consideration. How do you get ‘in the mood’ (cf. Fleck 1979; Rabinow and Stavrianakis 
2013:107–109; Silver 2011) to do sociology? It arises out of a simple observation. If you 
take, from the last quarter of the twentieth century, a certain rather broad strand of mostly 
French, British and Canadian social science, some of which fits under the label of 
‘Studies in Social and Moral Regulation’—social science influenced by cultural 
Marxism, Foucault, and Foucault-inflected readings of Durkheim—alongside a 
contemporary strand of American ‘Communitarian’ social science, you find, in the 
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former, anxiety operating as an independent variable, and described as a characteristic 
affect of the group being analyzed, in the latter, an implicit claim that the researcher 
embodies social concern. To complete the triangle (whose pseudo-Oedipal structure will 
become evident in a moment), at the same time that Communitarian and Moral 
Regulation studies were developing, a debate was developing around Carol Gilligan’s In 
A Different Voice (1982), a book that criticized the existing developmental psychology of 
Lawrence Kohlberg (1984) and put forward the notion of an ‘ethic of care’ based on 
women’s experiences and labour. Here the ‘ethic of care’ was presented as both an 
empirical finding and, implicitly, as a kind of ideal for feminist social science practice.
These three strands of social science constitute, broadly speaking, immediate 
precursors to what has been called the ‘affective turn.’83 The turn to affect, which Clough 
locates in the 1990s (2008:1), was motivated in part by mounting claims that 
contemporary theoretical developments, especially deconstruction, had neglected the 
body and, along with it, affect and emotion. Against the long-dominant Enlightenment 
notion of reason as triumphing over the passions, or over what Kant called ‘inclination,’ 
the turn to affect—initiated to a significant degree in philosophy by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987 [1980]) (and the work of their English translator 
Brian Massumi)—re-reads the philosophical lineage, giving new emphasis to Spinoza 
and Bergson and to their attempts to formulate reason as a kind of passion, as affective 
83  This chapter avoids discussing distinctions between affect, emotion, passion, pathos and so on. For 
sustained and useful discussions of these distinctions, see Terada (2001) and Clough (2008). I will also not 
engage the significant question of how to move between affect theory (e.g., Berlant 2011; Cvetkovich 
2012; Sedgwick 2003; Stewart 2007) and the sociology of emotions (e.g., Barbalet 2002; Hochschild 1975; 
1983; 1995; Turner 2011; Turner and Stets 2005).
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action. Following the broad lines of this turn, the three strands of research developed here 
all involve a critical re-reading of the idea of Enlightenment as the triumph of reason over 
emotional bias, the triumph that Weber tried to institutionalize along with sociology with 
his fact/value distinction. Each of these approaches makes affect or emotion (generally 
the more psychologically inflected term) in some sense inseparable from rationality. Each 
also tends to use affect, I would argue, as a kind of bridge between binaries of is and 
ought, fact and value, theory and practice—a means by which to provide a tacitly 
normative analysis of human sociality and a foundation for a sociology of morality based 
in a notion of human flourishing that contains, at the same time, a notion of social 
scientific flourishing conceived as the cultivation of a particular kind of affect. In short, 
these affective positions appear as possible solutions to the tragic conflict (social and not 
just psychological) between reason and the passions experienced and described by Weber. 
Thus, both communitarianism and the feminist ‘ethic of care’ perspective regularly argue 
that modern social life and also modern social science exhibit excessive detachment and 
abstraction, and that this needs to be addressed by recognizing the emotionally and 
relationally embedded nature of sociality and by helping to strengthen society’s affective-
relational structure (i.e., by contributing to healthier or more mature types or levels of 
social affect or emotion). In contrast to this, but still with a view to the structure of social 
affect, studies in moral regulation give an implicitly normative endorsement to a mature 
and courageous overcoming of anxiety, suggesting that contemporary capitalist society is 
organized by an underlying and immature (class) anxiety. We need the courage to grow 
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up, to think differently, rather than making scapegoats out of groups and individuals that 
appear to threaten our social position. The implicit claim, in other words, is that we are 
still too subject to emotional distortion of reason.
Studies in moral regulation come the closest to carrying forward Weber’s own 
project but, in an interesting way, they advance a more universalizing claim, rather than 
one confined to the vocation of science. All three approaches suggest that contemporary 
society suffers from an affective pathology, a collective emotional disorder or arrested 
development. By extension, they each suggest a task for social science that goes beyond 
description, interpretation, or understanding. What one approach defines as human 
flourishing, however (e.g., communitarian concern), another approach may define as 
pathological (e.g., bourgeois anxiety). The hermeneutics of suspicion can be deployed in 
several directions across these three perspectives in order to question the motives or 
affective qualities that characterize the respective projects.
To be sure, affective concepts have always been present in sociological 
explanation:84 anomie and egoism in Durkheim; alienation in Marx; Simmel’s notion of 
the city dweller’s blasé attitude; above all, Weber’s thesis concerning the role in the rise 
of capitalism of the salvation anxiety unleashed, in general terms, by the fragmentation of 
Christendom in the course of the Protestant Reformation and, more specifically, by the 
influence of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination (cf. Riesman et al. 2001:124). All of 
these classic sociological concepts also indicate affective pathologies of the social, and all  
84  See Parsons (1951) on ‘affective neutrality.’ See also the sociology of emotions tradition associated 
with Arlie Hochschild (1975; 1983; 1995; Hochschild and Thorne 1997), Jack Katz (1999), and others, as 
well as the more recent Emotions Matter collection (Hunt, Walby, and Spencer, eds. 2011).
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have been used, although not necessarily by their originator, to skirt the fact/value 
distinction in order to provide sociologists with a moral telos. However, while classical 
discussions of affect dealt with collective and individual (existential) crisis, especially in 
terms of religious and economic questions, they largely suppressed or otherwise failed to 
address the extent to which their understanding of affect was structured by issues of 
gender, ethnicity, racialization, and even class.85 The ideal scholar always turned out to be 
a bourgeois European male who rises above his petty bourgeois place in history to 
become an ascetic masculine hero, perhaps by joining the revolution, as Marx counselled, 
perhaps by simply ‘bearing’ the truth without self-deception, as Weber recommended.
The tensions and contradictions of these three late 20th century perspectives offer 
an opportunity to re-think the question of sociology as a vocation in light of an eventful 
century for issues of race, nation, gender, class, religion, sexual difference. This 
eventfulness envelops the rise of a professional academic class (or ‘cadre’) of 
sociologists. In light of the bankruptcy86 of the European masculine ascetic hero, what 
does the affective turn offer us in terms of how and why to be a sociologist? On one view, 
this broadens the notion of scientific vocation to include a fuller version of human 
‘flourishing’ or ‘maturity.’ At the same time, there are important limits to this way of 
thinking about the affective turn. Insofar as the tensions of society under late capitalism 
85  Alienation, like anomie, is only ambiguously a psychological/affective concept. Marx never addresses 
the affective bases of his own vocation (‘abandon ship!’ a ‘section’ of the bourgeoisie cries.). 
86  This bankrupt character continues to get considerable undeserved credit, of course. The claim of 
bankruptcy is here merely asserted (cf. Bologh 1990). Does this claim need to be defended? See, for 
support, the Nobel Prize winning work of Elfriede Jelinek.
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remain in force, we will be no more able to ‘resolve’ them than others were.87 Each of the 
perspectives that will be discussed seems to advance our thinking about affect and 
science, but also to run into difficulties in completing their projects theoretically (i.e., 
‘residual category’ problems, etc.). The turn to affect does not deliver a synthesis that 
would finally bridge, without remainder, the gap between is and ought, fact and value, 
producing a coincidence of the sociology of morality and the morality of sociology. 
Sociology cannot simply be turned into a method for transforming anxiety into concern, 
or detachment into care.88 The turn to affect delivers, rather, a negative dialectic, a 
constellation (Adorno 1973:162) of concepts that helps us to think about the affective 
tensions and contradictions in social life and social science. There is no one affective 
solvent for these tensions. What we encounter and experience are protensions between 
utopian hope and pessimistic realism; between the liberating pleasures of detached 
thought (the much-vaunted ‘life of the mind’) and those of un-theorized everyday 
involvement; between attachment to emergent practices and nihilistic impulses to do 
away with the present; between melancholia and the work of mourning.89
B. EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY & THE 20TH CENTURY
Weber’s model of science and of the vocation for science is a kind of culmination of 19 th 
century post-Christian thought, one important movement of which was the reconstruction 
87  See Lauren Berlant’s edited collection Compassion: The Culture and Politics of an Emotion (2004), for 
a literary critique of George W. Bush’s ‘compassionate conservatism.’ See also Cruel Optimism, where 
Berlant adverts to Ghassan Hage’s distinction between class worry (paranoia) and care (Berlant 2011:14).
88  As Sara Ahmed has argued (2010), to lay the blame for negative affect on those who perform critical 
analysis, to blame, for instance, the ‘feminist kill joy,’ is to miss the point in the worst way possible.
89  I am so far unconvinced by Lee Edelman’s (2004) attempt to theorize the link between queerness and 
the death drive, which posits a particular relationship between queer figurations and melancholia.
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of science on a secular (and ‘disenchanted’) basis. Weber takes us to an existentialist 
position after Nietzsche and Kierkegaard: we must look within. We must call ourselves, 
auto-interpellate. Thus the concept of anxiety assumes a central importance for science. 
We must face our vocation with fear and trembling, not before God, but before our own 
inner forces and potentiality, before our daimon. But if Weber moved us to the post-
Christian question of the individual calling, and if, at the same time, he emphasized the 
importance of Verstehen, he failed to move into a truly intersubjective or historicizing 
understanding of desire, impulse, calling, or will. Weber gives us a deeply searching 
meditation on what it means to be a German man in the early 20 th century, an heir to a 
tradition of masculine power whose father died, in a symbolic sense, either intestate or 
without an executor. In other words, the ‘greatness’ (again, cf. Bologh 1990) of Weber’s 
analysis is deeply limited by his failure to understand modern pluralism as more than a 
series of violent disagreements between men. His theory of charisma, discussed earlier, 
assumes but leaves unexamined the gendered elements of his conception. It sociologizes 
the effects of charisma, but not its origins. His discussion assumes that charisma, the pre-
legal source of law, is fundamentally masculine, and that its essential structure is 
submission to authority. Maternal (i.e., individual and collective ‘archaic prehistory’) 
charisma as care is undiscussed, but is, implicitly, the ‘traditional’ structure that is 
overcome (‘it is written but I say unto thee’) by the ‘real’ charismatic-masculine source of 
social energy. On this reading, the charismatic rebirth, renewal, or conversion (e.g., being 
‘born again’) appears to be, implicitly and perhaps also unconsciously, a renunciation of 
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the archaic-maternal even if it appears consciously and explicitly as a renunciation of the 
‘dead’ patriarchal law. Durkheim’s notion of ‘collective effervescence,’ by contrast, 
works with a more feminine-inflected model, in which the social body gives birth to 
itself. His conception of the importance of the organic division of labour, however, 
suggests that, in modernity, the return of the archaic collective mother would resemble 
the ‘attack of the blob,’ such that his rejection of revolution in favour of radical reform is 
also implicitly an attempt to suppress feminine power. This is one way of interpreting 
American communitarianism.
Anxiety’s conceptual and social significance only grew, after Weber’s death. The 
Weimar Republic, in place from 1919 until 1933, existed in an almost permanent state of 
political, economic, and cultural crisis until giving way to Hitler’s Nazi Party. Should we 
be surprised, then, that two of the most influential 20th century treatments of anxiety 
appeared in German-speaking Europe in 1926 and 1927? Martin Heidegger’s Being and 
Time was first published in 1927, just one year after the 1926 appearance of Freud’s 
Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety. Like Freud’s slim volume, Heidegger’s bulky tome 
made angst one of its central concepts. This coincidence was no accident. Nor is it an 
accident that anxiety should be an important topic in the German-speaking world after 
World War I. Furthermore it is not that odd that Heidegger, the German philosopher of 
existentialism and ontology, saw in anxiety the means of disclosure, the means of 
grasping the fundamental structure of Being (i.e., being German), while Freud, the Jewish 
Austrian psychoanalyst, saw in it a sign of the desperate attempt of the ego to achieve 
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‘civilization’ (i.e., enforce the ‘reality principle’) by means of a kind of deception (i.e., by 
sending an inhibiting danger signal to the id). For Heidegger, anxiety signalled, in a 
manner ominously similar to Carl Schmitt’s theory of the political, the need for decisive 
commitment. For Freud, it signalled an over-developed super-ego.
Freud interpreted anxiety in terms of the ego’s attempt to inhibit the instinctive 
drives and thereby to avoid punishment (and loss of love). He theorized a developmental 
sequence of danger situations and trauma situations: 1) the trauma of birth with its over-
excitation of the senses; 2) the fear of losing the loved object (i.e., the mother protector); 
3) the fear of castration (i.e., by the father); 4) the anticipation of punishment (i.e., 
enshrinement of the super-ego). Fully-developed anxiety, distinct from fear, which has a 
definite object, is a kind of free-floating orientation toward the world, an affect generated 
by trinitarian and largely unconscious interaction between id, ego, and super-ego:
Anxiety is therefore on the one hand an expectation of a trauma, and on 
the other a repetition of it in a mitigated form...Its connection with 
expectation belongs to the danger-situation, whereas its indefiniteness and 
lack of object belong to the traumatic situation of helplessness—the 
situation which is anticipated in the danger-situation. (Freud 1959:92)
Heidegger follows a similar line in distinguishing anxiety from fear: “fear is a fearing in 
the face of something threatening” (1962:391). For Heidegger, in fear one forgets oneself. 
In fear one becomes incapable of making a choice between the myriad possibilities for 
one’s life. Faced with every overwhelming thing in our environment, in bewilderment we 
‘make present’ whatever is ready to hand, like fleeing from a burning building while 
holding our bowl of breakfast porridge. In anxiety, by contrast, for Heidegger, the 
360
environment melts away, disappears. The world sinks into insignificance: “Anxiety is 
anxious in the face of the ‘nothing’ of the world” (393). Anxiety brings one back to “the 
pure ‘that-it-is’ of one’s ownmost individual thrownness” (394). Anxiety is not authentic 
Being, but it is its condition of possibility90: “it does not as yet have the character of the 
moment of vision, which temporalizes itself in a resolution. Anxiety merely brings one 
into the mood for a possible resolution. The Present of anxiety holds the moment of 
vision at the ready” (393). For anxiety to develop authentically, towards the resolute, 
Dasein “must know no fear” (395). In terms of temporality, “Anxiety springs from the 
future of resoluteness, while fear springs from the lost Present” (395).
For Heidegger “anxiety—together with Dasein itself as disclosed in it—provides 
the phenomenal basis for explicitly grasping Dasein’s primordial totality of Being” (227). 
This totality of Being, according to Heidegger, is care (sorge, related to Besorgen, 
translated as ‘concern’). Note, however, that, for Heidegger, the ontological structure of 
Dasein, its Being as care, “has nothing to do with ‘tribulation’, ‘melancholy’, or the 
‘cares of life’, though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein” (84). Care is, 
for Heidegger, a description of Dasein as Being-in-the-World. It is the ontological 
condition of possibility of having ontic ‘cares of life.’ It is our thrownness, our always 
already being in-the-middle-of-things, in medias res, that constitutes our Being as care. It 
is not a care for particular people and things: anxiety (angst) discloses, for those who do 
not turn to ontic distractions, our ‘being towards death,’ our mortality. Freud disagrees. 
90  “So to despair over something is not yet properly to despair. It is the beginning, or it is as when the 
physician says of a sickness that it has not yet declared itself” (Kierkegaard 1954:152).
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The fundamental question, then, between Freud and Heidegger, is whether death or the 
drives (Trieben) underwrite anxiety. From these opposed understandings of the origin and 
significance of anxiety Freud and Heidegger derive opposed understandings of guilt. For 
Heidegger, still cribbing from Kierkegaard, authentically facing our anxiety entails facing 
all the ways in which we have ‘fallen’ into inauthenticity, seeking refuge in particular 
cares, not facing our more primordial being as care, which exists prior to particular object 
choices and renders them, in a certain sense, arbitrary. For Freud, guilt should be 
weakened insofar as it signifies an over-developed and sadistic super-ego. To be sure, 
both Heidegger and Freud were concerned with Weber’s themes of individual 
authenticity as stoic masculine acceptance of ‘reality.’
For Heidegger, just as Dasein’s Being as care is a kind of a priori condition of 
particular cares, it is also to be distinguished from other derivative phenomena “such as 
will, wish, addiction, and urge” (227). According to Heidegger, “Care, as a primordial 
structural totality, lies ‘before’ [‘vor’] every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘situation’ of Dasein, 
and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them” (238). 
Heidegger goes on, however, to head off a mis-reading: 
[...] this phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the ‘practical’ 
attitude over the theoretical. When we ascertain something present-at-hand 
by merely beholding it, this activity has the character of care just as much 
as does a ‘political action’ or taking a rest and enjoying oneself. ‘Theory’ 
and ‘practice’ are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must be 
defined as ‘care’ (238).
In other words, both ‘theory’ and ‘practice’ already involve a “relation to entities within-
the-world” (238). In sum, “The phenomenon of care in its totality is essentially 
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something that cannot be torn asunder; so any attempts to trace it back to special acts or 
drives like willing and wishing or urge and addiction, or to construct it out of these, will 
be unsuccessful” (238).
For Freud, what is unconscious, or repressed, in everyday life, are the instincts, 
the drives, rather than, as in Being and Time, the fact of the non-relational end, Being-
towards-death. One’s own death is certain but indefinite, writes Heidegger. This makes 
the meaning of one’s own life taken-as-a-whole into an indefinite thing. Unlike every 
present-to-hand project organized within the ‘they’ self, the completion of one’s life as a 
project is simultaneously its negation, its turn to nothingness. For Freud (and also 
Nietzsche), to be shaken by the thought or reality of one’s own mortality or death is 
already to be inauthentic. To be afraid of death is to be afraid of a nothing, a shadow. 
Both Freud and Nietzsche show the influence of the Epicurean position,91 although 
diverging from it in the place that they give to the will. Epicurus advocates prudent 
management of the will, rather than exploring the possibility of bursting old limits 
(Nietzsche) or binding oneself to truth (Freud). According to Epicurus, “prudence is more 
precious than philosophy itself” (Epicurus 1964:132b).
According to Freud, anxiety has a ‘worldly’ cause. For Heidegger, however, the 
urge, the will that makes Being-ahead-of-oneself (focused on possibility as an 
instrumental ‘for-the-sake-of’), modifies and makes inauthentic the primordial structure 
of care. The Heidegger of Being and Time contends that drive and will “both turn out to 
be modifications of care” (1962:254). If care is prior to willing [Triebe], Freud wrongly 
91  “death is nothing to us” (Epicurus 1964:139).
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makes instinct the fundamental building block of our understanding of the human being. 
Care, the thrownness of Dasein, rather than drives, is the truly a priori structure. 
Heidegger equates authenticity with self-calling, asking, “is it at all necessary to keep 
raising explicitly the question of who does the calling? Is this not answered for Dasein 
just as unequivocally as the question of to whom the call makes its appeal? In conscience 
Dasein calls itself” (320).
I have set out some differences between Heidegger and Freud on the concept of 
anxiety in order to give perspective on the still unresolved question of vocational affect 
that haunts the three movements introduced at the beginning of this chapter. The thesis of 
this chapter, to reiterate, is that there is no one way of being ethically ‘in the mood’ for 
sociology. With Weber, Heidegger, and Freud, the question is still more or less the 
existentialist and masculinist question: How shall we face our fears?92 But has the ‘long 
century’ of existentialism ended since 9/11 and the beginning of the ‘War on Terror?’ 
Have we lost our nerve? Maybe. Perhaps not quite. Indeed, some strands of social science 
continue to advocate existentialist authenticity, whether of Weberian, Freudian, or 
Heideggerian variety, as a methodological starting-point. But perhaps losing one’s nerve 
is the right thing to do. Perhaps we need to soften up. Perhaps it is our calling.
In any case, it seems that we must take for granted, in a certain sense, that even 
beyond the existentialist move to ‘judge for yourself,’ a vocation involves, these days, a 
92  See May (1977) for an influential mid-century overview of the role of anxiety. This chapter can only 
assume as background, without focusing on, the extensive history of critical readings—from Karen Horney 
and Levinas, and the Frankfurt School onward—of Freud and Heidegger on the entanglement of 
authenticity and maturity with problematic assumptions about gender and sexuality.
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refusal of the conventionally constructed vocation. From Dorothy Smith to Louis 
Althusser to Pierre Bourdieu, sociology since Weber has urged us to rethink what ‘comes 
naturally.’ That is to say, the call ‘from within’ is not enough. The moral intuitions of our 
conscience, too, are subject to critique, subject to skeptical inquiry into the ‘symbolic 
violence’ which appears to discipline our intuitions, impulses, and desires.
One affective model, often implicit within communitarian thought, outlines a kind 
of dialectic, synthesizing the fundamental positions of care and anxiety to produce 
concern. On the Heideggerian model developed in Being and Time, the fundamental 
ontological structure of care enters a crisis when we move from a primary identification 
with the ‘they-self’ (in developmental term’s, Mead’s ‘I’ and ‘Me’), to the question of the 
autonomous self and the call of conscience. Successfully navigating this crisis means 
moving to particular concerns without lapsing into bad faith. One makes, for instance, a 
traditional practice into one’s own, but now as a conscious and resolute choice. Bellah et 
al.’s Habits of the Heart (1985), for example, actually tries to lead American culture 
through a crisis of anxiety over the contradiction between ‘individualism’ and community 
‘commitment,’ trying to point, like Riesman (2001), to the possibility of social autonomy.
If we take the Freudian position that at the base are drives, not care, anxiety still 
plays a critical role in the development of the psyche, whether in ‘normal’ or ‘neurotic’ 
directions. Here, however, anxiety is the super-ego. The methodological affect tacitly 
recommended by moral regulationists blends Heideggerian and Freudian positions, and 
moves toward a critical model of the social, according to which anxiety is simply the 
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‘claustrophobia’ (Adorno 1973:24) of bourgeois society, the ‘spectre’ haunting Europe. 
On this view, converting anxiety into solicitous concern is really a reaction formation, a 
regression into a self-idealizing fantasy. But let us turn to the cases at hand.
C. THE RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY? CONCERN AS SOCIOLOGICAL 
VOCATION
Research on ‘moral panics’ suggests that anxiety is an emotion that can be studied at the 
level of the social. It is an object of sociological research. On the other hand, in reading 
American sociology of a communitarian tone, one gets the impression that anxiety is 
something that rests in the activity of research. Bellah and his co-authors (1985, 1992) 
seem to be anxious about the future of American society, as do Wolfe (1989), and Robert 
Putnam, author of the best-selling Bowling Alone (2000). Are researchers anxious about 
their subjects? Are Canadian sociologists less anxious than American sociologists? Does 
American work arise from a fundamental attitude of ‘concern?’ while Canadian work 
arises from, for instance, ‘critique?’
The classic text of communitarian sociology is Habits of the Heart, published first 
in 1985 and co-authored by Robert Bellah and several others. This work drew its classical 
sociological insights from Tocqueville and Durkheim, but it was also influenced by 
contemporaries in philosophy such as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Alasdair 
MacIntyre, who were engaging in a philosophical debate at the same time (MacIntyre 
1984). Habits of the Heart quickly became a classic, and it continues to be an excellent 
text for framing the project of communitarian sociology that declared itself formally soon 
after. In 1990 a journal appeared, The Responsive Community (1990–2004), which 
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included, in its first volume, a platform outlining the ‘rights and responsibilities’ entailed 
in ‘responsive communitarianism.’ There were 58 signatories to this platform. While 
most were academics affiliated with American universities, there were also journalists, 
attorneys, and political figures. Prominent academic signatories included Benjamin 
Barber, Robert Bellah, Harvey Cox, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Amitai Etzioni, Terry Pinkard, 
Alice Rossi, Philip Selznick, and Dennis Wrong (Etzioni, ed. 1998:xxxvii–xxxix).93
The Responsive Communitarianism platform tries to strike a path between several 
binary oppositions (state and market; socialism and capitalism; liberalism and 
conservatism). Responsive Communitarianism emphasizes participatory democracy, and 
explicitly rejects, to counter its liberal critics, ‘majoritarianism.’ Pride of place among the 
institutions of civil society is given to the family, along with a qualified but clear 
affirmation of the nuclear, two-parent family as the ideal, explicitly rejecting the idea that 
extended families or communities can adequately replace mom and dad.94 Schools are the 
second major civil society institution. In the absence of ‘good families,’ schools need to 
take on ‘character formation and moral education’ as a serious aspect of their role, 
teaching “those values Americans share” (xxix).
For American communitarians, sociologists need to overcome detachment and 
neutrality and become concerned. They reject the notion of value neutrality (e.g., Etzioni 
93  Interestingly, the journal’s Editorial Board included, in 1997, some prominent scholars who did not sign 
the platform, including Nathan Glazer, Hans Joas, and Charles Taylor (Etzioni 1998:xx).
94  Contemporary communitarians constantly try to differentiate communitarianism from fascism. Liberal 
critics tend to remain unconvinced. Advocacy of the nuclear family is one of the tender points. Of the 
dozen women who signed the platform, two signed with the exception of the family section. See Arendt’s 
claim: “the family man...was also the great criminal of the century...Himmler’s over-all organization relies 
not on fanatics...it relies entirely upon the normality of jobholders and family men” (Arendt 2000:152).
367
2001:xiii). “How ought we to live?” is the first sentence of the preface to Habits of the 
Heart (1985:vi). Paraphrasing C. Wright Mills (1959) and his notion of the ‘sociological 
imagination,’ Bellah et al. declare their goal to be to bring moral questions out of the 
realm of “private anxiety” and into the realm of public “concern.” In their view “many 
doubt that we have enough in common to be able mutually to discuss our central 
aspirations and fears. It is one of our purposes to persuade them that we do” (1985:vi).
On the communitarian reading, social scientists, like everyone else, are inevitably 
drawn into making value judgments, drawn to “cross the line between sociology and 
ethics” (Etzioni 2001:xiv). Their task as social scientists is simply to justify these 
judgments in social scientific terms. One problem with this model, of course, is that it 
implicitly assumes purity of motive, even if it inserts caveats about fallibility and bias. 
Where does the hermeneutics of suspicion go? On this score, Habermasian proceduralism 
does more to ‘neutralize’ moralizing claims of concern.
The central figure of this academic project-cum-social movement was Amitai 
Etzioni, and the high point for the intellectual influence of sociological 
communitarianism, in the United States, at least, probably came around 1995, when 
Etzioni became President of the American Sociological Association. In his Presidential 
Address he argued that “Only a community that is responsive to the ‘true needs’ of all its 
members...can minimize the penalties of order and the dangers of autonomy” (1996a:1). 
Etzioni has a long history of connection with ideas of community. In the 1940s he studied 
with Martin Buber, who had been involved with and had written on the kibbutz 
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movement in Israel. References to the kibbutz movement pepper Etzioni’s books, from 
The Active Society (1968) to My Brother’s Keeper (2003).
In The Monochrome Society, published in 2001, Etzioni starts this way: “One 
theme runs through the chapters in this volume: the concern with social virtues and the 
social foundations on which they rest” (2001:xiii). Near the end of the book he claims 
that even the language of concern is not enough, going so far as to openly claim, against 
the advice of “One of my best friends” (221), that he is searching for a “moral voice.” In 
broad terms, Etzioni conceives of communitarianism as a progressive response to the 
impasses between liberalism and conservatism, “the tension between individual rights 
and social characterizations of the good” (xiii). Etzioni speaks often of this tension, 
usually with reference to developing a third way, which he comes to call “responsive 
communitarianism,” beyond liberal and conservative, left and right. Like others of his 
generation, Etzioni has moved from being what he describes as a “peacenik” (2005:5) to 
claiming, in his book on the Patriot Act, that
Americans should share the commitment to find a middle course, a third 
way, between those who are committed to shore up our liberties but who 
are blind to the needs of public safety, and those who in the name of 
security never met a right that they were not willing to curtail to give 
authorities an ever freer hand. (8)
According to Etzioni, America’s international military exploits should be guided by the 
principle of Security First (2007), focusing less on projects of “democracy-building” and 
more on interventions that support basic physical safety for people (1996b).95
95  Another signatory to the communitarian platform, Jean Bethke Elshtain, has also turned rather martial 
in the ‘post 9/11’ world, as in her security-focused Just War Against Terror: The Burden of American 
Power in a Violent World (2003).
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Another scholar actively involved in staking out the claims of communitarianism 
was Philip Selznick (1919–2010), one of Etzioni’s professors at Berkeley when Etzioni 
was completing his dissertation. One of the 1930s New York Trotskyites (Krygier 
2012:15–21), many of whom later shifted to the right (e.g., the husband and wife duo of 
Irving Kristol and Gertrude Himmelfarb), Selznick earned his PhD from Columbia in 
1947, under Robert Merton. He taught at UC Berkeley from 1952 until his retirement in 
1984. Turning from Trotsky to Robert Michels, Selznick made a scholarly name for 
himself through neo-Weberian contributions to the theory of bureaucracy (1943), to 
organizational theory (1948; 1949), and to leadership studies (1957). He wrote, along 
with Leonard Broom, an introduction to sociology (1973) that ran through numerous 
editions and influenced the discipline for decades. Selznick turned to legal sociology in 
the 1960s and 70s (Selznick 1969; Nonet and Selznick 1978), founding the Center for the 
Study of Law and Society at the University of California Berkeley in 1961 and co-
founding the Jurisprudence and Society Policy Program there in 1978 (Krygier 2012:3).
While Selznick did not move as far or as fast as some of the other young 
Trotskyites, by the early 1950s he was contributing to the American Cold War effort with 
projects like The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics 
(1952), published for and by the RAND Corporation, an American Cold War think tank 
formed in 1946 as Project RAND (a portmanteau of ‘research and development’), a 
project aimed at military research, development, and planning initially linked to the 
Douglas Aircraft Company (RAND “History and Mission” accessed April 30, 2014 
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http://www.rand.org/about/history.html). In this book, Selznick refers to the communist 
movement as inherently subversive and, although he calls the House Un-American 
Activities Committee “rather far removed from scientific objectivity” (1952:15–16), he 
endorses the use of the testimony and documentation that it collected. According to 
Selznick, The Organizational Weapon “...may be used as an advanced-training manual for 
anti-communist forces” (16). In short, in the time between entering City College New 
York in 1936, and taking up a post at UC Berkeley in 1952, a period during which he 
completed his undergraduate and graduate work, as well as US military service, Selznick 
shifted from anti-Stalinist Trotskyist to ‘realistic’ analyst of organizations and 
bureaucracies, an analyst that, influenced by both John Dewey and Reinhold Niebuhr, in 
his ‘mature’ sociological position came to reject communism in favour of communities. 96
After his retirement in 1984, Selznick published several summative statements of 
his sociological position (1992; 2002a; 2008). In his magnum opus, The Moral 
Commonwealth (1992), Selznick laid out what he called ‘liberal communitarianism.’ We 
can expect the differences between this model and Etzioni’s ‘responsive 
communitarianism’ to be subtle ones, for Selznick conspired with Etzioni in formulating 
sociological communitarianism and signed the ‘rights and responsibilities’ platform. In 
his ASA Presidential Address Etzioni cites The Moral Commonwealth as providing 
concepts directly parallel to his own approach (Etzioni 1996a:1). In 1994 Selznick 
published an article-length version of his ‘liberal communitarian’ position in the official 
96  Here is the short version of Selznick’s critique of Marx: “Marx did not face up to the realities of 
cooperation” (1992:145).
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journal of American sociological communitarianism, The Responsive Community (see 
also 2000; 2002b). While Selznick, like Etzioni, seeks to find a via media between liberal 
and conservative extremes, his emphasis on liberalism rather than ‘responsiveness’ may 
be worth pondering (cf. Barber 1998/1999).
It is also worth noting the heavy emphasis, in The Moral Commonwealth, on the 
American Pragmatic tradition, an emphasis largely absent from Etzioni’s writing, which 
tends rather to cite Durkheim. Selznick discusses Durkheim, noting his commitment to a 
science of morality (1992:141), but in setting out the liberal communitarian project he 
asserts, early on, that “we need to re-affirm the central tenets of American pragmatism” 
(17). Indeed, he sees communitarianism as the rightful heir to pragmatism.
Turning away from Trotsky (1969), Selznick turned to American Pragmatists John 
Dewey and George Herbert Mead. In particular, he endorses Dewey’s well-known 
argument, articulated in The Quest For Certainty (1929), in favour of “substituting search 
for security by practical means for quest of absolute certainty by cognitive means” 
(Dewey 1929:24 cited in Selznick 1992:16). This move is directly relevant to what I have 
referred to as ‘methodological affect.’ What mood should a sociologist be in? On 
Selznick’s reading, the project that began with the Reformation—which Weber still 
followed, in key ways: the “fateful intellectual strategy...[the]...effort to locate certainty in 
subjectivity” (1992:16)—has run its course. Rejecting both the classic ‘quest for 
certainty’ as well as the nihilistic ‘quest for uncertainty’ characteristic of solipsistic late 
modernity, Selznick turns to pragmatism and to Dewey’s ‘search for security.’
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The notion that social science, along with other human activities, should be 
engaged in a search for security, implies a methodological affect grounded “in the 
problem-solving experience of human communities” (16), practices developed as a 
“response to felt needs and difficulties” (99). This reform approach differs from Trotsky’s 
revolutionary approach, of course, but it also differs from Weber’s ‘demands of the day’ 
approach, since Weber’s view is that action in modernity begins with a decision between 
incompatible alternatives involving contradictory worldviews and the ever-present 
possibility that one will have to make a deal with the devil. While Weber emphasizes the 
importance of leaders and decision-making, the pragmatists emphasize team-work and 
communication (e.g., Mead 1967). Selznick had his own Michels-inspired leadership 
analysis, but he focused on organizational qualities rather than decisions. On Selznick’s 
Deweyan reading, when social science is drawn into the general ambit of human-activity-
as-problem-solving, as necessarily transcending the separation of theory and practice as 
well as means and ends, it also mitigates overwhelming affects, producing researchers 
who are practically concerned but neither panicky nor focused obsessively on inner 
certainty or absolute truth. With the Deweyan search for security, we acknowledge the 
fragility of the mortal human, but respond to this fragility with practical solutions and 
protections, instead of an overly cognitive (or politically obsessive) ‘quest for certainty,’ 
or a symbolic ‘denial of death’ (cf. Becker 1973) that is ultimately escapist, impractical, 
and tends to stagnate around its dogmatic limits instead of continuing to grow and 
develop.
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Against Weber’s still transcendental notion of ultimate values, Selznick follows 
Dewey’s resolute (cf. Heidegger) naturalism. Take, for instance, the way that Dewey uses 
the notion of ‘participation,’ a heavy-duty concept in Scholastic (i.e., Thomist) theology. 
Instead of a mystical connection to a transcendental God, Dewey describes participation 
as occurring “when an organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment...[so as 
to]...secure the stability necessary to living” (Dewey 1958:15). Sharing or participating in 
the patterns of the environment generates a “harmonious feeling...[and]...when the 
participation comes after a phase of disruption and conflict, it bears within itself the 
germs of a consummation akin to the aesthetic” (15). Dewey’s notion of participation 
appears to avoid the perplexity about vocation that Weber found so troubling, largely 
because Weber still approached it in terms of the self-relation of the Kantian unified 
subject. On a pragmatic reading, the question of vocation only becomes relevant in the 
course of practical problems that are not once-for-all existential absolutes, but problems 
for which various proximate solutions—each of which may move one in the direction of 
personal growth, development, and expansion—may be devised.
The fact that Dewey reads vocation in pragmatic and interpersonal terms relates, 
in general, to his non-existentialist approach to anxiety. For Dewey, the fundamental 
question is not ‘being-towards-death,’ but how to be ‘fully alive.’ To be fully alive is to be 
caught up in the present, ‘involved’ in the here and now, preoccupied neither with the past 
nor the future: “Only when the past ceases to trouble and anticipations of the future are 
not perturbing is a being wholly united with his environment and therefore fully alive” 
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(18).97 In keeping with his emphasis on participation, the real problem with the ‘quest for 
certainty,’ for Dewey, is not the issue of denying death or otherwise avoiding thoughts of 
mortality, but withdrawal from the world.98 The communitarian link, here, is that the 
world that one withdraws from is also the world of human relations and interpersonal 
cooperation. On this view, the search for security is a practical project for establishing a 
(community) future full of promise. Security is also a basic condition for scientific 
practice, a condition that scientific practice directs itself both to maintain and to extend, 
at least when it understands the limits of its own capacities.
In keeping with my established practice, however, I would like to make a note, 
here, of the literal meaning of ‘security.’ The Latin se cura means ‘free from care.’ For 
Dewey, security of this sort comes through successful adaptation, “For only when an 
organism shares in the ordered relations of its environment does it secure the stability 
essential to living” (Dewey 1958:15). Still, security is not detached spectatorship; it is a 
product of participation, and as Toulmin points out (2002:xiv), any sociological 
epistemology developed under the influence of Dewey would need to take account of 
Dewey’s pragmatic critique of both the classical notion of theoria as the onlooker’s 
activity as well as the modern empiricist spectator model (whether spectating on the 
external or internal world) that Nagel called the ‘view from nowhere’ (1986).  
For a couple of reasons, we should not take Dewey’s ‘search for security’ as 
completely representing Selznick’s liberal communitarian view. First, Selznick takes a 
97  cf. Benjamin’s ‘Angel of History.’
98  The relevant dispute, here, is with Heidegger’s notion of ‘thinking.’
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less rosy and optimistic view of human nature. Against Dewey’s optimism Selznick poses 
the ‘realism’ of Reinhold Niebuhr, and evidence of the “human potential for iniquity” 
(1992:182) demonstrated by the Holocaust and other horrors.99 Second, Selznick lays 
more emphasis than does Dewey on the importance of concrete primary social relations, 
especially those of the family. Nevertheless, we may look, for instance, to Selznick’s 
response to the Berkeley free speech movement in the mid-1960s as instructive in this 
regard. In a response to his sociology colleague Nathan Glazer, who had written a 
broadly negative response to the student demonstrations, Selznick argued that 
“Something basically good has happened here” (1965:80). Here we return to the general 
ambit of ‘liberal communitarianism.’ The Berkeley free speech movement, the anti-
Vietnam war movement, should be taken as movements towards participation, and not as 
fundamentally anti-social. Indeed, protest and conflict, within certain parameters, may 
indeed be what clarifies and establishes the common core of social values, the capacities 
for cooperation needed by communities. In this context, we may read social movements 
as attempts to confront the paradoxical traditions of the United States, correctives for the 
paradoxes of ‘individualism’ and commitment’ described by Bellah et al. as having 
generated “glorious, but terrifying, isolation”:
American cultural traditions define personality, achievement, and the 
99  Krygier calls Selznick a “Hobbesian idealist” (Krygier 2012:10). Although the realism of Robert 
Michels influenced Selznick to turn from Trotsky, he distanced himself from Michels’ pessimistic view of 
human nature, seeing oligarchy as an outcome that could be avoided with better organizational science:
Michels had the idea that leaders try to stay in office and exploit their privileges because 
it is inherent in human nature to seek power and retain it...This proposition is not really 
necessary to his argument. He need only have postulated ordinary human desire for 
security, comfort, and status. These motivations...adequately explain the drift to 
oligarchy. (Selznick 1992:245)
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purpose of human life in ways that leave the individual suspended in 
glorious, but terrifying, isolation. These are limitations of our culture, of 
the categories and ways of thinking we have inherited, not limitations of 
individuals...who inhabit this culture. (Bellah et al. 1985:6)
It is not an accident, I think, that American communitarians tend to deploy the language 
of ‘concern’ rather than of ‘care.’ So what is the difference? One way of thinking about it 
is that the two terms tend to be coded differently in terms of gender. The attitude of 
concern preserves a certain paternal distance between subject and object. To be concerned 
is to be concerned with some thing; it is to take something up, to broach the possibility of 
an attachment. Concern is solicited, it is inaugurated, set in motion, by anxiety. Care, on 
the other hand, connotes a more primordial bond, a ‘being-with.’ Care is discursively 
coded, in general terms, as maternal. Concern, on the other hand, involves a degree of 
distance that more consistently connotes paternalism. Communitarianism runs on a 
discursively paternalistic track. The paternalism of concern is aided by the community, 
and involves a sublimated patriarchy, rewritten in paternal terms. A more intimate 
marriage of the genders, with the social scientist, a moral philosopher in disguise (Wolfe 
1989), appearing as a kinder, gentler patriarch (and occasionally a matriarch). The 
concept of community provides a pseudo-synthesis of the family and the state, one which 
‘saves’ cultural traditions and makes them ‘voluntary,’ ‘local,’ and characterized by 
‘involvement.’ The concept of community saves the possibility of justifying a 
hierarchical division of labour; it preserves the subject-object split in the notion of 
concern. The emphasis on voluntarism masks a subversion of the democratic process, a 
reversion to ‘community leaders.’
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Communitarians walk a middle path, the path of the kinder and gentler father that 
allows his children to experiment, to explore, but sets pragmatic limits and boundaries. 
He is a pluralist, not a radical relativist, and not in Weber’s sense of pluralism as a 
pitched battle between warring gods, but in the tradition of American pragmatism 
(Selznick 1992:91–116). The warm paternalism of communitarianism strikes a balance, 
seemingly, between the ‘cold monster’ of the State and the ‘hot monster’ of the 
completely private family. This ‘Goldilocks’ approach is more passenger than driver of 
discourse, however, and we would do well not to ride too far on this particular gravy train 
of connotation. As ‘warm’ as community may feel, we should not be caught napping. 
Selznick criticizes Foucault’s wild use of metaphor (Selznick 1992:260), but it seems that 
the question is not whether but which metaphor. Is ‘the common’ a good place to start?
There are numerous problems with the concept of ‘community,’ a concept which, 
in use, often presumes what is dubitable, the existence of a shared social object (i.e., the 
common). Here we do not focus on the concept, but have simply travelled along with the 
affective connotations of communitarian discourse. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to 
rehearse some extant critiques of community. For Zygmunt Bauman, for example, 
communitarianism was just the latest iteration of the views of the ‘power holders.’ When 
power holders change, “social thought, promptly and obligingly, changes the tune” 
(2000:75), here moving from neo-imperialism and universalism to territorial 
retrenchment, distinctiveness, and the preservation of boundaries. According to Bauman, 
Community advertises itself as the cozy home amidst a hostile and 
dangerous city...the promise of freedom from fear...But again, the reality is 
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all too often the opposite. Given the endemic brittleness of foundations, 
community can ill afford anything but full and militant dedication to the 
cause; its self-appointed guardians are day and night on the lookout, 
searching for real or putative traitors...the craved for coziness of belonging 
is offered at the price of unfreedom. (76)
Instead of promoting morality, a boundary-obsessed community undermines individual 
responsibility and encourages double standards, with one set of rules for ‘us’ and another 
for ‘them’ (77). This form of us/them moralization does not support genuine morality. 
Instead “It replaces the torments of moral responsibility with the certainty of discipline 
and submission” (77). For Bauman, community cannot remove the uncertainty of our 
individual moral choices, for “uncertainty is not a temporary nuisance, which can be 
chased away through learning the rules, or surrendering to expert advice, or just doing 
what others do. Instead it is a permanent condition of life” (78). Bauman goes further, 
suggesting that moral selves develop through these experiences of moral uncertainty (78). 
Still, Bauman closes with a Durkheimian claim (although he would deny this) about the 
‘intimate connection’ between individual autonomy and a fully self-reflective political 
community, one that seems to bring him right back into line with both Etzioni and 
Selznick’s liberal communitarianism. Bauman is concerned, too!
D. ANXIETY THEORY IN STUDIES IN MORAL REGULATION
American communitarian research presents a concerned researcher focused on providing 
guidance to a well-intentioned but sometimes confused American people. The case is 
different with another kind of study often appearing in Canada and Great Britain and 
associated with concepts like ‘moral regulation,’ ‘moral panic’—a term originating in 
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Stanley Cohen’s work (2011 [1972])—and, later, ‘governmentality.’ In a critical 
retrospective discussion, Alan Hunt grouped this work together with some others under 
the label ‘Anxiety Theory’ (1999b:509). Here, anxiety primarily appeared as a causal 
explanation for a particular social phenomenon. Most commonly, anxiety was posited as 
an independent variable influencing members of the middle-class to engage in a variety 
of moral regulation projects aimed at poorer, more marginalized groups. Indeed, 
communitarians are, at times, the object of ‘anxiety theory.’ In other words, we have, 
within sociology, the interesting phenomenon of one school implicitly making another 
school into the object of study. This is significantly different from directly addressing and 
or debating the other school, which does not appear to have happened in any substantial 
manner. Indeed, there is a remarkable dearth of cross-referencing between the two 
research streams. Mutual ignorance is the less likely explanation. The more likely 
explanation is that both are engaging, at least sometimes, in one of the most effective 
rhetorical strategies available—probably more effective than the ‘straw-man’ strategy—
that of strategic silence, erasing opponents altogether (cf. preterition).
While anxiety theory can be found outside of moral regulation studies (e.g., 
prefigured and influenced by Foucault and Foucaultians of the 1960s and 70s), here we 
will focus on the specific strand of moral regulation studies that Hunt describes. In the 
introduction to an edited collection appearing in 1994 under that title, Mariana Valverde 
gives us a general overview:
Moral regulation is a concept developed from the late seventies onward as 
part of a simultaneous synthesis and critique of Marxist, Durkheimian, and 
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Foucaultian analyses of bourgeois society. The conventions and routines 
that often have been regarded as mere cultural expressions of, or covers 
for, class formation, from unwritten dress codes to national spectacles, are 
given detailed consideration by scholars analyzing how these codes for 
everyday living legitimize and naturalize certain ways of being human 
while marginalizing all other ways...these regulatory processes are 
consistent with the economic processes of capitalism... (Valverde 1994b:v)
The concept of moral regulation, in other words, served to focus research on the details of 
cultural practice that the base/superstructure model of vulgar Marxism considered to be 
relatively secondary and unimportant. Moral regulation studies coalesced in Canada and 
Great Britain around the work of Philip Corrigan. His book The Great Arch: English 
State Formation as Cultural Revolution (1985), co-authored with Derek Sayer, 
emphasized the importance of close studies of concrete efforts by the State at organizing 
and normalizing attitudes and practices, including practices that institutionalize the State 
itself, as well as the emergence of social science. This work draws both on Durkheim’s 
theory of the State as an organ of moral reflection (1957) and on Foucault’s genealogical 
approach to institutionalizing practices, while remaining classifiably Marxist in basic 
orientation (cf. Ruonovaara 1997). While teaching in Toronto, in the 1980s, Corrigan 
influenced the rise of a Canadian school of moral regulation studies. Thus, at the same 
moment that Amitai Etzioni was launching The Responsive Community in the United 
States, across the border, in Canada, a group of scholars were initiating research projects 
into the voyeuristic and prying paternalism of social science. One of these scholars was 
Mariana Valverde. In her book about turn of the century moral regulation in Canada, The 
Age of Light Soap and Water, she made this claim about the origins of social science 
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research:
...the work of knowing the poor became a great deal more than a means to 
the end of remedying poverty: it became a science for its own sake—
social science, a term that in the late nineteenth century included the 
present-day fields of sociology and social work...This investigation began 
with the kitchens, clothes, and cupboards of the poor, but it did not end 
there: the prying gaze of philanthropy sought to penetrate the innermost 
selves of the poor, including their sexual desires... (1991:21)
 
Valverde’s edited collection appeared three years after The Age of Light, Soap, and Water, 
in 1994, as a special issue of the Canadian Journal of Sociology100, and would serve as a 
convenient starting point of comparison with The Essential Communitarian Reader, 
edited by Amitai Etzioni and published in 1998. Here we will briefly address only one 
example, the respective treatments of the family. Studies in Moral Regulation features an 
article, by Margaret Little, that explores how governmental policies, like the Ontario 
Family Benefits Act “help to stigmatize the poor and encourage all those around them to 
scrutinize their daily behaviour” (1994:234). In “Manhunts and bingo blabs: the moral 
regulation of Ontario single mothers” (233–249), Little argues that poor single mothers in 
Ontario are subjected to a variety of intrusive practices enacted by social workers, public 
officials, and neighbours, in return for meagre food allowances that are insufficient even 
to meet the nutritional standards of Canada’s Basic Food Guide (237–239). These 
intrusive practices exhibit both middle-class voyeuristic pleasure, as well as bourgeois 
class anxiety. On the other side, The Essential Communitarian Reader features an article 
emphasizing the importance of the nuclear family, and the efforts of the ‘good mother’ in 
100  Making Normal: Social Regulation in Canada (Brock 2003) is a more recent collection of social and 
moral regulation studies. Arguably, the struggle against giving moral or ethical legitimacy to the ‘normal’ 
continues to gain ground (e.g., Spade 2011; Halberstam 2012; Warner 1999).
382
a bad neighbourhood (Galston 1998:145–156). Thus, on the one side, intrusive over-
regulation is criticized and explained by bourgeois class anxiety. On the other side, 
anxiety/concern about the erosion of the family as a basic community institution 
motivates arguments about the importance of traditional social structures. A side-by-side 
comparison of the two collections reveals discussions of similar issues (the ECR also 
includes numerous chapters by authors critical of communitarianism, including articles 
by Charles Taylor and Ralf Dahrendorf), but almost none of the same references, and 
above all, for our purposes, with a different methodological affect.
Perhaps the best way to address the question of ‘methodological affect’ in moral 
regulation studies is to follow the trajectories of two particular scholars. Mariana 
Valverde and Alan Hunt both produced historical studies of moral regulation that used 
anxiety in the way that I have described. But their approach to research, and to anxiety, 
appear to have altered in the late 1990s, signalling a kind of decline of ‘anxiety theory,’ if 
perhaps only a temporary one in the light of the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror,’ which seems 
to turn a particular range of related emotions into a basis for the foreign policy of 
numerous Western nations. We begin with Valverde, who describes her work, in an article 
from 1997, as that of an “historian of social, moral and legal regulation” (1997:253).
In Mariana Valverde’s work, a changing deployment of anxiety develops over the 
course of several texts. From the late 1980s until the late 1990s, Valverde’s work fits 
fairly well into the category of ‘studies in social and moral regulation.’ Before and after 
that period, however, her approach changes, at least to anxiety. To begin, Sex, Power, and 
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Pleasure, Valverde’s “sex book” (1987:9) was a direct attempt to open a breach between 
her approach to social investigation and the traditional model of expert scientific concern. 
This book takes the anxiety of men concerning female independence and autonomy, 
particularly with respect to sexual pleasures, as one of its main themes. According to 
Valverde, “what is threatening, and what most men are unable to imagine, is a fulfilled 
female life that proceeds independently of men” (99). Valverde also addresses the 
anxieties of middle-class heterosexual feminists, suggesting that “When heterosexual 
feminists fail to support lesbian initiatives, it is not only through incorrect political ideas. 
It is also because certain emotional reactions and gut feelings prevent them from thinking 
clearly. Lesbians by their very presence often make heterosexual women uncomfortable 
and anxious” (106). Thus, the theme of anxiety is already present in this earlier work, by 
Valverde, but it is not really a work of ‘anxiety theory’ or of ‘moral regulation.’ Valverde 
calls this book “a critical work that would be helpful to women (and men) who were 
looking for not sexual cookbooks but for analyses to help them think differently and more 
clearly about the whole subject” (9). However, it is “not just an intellectual project” (10), 
nor does it use anxiety as a kind of central hypothesis or as a [quasi]-independent 
variable. Indeed, in stressing the commonness of anxiety, and the need for pragmatic 
working-through of practical issues, Valverde sets out a position that she will return to in 
the late 1990s, in Diseases of the Will (1998).
In the meantime, however, Valverde’s next book, The Age of Light, Soap, and 
Water (1991) is more clearly classifiable as a study of moral regulation. Valverde 
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acknowledges the influence of Corrigan and Sayer, but suggests that The Great Arch 
focuses too narrowly on the state, obscuring the regulatory effects of civil society actors 
and organizations (1991:171n.34). In thinking about the subjectivities of non-state actors 
and organizations, anxiety provides an excellent ‘residual category.’ Here the anxieties of 
the late 19th century and early 20th century English Canadian middle-classes serve as a 
form of explanation for moral regulation projects around things as exotic as ice-cream 
(and the Italian immigrants selling it). Anxieties provide only a partial explanation. 
Valverde also attributes much to positive projects of nation-building. Nevertheless, 
references to anxiety, rooted primarily in initial references to the notion of a ‘moral 
panic,’ a concept developed in the 1970s, occur at important points in the text, never in 
the form of an explicit thesis or named as the ‘independent variable,’ but located in key 
positions, nonetheless. Valverde states, explicitly, the analytical importance of “capitalist 
social formation” (15) and the impossibility of making ultimate decisions between the 
influence of race, class, and gender on these ongoing developments. Nevertheless, 
throughout the book, whose subtitle is Moral Reform in English Canada, 1885–1925, 
Valverde tends to refer projects of moral regulation and ‘reform’ to English middle-class 
anxieties about social change and about potential status threats.
On the broad question of affect, one of the first major theses of The Age of Light, 
Soap, and Water refers to the power of imagery to affect consciousness. According to 
Valverde, “metaphors and allegories work differently on people’s consciousnesses than 
do systematic literary or philosophical texts” (12).101 Systematic texts, writes Valverde, 
101  Another detailed attempt to explore the power of popular images and discourses may be found in Paul 
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have less influence than those that are “short, popular, and are geared to action” (12). 
Furthermore, popular texts can contain (like a Trojan Horse) complicated subtextual 
explanations for social developments. Valverde puts it this way: “...the emphasis 
throughout is on what I call ‘slippages.’ For example, a discourse on single women could 
easily have a strong and complex subtext on race, or a discourse apparently on race and 
immigration might slip into moral categories” (13–14). At the conclusion of her preface, 
Valverde more systematically outlines this thesis of ‘slippages’ in relation to her 
explanation for “various moral panics” (14):
The presence of constant slippages makes it impossible to determine 
whether a particular statement or a genre of statements (for instance, about 
the moral dangers posed to middle-class Canada by British female 
domestics) was really about class or about gender. Moral panics, I 
conclude, are by definition multidimensional, and the social anxiety 
associated with them is probably rooted in the unconscious coming 
together or condensation of different discourses, different fears, in a single 
image. (14)
Valverde draws on the Freudian notion of condensation, here, which refers to a symbolic 
return of the repressed, for example, in the way that dreams seem to combine various 
experiences, to switch between situations, and so on. In a review article from 1992, 
Valverde reiterated the anxiety thesis, returning to the political economy underlying 
social situations, suggesting that 19th century social interventionism, the precursor to the 
welfare state, “masked an anxiety about the production of the social/moral preconditions 
of capitalist accumulation” (1992:215). Speaking more broadly, Valverde suggested that 
“from 19th-century liberalism to today’s social democracies, one can detect among the 
Gilroy’s ‘There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack’ (1987), a work that builds on the classic British analysis 
of ‘moral panic’ by Stuart Hall and others, Policing the Crisis (Hall et al. 1978).
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ruling classes a profound uneasiness about the ability of the working class to reliably 
reproduce disciplined young workers, self-sacrificing poor mothers, and all the other 
identities making up what I call the moral capital of the poor” (215). The philanthropy 
practiced by the ruling classes is “not moved by compassion but rather by anxiety” (216).
Valverde suggests that bourgeois anxieties, expressed as moral judgements, need 
to be directly addressed in criticizing capitalism, for “moral/cultural struggles are just as 
important as class struggle in challenging capitalism” (218). On the basis of this point, 
Valverde suggests an important limitation of social democratic projects that challenge 
class relations and economic distribution without challenging predominant bourgeois 
moral concepts of ‘character.’ As she points out, “Even Marx resorted to bourgeois moral 
clichés when attempting to separate the honest proletariat from the ‘lumpen’” (219). In 
this early-90s period, Valverde’s version of the moral regulation approach used ‘anxiety 
theory’ to go beyond Marx’s general critique of bourgeois hypocrisy.
In an article called “Moral Capital” (1994b), however, Valverde made a number of 
important statements which, without explicitly criticizing the concept of anxiety, turned 
to Bourdieu’s ‘neo-Marxist’ concept of ‘capital’ to develop a further critique of middle-
class morals, a discussion that included a critique of Foucault and of ‘neo-Durkheimians’ 
(214). This article presaged a move away from the narrow form of moral regulation 
studies that provides the best foil for American communitarian concern.
Diseases of the Will (1998), Valverde’s remarkable study of alcoholism, shares 
with her earlier moral regulation studies and much other Foucaultian work, the (intended) 
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effect of subtly but steadily holding ‘Victorian’ anxieties up to ridicule, as in the section 
where Valverde describes the rather comical post-prohibition attempt to eliminate beer 
parlours (160). At the same time, however, in this book Valverde moderates references to 
bourgeois anxiety and focuses on particular ‘technologies’ of liberal governance as well 
as practices that may resist this governance, giving more space to the notion of a common 
and shared set of anxieties that many people experience in the face of everyday problems. 
In the face of these anxieties, Valverde returns more explicitly to some of the themes 
organizing Sex, Power, and Pleasure, as this summary statement makes clear:
Of course, the people for whom this book is ultimately written—those 
who seek to understand and transform themselves by experimenting with 
ways of understanding and changing the relation between consumption, 
desire, and freedom—are hardly to be blamed for the absence of a 
democratic public sphere. It is in all probability the absence of such a 
sphere...that has in the first place led to the felt need for micro-public 
spheres encompassing only those affected by a particular condition or 
injury. And an understanding of history is in this case not directly helpful, 
given the dearth of historical precedents for democratic and inclusive 
public spheres. (Valverde 1998:204)
One such micro-public sphere, according to Valverde, is the AA meeting. Indeed, 
Valverde devotes considerable space to a discussion of the practices of Alcoholics 
Anonymous. Valverde expresses admiration for AA, but only to a point, criticizing their 
essentialist and ontological (rather than pragmatic) approach to alcoholic identity. Her 
highest compliment is to say that it is not ‘disciplinary.’ According to Valverde, “The 
nineteenth century clinical/disciplinary techniques described by Foucault—hierarchical 
observation, classification, and so forth—are overtly refused. In AA, there is a positive 
refusal to collect information about anyone but oneself” (124). We have, here, “an ethical 
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gaze” (124) not a clinical one. She calls AA “one of the most successful challenges to the 
authority of the medical and psy experts that this century has seen” (123). Valverde 
concludes Diseases of the Will in fairly orthodox Foucaultian manner, with some brief 
reflections on the possibility of understanding oneself differently, of experimenting on 
and transforming the self and various relations with the self; in short, the book concludes 
with a refusal to think the self in terms of identity. On the other hand, against a rigorous 
existentialist demand for self-sufficiency and authenticity, the kind that stares anxiety in 
the face and overcomes it, the last lines of the book suggest something a little less 
demanding. Against the paradoxical liberal formulations about individual free will, 
Valverde suggests, speaking about an imagined better world, that “the citizens of this 
wholly fictional community are different from us in that, in discussing their hopes for 
freedom and their fears about compulsion, they do not feel compelled to deploy 
abstractions such as the free will. And that alone would be a blessing” (205). This rather 
crypto-Christian hope for heaven, where one is relieved, finally, of the temptation of 
disobedience to which a free will is always subject, and can relax into the embrace of the 
divine, retreats, it seems to me, from a hardline Marxist refusal to acknowledge the 
validity of bourgeois affect or bourgeois morality. Jumping back a few lines, we get 
another nod to the ‘poetry of the past’ in Valverde’s conclusion that: “The fiction of a 
public sphere that neither medicalizes our compulsions nor rationalizes our capacity for 
freedom...may serve to inspire us as we scavenge for useful bits among the ethical and 
intellectual fragments of our present...serve us better than the alternatives” (205).
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In an article published in 2002, Valverde makes a new move in the realm of 
methodological affect. In “Justice as Irony: A Queer Ethical Experiment,” Valverde 
grapples with the tension that Weber faced in ‘Science as a Vocation,’ between the 
undeniable fact of pluralism/relativism and the practical decisions demanded by everyday 
life. Turning to Nietzsche, just as Weber did, Valverde develops an argument that exhibits 
less nostalgia and more hope than Weber does. In it, she recommends that scholars and 
political actors adopt an ironic stance, and a habit of making fun of their own pretensions 
to the truth. According to Valverde, “A certain ironic self-deprecation enables us to act 
politically while at the same time admitting that in our post-Nietzschean world, it is not 
possible to derive ethical and political choices from any absolute political and ethical 
truths” (2002:86). Here Valverde moves away from the tone of ‘anxiety theory,’ which 
tends to reserve mockery for the bourgeoisie, those subject to ‘moral panic.’ She does not, 
however, rule this tactic out:
This ironic stance may well be accompanied by either a parody of the 
authorities we challenge or an angry tirade against them. But whether we 
choose postmodern parody or classic jeremiads as our discursive practice 
in regard to oppressive power, irony is a helpful stance to take in respect to 
our own position. A lesson that I have drawn from my own history of 
activism...is that when political movements lose their irony, their sense of 
humor...then do movements become uncomfortably similar to the powers 
they seek to challenge. (86) 
Here Valverde makes an important move in the tradition of methodological reflection. 
Suspicious of expertise, she attempts to limit, as Weber did, the range of her influence 
and the scope of her claims. Here the question, addressed in a law journal, is the question 
of justice. Experiencing and knowing about injustice, Valverde tells us, does not mean 
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knowing about or representing justice, for “...none of us can claim to either do or to know 
justice” (87). When we act, we end, instead, in the realm of law, not the realm of justice.
In the second half of the article, Valverde engages in an extended reflection on the 
relationship between this irony and the question of gender (and its limits), taking as her 
starting point Hegel’s claim, in his discussion of Antigone, that womankind is ‘the 
everlasting irony of the community.’ In working through the gender binary that both 
sexists and feminists use to read the social (94), Valverde suggests that, if womankind 
was the irony of the Greek community, it may be that the irony of contemporary life is to 
be found in “queer attitudes and acts” (95) that continue to activate, for instance, our 
anxieties about sexuality, attitudes in the face of which those without the ability to 
recognize the joke of gender are left with “deadpan, fetishistically detailed forensic 
discourse...[and]...the essential humor of the human belief in the necessity of the gender 
binary has been lost to human beings themselves” (100). Drag queens, in the end, make 
other people look silly rather than themselves, and dignity lies in recognizing one’s clown 
status, rather than in avoiding such recognition (cf. Warner 1999). In this article we see a 
return to the more pragmatic and multivalent affects dealt with in Sex, Power, and 
Pleasure. ‘Anxiety theory’ is still deployed, but more openly embedded within a plurality 
of affects, which are also taken on in the writing style.
By 2006, when Valverde publishes Law and Order: Images, Meanings, Myths, she 
has settled into a more ‘balanced’ approach to anxiety. Here is how she frames this book 
about crime, public sentiments, and popular culture: “‘fear of crime’ needs to be 
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understood in a larger frame. Fear of crime is a mostly negative emotion that is part of a 
larger and less negative psychic process, namely people’s strong, passionate desire for 
safety and order” (11). Here Valverde makes some significant concessions, moving away 
from existentialist-Marxist absolutism and distinguishing between moral panics and 
legitimate forms of anxiety, transformed into positive terms, here, as the ‘strong, 
passionate desire for safety and order’ (which moves her in the direction of Mary 
Douglas, 2002). We turn, now, to Alan Hunt, whose work contains a similar trajectory.
Alan Hunt has been both a practitioner and a critic of what we have called, 
following his own usage, ‘anxiety theory.’ His first big book was The Sociological 
Movement in Law (1978). This was followed by two books on Marx (1979; 1980), and 
several books on law (Hunt and Fitzpatrick 1987; Hunt 1992; 1993). Foucault and Law: 
Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (Hunt and Wickham 1994) explicitly marks 
Hunt’s entry into the realm of moral regulation studies, followed by Governance of the 
Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (1996), both a study in moral 
regulation and an example, self-confessed, of “anxiety theory” (1999b).
1999 is the pivotal year, with respect to anxiety. In this year he published his third 
book-length work of ‘moral regulation,’ Governing Morals: A Social History of Moral 
Regulation. In this book anxiety plays just the kind of important role in studies in moral 
regulation that we have been asserting:
This chapter explores the implications of the thesis that an intensification 
of projects of moral regulation in early nineteenth-century Britain resulted 
from the interacting social, economic and political anxieties of the 
propertied classes generated by the dual revolutions, the Industrial 
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Revolution and the French Revolution. (Hunt 1999a:57)
 
Interestingly, the chapter referred to in this quote, “Moral Regulation from Above: The 
Vice Society,” doesn’t actually examine anxiety. It simply assumes it as a causal element. 
On occasion, moral regulation studies and other Foucaultian work go so far as to suggest 
that anxiety and the social occupy the same space. In Governing Morals Hunt writes that 
sociology itself emerged out of a kind of anxiety: “At home [Great Britain] a deep 
foreboding manifested itself in a preoccupation with social conditions that in a very real 
sense created ‘the social’ as a focus for debate” (1999a:58). In the same year, however, 
Hunt published an article entitled ‘Anxiety and Social Explanations: Some Anxieties 
about Anxiety,” where he critically questions the use of anxiety “as an explanatory device 
in a wide variety of historical and sociological writing” (1999b:509).102
Hunt’s discussion of anxiety problematizes the concept, but does not rule it out 
altogether. Instead, he suggests “some protocols that should be taken into account when 
use is made of anxiety theory” (509). These protocols are as follows: 1) “it is necessary to 
interrogate the form of the causal connection that is posited” (524); 2) “An individual 
anxiety has no social significance unless it is a shared or social anxiety and, additionally, 
it results in some discernible action by significant numbers” (510). While Hunt’s 
discussion articulates an effective critical re-reading of ‘anxiety theory,’ he does not, 
except implicitly (and this is still important), bring a critical discussion to bear on the 
102  Stanley Cohen, introducing the third edition of Folk Devils and Moral Panics, criticized the use of the 
‘moral panic’ label to mean that an issue has been exaggerated or has received undue attention. According 
to Cohen, “This labelling derives from a wilful refusal by liberals, radicals and leftists to take public 
anxieties seriously. Instead they are furthering a politically correct agenda: to downgrade traditional values 
and moral concerns” (2011:vii).
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affective mode of the social researcher. While he confesses to have some ‘anxiety about 
anxiety,’ he leaves this as a joking example of reflexivity. In fact, reflexivity often 
appears in this way. It is difficult to avoid causing smiles when one attempts to perform 
reflexivity, especially in oral presentations (Goffman 1974).
While Hunt succeeds in making “the way we go about handling anxiety as a 
socio-historical causal factor more self-conscious by problematizing the relation between 
‘anxiety’ and ‘cause’” (1999b:524), one should go a step further by problematizing the 
relation between anxiety and the researcher as well. Hunt has established that anxiety is a 
residual category: it is a term that circulated in social science (and continues to), posing 
as explanatory while not being critically interrogated, whether theoretically or 
empirically. Foucault had suggested (1988) that anxiety is at the very basis of the modern 
savoirs, the social sciences of the disciplinary society. But Hunt does not thematize the 
issue of anxiety in relation to his own disciplinary activity. Can we sustain something like 
a Heideggerian distinction between authentic concern and inauthentic panic? Moral 
regulation studies have needed to come to terms with the tensions inherent to using 
anxiety as a causal explanation while simultaneously (implicitly) denying it as a research 
motive. What this amounts to (and the later Foucault would seem to support this) is a 
continuation of the Enlightenment project. But, as Hunt himself suggests, without 
perhaps realizing the double meaning of his words, “Social anxieties, whether acute or 
trivial, stimulate enquiry” (524). He is vague about where the social anxiety is, although 
from the context he seems still to be talking about anxieties that are ‘out there’ in the 
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social objects to be studied (rather than in the subjects doing the studying). 
Hunt, like Valverde, comes to the conclusion that the concept of anxiety should 
not be reserved exclusively for negative uses. Not all anxiety is ‘conservative,’ 
‘nostalgic,’ or over-reaction (Hunt 1999b:514). However, Hunt still sees considerable 
explanatory potential in anxiety theory. His ‘anxieties about anxiety’ pertain to its status 
as a residual category. It needs, he argues, to be more adequately operationalized, so that 
the ‘residual’ element can be reduced. He implies that theory needs to come to terms with 
the quantity of anxiety—it needs to be studied in terms of its empirical causation of 
“discernible action by significant numbers” (510)—in order to realize this potential.
Through the late 1990s, Valverde and Hunt succeeded, to some extent, in doing 
what Marx did not: a self-interrogation with respect to motivation. Moral regulationist 
approaches to anxiety tend (especially when bearing elements of Heidegger’s 
existentialist notion of authenticity) to involve implicit normative claims about ‘mature’ 
and ‘immature’ forms (e.g., ‘moral panics’) of action and motivation. As Valverde and 
Hunt moved, in some ways, to bring their own motivations (as researchers and social 
critics) into question, and to limit their application of anxiety to middle-class morality as 
the tool of a sweeping ‘hermeneutics of suspicion,’ they render the vocation of sociology 
more complicated, and they open their own practice to the complexities of contemporary 
social life. They place new limits on their role as experts capable of locating particular 
pathological affects in particular groups or classes and normatively dividing sections of 
the social in affective terms. This reflexivity and moderation of explanation may or may 
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not be a more ‘scientific’ approach, but it does move in the direction, it seems to me, of 
‘answerability.’ This is what Valverde seems to have in mind with her turn to irony, and 
what Hunt has in mind in trying to specify more rigorous and limited uses of the notion 
of anxiety. This ‘answerability’ is not quite as evident, I think, in the Communitarians, 
who have tended to continue to legitimate their ‘concerns,’ focusing on the mote in the 
eye of their subject (who requires their expert ‘concern’) rather than the plank in their 
own. At the same time, in fairness, communitarians have been open to considerable 
debate. The Responsive Community included, in the course of its 15 years, a wide variety 
of voices and debates, although mostly about what a community is or is not, not what a 
communitarian may or may not be.
I have suggested a rather stark contrast between ‘moral regulation studies’ and 
‘communitarianism.’ There are problems with this contrast, the most obvious one being 
the fact that there is enough diversity within each research program to justify using a kind 
of continuum rather than a binary typology. In addition, some of the work does not 
properly fall under either label. I hope, however, that this looseness of terminology has 
actually served to enrich my discussion of the place of anxiety in sociological research 
into morals, for the central thesis is not an empirical one about the actual place of anxiety 
in particular research projects; rather, the project of this chapter is to perform a structured 
discussion of the possible locations of anxiety in sociological research into morals, and to 
reflect on this theoretically and methodologically by means of a somewhat opportunistic 
usage of schools of sociology of morals that are ready-to-hand. We turn now to our third 
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affective approach, the feminist ‘ethic of care.’
E. THE ETHICS OF CARE
In 1982, very close to the time that studies in Moral Regulation and Communitarianism 
were receiving their first articulations, Carol Gilligan, a student of the influential 
developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, published In A Different Voice, a book 
that criticized the male-centric quality of developmental psychology. According to 
Gilligan, “as long as the categories by which development is assessed are derived from 
research on men, divergence from the masculine standard can be seen only as a failure of 
development. As a result, the thinking of women is often classified with that of children” 
(1982:69–70). On Kohlberg’s hierarchy theory of moral development, individuals reach 
the highest stage when they learn to bracket their own situation and to follow a sort of 
Kantian ‘categorical imperative.’ Kohlberg’s most well-known study assumed that not 
stealing an unaffordable drug needed by a loved one is the highest (most universal and 
just) form of the moral reasoning. Those research subjects who argued that there is a duty 
of care to a loved one that trumps societal laws, particularly when a ‘necessary’ crime 
could conceivably be a ‘victimless’ crime (e.g., the pharmacy being robbed would have 
insurance), were considered to have fallen short of the highest moral reasoning. Gilligan 
argued that this level of abstraction both 1) denigrated the practical moral reasoning of 
caregiving women, and 2) over-valued the morality of abstract universal reasoning.
In A Different Voice was followed, two years later, by Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984), written by Nel Noddings,103 which 
103  A 1991 book review by Noddings in The Responsive Community provides a rare point of cross 
397
developed a similar critique of abstract moral reasoning. A debate followed the 
appearance of Caring and In A Different Voice, in which feminist theorists and others 
argued about the relationship between justice and care, and about the extent to which 
these were tied to (socialized or natural) gendered traits. Among other results, this debate 
1) rendered the labour of care more visible; 2) challenged the affect-based division of the 
private and the public spheres; and 3) developed a nuanced analysis of the opportunities 
and dangers involved in advocating for the particularity of the ethic of care, especially the 
danger that idealizing women’s ‘ethic of care’ will tend toward recapture by traditional 
and ‘essentialist’ gender binaries and the reproduction of asymmetrical outcomes in terms 
of a gendered division of labour (cf. Baines, et al., eds. 1991; Clement 1998).
The ‘ethics of care’ debate developed simultaneously—but in a kind of parallel 
universe, with few cross-references—with the development of communitarianism and 
studies in moral regulation, thus producing, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 
a trio of affective approaches all taking positions on the methodological adequacy of 
various forms of detachment and involvement, abstraction and relation. Within the ‘ethics 
of care’ debate, some argued that women’s caring was a biologically different and 
morally superior form of morality. There were critics of this ‘gender essentialism’ (both 
feminist and conservative). Some argued that (public) justice must trump, at least in the 
long run (private) care (bringing us back to the Antigone story). Others criticized the 
over-valuation or narrow definition of caring as a ‘feminine’ trait. In “Girls Learn to 
Care; Girls Policed to Care” (1991), for example, Marge Reitsma-Street argued that 
reference between communitarians, care scholars, and moral regulationists,
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adolescent girls are policed to care in ways that emphasize caring for others, especially 
boyfriends and other men in the adolescent’s life, rather than self-care. Was the ‘ethics of 
care’ going to do anything for feminist goals of equality? This was the heart of the debate.
The feminist debate around the ‘ethics of care’ made a profound contribution to 
our understanding of affect by drawing attention to care as work. A variety of approaches 
gradually deployed and deconstructed, for instance, the phrase ‘labour of love’ (e.g., 
Finch and Groves, eds. 1983; Luxton 1980). To give a simple example of this linking 
together of labour, gender, and care, Baines, Evans, and Neysmith introduce their edited 
collection of essays on Women’s Caring by defining care as more than an emotional 
attitude: “Caring refers to the mental, emotional, and physical effort involved in looking 
after, responding to, and supporting others. In our society, most of this work is done by 
women in varying forms throughout their lives” (1991:11). Within professional caring, on 
the other hand, critique is constrained by practical demands of the job, and by some of the 
idealizing discourses pervading the profession. Such, for instance, is the case with Jean 
Watson’s (1985) Nursing: The Philosophy and Science of Caring, an interesting practical 
manual that draws heavily on the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers and Abraham 
Maslow, while emphasizing the unity of ‘caring for’ and caring about.’
Feminist debates about the ethics of care have managed to produce a set of 
positions that avoid, as Jessica Benjamin puts it, either “a simple reversal that leaves the 
terms of the sexual polarity intact” or the ultimately self-defeating project of “conquering 
men’s territory for women” (1988:91–92). What’s more, the debate prevents the simple 
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(and ‘uncareful’) valorization of ‘care.’ The task, according to Benjamin, is “to transcend 
the opposition of the two spheres by formulating a less polarized relationship between 
them” (92). In Bologh’s (1990) terms, this is the move from love or greatness to the 
possibility of love and greatness. With respect to the discipline of sociology, this would 
imply that ‘careful’ sociology does not simply engage in a process of ‘maternalization’ in 
response to the paternalism and choice of ‘concern,’ in communitarian approaches (which 
tend to reproduce Weber’s notion of ‘value-relevance’). Maternal ‘caring’ sociology has 
its own problems, as the feminist debate, which criticized and clarified the ambiguities of 
various claims about nature, gender, labour, and care, made clear. As Benjamin points 
out, maternalized approaches could amount, at the same time, to a kind of 
desexualization, repressing the play of sexual difference with the binaries of sexual roles 
and professional duties. It might generate an overly-moralistic form of sociology, 
sociology as caring work, a self-sacrificing work difficult to take pleasure in. In order to 
avoiding repressing care as desire, a kind of erotics of sociology would need to be 
cultivated. In these terms, the search for a ‘caring’ sociology might also bear melancholic 
undertones,104 and we do well to be reminded of the discursive circulation of 
(unconscious) misogyny as well as cautioned against a reaction-formation which 
idealizes the maternal over against the paternal, missing the chance to work through the 
ambivalence which is generally present in the face of all parental authority.
The ‘ethics of care’ debate suggests that we can expect ambivalence to persist in 
104  To turn briefly to popular culture, what I have in mind, here, are the kinds of issues imagined in films 
from Metropolis (1927) to The Matrix (1999) (which literally returns us to the womb). The Mother returns, 
here, as the monstre froide, or ‘cold monster’ of state control.
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methodological and theoretical debates. This ambivalence can hardly be seen as an end in 
itself, as it sometimes seems that Zygmunt Bauman believes, however. Practices of 
judgement ought lead to a successful traversing and transcending of at least some 
ambivalent situations. Still, this chapter has argued against a spiritualizing synthesis of 
affect, moving, say from bourgeois anxiety, to late capitalist death of affect, or to post-
capitalist ‘social concern.’ Such dialectical syntheses reposition the expert in a position of 
privilege, or, rather, gives a moralizing rationalization for that position of privilege. 
Whether ‘careful,’ ‘concerned,’ or ‘anxious,’ sociologists would do well to remember 
Heidegger’s ontological notion of care as something that precedes any particular care, 
including all humanistic forms of care. Careful sociology is not necessarily humanistic. 
Careful thinking is not directly a caring for other humans. There are limits to the 
(‘disciplinary’) problems that a model of ‘caring’ or ‘careful’ sociology will solve. We 
should note, too, the ambivalence of our choices of particular objects of care insofar as 
these choices purport to solve the problem of anxiety. Anxiety is not just something to be 
solved, either by weakening the guilt that we feel because of the exaggerated strength of 
our super-ego, or by engaging in self-sacrificial heroism. Is it really advisable to move 
from Weber’s lonely masculine hero to either the paternalist concerned expert, or to an 
even more self-sacrificing feminine-maternal sociology-saint (i.e., care as that which 
negates desire; Lacanian drive)? I leave these questions, for now, or at least change their 
form, in turning to my final chapter, on practices, sometime proposed solution to puzzles 
of methodological affect.
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CHAPTER 7: RIVAL VERSIONS OF PRACTICE: BOURDIEU & MACINTYRE
Like all sea-going ship carpenters, and more especially those belonging to whaling 
vessels, he was, to a certain off-handed, practical extent, alike experienced in numerous 
trades and callings collateral to his own; the carpenter’s pursuit being the ancient and 
outbranching trunk of all those numerous handicrafts which more or less have to do with 
wood as an auxiliary material. But, besides the application to him of the generic remark 
above, this carpenter of the Pequod was singularly efficient in those thousand nameless 
mechanical emergencies continually recurring in a large ship, upon a three or four years’ 
voyage, in uncivilized and far-distant seas. For not to speak of his readiness in ordinary 
duties:—repairing stove boats, sprung spars, reforming the shape of clumsy-bladed oars, 
inserting bull’s eyes in the deck, or new tree-nails in the side planks, and other 
miscellaneous matters more directly pertaining to his special business; he was moreover 
unhesitatingly expert in all manner of conflicting aptitudes, both useful and capricious. 
The one grand stage where he enacted all his various parts so manifold, was his vice-
bench...
Thus, this carpenter was prepared at all points, and alike indifferent and without respect 
in all. Teeth he accounted bits of ivory; heads he deemed but top-blocks; men themselves 
he lightly held for capstans. But while now upon so wide a field thus variously 
accomplished, and with such liveliness of expertness in him, too; all this would seem to 
argue some uncommon vivacity of intelligence. But not precisely so. For nothing was this 
man more remarkable, than for a certain impersonal stolidity as it were; impersonal, I 
say; for so it shaded off into the surrounding infinite of things, that it seemed one with the 
general stolidity discernible in the whole visible world; which while pauselessly active in 
uncounted modes, still eternally holds its peace, and ignores you, though you dig 
foundations for cathedrals...He was a pure manipulator...
(Melville 1961 Moby Dick Ch. 107, ‘The Carpenter,’ 441–443)
Going for this particular diminished scale seldom involved me starting on B with the 
second finger, say, not because I can’t move around fast when starting there, but because 
(as the scale was known as a handful and not an individual note/individual finger affair) I 
“didn’t know” that, for this scale’s production, my second finger was used for a B. It was 
initially learned that way; once learned, just as the finger-character responsibilities on a 
typewriter are forgotten as conceptually available facts for the touch typist, so which 
finger played the B in the course of this particular diminished scale was unknown to me 
(when teaching scale fingerings to students today I must play scales slowly to rediscover 
best fingers; if you’re a decent touch typist try calling out the names of the letters on the 
second bank of characters without looking down). 
(Sudnow 2001 Ways of the Hand:26–27)
A. BREAKING THE CYCLE? PRACTICES, COLONIALISM, PUBLIC ISSUES
On August 31, 2009, in Toronto, Ontario, 33 year old bike courier Darcy Allen Sheppard 
died during a traffic altercation with then 43 year old lawyer Michael Bryant, a former 
member of the Ontario Legislature, and the youngest ever Ontario Attorney General 
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(serving from 2003–2007). Details are disputed, as one might expect, but video footage 
shows Sheppard hanging to the side of Bryant’s car as it drives up and onto the sidewalk, 
where Sheppard is then “dislodged from the car after hitting the side cap of a fire hydrant. 
The subsequent impact to the right side of his head proved fatal” (Wells 2012). While 
Bryant was initially charged with criminal negligence causing death and dangerous 
driving causing death, eight months later these charges were dropped.
These events were the subject of considerable public controversy, and appear 
entangled in a series of overdetermined social juxtapositions, including the fact that this 
incident had Bryant, who championed a stunt driving law while he was Attorney General, 
careening (by some eyewitness reports) down the wrong side of the street and up onto the 
curb in a sporty Saab convertible. To add more social irony to the scenario, while 
Sheppard was an Albertan of Métis descent whose difficult childhood included 
considerable involvement with the bio-politics of the (declining) Canadian welfare state, 
including long-term foster care, periods of psychiatric institutionalization (Wells 2012), 
and legal troubles (Timson 2010), Bryant, after his stint as Attorney General, served as 
the Ontario Minister of Aboriginal Affairs (Oct. 2007–Sept. 2008). Furthermore, Bryant 
now works at a consulting firm owned by Phil Fontaine, once national chief of the 
assembly of First Nations (Wells 2012). While Sheppard lies mouldering in the grave, 
Bryant has partially rehabilitated his reputation, parlaying his experiences into new 
opportunities to exercise social symbolic powers, presumably for the ‘collective good.’
What frame should we use to interpret and to represent these events, whether to 
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tell a compelling story or to frame a public debate? Should there be a debate? Perhaps 
this incident has no social significance, and was just a matter of being ‘at the wrong place 
at the wrong time.’ In this case, justice was done when the charges against Bryant were 
dropped, and whether we are approaching the issue from a Weberian focus on 
‘meaningful action,’105 a Durkheimian focus on ‘social facts,’ or from some other angle, 
the sociological task involves turning our attention to broader issues (to bicycle-
automobile collision rates, for instance) or to more meaningful interactions.
If there is something to talk about, is it cycling, or driving, or the physical 
infrastructure that shapes, enables, and constrains these activities? Or do these factors 
pale in significance behind, for instance, the structural history of colonialism in 
European-Aboriginal relations (e.g., the residential school experiences of Sheppard’s 
mother’s generation, or the foster care experiences of his own)? Should we focus on law? 
On Sheppard and Bryant’s shared experiences with substance abuse? This is what Bryant 
would like us to do. In 2012 he published an account of the events called 28 Seconds: A 
True Story of Addiction, Tragedy, and Hope. In it, he details his struggles with 
alcoholism, presumably the basis for his ability to recognize Sheppard immediately: “I 
knew when I saw him that he was an alcohol addict. The first second I saw him” (quoted 
in Wells 2012). Profiling is ostensibly redeemed, here, by means of the playground logic 
105  Weber used cyclists to illustrate the difference, as he saw it, between social and non-social action:
Not every type of contact of human beings has a social character; this is rather confined 
to  cases  where  the  actor’s  behavior  is  meaningfully  oriented  to  that  of  others.  For 
example, a mere collision of two cyclists may be compared to a natural event. On the  
other  hand,  their  attempt  to  avoid  hitting  each  other,  or  whatever  insults,  blows,  or 
friendly discussion might follow the collision, would constitute “social action.” (1978:23)
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that ‘it takes one to know one.’ Bryant turns this capacity for instant ‘recognition’ into a 
symbolic narrative where each character finds a proper social position.
For our purposes, how do we get some traction from the point of view of the 
sociology of morality? What can we say, sociologically, about morality’s involvement in 
this case? According to Bryant, not much. An article in the Globe and Mail quotes him 
claiming that “It is not a morality play about bikes versus cars, couriers versus drivers, or 
about class, privilege and politics” (Timson 2010). As his book-length intervention would 
have it, however, it is a morality play, just not one about society-level issues. Instead, it is 
a ‘personal’ story about ‘addiction, tragedy, and hope.’ Bryant would have us understand 
this in terms of a narrative structured by his personal affective trajectory and as the 
gradual development and triumph of character over situation. Bryant would have us 
believe that he is a ‘better man’ for all these experiences. It reminds me of an early 
experience I had with team sports. During the traditional handshake at the end of a junior 
high softball game which had ended in a lopsided score, one member of the losing team 
grinned as he shook each opposing player’s hand, repeatedly saying ‘If it wasn’t for us, 
you wouldn’t have won.’ I am tempted to imagine Darcy Sheppard smiling at Michael 
Bryant, sardonically delivering this Yogi Berra style remark.
Does suffering have a meaning? Does death? What particularly sociological truth 
can we use to construct a moral meaning from one or the other? If it were possible to do 
so, would the moral meaning give us a way of identifying particular heroes and villains? 
Do addiction, tragedy, and hope trace the moral trajectory of the human ‘journey?’ Or are 
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we confined to observing ‘moral’ claims-making, documenting institutionalized and 
emergent debates about good and evil, empirically demonstrating the existence of 
particular kinds of suffering and dying?
Previous chapters argued that neither affect nor character can provide a magic 
bullet for the fact/value vampire draining the blood from successive sociologies of 
morality. On the one hand, I suggested that the dichotomous bad infinity of the situation 
and character debate might fruitfully give way to a kind of negative dialectic opening 
onto answerability and reflexivity. In other words, neither character nor situation (alone) 
can provide an adequate basis for sociologically analyzing this as a moral question. On 
the other hand, although the question of affect is deeply important to the sociology of 
morality, we cannot base the sociology of morality upon a particular affective claim (e.g., 
‘detached’ observer resistant to ‘moral panics’; ‘concerned’ citizen-scientist). We should 
be skeptical that a particular affective claim or performance could provide an adequate 
basis for meaningful sociological analysis. What we have, again, is a negative dialectic, 
and not a synthesis. To repeat, this was Goffman’s (1959) point about the relationship 
between ‘sincerity’ and successful performances. The real issues reside in the obligation 
to perform, the criteria for assessing performances, the social ‘authorization’ of certain 
actors and their socially cultivated performative capacities, not in their sincerity, not in 
the ‘real reality’ of the actor. In the case of Sheppard and Bryant, we should be extra 
skeptical. Indeed, the Goffmanian work of Richard Weisman (2009), would suggest that a 
talented lawyer like Bryant is both well-trained and effectively authorized to perform an 
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artful balance of regret and remorse without admitting legal culpability.
Against Bryant’s autobiographical push in the direction of an individualizing 
focus on affect and character, then, this chapter explores some ways that notions of 
practice, a concept that has been gaining traction in a number of areas,106 can provide a 
sociological path into questions of morality, including events that become flashpoints for 
emergent public debates on how to live, how to explain ‘when bad things happen,’ how to 
locate, recognize, define, and respond to problematic issues (e.g., like urban 
transportation; intergenerational effects of racialization and marginalization), how to 
understand micro-interactions between individuals that we might be tempted to 
understand through journalistic profiling categories (e.g., ‘white, recovering-alcoholic, 
sports-car driving lawyer’; ‘under-the-influence Métis bike courier’). This analysis could 
include, on the one hand, viewing legal practice, car driving, bike riding, journalism, 
even drunkenness or other forms of drug use, as distinctive and differentiated activities, 
or ‘practices,’ and as the sites of the agonistic pursuit of distinction (cf. Bourgois and 
Schonberg 2007). This agonistic approach sees practices as tacit but artfully enacted 
struggles for social status and position. It attempts to unveil, and critically reflect upon, 
hidden social practices tending to reproduce social relations of domination and inequality.
A more optimistic strand of practice theory sees practices as the building block of 
justice, not of inequality. Thus Richard Sennett’s (2008) work on the related concepts of 
craft and craftsmanship, while acknowledging the ambivalence of craft, or technique, as 
expressed in the two Greek gods Pandora and Hephaestus (291–294), offers a critically 
106  For a philosophical instance, see Sloterdijk’s recent advocacy of practice (2012; 2013).
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qualified endorsement of craftsmanship as the means to building an ethical life. 
According to Sennett, pride in one’s work combined with the effort to foresee and to 
evaluate the possible consequences of one’s work, points us in the direction of the good 
life: “The clubfooted Hephaestus, proud of his work if not of himself, is the most 
dignified person we can become” (296). On this view, the concept of practice, broadly 
speaking, may be recruited in order to make sense of moral and ethical gaps in modernity 
as rooted in the lack of a substantive ethical life, or Sittlichkeit. It has been heralded as a 
way of bridging the fact/value distinction, a way—as Stephen Turner puts it—of “making 
normative soup out of nonnormative bones” (2002:120–141). Omar Lizardo suggests that 
practice theory appeals because “it does away with the separation (on conceptual and 
empirical grounds) between subject and object, observer and observed, action and 
perception, which has been a durable and pervasive set of dualisms in the history of 
Western thought and Western social theory” (2007:321; cf. Polanyi 1962). Approaches to 
practice inspired by Foucault and Heidegger celebrate its potential to release us from the 
nihilism of modern subjectivity (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011) through “practices of freedom” 
(Weeks, et al. 2001:186–191) that enable us to “desubjectivize” or otherwise “feel out 
alternate routes for living” (Berlant 2011:18).
We can use either of these approaches to practices in order to think about the 
Sheppard and Bryant story and its broader social context. Indeed, some version of 
practice theory already operates in the popular public debates. Cyclists, for their part, 
have done a variety of things, including public demonstrations (e.g., ‘critical mass’ 
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cycling events), newspaper articles, and online discussions, to generate a discourse of the 
‘good cyclist,’ a discourse of cycling as a practice that is good for the city (e.g., in terms 
of traffic congestion, pollution, physical and mental health, social relations, and so on) 
(Scott 2015).107 Car advocates, on the other hand, have tended to find ways of depicting 
cyclists as careless, foolish, dangerous, literal ‘free riders’ on public infrastructure, and as 
holding irresponsible political views. Most famously, a few months after the charges 
against Bryant were dropped, and after a Toronto mayoral election campaign in which the 
car-bike debate played a sometimes prominent role, Canadian media personality and 
hockey commentator Don Cherry, speaking at then Mayor-elect Rob Ford’s inauguration, 
claimed sarcastically that the pink suit that he was wearing was “for all the pinkos, out 
there, who ride bicycles and everythink” (Momentum Mag, Dec. 10, 2010).108 This 
teasing statement was duly noted in pro-cycling publications like Momentum Mag, and 
some members of the cycling community proudly began wearing shirts that declared 
them to be, indeed, ‘pinkos.’
The agonistic concept of practice would tend to analyze cycling and driving, 
couriering and lawyering, drinking and riding/writing as subtle practices of distinction 
that, either consciously or unconsciously, dialectically shape and express the dispositions 
of those who enact them, while simultaneously positioning them socially. Pierre 
Bourdieu, whose theory of practice will be discussed at length in this chapter, would 
likely posit a difference between Toronto cyclists and drivers in terms of ‘class fractions,’ 
107  http://nicholasadamscott.com/research/
108  http://momentummag.com/videos/don-cherry-call-cyclists-and-left-wing-media-pinkos/
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and attempt to study their practices accordingly. If we were to attempt to apply a layer of 
sociological moralizing to this exposé approach to practices, it would need to be at a 
meta-level based upon, for example, a theory of the struggle for recognition, or perhaps 
upon a critical class analysis. Bourdieu’s moral judgements derive not primarily from his 
theory of practice, but from his theory of domination.
On the other hand, if we treat practices as inherently moral forms of activity that 
provide a foil to amoral, or immoral, or degraded forms of activity (being merely 
instrumental, or, worse, ‘half-assed’), we might, following Sennett, attempt to find a way 
of studying driving, cycling, lawyering, etc., in relation to an idealized vision of craft, 
attempting to assess the degree of craft or artfulness that prevails in certain forms of 
activities (e.g., perhaps Toronto does have a lot of ‘bad drivers’). On this view, an urban 
cyclist might be tempted to suggest that, in spite of the claim that Darcy Allan Sheppard 
is not a good model of the cyclist of the future (Gee 2010), we can find in urban courier 
culture some important strategies of resistance to prevailing automobile cultures of 
movement, resistance strategies that may eventually make room (literally) for more 
ethical and artful forms of urban movement. With this example in mind, let us broach the 
theoretical question.
B. FROM THE ‘AFFECTIVE TURN’ TO THE ‘PRACTICE TURN’
The last chapter moved from the character/situation debate to the question of 
‘sociological affect,’ arguing that following the ‘affective turn’ through some of its 
sociological iterations reveals a kind of constellation of attempted affective solutions to 
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the project of constructing a fully reflexive and socially immanent morality. Specifically, 
the chapter focused on a discussion of anxiety, care, and concern as possible (or perhaps 
‘fundamental’) sociological ‘moods.’ I concluded that affective approaches to the 
sociology of morality do not resolve the central dilemmas involved in bridging the 
is/ought divide. They still leave us with significant disagreements on what a flourishing 
affective life for either collectivities or individuals actually is. How can we decide, 
scientifically, between existentialist emphases on courageous authenticity, communitarian 
emphases on paternalistic relational concern, and the feminist ethic of care, even with the 
resources of contemporary developmental social psychology?109 Nor do these three 
versions of appropriate sociological affect constitute a happy family of sociological 
approaches. Quite to the contrary, they seem almost to express an unresolved complex, 
whether that of Oedipus or Electra, or of some other mythic narrative structure, perhaps 
yet to be written, perhaps already imagined in some of our contemporary fiction or in the 
suppressed and fragmented narratives of colonized societies. Even worse, all three 
approaches remain vulnerable to the Nietzschean critique—with which they sometimes 
impugn each other—that a disavowed will to power operates in all such affective 
position-takings (at least taken as normative principles), that nihilistic and sado-
masochistic impulses of aggression and cruelty lie beneath all gentle and kind 
109  Developmental social and psychological theories, from Piaget, Kohlberg and Fowler to Hönneth and 
Jessica Benjamin, remain more or less compelling reconstructions. They remain resistible, as sections of 
the previous chapter attempted to demonstrate. The critiques directed at Hönneth (and, implicitly, at 
Habermas) by Geuss (2008), Butler (2008), and Lear (2008) articulate some of the complications of 
sublating Nietzsche’s ressentiment thesis via the concept of recognition. Perhaps ressentiment is an 
ineradicable part of scientific practice, and not just of anti-intellectualism (cf. Bourdieu 2003:19).
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appearances, and that the sociologist is in fact a cringing Uriah Heep.
Furthermore, in those moments in which the pursuit of scientific knowledge 
appears most fully to be about the domination of nature, including our own, it remains a 
disturbingly open question whether the ‘best’ scientific observations come from 
concerned participants, impartial spectators, or sadomasochists. Still, if we can steer clear 
of Nietzsche’s one-sided misanthropic obsession with hypocrisy (cf. Shklar 1984), or at 
least resist being hypocrisy-obsessed in our reading of Nietzsche, such an affective 
constellation generates new possibilities for reflexive debates on moral questions, both 
within the discipline of sociology and between sociology and its ‘publics,’ and this offers 
new resources for forwarding the democratic project (e.g., of ‘unity in diversity’) within 
conditions of deep societal pluralism while still advancing rigorous scholarly 
investigation (at least insofar as we can bring ourselves to recognize differentiation 
within scholarly pursuits as a positive development). This is so even if we cannot be sure 
of the ‘authenticity’ of these debates, or even whether authenticity should be our ideal, or 
whether such debates are best characterized (or structured) as discourses involving 
‘criticizable validity claims’ (Habermas), as dialogues (Bakhtin, Buber, Rosenzweig, 
etc.), as agonistic struggles (Mouffe 2000), or as a kind of erotics (cf. Baudrillard 1990). 
As far as the ‘weak’ program goes, this constellation of affective approaches provides a 
negative dialectical structure capable of undermining ‘affective authoritarianism’ in social 
(and other) scientific activity—without necessarily doing anything to affect or undermine 
the ‘self-overcoming’ forms of everyday scholastic asceticism—while simultaneously 
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extending capacities for social engagement. Sociology has no fundamental mood.
This chapter attempts to do something similar with the so-called ‘practice turn’ 
(cf. Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny, eds., 2001), a turn that, like the ‘affective 
turn,’ can be partly traced to Heidegger (cf. Turner 1994). Indeed, Heidegger’s notion of 
care, which seemed at times to provide the synthesizing key to our affective constellation, 
also provides a way into the concept of a practice. Heidegger claims that we are 
ubiquitously involved in the world, even when we are apparently doing nothing (and 
doing nothing may itself turn out to be a deeply sophisticated form of involvement).
As Schatzki points out, the turn to practices, which may be found in diverse 
disciplines, including philosophy, sociology, history, and science and technology studies, 
has often been motivated by a desire to move past “problematic dualisms” (2001:10) such 
as subject/object, action/structure, representation/thing, and human/nonhuman. According 
to Schatzki, who places special emphasis on the broad focus of the field of practices, 
The ‘practice approach’ can...be demarcated as all analyses that (1) 
develop an account of practices, either the field of practices or some 
subdomain thereof (e.g., science), or (2) treat the field of practices as the 
place to study the nature and transformation of their subject matter. Note 
that this demarcation makes the notion of a field of practice the linchpin of 
the practice approach.
A central core, moreover, of practice theorists conceives of 
practices as embodied, materially mediated arrays of human activity 
centrally organized around shared practical understanding. (11)
This statement is useful for a couple of reasons. First of all, its tendency towards 
circularity provides an indication of the high hopes practice theorists have for the very 
word practice. Here scholarly vocabulary reveals a twofold function, both as technical-
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conceptual fulcrum and as a ritual invocation of a ‘word of power,’ practice, which has—
to quote Adorno on the cultic significance attributed to the word Being—“the attraction of 
the word as of something superior” (1973:65; cf. Williams 2011). Apart from the 
circularity of the definition-as-spell-casting, Schatzki’s statement points to the importance 
to practice theory of embodiment, fields, and shared practical understanding, aspects of 
human activity that have been passed over by approaches ensconced in atomistic 
individualism or mind/body dualism (in which, for instance, ‘values’ are often analyzed 
as abstract ideals rather than embodied dispositions or products of concrete activity). 
Schatzki suggests that the emphasis on embodiment may be traced to Foucault’s re-
visioning of discourses as practical lines of activity that discipline and fashion bodies in 
particular ways. Foucault’s notion of a discourse, far from being a Cartesian abstraction, 
indicates the weaving together of bodies and talk, of writing and reading as moving and 
shaping embodied writers and readers. Much practice theory focuses on human skills and 
understanding as ‘embodied know-how’ and on practices as “the common meeting point 
of mind and activity and of individual activity and society” (Schatzki 2001:12). Pierre 
Bourdieu, who will be discussed at some length in this chapter, describes the worlds that 
practices produce, reproduce, and depend upon, the ‘habituses’ and ‘fields,’ the networks 
of embodied social positions, position-takings, and power relations. Lois McNay suggests 
that Bourdieu’s approach improves on agent-focused concepts of recognition, experience, 
and performativity, since “The idea of practice exteriorizes dimensions of embodied 
existence—for example, emotions—in respect to social relations and thereby avoids the 
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simplification and naturalization of agency” (2008:195).
In an extension of the emphasis on embodiment and fields, Schatzki points out 
that practice theory highlights ways in which human activities “interweave with ordered 
constellations of nonhuman entities” (2001:12). Thinking about embodiment, a quality 
we share with many non-human ‘things,’ leads us away from anthropocentrism. In the 
same way, the notion of a field appears, quite naturally, to refer us to the physical spaces 
and places, the ‘clearings’ or ‘openings,’ as Heidegger might say, in which we act, in 
which we find our place. Our sociality, as has been noted previously, cannot be restricted 
to the human, or even to the living. Practice theory promises so much in part because it 
offers an opening onto previously unrecognized or under-explored spaces and relations.
With respect to morality, practice theory offers a way of constructing morality’s 
genetic building blocks—as discrete ‘practices’—and bridging the is/ought divide, since 
it purports to provide insights into how human activity works (or does not work) ‘in 
practice.’ On the one hand, practice theory appears to provide a neo-functionalist account 
of human behaviour, under phenomenological cover: a sharpened acuity to is (an activity 
that is or is not working) generates recommendations for what ought to be done. If we 
figure out what a practice is, how it works, how to distinguish it from other forms of 
human action, and if we find a way to observe the ‘disrepair’ of a particular practice, or 
that ‘deskilling’ of labour has negatively effected reported ‘happiness,’ this would support 
protests against the loss of ‘craft.’ Apart from the utilitarian implication of suggesting that 
happiness can be measured as a kind of sum, praising practice and mourning its loss 
415
roughly approximates Alasdair MacIntyre’s approach.110
On the other hand, if, like Bourdieu, we find that practices to be artful forms of 
human activity that reproduce social inequalities (Bourdieu and Passeron 1977) behind 
our backs—while generating meritocratic self-interpretations—this is may lend empirical 
support to a pre-existing ought that condemns social inequalities.111 Thus, very different 
notions of practice may be partnered with closely aligned moral-scientific lines of 
activity. Bourdieu and MacIntyre both understand capitalism as a system that generates 
injustice and inequality, but are far apart in their analyses of pre-capitalistic forms of 
activity remaining within modernity and in the significance assigned to practices.
Regardless of what lies ‘behind’ the concept of a practice, Bourdieu reminds us 
that the word itself may be a stake in the struggle for symbolic capital within the 
academic field (or the political field, for that matter). The vocabulary of embodiment and 
materiality is itself involved in a rhetoric of the real that often accompanies practice 
theories, a rhetoric itself embedded, we can only suppose, in specifiable material 
110  It is difficult to exaggerate how consistently social theorists have assumed a positive correlation 
between highly skilled craft work and good moral character. From Karl Marx and William Morris to Harry 
Braverman (1974) and Richard Sennett (Sennett and Cobb 1973; Sennett 1998; 2008), a neo-Aristotelian 
thread accompanies most critiques of late capitalism’s destruction of practice.
111  Here is an extended articulation of Bourdieu’s ethical program, including a remark on human nature:
Thus, we must acknowledge that if everything leads us to think that certain fundamental 
dispositions toward the world, certain fundamental modes of construction of reality 
(aesthetic, scientific, etc.), of worldmaking, constitute universal anthropological 
possibilities, these potentialities are actualized only in definite conditions and that these 
conditions, starting with skholè, as distance from necessity and urgency...are unevenly 
distributed across civilizations...or, in a more rigorous language, across positions in social 
space. These are all very simple but very fundamental things, and it is not superfluous to 
insist on them...This simple observation leads us to an ethical or political program that is 
itself very simple: we can escape the alternative of populism and conservatism, two forms 
of essentialism which tend to consecrate the status quo, only by working to universalize 
the conditions of access to universality. (1998a:137)
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practices (based in what Bourdieu calls skholè). Just as we cannot solve all the difficulties 
of developing a fully-fledged sociology of moral life by simply learning how to take the 
correct or authentic or mature affective position, neither we cannot solve them by 
confidently intoning the word ‘practice.’ As with the ‘affective turn,’ although the 
‘practice turn’ seems to reveal varieties of ‘normativity’ (e.g., as ‘tacit’ rules) operating in 
hitherto unexplored social registers, it has not produced any unified normative theory of 
its own apart from the basic endorsement of a research agenda: ‘let us study practices!’ 
(cf. Schatzki 2001:11). Indeed, Stephen Turner has mounted a sustained attack on the 
concept of a practice, describing it as a kind of residual category that cannot be 
legitimately operationalized (1994) and there is surely something to Turner’s critique, 
although he focuses too narrowly on the ‘tacit,’ and on the supposedly general premise of 
all practice theory that all ‘practitioners’ have an identical (if ‘tacit’) mental content with 
regard to the practice, which leads to what Turner calls the ‘problem of transmission.’ 
What is more, there are now so many extant accounts of practice that this chapter will 
only be able to discuss a rather small and somewhat arbitrary selection.
The versions of practice theory discussed here, however, suggest that something 
in play in the concept of practice could help to frame the sociology of morality. To begin 
with, a focus on practices can supplement our perspective on the central dilemmas of the 
previous chapters. First, the concept of practice is one way of extending Goffman’s 
performative end-run around the character-situation standoff. This points onward to the 
possibility of escaping or synthesizing the structure-agent dichotomy while developing a 
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kind of genetic building-block of morality (Rawls 1987; 1990) by referring the 
Hobbesian ‘problem of order’ to the field of practices (Schatzki 2001:14). Second, the 
concept of practice might help unfold the issue of affect within a context of social 
interaction that allows us to replace philosophical and psychoanalytic claims about 
internal states with a focus on emotion or affect as generated or embodied in practical 
enactment.112 In Bourdieu’s terms, this entails collapsing the distinction between the 
internal and the external by thinking in terms of dispositions that are at the same time 
position-takings. This can mean, with Goffman, focusing on situated face-to-face 
performances; it can mean following Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological approach (1967), 
or Sacks’ related approach to conversation analysis (1995), which both attend to the 
sequential and indexical aspects of specific practices (cf. Katz 2012); or it can involve, as 
in Hochschild’s work (1983), for instance, studying the accounts actors give of 
experiences in everyday practical action in order to get at ways in which the inhabitants 
of a late capitalist world engage in managing affect.
The remainder of this chapter compares the practice theories of Pierre Bourdieu 
and Alasdair MacIntyre. Both advance important promises regarding practice’s role as a 
basic building-block of morality, and offer an opportunity to revisit questions about 1) 
social science as a vocation; 2) the character or situation debate; and 3) methodological 
112  As Seigworth and Gregg put it in their introduction to the Affect Theory Reader, 
Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act and be acted upon. 
Affect is an impingement or extrusion of a momentary or sometimes more sustained state 
of relation as well as the passage...of forces or intensities. That is, affect is found in those 
intensities that pass body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those 
resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and 
in the very passages or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves. 
(2010:1)
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affect. I conclude that the concept of practice does not settle the issue of vocation, of 
character, or of affect. It does not perfectly synthesize the structure-agent or situation-
character dichotomies, nor decisively adjudicate the constellation of affective 
sociological stances. This is not surprising. Conceptual developments and transitions, 
Heidegger taught us, both reveal and conceal. To reiterate the idiom of Negative 
Dialectics, “objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder” (Adorno 
1973:5). They are also entangled in broader commodification processes—“No theory 
today escapes the marketplace” (4)—and the paradoxical condition of their success, as 
Bourdieu himself argues, is a disavowal of their participation in the commodity-form. 
The concept of practice is no exception. Once again, I suggest that we view practice 
theory as providing an Adornian constellation, not a synthesis.
C. TWO RIVAL VERSIONS OF PRACTICE: MACINTYRE & BOURDIEU
The versions of practice theory presented by Pierre Bourdieu and Alasdair MacIntyre are 
now approaching the status of classics. They appear to be rather different projects. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the differences are enough to make a comparison of these 
two projects misleading, at best. Bourdieu and MacIntyre may both use the word practice
—translation issues aside—but do these two projects really intersect?113 Indeed, there is a 
kind of wishful ‘projection’ operating in my attempted comparison—as there is/ought to 
be in any ‘project.’ To inject a bit more reflexivity, the naivete of my comparative 
premise is part of the point, for the most naïve questions are the ones that can best 
113  The MacIntyre partisan Kelvin Knight posed this question to the first version of this paper, presented 
at the 2009 conference of the International Society for MacIntyrean Enquiry.
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address the ‘elephant in the room,’ the possibility that practice is simply a residual 
category used to make problems of explanation magically disappear. If MacIntyre and 
Bourdieu really are talking about completely different things, perhaps practice really is 
just a term experiencing a popularity bump due to cycles of intellectual fashion combined 
with certain persistent roadblocks in social science. A somewhat different justification 
may be found in one of MacIntyre’s own suggestions: 
...what may appear at first misleadingly as two rival elucidations of the 
same concept, between which we have to choose, may be envisaged more 
usefully as two successive analyses of a concept in process of 
transformation, between which there is no question of a choice. Both are 
needed and so is their interrelationship. (1966:93)
I argued for such a position on the situation or character debate, and the same seems 
likely to hold, here. On my view, MacIntyre and Bourdieu provide two important 
attempts to forge concepts of practice that connect individual and society, agent and 
structure, subjectivity and institution. To think about the sociology of morality, I would 
argue, “Both are needed and so is their interrelationship.”
In After Virtue (1984), MacIntyre defined practices as institutionalized forms of 
complex activity that extend our powers to conceive and to realize excellence in the 
goods peculiar to humans. Pierre Bourdieu, by contrast, outlined a theory of practice 
conceived as an object of critique. Rather than focusing, as MacIntyre does, on ‘goods 
internal’ to practices, Bourdieu describes practices as activities carried out by means of 
largely unconscious skills embedded in and embodied by socially situated actors. These 
practices tend to reproduce social inequalities and to perpetuate symbolic violence (i.e., 
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legitimations of social inequality that are accepted by the dominated). At best, practices 
may be embedded in fields which require an ‘interest in disinterest’ because they include 
a permanent test of universalizability. For Bourdieu, socio-analysis, carried out in a 
sociological field with such a permanent test of universalizability, may provide a form of 
critical reflexivity that can neutralize injustice, breaking the spell of legitimation by 
subjecting it to tests of transparency. Against this pessimistic view of everyday practices, 
MacIntyre makes substantial claims about ‘human flourishing’ based upon Aristotelian-
Thomist views rather than Bourdieu’s agonistic presuppositions about human nature.
In short, while Bourdieu carries out a critique of practices, MacIntyre calls for a 
return to practices. Bourdieu theorizes practices as ubiquitous seen but unnoticed 
activities (peculiar to humans, with our unique dialectic of conscious-unconscious 
behaviour) that continuously reproduce relations of social domination. MacIntyre argues, 
by contrast, that modernity’s main problem is the break-up of practices into fragmented 
and largely incoherent forms of activity. Without being a straightforward call for a return 
to the past, an implicit nostalgia pervades MacIntyre’s discussion of pre-modern forms of 
activity that have been broken up by the processes of modernity. Bourdieu takes a more 
Foucaultian position, arguing that the ‘dark side’ of the Enlightenment can only be 
overcome by a break with modernity and with the ‘second nature’ of its assumptions 
about individual autonomy, moving beyond its naïve optimism in order to develop a 
reflexive project of ‘thinking differently.’ This way of stating the difference exaggerates 
it, of course. A kind of ‘Neo-Marxian’ synthesis might also be available.
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MacIntyre and Bourdieu appear to use rather different models in outlining their 
respective notions of practice, as well as the forms of scholarly practice that best analyze 
them. Bourdieu sees the best social critic as an outsider with an axe to grind. For 
MacIntyre, on the other hand, thinking about the social world is best done within a 
tradition of thought, and by addressing challenges that emerge within that tradition. Does 
MacIntyre’s notion of ‘goods internal’ to practices hold up to Bourdieu’s critique? Does 
Bourdieu’s ‘disenchantment that isn’t disenchanting’ give satisfaction? Finally, what kind 
of practice is sociology? Is the vocation of social thought, if there is such a thing, or the 
‘life of the mind,’ one of resentment or care? Will to power or conversion of the will? On 
these issues Bourdieu and MacIntyre seem divided.
Bourdieu and MacIntyre share the view that scholarly thought about the social 
world ought to be a searchingly critical activity. Bourdieu describes sociology as “a 
supremely difficult craft...that consists in organizing the return of the repressed and in 
saying out loud to everyone what no one wants to know” (2008:112). MacIntyre, on the 
other hand, writes that it is both a sociological and moral imperative to “Always ask 
about any social and cultural order what it needs its inhabitants not to know” (1999:319). 
They provide critiques aimed not at the surface dysfunctions of a social order that needs a 
few therapeutic tips, but at the very organizing principles of modern Western society, the 
invisible logic of reproduction of the prevailing social order, what Bourdieu sometimes 
calls the ‘social unconscious,’ and what MacIntyre diagnoses as the underlying 
unintelligibility of liberal individualism. Both thinkers carry out their critical projects 
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using deeply sociological conceptions of human life. Both mount formidable critiques of 
modern contemporary philosophies that conceive of persons abstractly and in isolation.
Beyond the shared critical component of their approaches, concepts of practice 
and practical rationality form important but distinct elements of both projects. The 
differences derive from the different directions taken in mounting their critiques of 
individualistic thought. Bourdieu began as a philosopher, but moved to sociology, where 
he adapted classical sociological as well as Freudian and Nietzschean influences, for a 
variety of quantitative, qualitative, and ethnographic empirical projects. MacIntyre 
gradually headed in the other direction, writing early and sympathetic works on Marx 
(1953) and Freud (1958) before settling into extensive philosophical analyses of pre-
modern alternatives to liberal individualism (especially those of Aristotle, Augustine, and 
Aquinas). Bourdieu began in philosophy, with which he became disillusioned. MacIntyre 
underwent a slow conversion to the philosophical tradition of Aristotelian-Thomism.
MacIntyre has not carried out a program of substantive-empirical sociological 
research, although he has supervised (e.g., Barnsley 1972) and influenced this sort of 
work (e.g., Bellah, et al., 1985; 1992). Further, MacIntyre’s critical engagement with 
sociology has been sparse since After Virtue (1984), where he was already moving away 
from modern sociology in favour of pre-modern social theory, although he still gave 
sociological pride of place, albeit in a passing manner, not to a pre-modern figure, but to 
the Scottish Enlightenment figure Adam Ferguson (MacIntyre 1984:195–196). His 
treatments of sociology there, of Weber and Goffman in particular, were already 
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somewhat strained. However, his critique of individualism constantly adverts to a 
fundamentally social and sociological conception of human relationships.
Bourdieu, after beginning his academic career in philosophy, switched to 
sociology in the mid-1950s, influenced by his experiences in Algeria, where he first went 
as a part of the French military. After ethnographic studies in Algeria and in his home 
region of Béarn, in France, he went on, for the better part of five decades, to carry out 
empirical social research projects—including extensive research into art, aesthetics, and 
the French education system—aimed at revealing how social inequality was sustained by 
largely tacit processes of social reproduction. Much of this research was carried out in 
concert with large teams of scholars. In spite of the differences in their careers, both 
Bourdieu and MacIntyre maintained academic projects dedicated to social critique, and in 
particular, to critiques of liberal capitalist modernity.
MacIntyre provides an indicator of their very different perspectives on sociology 
and the history of social thought with his surprising claim that, rather than being the 
period of sociological thought’s emergence, the unstable socio-political conditions of 
European early-modernity removed sociological thought from its activity, and precisely 
as a consequence of socio-political conditions (1988:208–211). He posits that the early 
modern ‘possessive individualism’ (Macpherson 1962) of Hobbes, Locke, and others, 
following standard Cartesian moves, extracted the social person from earlier Scholastic 
conceptions of the person as embedded in social networks and roles.
Bourdieu also makes use of Scholastic categories (or at least of Latin terminology 
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such as habitus, illusio, and skholè), but with critical genealogical intent rather than pre-
modern nostalgia.114 He mounts a sweeping critique of philosophical thinking, grounded 
in the conviction that modern sociology offers insights that are fundamentally absent 
from classical forms of social thought. Modern sociology recognizes, in particular, the 
economic and material character of social interaction and, along with this, the labour 
theory of value.115 Bourdieu bases his critique of philosophical practice on the claim that 
philosophy (both ancient and modern) systematically erases the material and economic 
basis of its possibility, presenting itself as a spiritual and free form of activity whose 
insights into social life are produced by activities of ‘thought thinking itself’ that 
transcend and render irrelevant the material conditions of their production. Classical 
social and political thought conceived of persons as embedded in social relations and 
roles, but failed to recognize its own practical conditions of possibility and tended to 
rationalize and justify rather than historicize and criticize the socialization processes that 
generate the differentiated habituses116 of a social order of hierarchy and domination.
114  For example, Bourdieu’s use of Illusio differs from Heidegger’s doctrine of truth as aletheia, or 
disclosure. For example, the Heideggerian Hubert Dreyfus offers the cultivation of coffee-drinking practice 
as a way out of contemporary nihilism and into the ‘shining’ or ‘flourishing’ generated by the disclosure of 
care (Dreyfus and Kelly 2011:216–219). Bourdieu would surely view the cultivation of coffee-drinking as 
an exercise in ‘distinction’ deserving of critical genealogical reflexivity.
115  In Bourdieu’s judgment, as in Marx’s, Aristotle’s failure to understand the condition of possibility for 
his own ‘freedom’ (i.e., slavery) make his notions of political friendship, phronesis, the virtues, and human 
flourishing, unusable without a radical overhaul. Jeffrey Alexander called Bourdieu “the most impressive 
living embodiment of a neo-Marxist tradition” (1995:128). Bourdieu’s view of human nature seems a bit 
more Nietzschean, however. He also emphasizes the ongoing importance of pre-capitalist economic forms 
(especially in the field of cultural production) that resist ‘bourgeois revolution.’ In addition, Bourdieu’s 
notion of capital sometimes seems less grounded in the labour theory of value than in a Nietzschean 
agonistics of value (Bourdieu 1984:252): not labour, but conflict. For these reasons, if Bourdieu is a 
Marxist, he is a revisionist one with a pessimistic focus on reform, not social revolution. 
116  Bourgois and Schonberg’s (2007) study of racialized differences of habitus (“intimate apartheid”) 
amongst homeless heroin users traced fractional distinctions to the most marginalized sectors of society.
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How do these apparently opposed readings of ‘scholasticism’ connect to their very 
different conceptions of practice and practical reason? Is MacIntyre guilty of what 
Bourdieu calls the ‘scholastic fallacy’ by failing to be critically reflexive about his own 
conditions of possibility and by imputing to himself a freedom of thought which actually 
depends upon a variety of socially positioned privileges? Does MacIntyre’s own thought 
constitute engagement in a practice in his sense of the word or in Bourdieu’s? Can 
modern philosophy (or social science) be a ‘practice’ (in MacIntyre’s sense)?
These questions are rooted in a series of apparent alternatives. First of all, does a 
negative or critical project need a substantive positive element—something like what 
MacIntyre means by virtues, by phronesis? Would generating this positive element 
involve a process of internal conversion, or character development, a turning of the will? 
On this question, Bourdieu often appears to be in agreement with Machiavelli, for whom 
the good life is possible, at least at the level of the social, by the creation of shared and 
public liberties through regulated conflict between opposed classes, but for whom we 
‘remain evil.’ MacIntyre, on the other hand, sees the salvation of the social as involving 
the conversion of wills and the development of character through the discovery and 
cultivation of practices which are not merely ‘fields of disinterest,’ as Bourdieu 
recommends, but practices that contain ‘goods internal’ to them, rewards that are, at the 
level of the social, non zero-sum, non-exploitative, and aimed at human flourishing. One 
way of framing this difference is to see it as a judgement about whether the best social 
critique is driven by the cultivation of resentment or of caritas.117
117  Bourdieu described his method as both a ‘double break,’ and as a “conversion of the gaze” (2008b:2).
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D. BOURDIEU’S THEORY OF PRACTICE
This alternative between resentment and caritas returns us to the previous chapter’s 
affective thematic and to the affective thematic underpinning justifications and critiques 
of institutionalized social science practices and conditions of possibility (e.g., their 
private or public sources of funding). But before turning to that binary, let’s take a walk 
through some background material concerning both Bourdieu and MacIntyre.
In 1972, after more than a decade of empirical research in Algeria and France 
(1961; 2008b; Bourdieu and Passeron 1985 [1966]), Bourdieu published a major 
theoretical statement. It was translated into English (in 1977) as Outline of a Theory of 
Practice. In Outline, Bourdieu attempted to position the ‘theory of practice’ between 
‘objectivism’ (i.e., the structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss) and ‘subjectivism’ (i.e., the 
Husserl-influenced phenomenology of Schutz and Garfinkel). Objectivism overestimates 
the extent to which an over-arching structure of social institutions and meanings 
determines human social action, reducing it to conscious rule-following. Subjectivism 
overestimates voluntarism by taking the actor’s point of view too seriously, limiting its 
own social scientific efforts to ‘constructs of the constructs’ (Schutz) or ‘accounts of the 
accounts’ (Garfinkel)118 (Bourdieu 1977:21). For Bourdieu, phenomenology and 
118  John Levi Martin criticizes Garfinkel’s ‘account of the account’ from a different angle:
Garfinkel chose to write in gobbledy-gook, and although I do not begrudge him the 
enjoyment he so obviously received from this activity, I also see no reason to wade 
through the results to extract arguments that were made previously and more clearly by 
others. Finally, rather than indicate to his sociological readers that there was a wide range 
of inspiring and dissenting traditions from which they could draw (the approach of the 
current work), Garfinkel instead attempted to put his own formalizations in between his 
students and the phenomenological tradition, acting more like a cult leader than a scholar. 
Even did I not find this somewhat disappointing on a human level, it would make little 
scientific sense to reward such behavior. (Martin 2011:xi, n.3)
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ethnomethodology retreated from objectivism when they needed to advance beyond it. 
He accepted objectivism’s ‘first break,’ from the naïve self-understanding of social actors, 
then called for a ‘second break’:
The critical break with objectivist abstraction ensuing from inquiry into 
the conditions of possibility, and thereby, into the limits of the objective 
and objectifying standpoint which grasps practices from the outside, as a 
fait accompli, instead of constructing their generative principle by 
situating itself within the very movement of their accomplishment. (3)
Having once gotten a good outside view of social life, we need next to reflect on the 
conditions that made this detached perspective possible. We need a meaningful model of 
the individual actor, but also a sense of the way social relationships of domination are 
legitimated, or ‘enchanted,’ by the ‘social alchemy’ of practice and its logic.
Bourdieu hoped, by means of a theory of practice, to build a dialectical bridge 
between objective structures and structured dispositions. Remarkably, Bourdieu offers no 
clear and explicit definition of a practice. Instead, he defines by means of examples, the 
first and most important of which is gift-giving. Gift-giving, says the ‘objectivist’ Lévi-
Strauss, is really exchange. All gifts are eventually returned, so while everyday actors 
hold to the official version that gifts are not exchanges, the objectivist model of gift-
giving emphasizes reversibility and reciprocity. The problem for the ‘objectivist’ account, 
says Bourdieu, is that the official definition of gift-giving denies this element of 
reciprocity, so that “even if reversibility is the objective truth of the discrete acts which 
ordinary experience knows in discrete form and calls gift exchanges, it is not the whole 
Mills famously wrote similar things about Garfinkel’s sometime supervisor, Parsons (Mills 1959). Such 
polemical comments may also be seen as strategic moves in the search for distinction.
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truth of a practice which could not exist if it were consciously perceived in accordance 
with the model” (5). The structuralist account of ‘objective reality’ misses the crucial 
function played by the practical denial of ‘objective reality.’
Above all, an objectivist account of gift-giving lacks a sense of its temporal 
structure, the need for the counter gift to be “deferred and different” (5). Only a gift 
returned at the right moment will bless the social relationship with an enchanted aura. 
The temporal character of practices like gift-giving renders the social world less 
transparent and less predictable than a structural model makes it appear. The temporal 
character of social life makes tempo, or timing, essential for the success of the act since it 
relies so heavily on the collective misrecognition of the closing of the circle of exchange. 
The requirements of tempo make practices into forms of strategic virtuosity rather than 
matters of meticulous rule-following. Rules will never be able to indicate the precise 
moment to act. Actors successfully navigate social fields by means of practical reason, a 
‘feel for the game’ being played, not by conscious rule-following.
We acquire the knowledge of when to act, the skill to engage in social life’s 
intricately patterned everyday activities, through socialization into particular fields of 
action, but not as an explicit curriculum (cf. Giroux and Penna 1979); practical reason is 
inculcated as tacit ‘know-how.’ Its subtleties often cannot be explained by its 
practitioners,119 and its reasons are usually and, of necessity, mostly unconscious, or at 
119  David Sudnow’s (2001) ethnomethodological study of learning to play jazz piano renders an explicit 
account of this subtle form of conscious/unconscious knowledge. Bourdieu would argue that this ‘account 
of the account’ accepts the practitioner’s position too uncritically. An adequate socioanalysis of jazz piano 
playing would need to account for far more than just the ‘ways of the hand,’ including other levels of social 
positioning and position-taking, class fractions, ‘race relations,’ semi-autonomy of fields, and so forth.
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least unreflected upon and undiscussed, except from within the game, where they are 
discussed earnestly, without a trace of skepticism (i.e., about its tacit presuppositions), 
like hockey fans learnedly disputing the ‘cleanness’ of a particular body-check and 
thereby demonstrating their legitimacy as true fans (fandom being its own game, one 
played in a field directly adjacent to the ‘real’ game). Above all, one needs to distinguish 
commentaries about particular practices as practices of their own, typically developing 
with relative autonomy from the field upon which they commentate, although 
undoubtedly under the influence of a variety of other social determinations.
Social practices, and the reasonings which accompany them, ritually affirm the 
social order and transform its arbitrary aspects into apparently legitimate relations. In 
order to affirm the social order, however, certain objective facts must be collectively 
misrecognized. Practical reason, or, the logic of practice, enables the ‘smooth 
functioning’ of society by means of this collective misrecognition. It is, says Bourdieu, “a 
logic that is intelligible, coherent, but only up to a certain point (beyond which it would 
no longer be ‘practical’)” (1998a:132). On this premise, for instance, we could 
hypothesize that the sociological significance of being (or not) a competent hockey fan in 
Canadian society remains collectively unrecognized, in spite of widespread public and 
private discussion of how hockey ought to be played, how it relates to Canada’s 
‘identity,’ whether professionals are paid too much, and so on. Bourdieu might ask 
whether a well-timed display of hockey knowledge (or ignorance), enthusiasm (or 
distaste) can significantly alter one’s economic or symbolic capital (by, for instance, 
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leading to a successful job interview or to a prestigious promotion).120 On this view, 
insofar as we naturalize rather than critically reflect121 upon the idea that there is 
something intrinsically Canadian about knowing how to play, understand, and enjoy 
hockey, we will tend to collectively misrecognize ways that the practices and practical 
reason associated with Canadian hockey serve to legitimate existing social, racial, sexual, 
and gender inequalities and ongoing forms of symbolic (and physical) violence, 
domination, and exclusion (cf. Cormack and Cosgrave 2013; Keohane 1997; Razack 
2008; Thobani 2007).122
Two basic claims about social life underly Bourdieu’s theory of practice. First, 
even disinterested actions turn out to be a species of interested actions (i.e., with an 
‘interest in disinterest’). Second, beneath the everyday rituals that affirm the justice and 
necessity of the existing social order, material relations of inequality and domination 
form society’s basic structure. Practice and the logic of practice embody largely 
unconscious activities of strategic calculation—a game one plays to win—but also of 
self-limitation (and symbolic violence). Our everyday activities incorporate aggressive 
strategies impelled by irrepressible desires and divert or deform those same impulses into 
120  Lamont’s (1992; 2000) comparative studies of French and American values carefully distance her 
position from Bourdieu’s. A Bourdieusian might intuit that Lamont, a Canadian, has never published a 
book-length study of Canada for reasons related to cultivating distinction. Lamont articulated her own 
analysis of academic distinction in an article on Derrida (1987), and later in How Professors Think (2009).
121  For Agamben (2007), ‘profaning’ a practice undermines its potential to be a secular ‘civil religion.’
122  Equations of hockey with Canadian-ness are ubiquitous but not uncontested. Popular but controversial 
television commentator Don Cherry constantly tries to build associations between hockey, traditional 
masculinities, Canadian military activities, and white racial nationalism. Elsewhere, critiques of physical 
and sexual violence associated with hockey circulate in the form of increased media attention to hazing 
rituals and concussions, and to the infamous case of sexual predation by hockey coach Graham James. 
These critiques imply that institutionalized forms of hockey also have the systemic problems we associate 
with institutionalized forms of education and religion (and their notorious nexus in ‘residential schools’).
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the means of producing a willing subordination to the social order. They are the means by 
which we ‘willingly’ reproduce and submit to symbolic violence and domination; but to 
understand them we need a more sophisticated concept of the will:
To understand this particular form of domination one has to move beyond 
the false choice between constraint through forces and consent to reasons, 
between mechanical coercion and voluntary, free, deliberate submission. 
The effect of symbolic domination...is exerted not in the pure logic of 
knowing consciousnesses but in the obscurity of the dispositions of 
habitus. (Bourdieu 2000:170)
There is clearly a tension involved in this depiction of practices. It stems, I think, from 
Bourdieu’s complex and not entirely coherent concept of the unconscious (and the will) 
(cf. Alexander 1995). Mixing elements of Freud’s unconscious, Marxian ‘false 
consciousness,’ Nietzsche’s will to power, and Durkheim’s conscience collective, 
Bourdieu’s notion of the unconscious (which he regularly invokes by pairing it 
ambiguously in the form ‘conscious or unconscious,’ as if it doesn’t matter which) seems 
both an over- and an under-socialized concept. On the one hand, we are subject to an 
unconscious competitive drive. Under cover of giving gifts, for instance, we passive-
aggressively pursue strategic economic interests. On the other hand, we all participate, 
through ‘the obscurity of the dispositions of habitus,’ in maintaining a social unconscious 
which harbours all of our arbitrarily imposed social inequalities; through our practices we 
‘enchant’ unequal social relationships and justify ‘real’ domination by adding a layer of 
symbolic legitimation. In this way, practices simultaneously express and repress our 
desires; they embody both id and super-ego, with ego constituting the subject’s achieved 
critical reflexivity (i.e., real consciousness). On this reading of Bourdieu, according to 
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which Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity turns out to be a re-articulation of Freud’s dictum 
that ‘where id was, there ego shall be,’ ego emerges through socioanalysis.
What does this mean for the practice of sociology? According to Bourdieu, only a 
truly sociological practice, made reflexive on account of being armed with the theory of 
practice, can raise the dynamics of both ‘will to power’ and ‘voluntary servitude’ into an 
analyzable realm. Structuralist or objectivist perspectives can show relations of power 
and domination, but they cannot show these relations in action. Structuralism has no 
actor, and so cannot demonstrate how domination works in practice, how it reproduces 
itself through the mostly unconscious logic of practices enacted by individual actors.123 
Subjectivism (for Bourdieu this means phenomenology and/or ethnomethodology), on the 
other hand, gives us an actor, or at least a sense of the actor’s experience, or process of 
experience, especially those gaps between the (structuralist) rules and ‘what actually goes 
on,’ but fails to make relations of power and domination visible. Both structuralism and 
phenomenology fail to perform the task of sociology, which is, for Bourdieu, the activity 
of making the social unconscious—what society needs not to hear—audible. This 
includes a suspicious reflexivity about one’s own practice as a sociologist and a constant 
inquiry into 1) the conditions of possibility for one’s activity and 2) the social 
relationships produced (and reproduced) through this activity. This task requires a 
sociology of sociology. Most obvious, on this point, would be the ways in which, 
throughout the 20th century, sociologists gradually became reflexive about the 
123  Althusser’s notion of ‘ideology’ is influential but inadequate and inferior, in Bourdieu’s view, to the 
notion of habitus, about which one may become reflexive. Althusser’s ideology is a totality in which one 
swims, immersed, never breaking the surface upon which reflection would be possible (cf. Rancière 1974).
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reproduction of various asymmetrical ‘relations of ruling’ (Smith 1990) within sociology 
itself. To build and sustain such a critical reflexivity, sociology needs to establish itself as 
a field where actors have an ‘interest in disinterest.’ Since our human drives cannot be 
fundamentally altered, habitus can only be reflexively reconstructed at the level of the 
social, in response to a sort of super-ego demand. Before getting entangled in the 
psychoanalytic frame, however, let us turn to MacIntyre’s rather different approach.
E. MACINTYRE ON PRACTICES (AS APPRENTICESHIPS)
For Bourdieu, practices are all those everyday lines of action that serve to create and to 
reproduce a social order. Only those kinds of sociological practice which have 
institutionalized, at the level of the field, a permanent test of universalizability and a 
critically reflexive ‘interest in disinterest,’ can provide an adequate critical analysis of 
existing social inequalities and the processes which maintain these inequalities. All 
practices that lack the resources of sociological critical reflexivity tend to contribute to 
uncritically reproducing and reinforcing existing ‘relations of ruling,’ regardless of the 
positional movements of individual actors within and between social fields of practical 
competitive struggle. MacIntyre, by contrast, normatively valorizes ‘practices’ as such; 
every ‘practice’ is a good one since every practice that really is a practice already 
contains substantive ‘goods internal.’ For MacIntyre, practices aim at ‘goods of 
excellence,’ and not merely at ‘goods of efficiency,’ or success. Every practice offers its 
‘goods internal’ to whomever learns to embed their activity in the practice, learning to 
recognize it (implicitly through a process of conversion) as an end in itself. By extension, 
434
every authentic practice provides critical insight into the social world and extends human 
powers to achieve excellence at the societal level. In other words, practices constitute the 
genetic building blocks of the ‘good society.’ Here is After Virtue’s extended definition:
By a ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to 
achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and 
goods involved, are systematically extended. Tic-tac-toe is not an example 
of a practice in this sense, nor is throwing a football with skill; but the 
game of football is, and so is chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; 
architecture is. Planting turnips is not a practice; farming is. So are the 
enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology, and so is the work of a 
historian, and so are painting and music. (MacIntyre 1984:187)
MacIntyre’s distinction between ‘goods of excellence’ and ‘goods of efficiency’ bears an 
important resemblance to Weber’s distinction between value rationality and instrumental 
rationality, but while Weber’s concept of value rationality positions ‘value’ as a kind of 
arbitrary and decisionistic starting-point to which one applies rationality—understood as 
a distinct activity governed by logic—in order to organize activity ‘according to 
principles,’ MacIntyre’s notion of ‘goods internal’ to practices suggests that only 
involvement in a practice teaches one to recognize the kind of value, the peculiar good, 
that the practice offers. MacIntyre is not interested in abstract values, but in forms of 
‘excellence’ embedded in particular practices.
MacIntyre must still explain the initial involvement in a practice by a ‘faith 
seeking understanding’ model, but his argument suggests a Thomistic rather than a 
Kierkegaardian adaptation; in other words, he seeks to deepen the possibilities of 
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practical rationality rather than to establish its limits. One does not enter into a practice 
irrationally, as an existentialist or decisionist ‘leap of faith.’ Instead, one commits to a 
kind of apprenticeship. MacIntyre suggests that “A practice involves standards of 
excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a 
practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own 
performance as judged by them” (1984:190). Instead of Nietzschean defiance of tradition, 
MacIntyre argues that binding oneself to a tradition is the only way to learn to recognize 
and to experience the rewards that it offers.
F. ‘GOODS INTERNAL’ OR THE TEMPO OF DISSIMULATED EXCHANGE
We need to explore a little more, if we can, the difference between this approach and 
Bourdieu’s more deeply Weberian position. In Bourdieu’s Outline, the first and most 
important example of a practice was gift-giving. With this example Bourdieu wanted to 
demonstrate the failure of either objectivism or subjectivism to deal adequately with the 
real social dynamics in place. While objectivist perspectives recognized the socially 
invisible exchange, and the underlying power relations that phenomenological treatments 
tended to overlook, they were incapable of reconstructing the view-from-the-inside that 
makes possible the maintenance of the collective fiction of the gift. A structuralist rule-
based approach is too rigid too account for the everyday demands of tempo.
The notion of temporality—which we take so seriously since Husserl and 
Heidegger, but which has been important in Western thought at least since Augustine—
plays a different role in MacIntyre’s conception of practice. More than timing comes into 
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play when MacIntyre emphasizes the need to understand a practice ‘from the inside.’ All 
practices contain rewards specific to meeting the demands of excellence, and these are 
never reducible to the momentary rewards of success in this or that particular instance. 
Seeing the rewards of a practice in terms of the short-term external goods that may be 
achieved means losing a sense of the kinds of goods that are peculiar to a particular kind 
of practice, whether it is farming, chemistry, football, or playing a musical instrument. 
Commitment to a particular practice requires more than good timing. It also requires 
long-term commitment to the practice itself and as such, and to the development of the 
substantial qualities or virtues essential to that practice. These substantive qualities, or 
virtues, are rooted in the accountability to others that one commits to in committing 
oneself to a field of activity and to the unity of a kind of life-project. This accountability, 
this commitment to integrity, stretches across time, not merely the Husserlian 
‘protension’ which allows one to make the next move successfully and to secure a 
temporary victory. If a practice distinguishes itself from other forms of activity, it is 
because it has managed to at least partially institutionalize forms of mutual accountability 
that establish a distinction between internal and external goods, a distinction that exists so 
long as the practice is maintained in good working order.124 In the case of gift-giving, 
MacIntyre would suggest, I think, that practicing the art of gift-giving leads to an inner-
transformation or conversion to ‘goods of excellence,’ such as the experience of 
124  The exemplars of particular practices are not merely the winners, record-holders, and ‘geniuses,’ but 
those who embody the ‘spirit’ of their field. Thus Bobby Fischer, Barry Bonds, Pete Rose, and Lance 
Armstrong have problematic status as heroes of their sports not so much for rule-breaking as for in some 
way contradicting the ‘spirit’ or the ‘goods internal’ to the game.
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generosity (Rancière 2012), that are irreducible to economic transactions.
Bourdieu recognizes the profit in increased solidarity that society can reap from 
the collectively sustained fiction of gift-giving, but he does not seem to think of these 
‘goods of excellence’ as involving a self-transformation so much as he sees them as 
involving further investment in activities meant to garner symbolic capital. This ‘inner 
conversion’ would involve a commitment to the illusio of a particular practice. Against 
this Bourdieu poses the sociological ‘double break.’ Sociologically, the conversion 
moment, if there is one, for Bourdieu, may happen when one loses faith in a practice, as 
he lost faith in philosophy and in the existentialist idea of a ‘total intellectual’ embodied 
by Jean-Paul Sartre. His ‘conversion’ to sociology from philosophy led, eventually, to a 
personal reconciliation with his humble provincial origins, origins that he had worked 
hard to efface in order to succeed in the urbane and snobbish world of the French 
intellectual elite. Bourdieu’s sociological conversion renders visible hitherto invisible 
forms of symbolic violence, violence that structures, without being acknowledged, the 
world of social positions and position-takings. It occurred, Bourdieu writes, during his 
first post-Algerian research project, The Bachelor’s Ball (2008a; 2008b), and entailed the 
reflective rejection of his socially internalized acceptance of the ‘idiocy of the country.’
Before we simply endorse Bourdieu’s choice of sociology’s ‘double break’ over 
philosophy’s scholastic illusio, however, let us follow MacIntyre’s analysis a little further. 
In broader temporal terms, for MacIntyre, deepening one’s engagement in a practice 
implies cultivating one’s relationship to the tradition which formed and sustained it. As 
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one can see from MacIntyre’s critical treatment of the Western philosophical tradition 
(e.g., 1953; 1958; 1966; 1984; 1988; 1990), this does not mean a necessary subordination 
to tradition or to history, nor a whiggish reading of history; rather, MacIntyre approaches 
philosophy’s history by attempting to recognize and analyze a variety of elements, 
including paths taken and not taken, problems solved and unsolved, and, above all, rival 
traditions. The idea that a field may be a field of struggle between rival traditions is close 
to Bourdieu indeed. Nevertheless, MacIntyre’s resistance to the idea that one must simply 
choose sociology over philosophy needs to be examined.
In his discussion of practice MacIntyre holds on to a substantive concept of virtue 
as “an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to 
achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of which effectively 
prevents us from achieving any such ‘goods’” (1984:191). Bourdieu’s relational or non-
substantive approach to social goods ties them to fields of practice, and to an economic or 
utilitarian interpretation: investment in a practice tends to reinforce itself, to increase 
commitment. Bourdieu endorses the successful institution of a sociological field in which 
participants have a vested ‘interest in disinterest’ through an inculcated disposition to 
have an interest in the universal, but implies that belief in the universal, though 
‘valuable,’ is still a kind of illusion (2000:164–167). The dispositions individuals possess 
as a result of the fields and practices in which they are involved, are, in a certain sense, 
neither good nor bad. For Bourdieu, as for Machiavelli, we ‘remain evil.’
When Bourdieu moves toward MacIntyre, as in some ways he does, in his later 
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works, he more explicitly articulates the necessity of constituting fields that demand and 
sustain critical reflexive practices. But Bourdieu does not approach the question of 
practices through the idea of virtues as ‘goods internal’ to practices. Rather, the goal is 
the institutionalization of fields in which practices are “permanently subjected to a test of 
universalizability” in order that actors are forced into “real universalization strategies” 
(1998a:144). The virtues he acknowledges—i.e., of “equality, fraternity, and especially 
disinterestedness and sincerity” (145)—unveil reality and uncover contradictions and 
hypocrisies. Bourdieu turns again to Machiavelli: “It would be a question of establishing 
social universes where, as in the Machiavellian ideal republic, agents had an interest in 
virtue, disinterestedness, and devotion to public service and the common good” (144).
Bourdieu’s universal is both Machiavellian and Kantian.125 Acting in the service 
of the universal is not a consequence of the determination of the will by the solitary 
activity and development of practical reason in Kant’s sense, however; the universal is 
made desirable by the state of the field, a social state which makes the pursuit of the 
universal ‘sociologically realistic.’126 MacIntyre, on the other hand, prefers to speak of the 
excellences that are peculiar to specific kinds of practice, and which are not the same as 
ends (1984:274). MacIntyre constructs his concept of practices precisely to combat “the 
notion of summing goods” (198–199) employed by utilitarian attempts to calculate the 
social good. Kant’s universal (although this was not his intention) makes such utilitarian 
125  It is also indebted to Durkheim’s sociologizing of Kantian epistemology (1995). As Lizardo points 
out, Durkheim’s EFRL and Bourdieu’s Distinction (1984) are “sociologizations of Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason and Critique of Judgment...respectively” (Lizardo 2007:322).
126  Does this sociologistic reframing of Kant put the categorical imperative back into the realm of 
prudence (instead of duty)? Durkheim managed to avoid this. Did Bourdieu?
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calculations possible. This is why MacIntyre emphasizes the substantive particularity of 
practices, of the virtues, and of the goods of excellence peculiar to them.
MacIntyre resists speaking of practices in terms of “summing goods,” part of his 
crusade against utilitarianism, on the basis of his distinction between internal goods and 
external goods. External goods remain a kind of personal possession “such that the more 
someone has of them, the less there is for other people” (190). Internal goods may be the 
outcome of a competition (e.g., in sport), but become a kind of commonwealth: “their 
achievement is a good for the whole community who participate in the practice” (190–
191). Bourdieu calls this the “illusion of cultural communism” (1984:227). The contrast 
is stark. In the realm of art appreciation, for instance, Bourdieu writes,
Those who possess the means of symbolically appropriating cultural 
goods...like to see symbolic appropriation—the only legitimate sort, in 
their view—as a kind of mystical participation in a common good of 
which each person has a share and which every person has entirely, as a 
paradoxical appropriation, excluding privilege and monopoly, unlike 
material appropriation, which asserts real exclusivity and therefore 
exclusion. (227–228)
Bourdieu allows that a cultural field and its peculiar practices may have relative 
autonomy from other fields, including the economic. But this autonomy amounts to no 
more than the kind of relative autonomy possessed by various national currencies. All the 
goods internal to practices are forms of capital and are best understood in these terms. 
Relative autonomy is merely the gap in which forms of cultural capital may be leveraged 
within a broader market, a broader struggle for legitimacy, social recognition and power. 
Insofar as there may exist a form of ‘cultural communism’ within, for instance, an elite 
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set of art connoisseurs, it exists within a broader context of inequality. Furthermore, 
Because the appropriation of cultural products presupposes dispositions 
and competences which are not distributed universally (though they have 
the appearance of innateness), these products are subject to exclusive 
appropriation, material or symbolic, and, functioning as cultural capital 
(objectified or internalized), they yield a profit in distinction, 
proportionate to the rarity of the means required to appropriate them, and a 
profit in legitimacy, the profit par excellence, which consists in the fact of 
feeling justified in being (what one is), being what it is right to be. 
(Bourdieu 1984:228)
This twofold profit of distinction and legitimacy also applies to social science, and 
Bourdieu points out Durkheim’s claim that science works progressively towards a world 
of cultural communism (577n.4). Once more, until an ‘interest in disinterest’ reigns in the 
scientific field, we should expect that all struggles for distinction and for legitimacy 
within the field will be ‘cashed out’ by individuals and groups in the form of (disavowed) 
exclusions and dominations. Note the ambivalence of artists and intellectuals towards 
popularization: “their relationship to everything concerned with the ‘democratization of 
culture’ is marked by a deep ambivalence which may be manifested in a dual discourse 
on the relations between the institutions of cultural diffusion and the public” (229). How 
far the value of a work (in producing or consuming) depends upon it falling outside the 
tastes of the masses (i.e., upon relative distinction) rather than being a true end in itself, in 
MacIntyre’s sense, may be measured in a certain sense by the danger posed by popularity.
A North American example of this ambivalence is not that difficult to find. When 
the American author Jonathan Franzen was invited to appear on Oprah Winfrey’s talk 
show and to have his novel The Corrections (2001) receive the ‘Oprah’s Book Club’ 
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stamp, his statements in other media venues gave the impression that he thought the 
Oprah stamp would mean the book would not be read by men. Offended by reports of 
these statements, Oprah rescinded her offer. The ensuing public debate around these 
events not unpredictably led to even higher sales of the book. Franzen and Winfrey have 
since become friends, Franzen presumably having found a way of reconciling his literary 
pretensions with Oprah Winfrey’s daytime television populism, and in 2010 his novel 
Freedom also received the Winfrey stamp.
A related Canadian example is found in the short media tempest around a small 
Nova Scotia boutique publisher that took its time before making a distribution deal with a 
larger press in order to handle the volume of sales expected for the 2010 Giller Prize 
winner, Johanna Skibsrud’s The Sentimentalists (2009). One possible interpretation 
would be that either the author or the boutique publisher, or both, had been so caught up 
in the practice as an end in itself that they had become, as a result, naïve about worldly 
affairs. On this reading, Franzen in the first case, and Gaspereau Press, in the second, 
made mis-steps which they then managed to correct in order to achieve both increased 
popularity and the preservation of the ‘integrity’ of their practice. For Bourdieu, they are 
caught within the paradoxical structure of the cultural fields of production and 
consumption. These fields are characterized by a “constant collective repression” 
(1980:261), which is “neither a real negation of the ‘economic’ interest which always 
haunts the most ‘disinterested’ practices, nor a simple ‘dissimulation’ of the mercenary 
aspects of the practice” (262) but a kind of ‘disavowal’ (dénégation). Full mastery of the 
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practice this paradoxical structure demands involves “an entirely improbable, and in any 
case rarely achieved, combination of the realism required for minor concessions to 
‘economic’ necessities that are disavowed but not denied and of the conviction which 
excludes them” (262).
Bourdieu generally stops short of making philosophical claims about human 
nature. Practically speaking, this adds a certain paradoxical quality to his pursuit of 
sociology as a social science, since it means he must take up the Durkheimian 
‘disavowal’ of psychology. As much as he writes in the language of psychoanalysis, and 
in terms which constantly advert to a notion of human nature, he should be read, I think, 
as subscribing to an agnostic position on human nature similar to Foucault’s, whom he 
rarely if ever criticized. Still, if we look back to a passage quoted early on in this chapter, 
we find Bourdieu making several related claims about universal dispositions and 
potentials: 1) “everything leads us to think that certain fundamental dispositions toward 
the world, certain fundamental modes of construction of reality (aesthetic, scientific, 
etc.), of worldmaking, constitute universal anthropological possibilities”; 2) “these 
potentialities are actualized only in definite conditions...distance from necessity and 
urgency”; 3) “This simple observation leads us to an ethical or political program that is 
itself very simple: we can escape the alternative of populism and conservatism...only by 
working to universalize the conditions of access to universality” (all from 1998a:137). 
Although he does not spell this out, my own reading of this ethical program, as I have 
been arguing all along, is that it depends upon a minimal notion of answerability.
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In the end, I contend that a minimal notion of answerability brings Bourdieu and 
MacIntyre together, even though on the question of human nature they seem opposed. 
MacIntyre’s substantive position on human ‘flourishing’ contrasts with Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on human drives.127 Still, Bourdieu’s language of universal potential sneaks in 
the back door of neo-Aristotelianism, all the same.
G. MACINTYRE & BOURDIEU ON ‘SOCIOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY’
Perhaps I have been exaggerating the difference between MacIntyre and Bourdieu. They 
are at times remarkably close, and I think there remains a real puzzle about their 
relationship. To demonstrate the difficulty in determining the difference between them, it 
may be useful to compare their respective views on what is ‘sociologically possible.’
Bourdieu’s essay ‘Is a Disinterested Act Possible?’ (1998a) argues that 
disinterested action is possible when a society is well-constituted. The diagnosis of 
hypocrisy, such as outlined in the maxims of La Rochefoucauld, only occurs in a society 
whose constitution around certain principles is beginning to unravel. Thus Bourdieu 
suggests that when La Rochefoucauld, “being the product of a society of honor...begins to 
say that aristocratic attitudes are in fact the supreme forms of calculation, calculations of 
the second degree” (87), this is evidence of a society in crisis, for “In a well-constituted 
society of honor, La Rochefoucauld’s analyses are incorrect; they apply to societies of 
honor which are already in crisis” (87). MacIntyre says something almost identical about 
127  Here the gap between Bourdieu and Marx is at its greatest, and Alexander’s claim that Bourdieu was 
the greatest late 20th century ‘neo-Marxist’ appears inapt. Alexander’s insensitivity to differences between 
Marx and Bourdieu stems partly from his tendency to portray issues in binary terms. Bourdieu is a Marxist, 
for Alexander, because he practices a ‘materialist’ ‘sociology of culture’ rather than a ‘cultural sociology.’
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societies of honour. For both, there is a question of the ‘sociological possibility’ of a 
certain convergence between individual and social character. Bourdieu writes, for 
example, that “If disinterestedness is sociologically possible, it can be so only through the 
encounter between habitus predisposed to disinterestedness and the universes in which 
disinterestedness is rewarded” (Bourdieu 1998a:88). For both, ‘sociological possibility’ 
means that something is possible for the average person, even that they are predisposed 
toward that something because of the state of the field. For both MacIntyre and Bourdieu, 
the society of honour is a thing of the past, historically and sociologically speaking.
Key differences remain, however, in the distinction that MacIntyre makes 
between ‘goods of excellence’ and ‘goods of effectiveness,’ and in the gap that he claims 
exists between institutions and practices. Bourdieu thinks of this gap as a dialectic, just as 
he uses a relational rather than a substantive conception of virtue. Virtues, for Bourdieu, 
are relationally defined within a field. In this sense they are ‘internal’ goods. On the other 
hand, Bourdieu substitutes the “interest in the universal” and the “profit of the universal” 
(1998a:89) for metaphysical debates about the possibility of virtue. While they agree on a 
possible convergence between the official version of roles and rules and the internal 
dispositions of social actors,128 MacIntyre wants to preserve the difference between a 
society which has succeeded in producing conformity to its official values and a society 
which has provided the institutional support for the development of virtues, the 
deepening of practices, and for human flourishing.
128  Thus Bourdieu: “When official representations of what man officially is...become habitus, they 
become the real principle of practices” (1998a:87).
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Bourdieu’s refusal to establish a substantive notion of virtues leads him to the 
concept of disinterested action, to the rather existential declaration that “sociology...must 
choose now more than ever between putting its rational instruments of knowledge at the 
service of an increasingly rational domination, or rationally analyzing domination and 
especially the contribution that rational knowledge can make to domination” (1998a:91). 
Thus he abruptly reintroduces, at the level of the collective actor (i.e., sociology), the 
kind of existential choice he earlier ruled out of court when he claimed that “Durable 
virtues cannot be established on a pure decision of conscience, that is, in the Sartrean 
sense, on something like an oath” (88). Loïc Wacquant, Bourdieu’s sometime 
collaborator, suggested that just such a move from the individual to the collective actor 
was the decisive factor inclining Bourdieu to accept the 1993 Gold Medal from France’s 
National Centre for Scientific Research, for “Bourdieu would be the first sociologist to 
receive that distinction so that, to overcome his intimate reticence, he could make the 
medal over from a personal accolade to a collective tribute” (2013:20). This is a good 
moment to turn to a discussion of intellectual and scholarly practice.
According to Bourdieu, “there are many intellectuals who call the world into 
question, but there are very few intellectuals who call the intellectual world into 
question” (2008a:23). He calls this failure to recognize that the intellectual world has its 
own unique conditions of possibility the ‘scholastic fallacy.’ In his critique of the 
objectivist’s knowledge of practices, he points to a “fundamental and pernicious 
alteration which, being a constituent condition of the cognitive operation, is bound to 
pass unnoticed: in taking up a point of view on the action, withdrawing from it in order to 
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observe it...he constitutes practical activity as an object of observation and analysis” 
(1977:2). The ‘impartial spectator’ represents practices without inhabiting them, without 
recognizing the contingent and strategic decision-making operating under the constraint 
of a thousand different relational forces within the field. The objectivist sees only rules 
and structures, being without temporality. Only the second break reveals the logic of 
practice, the significance of the observer’s position, and the dialectical relationship 
between structures and structuring dispositions.
The ‘scholastic’ point of view takes thought’s structure to be a form of pure 
rationality, rather than, like activity in every other social field, a form of practical reason 
1) made possible by the possession of various levels of cultural, social and economic 
capital and 2) devoted to acquiring the particular forms of symbolic capital available in 
that field. Kant and Descartes stand as two of the most important modern examples of the 
‘scholastic fallacy.’ Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, and Kant’s a priori categories stand as 
prototypes of the peculiarly modern attempt—a highly instructive failure—to constitute 
reflexive reason by explicitly attempting to deny the relevance of material conditions. 
According to Bourdieu, “Scholars who do not know what defines them as scholars from 
the ‘scholastic point of view’ risk putting into the minds of agents their scholastic view or 
imputing to their object that which belongs to the manner of approaching it, to the mode 
of knowledge” (130). Scholasticism mistakes ideas for causes, whether in the form of 
Platonic Ideas or in the form of superimposed structures and rules. Unreflexivity about 
the conditions of possibility and the underlying strategic purposes of our own intellectual 
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activity, turns ‘practice into method,’ treating past practices as consciously chosen when, 
in fact, they were largely unconscious strategies adopted in the context of a particular 
habitus and associated dispositions, as well as a particular state of the field.  In The 
Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger (1991), Bourdieu argues that Heidegger, too, 
committed the ‘scholastic fallacy’ through his incapability or unwillingness to admit that 
his philosophical thought was bound up with the state of the field of German scholarship, 
and the state of German society. Rather than explaining Heidegger’s Nazi period as the 
result of political naivete, Bourdieu argues for the deep compatibility, at the dispositional 
level, of Heidegger’s philosophy and Nazi ideology. Bourdieu treats his own scholarly 
past as if largely guided by partly formulated antipathies and resentments (cf. 2008a:2).
There are two main consequences of misrepresenting social reality through a lack 
of reflexivity: 1) unreflexive scholarship tends to overlook social inequality and even to 
develop an inverted view of the sources and content of ‘social problems’ (e.g., ‘blaming 
the victim’); 2) even where inequality is recognized, as in some forms of objectivism, the 
real forces and processes sustaining and reproducing that inequality will remain 
unrecognized and unaddressable. The question naturally follows, what makes for a 
critically reflexive scholar? As it turns out, Bourdieu’s portrait of the ideal critical scholar 
is also a self-portrait. Bourdieu points to two main factors:
One’s chances of contributing to the production of truth seem to me to 
depend on two main factors, which are linked to the position one occupies
—the interest one has in knowing and making known the truth (or 
conversely, in hiding it, from oneself and others), and one’s capacity to 
produce it. As Bachelard so neatly put it, ‘There is no science but of the 
hidden.’ The sociologist is better or worse-equipped to study what is 
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hidden, depending on how well armed he is scientifically—how well he 
uses the capital of concepts, methods and techniques accumulated by his 
predecessors, Marx, Durkheim, Weber and many others—and also on how 
‘critical’ he is, the extent to which the conscious or unconscious intention 
that impels him is a subversive one, the degree of interest he has in 
uncovering what is censored and repressed in the social world...these two 
factors tend to vary in inverse ratios. (Bourdieu 1993:10)
As it turns out, the best scholarship is likely to come from talented outsiders with chips 
on their shoulders. In his Sketch for a Self-Analysis (2008a), Bourdieu describes the sense 
of being out-of-place that afflicted him from his earliest days in boarding school. While 
he managed to thrive in the competitive atmosphere, he also felt a profound ambivalence 
about his position in the academy. This made it impossible to fully identify with his 
original field of philosophy, or with the dominant figures in the field, like Jean-Paul 
Sartre, about whom Bourdieu has mostly negative things to say, especially regarding 
Sartre’s idea of the ‘total intellectual.’ Because of his outsider or ‘cleft’ habitus, and 
assisted by strains of academic thought which contested the dominant model and which 
were constituted by scholars, like Georges Canguilhem, who were usually also of “lower 
class or provincial origin” (10), Bourdieu never completely added the collusio to illusio 
which would have led to full “complicity in the collective fantasy” (7). Instead, Bourdieu 
turned to sociology, which was “ignored and despised” by prestigious philosophy, 
eventually achieving “a resolute break with the vanity of academic things” (71).
For those more naturally comfortable in the academy, whose dispositions, formed 
through early socialization experiences, made it easy to accept the titles and entitlements 
of the university, the possibility of doing useful work depends on the very nature of their 
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self-deception. According to Bourdieu, although Sartre was fundamentally misinformed 
or self-deceived (Bourdieu often reverts to Sartre’s own terminology of ‘bad faith’) about 
the social bases of his scholarly activity, Sartre’s sense of a calling to be a ‘total 
intellectual’ is not without its usefulness:
...the myth of the intellectual and his universal mission is one of those 
ruses of historical reason which mean that those intellectuals most 
susceptible to the profits of universality can be led to contribute to the 
progress of the universal, in the name of motivations which may have 
nothing universal about them. (25)
Bourdieu nearly produces a version of the ‘private vices, public virtues’ slogan, here, 
which makes one wonder whether Bourdieu is endorsing a ‘free market’ approach after 
all. Indeed, a central premise of Bourdieu’s critique of the ‘field of cultural production’ is 
that art and cultural production belong “...to the class of practices in which the logic of 
the pre-capitalist economy lives on” (1980:261). Much of Bourdieu’s work may be 
understood as contributing to the bourgeois revolution insofar as he pushes for reflexivity 
about aspects of practice organized by the “collective disavowal of commercial interests 
and profits” (261). Bourdieu sides, however, with Hegel’s ‘cunning of reason’ over 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand.’ In this spirit, whatever benefits the ‘myth of the intellectual’ 
may bring, there is no doubt that Bourdieu thinks of the scholar critical by second nature, 
like Foucault or himself (cf. Bourdieu 2008a:79–82)—one of the intellectuals with whom 
Bourdieu felt a ‘homologous affinity’129—as the type more likely to get at the truth of the 
social world, precisely because of their personal interest in exposing inequality.
129  This term serves Bourdieu as both a definition and an explanation of friendship, giving some 
indication of just how far he was prepared to go in his project of critical disenchantment.
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For Bourdieu, the intellectual virtues are the hard-nosed ones that Nietzsche and 
Weber praised. Foremost among them is that of honesty. Bourdieu’s depiction of honesty, 
however, is not precisely Nietzschean. It is, rather, the product of a kind of ressentiment, 
the product of a condition of permanent alienation within the university. This is how he 
put it in 1982, in his inaugural lecture as the chair of sociology at the Collège de France 
(i.e., as the most powerful sociologist in France):
...sociology, the science of institutions and of the happy or unhappy 
relationship one may have with institutions, presupposes and produces a 
distance that is insurmountable and sometimes intolerable, and not only 
for the institution; it shakes you out of that state of innocence which 
enables you to fulfil the expectations of the institutions with a sense of 
satisfaction. (1990a:177)
Once again we are being told that the sociological vocation is not a pure one. It does not 
bring a comforting relaxation, as Bruno Latour (2010) would like. It is precisely through 
discovering the gap between social justice and one’s ‘place’ in society that we become 
good sociologists. If we bracket the overtones of Zen Buddhist detachment, Leonard 
Cohen’s line from his song ‘Anthem’ expresses this well: ‘There is a crack, a crack in 
everything. That’s how the light gets in.’
I have suggested that Bourdieu recommends himself as the model kind of scholar, 
a brilliant outsider with ample resentment for the establishment and a vested emotional 
interest in exposing the underlying principles of the social order. Alasdair MacIntyre, on 
the other hand, holds up Thomas Aquinas as an intellectual exemplar. Instead of ‘critical 
reflexivity,’ MacIntyre champions “dialectical and confessional accountability” 
(1990:201), and argues that it was Aquinas that most successfully combined the dialectics 
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of Plato and Aristotle with the Christian confessional mode of St. Augustine.
How to distinguish between accountability and reflexivity? It may be useful to 
remember the difference in practical research between MacIntyre and Bourdieu. While 
Bourdieu engaged in a variety of empirical research projects involving living human 
subjects, MacIntyre’s empirical objects have always been either texts or the oral 
arguments of interlocutors encountered directly in the context of discussion and 
argumentation. Thus it may be that accountability implies, to begin with, accountability 
to those with whom one engages in argumentation. Since, for MacIntyre, there is no 
possibility of being neutral (e.g., MacIntyre 1990:117), the best practice is to try to 
develop arguments in a form that can incorporate the criticisms of other positions.
Bourdieu is more sanguine about objectivism. On the first page of the Outline, 
Bourdieu claims, not that scientific activity fails to be ‘neutral,’ but that it fails to 
recognize the practical privileges that make scientific activity possible and that constitute 
the detached and distanced viewpoint. This inclines the social scientist “...to a 
hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to reduce all social relations to 
communicative relations” (1977:1). For Bourdieu, objectivism produces an excess rather 
than a lack of neutrality, so the hermeneutical or communicative move that MacIntyre 
makes in emphasizing accountability as a procedure of argumentation, seems somewhat 
mistaken.
For Bourdieu, objective universals exist as the consecrated products of social 
fields, and “The legalization of symbolic capital confers on a perspective an absolute, 
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universal value, thus releasing it from a relativity which is by definition inherent in every 
point of view” (1990a:136). The problem, as you will recall, is just that neutrality, while 
possible, fundamentally misunderstands practice, precisely because it understands it from 
the outside. We discussed this earlier in the context of tempo and gift. Bourdieu, then, is 
rather more optimistic, and even relatively positivistic, in comparison to MacIntyre, at 
least on the question of objectivity, if not on the question of human nature. What is, for 
MacIntyre, usually a question of a misunderstanding stemming from a failure to declare a 
clear allegiance to a particular tradition of thought, to a particular set of presuppositions, 
and to clearly defined basic vocabulary, is for Bourdieu a question of developing critical 
reflexivity, less a voyage into the history of ideas to clarify meaning than an empirical 
inquiry into social positions and fields and a dialectical theory of practice.
MacIntyre’s view of accountability is not reducible to argumentation and 
communication, however, at least not in his later work. MacIntyre’s best response to 
Bourdieu on this count has been articulated more recently, in the Paul Carus lectures, 
published in 1999 as Dependent Rational Animals. Here MacIntyre argues that, in 
addition to the virtues of independent rationality, we need “the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence...Moreover both sets of virtues are needed in order to actualize the distinctive 
potentialities that are specific to the human rational animal” (1999:8–9). This ability to 
acknowledge (or to confess) dependence connects to MacIntyre’s idea that we always 
engage in or commit to a practice before fully understanding its character or telos. We 
begin to discover the ‘goods internal’ to a practice as we become embedded in the 
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practice. Engaging in a practice means engaging in a kind of permanent turning, even a 
conversion. Furthermore, a practice which commits one to dialectical and confessional 
accountability also commits one to the development of the virtue of care (or caritas), 
both for the practice and for those other creatures and beings in relation to which one has 
developed the ‘virtues of acknowledged dependence.’ According to MacIntyre, 
“acknowledgement by oneself of radical defect” is “a necessary condition for one’s 
reception of the virtues of faith, hope, and charity” (1990:140). There is no such 
‘confessional’ element in Bourdieu, who more often exhibits almost a martyr complex. 
His introduction to the republication of The Bachelor’s Ball, for instance, characterizes 
his “conversion of the gaze” (2008b:2) as rejecting the radical defect in Lévi-Strauss and 
structuralism rather than in himself, and heroically turning to the “immense and infinitely 
painstaking work” (3) of empirical observation. This conversion reconciles him to his 
provincial origins, rejecting the earlier rejection, as it were, and he praises his own 
dedication to “humble, obscure tasks” (5).
H. RESENTMENT & CARE
Thinking through these two projects—which try to reveal some of what society cannot 
permit itself to know—returns us to emotional-methodological dilemmas. Which type of 
scholarship do we choose, the perpetual outsider with a ‘cleft habitus’ and a chip on his 
shoulder, or the somewhat paternal insider, glowing with caritas? Is critical analysis of 
the social world best approached through resentment or through love? This returns us to 
our previous chapter, which already criticized the possibility of an ‘affective’ solution to 
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the problem of sociological vocation. Is it possible that we might reboot the question of 
methodological affect by pairing it with a concept of practice?
I have noted Bourdieu’s discussion of resentment, but it is not as if MacIntyre 
himself is a scholar entirely unmotivated by resentment. One need only examine various 
of his discussions of Scottish history and culture. His critique of Hume in Whose Justice? 
Which Rationality? involves a nationalistic attack on ‘Hume’s Anglicizing Subversion’ 
(1988:Chapter XV). But does he go so far as to say, as Bourdieu does, that a long-abiding 
resentment for the unconscious enjoyment of privilege that characterizes dominant 
groups is essential for science? No.
Is this difference, as MacIntyre would have it, a difference regarding the nature of 
the will? We might imagine MacIntyre’s model this way: an undeveloped and thwarted 
will experiences the natural passion or emotion of resentment—as the consequence of a 
traumatic entry into social life, the natural consequence of our lack of a language to 
interpret and store experiences—but love, as a social product, represents a conversion or 
maturation of the will, not merely an evolutionary development, but the emergence of a 
telos, a conscious intention (i.e., in Freud’s terms: ‘where id was, there ego shall be’). Let 
us examine the tension in the context of the pursuit of truth. Is the truth something that 
we can love? Can the truth, in itself, become the object of desire? Or is there always 
some more fundamental resentment underlying that surface motive, a resentment 
indicating that the deeper meaning of the will to truth is a will to triumph over an enemy 
or to distinguish oneself from a rival? Perhaps the new form of Max Weber’s question 
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concerning ‘science as a vocation,’ is whether we are suited or unsuited to science by our 
particular daimon, by what haunts us, by the trauma and humiliation that makes us suited 
for finding out the (dirty) secrets of the social world, or whether the desire for truth is a 
kind of telos of its own. Are all called, or only some? Who, if anyone, does the truth set 
free? Is this a question, as it most certainly was for Max Weber, of grace? Bourdieu’s 
term here is oblat miraculé, referring to one whose complete commitment to the 
academic field “gives him a ‘miraculous’ social mobility” (2008a:5, translator’s note). On 
this note, Margaret Frye’s recent article, ostensibly a critique of rational choice theory 
(and celebrated at the 2012 ASA meetings, where it won several awards), “Bright Futures 
in Malawi’s New Dawn: Educational Aspirations as Assertions of Identity” (2012) opens 
up questions of success and temporality by shifting focus from strategic future-oriented 
questions to the ‘moral claim’ quality of statements about imagined futures.
My conclusion remains the same as in the last chapter. I will not be able to answer 
those questions about the fundamental moods of sociology. But to deepen their 
implications, perhaps we should extend the earlier references to the difference between 
‘goods internal’ to practices and ‘fields of disinterest.’ While MacIntyre sees the need for 
certain substantive definitions of the good, and of liberty as an achievement through 
restraint (and through a relationship of tutelage),130 Bourdieu refers to relational issues. 
One can feel ‘at home’ in a social world with which one is fully identified and where one 
is fully accepted, but one can also be subjected to real and to ‘symbolic violence.’ These 
130  Rancière (2012) uses the notion of the ‘ignorant master’ to criticize Bourdieu’s approach to inequality 
in education as a self-fulfilling prophecy. True political transformation begins by asserting equality.
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are relational questions, suggesting that the good may just mean harmonizing social 
relations and maximizing liberty. In fact, Bourdieu sometimes seems content with the 
project of eliminating constraint (as domination). He seems to advocate this with respect 
to scientific reason, though the reader will quickly note the tension between ‘conflictual 
cooperation’ and ‘total independence of constraints’:
Once it has repudiated the illusory quest for an ontological 
foundation...the collective work of critical reflexivity should enable 
scientific reason to control itself ever more closely, in and through 
conflictual cooperation and mutual critique, and so to move progressively 
towards total independence of constraints and contingencies, a kind of 
focus imaginarius, to which the rationalist conviction aspires and by 
which it is measured. (Bourdieu 2000:121–122)
While MacIntyre works with an Augustinian conception of a will capable of and 
requiring conversion, Bourdieu’s project of transparency, and critical reflexivity in the 
context of universalizing intellectual stand-offs, appears as the project of dismantling the 
material and symbolic violence of meritocratic ideology rather than being internally 
converted to a disciplinary practice. In what sense, for Bourdieu, could society or the 
individual be in need of redemptive conversion? Only in a relational, and not a 
substantive sense referring to a kind of spiritual substance. Bourdieu rejected any 
‘spiritualization’ of society. Thus, his conception of the conscience collective is rather 
non-Durkheimian, and almost entirely negative (Robbins 2002:314)—he usually calls it 
the ‘social unconscious,’ actually. Bourdieu associates consciousness with what can be 
reflexively understood, not with some socio-spiritual substance. Nevertheless, while 
Bourdieu always saw the sociologist’s task as one of critique, especially self-critique, the 
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later writings contain an increasing number of remarks like the following: “I would like 
writers, artists, philosophers and scientists to be able to make their voices heard directly 
in all the areas of public life in which they are competent...It would be a good thing if the 
‘creators’ could fulfil their function of public service and sometimes of public 
salvation...a higher degree of universalization” (1998b:9).
Reflexivity may be demanded of someone in a particular field, one with a 
universalistic test (a field not unlike Habermas’s ‘ideal speech situation’). It is not 
something cultivated by an isolated reasoner, as in the Cartesian-Kantian scholastic 
fallacy. This scholastic notion of an inward turning is still too Christian for Bourdieu, for 
whom the really significant determinants of the trajectory of thought are the early 
experiences of social position and place. For Bourdieu, those with the most highly 
developed capacity for reflexivity and critical thought—for projects truly subversive to 
scholasticism—are those, like himself, who had early experiences of marginalization in 
working-class or lower middle-class contexts, but then went on to academic careers, 
while remaining deeply ambivalent about and critical of scholastic privilege. Their 
intellectual virtues of critical reflexivity, humility, and honesty are the consequence of 
their positions and their position-takings in the social field rather than of a kind of 
Aristotelian ‘flourishing.’ These three virtues structure Bourdieu’s autobiographical 
account of the ideal scholar: 1) In general terms Bourdieu defines and endorses critical 
reflexivity as the ability to “call the intellectual world into question” (2008a:23); 2) his 
preference for Georges Canguilhem over Sartre and Raymond Aron is framed in terms of 
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Canguilhem’s relative humility (26–30) as opposed to the self-important ‘total 
intellectual’; 3) these two virtues of critique and humility are unified in the virtue of 
honesty. Here I take Bourdieu’s remark about Raymond Aron, that “It was my principle 
never to lie to him” (34) as a key moment in Bourdieu’s presentation of himself as the 
ideal scholar. Following Marx, Bourdieu would seem to fundamentally reject Aristotle’s 
notion of phronesis—at least if it is just that form of practical reason which allows one to 
cope with one’s position as a ‘free man’ in Greek society—for its un-reflexive basis in a 
slave society. Some of Bourdieu’s comments on friendship are instructive in this regard 
because of the contrast they form with Aristotle. As mentioned earlier, for Bourdieu, an 
intellectual friendship is formed by what he calls an ‘homologous affinity,’ or a ‘shared 
habitus.’ Rather than a shared conception of and striving for the good, a friend may just 
as well be one with shared resentments (and friends with shared resentments of scholastic 
privilege make better and more scientific critical thinkers).
For Bourdieu, then, the notion of the ‘good will’ is not a question of an internal 
conversion, it is a question of the state of the field. One can be largely driven by 
resentment, and he admitted to being so, but resentment does not necessarily undermine 
the objectivity of the science. All of this tends to reduce practices to ‘goods of 
effectiveness’ rather than ‘goods of excellence,’ but Bourdieu encourages his readers not 
to be discouraged at this appearance of things. In Practical Reason, Bourdieu quotes La 
Rochefoucauld’s adage that ‘hypocrisy is the homage paid by vice to virtue,’ suggesting 
that it is really a matter of perspective: “we can focus on the negative and universally 
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stigmatized concept of hypocrisy, or in a more realistic manner, on the homage to virtue, 
universally recognized as a positive concept” (1998a:143).131
How might MacIntyre respond? Bourdieu seems to side with the reading of 
practical rationality whose early exemplar is Thucydides, and whose early modern 
representatives are Machiavelli and Hobbes; it is to argue that there are only goods of 
efficiency; and it is, for MacIntyre, not a question of being able to refute this tradition 
outright, but a matter of committing oneself to responding to this tradition from within 
another tradition, another community, and under conditions of mutual accountability 
(1990:200–201), a situation which MacIntyre has adumbrated in his various discussions 
of Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, and others. Accountability is crucial, for it means, for 
MacIntyre, a conversation carried out in the context of shared beliefs that make possible 
shared practices. The accountability implied involves a contrast between those 
interactions “in which in one way or another truth is at stake and those governed only by 
standards of rhetorical effectiveness” (200). Here the contrast between a discursive 
community and a Bourdieusian field appear at first to be rather profound. Indeed, 
Bourdieu’s tendency toward scientism appears to put him in what MacIntyre calls the 
‘Encyclopaedic’ tradition. See, for example, Bourdieu’s distinction between scientific 
analysis of art and the analysis of either amateurs or specialists in art interpretation:
The simple placing which the amateur or specialist [in art interpretation] 
performs when he undertakes attribution has nothing in common with the 
genuinely scientific intention of grasping the work’s immanent reason and 
raison d’etre by reconstructing the perceived situation, the subjectively 
131  Shklar (1984) makes a similar argument about hypocrisy, but Bourdieu’s notion of reflexivity suggests 
that he sees cruelty and hypocrisy as more deeply intertwined than Shklar does.
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experienced problematic, which is nothing other than the space of the 
positions and self-positionings constituting the field and within which the 
artistic intention of the artist in question has defined itself, generally by 
opposition. (Bourdieu 1984:52)
Indeed, if we take this claim to be scientistic, such a placement moves Bourdieu back 
toward neo-Marxism. On this reading, his concepts of field and ‘cleft habitus’ are 
attempts to solve some of Marx’s problems concerning the special insights of the 
scientist, and they provide a commentary on the motive behind Marx’s use of the dictum 
Dixi et salvavi animam meam (‘I have spoken and saved my soul’) (Marx 1972:398).
I. GIVING AN ACCOUNT OF ONESELF: UNIVERSITIES AS SITES OF 
EXEMPLARY CONFLICT
To bring Bourdieu and MacIntyre into conversation on the question of the fundamental 
moods of thought, it helps to ask whether Bourdieu does indeed fit within what 
MacIntyre calls the ‘Encyclopaedic’ tradition, or within what MacIntyre considers to be 
Nietzschean genealogy. At stake, here, is the extent to which Bourdieu’s own practice 
successfully undermines the social and self-deception generated by practices, more 
generally (as Bourdieu defines them). While an ‘encyclopaedist’ tries to bracket their own 
biases, the genealogist necessarily includes themselves, but in a complicated way. In the 
last chapters of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, MacIntyre tightens the strings of 
his critique of genealogy, arguing that proponents of Nietzschean genealogy are led by 
their critique of the unified subject to attempt to elude the question of answerability. 132 If 
the notion of a unified subject is the founding myth of Western metaphysics, the 
genealogist must refuse even the late existentialist project of authenticity, of constructing 
132  Nietzsche accuses the ‘slave moralist’ of nihilism, but equivocates over the nature of his own nihilism.
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the ‘unity of a life.’ According to MacIntyre, “the genealogist faces grave difficulties in 
constructing a narrative of his or her past which would allow any acknowledgement in 
that past of a failure, let alone a guilty failure, which is also the failure of the same still-
present self” (1990:213). MacIntyre argues this first in the case of Paul de Man and the 
revelation that, during 1940 and 1941, he had published articles “consonant with and 
supportive of Nazi and anti-Semitic ideology” (211). The scandal, if there was one, was 
not just that de Man had a Nazi past, but that he had kept silent about it. His defenders—
here MacIntyre mentions disciples Christopher Norris and Geoffrey Hartman—argued 
that de Man’s later writings amounted to an implicit confession and critique of his earlier 
Nazi sympathizing. MacIntyre argues that “post-Nietzschean genealogy” contains an 
internal tension. There is no need to vindicate de Man, because there is no unified 
subject. There is nothing to confess, since the post-war de Man is no longer the same 
person, and has no commitment to the ‘unity of a life,’ since such a unity is always an 
illusion, in any case. MacIntyre then turns to Foucault, arguing that Foucault also resists 
accountability. As Foucault famously wrote, “I am no doubt not the only one who writes 
in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: 
leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare 
us their morality when we write” (1972:17).
Habermas speaks of the same set of writers as MacIntyre under the label “The 
radical critique of reason.” According to Habermas “these discourses can and want to 
give no account of their own position” (1990a:336). Like MacIntyre, Habermas argues 
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that this has significant effects on the institutionalized practices of the university, for 
“such discourses unsettle the institutionalized standards of fallibilism” (337).
Bourdieu emphasizes his distance from ‘total intellectuals,’ like Jean-Paul Sartre, 
with their unreflexive meritocratic and self-congratulatory account of their own place on 
the academic and public stage. Bourdieu’s own Sketch for a Self-Analysis, however, 
contains not a single word of self-critique. Indeed, he goes from strength to strength, 
elaborating an autobiography that might as well be his own Ecce Homo, answering 
Nietzsche’s questions: his amazement at his own wisdom, his cleverness, his good books, 
his destiny (Nietzsche 2006). Bourdieu claims that, in his critical and reflexive sociology 
“...all the propositions that this science enunciates can and must be applied to the subject 
who practises this science” (1990:177). He diverges, however, from the critical sociology 
of the Frankfurt School, at least that of Adorno, in attributing “critical distance” to the 
“objectifying” process of science (177). Bourdieu’s approach contains a residually 
positivistic emphasis on ‘objectifying,’ as opposed to Adorno’s ‘priority of the object,’ 
which criticizes the reification of the concept more emphatically. Bourdieu’s logic of the 
‘cleft habitus’ works perfectly, it turns out, as a justification for his occupation of the 
most prestigious and powerful chair of sociology in France. He argues that the corrupt 
and unconscious practices by which social inequality is reproduced can only be displaced 
by a new hegemony. This turns out to be his own scholarship. Here the ‘sketch for a self-
analysis’ teeters toward a just-so story.
According to MacIntyre, however, seeing practices as necessarily driven to 
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hegemony has an ironic result: the radical Nietzschean who dominates a field finds 
herself occupying the ‘chair’ of power, and reproducing the institutional ‘relations of 
ruling.’ There are background reasons for this. According to MacIntyre, “what forced 
fundamentally dissident thinkers, such as Foucault, into the conformism of the university 
was in fact the absence of any independent forums for debate” (1990:221). In the absence 
of these fora, university communities need to aim to fit the following description:
...universities are places where conceptions of and standards of rational 
justification are elaborated, put to work in the detailed practices of 
enquiry, and themselves rationally evaluated, so that only from the 
university can the wider society learn how to conduct its own debates, 
practical or theoretical, in a rationally defensible way. (1990:222) 
This position is only defensible, however, “when and insofar as the university is a place 
where rival and antagonistic views of rational justification...are afforded the opportunity 
both to develop their own enquiries, in practice and in the articulation of the theory of 
that practice, and to conduct their intellectual and moral warfare” (222). Here MacIntyre 
turns to Durkheim’s position, that the academy should stand as society’s model.
How are we to adjudicate, here? According to the trajectory of this dissertation, 
we are aiming at a position somewhere between Bourdieu’s endorsement of agonism and 
hegemony, and MacIntyre’s more nostalgic notion of pluralistic debate. Let’s return to the 
illustration used at the beginning of this chapter, the death of a cyclist in Toronto. Does 
practice theory, whether Bourdieu’s or MacIntyre’s, help us to understand this situation?
J. BREAKING THE CYCLE?: PRACTICAL ACCOUNTS OF PRACTICES
A quick and dirty (to use computer programmer jargon, another interesting practice) 
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Bourdieu-style analysis of Darcy Allen Sheppard’s death would look to define the 
relevant practices and fields of practice (e.g., politics, media, driving, cycling, couriers, 
drinking). Bourdieu would make assessments of cultural, economic, social, and symbolic 
capital. Skeptical of those who would make too easy claims about the virtues of cycling 
as an end in itself, Bourdieu would likely deploy this claim, cited earlier, to disrupt the 
simplistic narrative of cyclist good/driver bad:
Those who possess the means of symbolically appropriating cultural 
goods...like to see symbolic appropriation—the only legitimate sort, in 
their view—as a kind of mystical participation in a common good of 
which each person has a share and which every person has entirely, as a 
paradoxical appropriation, excluding privilege and monopoly, unlike 
material appropriation, which asserts real exclusivity and therefore 
exclusion. (1984:227–228)
In this case, Bourdieu would target those denizens of downtown Toronto for whom 
(certain styles of) cycling are available because of their physical and social location, 
because of their habitus, and for whom it is an activity that may be symbolically 
displayed to appreciative audiences (e.g., friends, acquaintances at hipster coffee shops, 
bike cooperatives, etc.), in short, those he tended to call ‘dominated fractions of the 
dominant class,’ those with a high level of cultural capital and lower levels of economic 
capital (e.g., artists and academics, the notorious ‘creative class’). The Greater Toronto 
Area (GTA), as recent political controversies have illustrated, is divided in complex 
ways, ways that would be described, by a related approach, as ‘intersectional’ (cf. Hill 
Collins 2000). For this reason, activities like cycling and driving are, for one thing, highly 
differentiated in economic, racial, cultural, and social terms. A highly commodified 
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object, the bicycle is also a symbol that may be deployed in a variety of inclusive and 
exclusive ways and used as a signal and an object of both solidarity and distinction. Anti-
SUV sentiments expressed by ‘environmentally conscious’ cyclists could be critically 
read, by a critical follower of Bourdieu, as the recoded return, for example, of repressed 
racism, or of repressed fat-phobia, which could be focused, for awhile, and ironically, on 
now ex-mayor Rob Ford, widely vilified by some, partly on the basis of his ‘shady’ (in 
reputation and in skin-colour) associates, but partly also by using his physical 
appearance, fitness, and driving habits as signs of his moral turpitude.
Bourdieu would doubtless be even more critical of the Bryant narrative and 
performance. The law is symbolically available to all. But in reality? And narrative? How 
is it the case that Bryant, on the basis of a claimed commonality (problem drinking), can 
publish a book that frames his drinking as ‘a true story of addiction, tragedy, and hope’ 
(2012), in which Sheppard becomes a character, a foil, a necessary ‘other,’ in Bryant’s 
own sketch of a self socio-analysis? In short, practices remain, for the most part, means 
of reproducing social inequalities, regardless of the high ideals that ostensibly guide 
them. Practices must be embedded in fields with an institutionalized ‘interest in 
disinterest’ if they are to do something else.
How about MacIntyre? Seemingly more optimistic about practices as such, he is no 
less concerned than Bourdieu with a practice’s institutional conditions of possibility. One 
simple question, of course, might be: how do these two feel about bike lanes? With 
respect to the city, MacIntyre would probably focus, it seems to me, on the public debates 
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(or lack thereof) rather than on the practices themselves. What are the conditions under 
which rival and antagonistic views can develop and express their positions, whether 
about cycling, or driving, or drinking, or due legal process, or the various legacies of 
colonization? It may be the case that MacIntyre and Bourdieu are interested in precisely 
the same processes of commodification and colonization which appear to make law, 
cycling, driving, drinking, and journalism into agonistic sites of distinction rather than 
practices characterized by ‘goods internal’ to them.
There is no space, here, to engage with the already massive sociological literature 
on traffic (e.g., Conley and McLaren, eds. 2009), space (e.g., Lefebvre 1991), and 
mobility (e.g., Urry 2007), but a short extension of my commentary on cycling is in order. 
All I can do, here, is to pedal quickly through a couple of attempts to engage ongoing 
conflicts between cars, pedestrians, and cyclists. First, Phil Jones writes, in “Performing 
the City: A Body and a Bicycle Take on Birmingham, UK” (2005), that, in England, 
“Cycling, ‘sustainable’ but marginalized, sits between the two predominant means of 
moving around cities—by motorized vehicle and on foot as a pedestrian” (816). 
‘Sustainable’ but marginal, the cyclist is officially legitimated in ways that skateboarding, 
for instance, is not, for “Whereas the skater is easily identified as a capitalistically 
disruptive figure, the cyclist can, by dint of simply getting back on to the road, conceal 
their unruly behaviour behind a facade of sustainable transport respectability” (821). 
Cycling happens ‘in between’ and across a variety of partly-structured spaces, almost 
none of which have been constructed with a view to cyclists as the primary users or 
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rights-holders. Jones ‘performs’ an autoethnography of being a commuting cyclist in 
Birmingham, affecting and being affected by his performance. His article highlights the 
tension between physically structured spaces, the sediment of urban histories, the 
experiences of traversing these spaces, and the now ubiquitous moral ideal, posing as a 
natural imperative, of sustainability. For the moment, cycling rolls in the gap. On the one 
hand, the bicycle is “a privileged mode of transport, in part because of its having been 
loaded with labels such as ‘sustainable’ and ‘healthy’” (827) but also because it can go 
places that are inaccessible to both cars and pedestrians. On the other hand, since the state 
of physical infrastructure and practices of mobility makes cycling dangerous, it is only 
accessible to those able, based on personal abilities, comfort levels, and personal 
independence, to engage in it. Jones writes that things would be different “...if I had 
family commitments. I would know that if my limits were transgressed—crushed beneath 
the wheels of a bus, for example—my being affected would spread out beyond the limits 
of my own body, to those that I love. That I would consider unacceptable” (827). Jones 
elucidates, here, the tension between individual enjoyment of his “politely deviant status” 
(828) and structural realities that keep sustainability, whether in transportation or 
elsewhere, out of reach.
Jones points out the affective tension between his own enjoyment and broader 
social realities. Nicholas Scott, an emerging Canadian scholar of cycling and 
sustainability, whose expressed goal in his article on the rise of automobile dominance in 
Ottawa, Canada’s capital, is a “critical politics of mobility” (2013:398), tends, in his 
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analysis, to fold individual pleasures of mobility into the broad structural realities of 
inequality and the limits of a capitalist modernity organized around facilitating 
commodity flows. Scott mediates this structural perspective with a ‘critical’ concept of 
neighbourhood. He turns away from the “ideological functions” (399) of ‘neighbourhood 
effects’ approaches that tend to confine their focus to poor slums and to responsibilize the 
‘local community,’ to the concept of ‘neighbourhoods of mobility,’ described as 
“constellations of social and technical elements that systematically facilitate particular 
ways of being mobile in the city” (399). When we perceive neighbourhoods in terms of 
the forms of mobility that they constrain and enable, the interactions and experiences that 
they support or prevent, we can begin to see how spaces produce different kinds of 
‘actants’ (to use Latourian terminology), and different ways of being together that exceed 
current regimes of mobility. What we need, Scott argues, are ways of “reassembling the 
city” such that our forms of mobility can open to “other possible ways of living together” 
(403). Scott concludes with the normative claim that “Given the sustained temporal 
manner in which automobility has dominated city space, the city needs to open 
neighborhoods of mobility onto a ‘radical outside,’ onto the point at which, according to 
the current model, chaos ensues” (407). Where Jones cautiously turns back, suggesting 
that family responsibilities mean that only some can (or should) engage the risky margins 
of the current regimes of mobility, Scott attempts to gesture emphatically towards the 
future, urging us to break open the currently constraining structures.
These two articles reframe questions of urban mobility in ways that can sharpen our 
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thoughts on practice. Jones suggests that practices, while being enjoyable for their own 
sake—and not merely exercises in distinction—may only be available to some. Only 
some can cycle in the city. Only some are equipped, psychologically and physically, for 
the affective challenges, pleasures, and pains, of cycling in the automobile city. The thrill 
of careening down a steep paved street, swerving potholes, would appear to exceed any 
merely comparative calculus, any invidious social distinction. Perhaps these distinctions 
come before, in the preparations one makes for an adventure. Perhaps they come after, in 
recounting reckless rides in order to gain a reputation for daring. But in the ride itself? 
This reminder of the affective bodily experiences available through particularly embodied 
practices suggests something substantive, a ‘good internal’ to the practice, and at the 
same time, a certain liberating excess. But this liberating excess can hardly become an 
ethical practice around which the good of an entire society is built, can it? Practices 
reproduce as often as they repair the splits between individual experiences and social 
effects, private and public vices and benefits. You only live once (YOLO), was the cry, a 
few years ago, of populist teen existentialism, a slogan it is tempting to call puerile, but 
for the awkward reflexivity about distinction that a reading of Bourdieu can engender. 
Whatever ‘radical outside’ one turns toward, the turning remains a kind of relational 
position-taking, a potentially political act of solidarity, or an individually distinguishing 
act. The concept of practice turns us back toward our residual category, answerability.
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CODA: QUESTIONING ANSWERABILITY
Now the boy Samuel was ministering to the LORD under Eli. And the word of the LORD 
was rare in those days; there was no frequent vision. 
At that time Eli, whose eyesight had begun to grow dim, so that he could not 
see, was lying down in his own place; the lamp of God had not yet gone out, and Samuel 
was lying down within the temple of the LORD, where the ark of God was. Then the LORD 
called, “Samuel! Samuel!” and he said, “Here I am!” and ran to Eli, and said, “Here I am, 
for you called me.” But he said, “I did not call; lie down again.” So he went and lay 
down. And the LORD called again, “Samuel!” and Samuel arose and went to Eli, and said, 
“Here I am, for you called me.” But he said, “I did not call, my son; lie down 
again.” Now Samuel did not yet know the LORD, and the word of the LORD had not yet 
been revealed to him. And the LORD called Samuel again the third time. And he arose and 
went to Eli, and said, “Here I am, for you called me.” Then Eli perceived that the LORD 
was calling the boy. Therefore Eli said to Samuel, “Go, lie down; and if he calls you, you 
shall say, ‘Speak, LORD, for thy servant hears.’” So Samuel went and lay down in his 
place.
And the LORD came and stood forth, calling as at other times, “Samuel! 
Samuel!” And Samuel said, “Speak, for thy servant hears.” Then the LORD said to 
Samuel, “Behold, I am about to do a thing in Israel, at which the two ears of every one 
that hears it will tingle. On that day I will fulfil against Eli all that I have spoken 
concerning his house, from beginning to end. And I tell him that I am about to punish his 
house for ever, for the iniquity which he knew, because his sons were blaspheming God, 
and he did not restrain them. Therefore I swear to the house of Eli that the iniquity of 
Eli’s house shall not be expiated by sacrifice or offering for ever.” 
Samuel lay until morning; then he opened the doors of the house of the LORD. 
And Samuel was afraid to tell the vision to Eli. But Eli called Samuel and said, “Samuel, 
my son.” And he said, “Here I am.” And Eli said, “What was it that he told you? Do not 
hide it from me. May God do so to you and more also, if you hide anything from me of 
all that he told you.” So Samuel told him everything and hid nothing from him. And he 
said, “It is the LORD; let him do what seems good to him.” 
And Samuel grew, and the LORD was with him and let none of his words fall to 
the ground. And all Israel from Dan to Beer-sheba knew that Samuel was established as a 
prophet of the LORD. And the LORD appeared again at Shiloh, for the LORD revealed 
himself to Samuel at Shiloh by the word of the LORD. (1 Samuel 3)
Vocation is, of course, a kind of interpellation. And a kind of interpolation. Sometimes, 
when I rap my knuckles on my work table, I have an impulse (usually resisted) to check 
to see if someone is at the door. Is that a self-calling or a neurosis? The rich and layered 
story of Eli and Samuel reaffirms the residual qualities of the notion of answerability and 
the ambiguity of transferential relations. Was Samuel a prophet? Or an interloper set on 
displacing the sons of Eli? Did Eli endorse his own downfall? Who or what calls the 
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sociologist, who sometimes claims to ‘speak truth to power,’ like an Old Testament 
prophet, and sometimes claims to be providing ‘just the facts?’ The often uneven rhythms 
of call and response haunt sociological practice.
Just as much or as little as The Structure of Social Action, this was an “empirical 
work.” Indeed, if Parsons said it, so can I: this dissertation “...was an empirical study in 
the analysis of social thought. The writings treated are as truly documents as are manorial 
court rolls of the Middle Ages” (Parsons 1968:vii). Unfortunately for me, I suppose, I 
have also proven the truth of Parsons’ claim that “It is possible to have scattered and 
unintegrated bits of knowledge, and to assent to the ‘truth’ of further scattered bits as they 
are called to one’s attention. This type of knowledge does not, however, constitute 
‘science’” (16). It must be obvious, by now, that my goal has not exactly been Parsons’ 
goal of “the carving out from residual categories of definite positively defined concepts 
and their verification in empirical investigation” (18).
The first two chapters of the dissertation dealt with Marx’s ‘strong’ program in the 
sociology of morality. I argued that Marx subordinates morality to political economy, to 
relations of production and social class divisions. Class-based morality lacks content and 
renders formal and class-based judgements. Science can overcome this partiality, 
subordinating the good to the true. Marx judges bourgeois morality to be hypocrisy. 
Furthermore, Marx rejected classical moral philosophy in favour of revolutionizing 
practice. Marx advocated attention to the social history of creative production over the 
abstract dialectics of recognition or the bourgeois moral imagination of the ‘impartial 
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spectator.’ This redirection derives from the influence of Rousseau’s notion of pity as an 
instinctive response to visible suffering, not something based in the imagination. For 
Marx, bourgeois morality suppresses pity.
Marx prizes intellectual virtues over moral ones. He views the public statement of 
the truth to be both a political act and an organizational call for revolution in the relations 
of production. Intellectual virtue becomes his de facto vocation in the absence of an 
explicitly self-justifying discourse. Chapter two discussed the tenability of this absence 
and the ambiguity of Marx’s position. Nietzsche’s critique of the will to truth suggests 
that Marx’s scientistic approach conceals a deformation of the will, isolating the root of 
social evils within a particular ‘class.’ And ‘speaking truth to power,’ sometimes makes 
the best contribution to the commodification of ‘truth’ and to bourgeois rather than 
proletarian revolution.
Chapter three presented Durkheim’s approach to morality, which explicitly 
defended sociology as a profession and positioned sociology as able to interpret but not 
to generate morality. In modern morality, Durkheim pointed to nationalism and the cult 
of the individual mediated through forms of nationalism. He emphasized the growing 
obligation to charity, and an increasingly dualistic and divided self. I argued that 
Durkheim’s notion of collective representation as societal self-representation is 
inadequate, and suggested the importance of exploring approaches that push sociality 
beyond the bounds of human to human relations.
Durkheim’s dualism conceives of moral relations in terms of the tension between 
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individual physical impulses and societal demands. His notion of conscience remains tied 
to the idea of a collectivity that is identical with itself in substance and meaning, and to 
the idea that sociologists can definitively interpret this meaning. On this point, however, 
Durkheim’s sociology of morality is only as good as his own understanding of the 
relationship between the social and the political.
Chapter four criticized Weber’s notion of value-free but value-relevant sociology 
through a discussion of his concept of charisma. While a version of the ‘value-
neutral’/‘value-relevant’ distinction remains useful, Weber’s attempt to deal with 
charisma as a non-moral concept misses a phenomenological distinction between 
democratic and non-democratic forms of authority. Using the work of Philip Rieff, I 
explored the possibility of thinking of charisma as an ambiguous but socially-conditioned 
form of moral relation.
Chapter Five turned to the ‘situation’ vs. ‘character’ debate carried out primarily 
in philosophy and social psychology. I argued that character and situation can be seen as 
complementary rather than competing, and that we should understand character as a sort 
of persistent residual category, a player in every script, scripts which take on, as Goffman 
suggests (1959), promissory qualities (i.e., minima moralia). In the contexts of acts and 
practices that amount to emancipatory reversals, we may give a positive moral evaluation 
to ‘weak’ character. The chapter closed with more references to answerability, this time as 
constituting a non-synthetic link in a negative dialectic between situation and character.
Chapter Six discussed the ‘affective turn.’ Does sociology have a fundamental 
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mood? To explore this question, I discussed three strands of social science research 1) 
American communitarianism; 2) studies in Moral Regulation; and 3) the Feminist ‘ethic 
of care’ approach. Each makes some fundamental assumptions about ‘mood.’ 
Communitarians try to adopt an attitude of ‘concern.’ Moral Regulation studies, by 
contrast, have used ‘anxiety,’ and even ‘moral panic’ to explain the actions of their 
research subjects while implying that they, the researchers, are resolute and clear-eyed. 
They emphasize the importance of not projecting anxieties about social changes onto 
socially marginalized groups and individuals. Finally, the ‘ethic of care’ approach 
advocates an ethic based on (women’s) experiences of connection, relation, and care. The 
‘ethic of care’ is presented as an empirical finding and a methodological ideal for feminist 
social science practice. I concluded the chapter by arguing that none of these approaches 
adequately resolves all the problems of doing sociology morally, but they provide a 
constellation that helps to make visible the aporetic quality of the sociology of morality. 
Once again, I argue that answerability constitutes a minimal criterion that can 
performatively structure a ‘weak’ program in the sociology of morality. Answerability, in 
this sense, complicates the notion of fundamental moods. It is a form without a specific 
affective content.
The last chapter addressed the ‘practice turn,’ taking on Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice, which he used as a tool in the hermeneutics of suspicion, unveiling the 
contributions of forms of practice to the reproduction of social inequalities. I contrasted 
Bourdieu with MacIntyre’s use of practice to critique instrumental action and to develop 
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a notion of human flourishing. Both approaches make significant claims regarding the 
role of practice as a basic building-block of morality. They also offer an opportunity to 
revisit questions concerning sociology as a vocation. I concluded, once again, that issues 
of vocation and morality remain open. Like the discussion of methodological affect, 
varieties of practice theory provide a constellation and a vision that opens up avenues of 
experience, expression, and reflexivity without supplying definitive moral interpretations 
of social life.
In Explaining the Normative, Stephen Turner critiques the notion of a (non-
sociological) normativity that could permanently exceed our capacity to simply describe 
human activity. Using the imagery of David and Goliath, he writes that “Claims about 
‘normativity’ seem to imply that this project can never be completed, that the project of 
desupernaturalization will always be defeated by the small stone of normativity” 
(2010:3). In this dissertation, by contrast, I have argued that our incapacity to ‘redeem’ 
the meaning of morality rationalistically speaks less to its a priori (extra-social) nature 
than to historical experiences that suggest that, instead of David defeating Goliath, 
morality goes on losing, persists as the loser. Benjamin famously interprets this failure as 
a messianic calling: “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the 
present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, 
we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a 
claim” (Benjamin 1968:254). There are worse definitions of answerability.
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